SOCIAL  CHANGE 


SOCIAL   CHANGE 

WITH  RESPECT  TO  CULTURE 
AND  ORIGINAL  NATURE 


BT 

WILLIAM  FIELDING  OGBURN 

Professor  of  Sociology  at  Columbia  University 


NEW  YORK    B.  W.  HUEBSCH,  Inc.    mcmxxiii 


COPYRIGHT,      Ig22,      BY 
B.     W.      HUEBSCH,    INC. 

PRINTED    IN    U.  S.   A. 
Second  printing,  March^  1923 


AGF.;C.  .vEPT.    -ff^i-'C.  BcJm. 


PREFACE 

The  vast  social  changes  which  characterize  our 
age  raise  to  a  plane  of  great  importance  for 
sociology  theories  of  social  evolution  and  prac- 
tical programmes.  Our  interest  in  the  pages 
which  follow  is  not  primarily  with  specific  pro- 
grammes but  rather  with  the  more  general  and 
perhaps  more  fundamental  aspects  of  social 
change,  which  are  not,  of  course,  without  bearing 
on  particular  issues.  The  treatment  deals  with 
inquiries  concerning  the  nature  of  these  changes, 
why  social  changes  occur,  why  certain  conditions 
apparently  resist  change,  how  culture  grows,  how 
civilization  has  come  to  be  what  it  is.  These 
questions  involve  considerations  of  the  nature 
and  frequency  of  inventions,  and  of  the  part  will 
power  and  human  nature  play  in  producing  these 
processes.  Are  these  changes  solely  in  man's 
social  heritage  or  are  they  changes  in  the  biolog- 
ical nature  of  man?  Could  the  great  progress 
that  has  taken  place  since  the  last  ice  age  have 
occurred  without  changes  in  mental  ability  and 
human  nature?     We  are  also  interested  in  inquir- 

[v] 


525!)u1 


ing  how  satisfactorily  human  nature  fares  amiSs't 
these  many  changes,  whether  the  inherent  nature 
of  man  is  better  adapted  to  the  new  conditions 
than  to  the  old,  and  how  serious  and  frequent  are 
the  social  maladjustments.  To  discuss  these 
questions  means  that  we  must  draw  somewhat  on 
researches  in  several  different  sciences,  namely, 
biology,  anthropology,  psychology  and  economics, 
as  well  as  on  prior  researches  in  sociology. 

The  reader  naturally  wishes  to  know  how  scien- 
tific consideration  of  such  broad  questions  can  be 
made.  The  most  widely  current  conception  of 
scientific  method  stresses  the  verification  by  data. 
That  the  collection  of  data  is  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance is  not  denied.  But  the  data  must  be  rele- 
vant to  some  inquiry;  there  must  be  something  to 
verify.  Therefore  the  construction  of  hypothe- 
ses must  take  its  place  along  with  the  accumula- 
tion of  evidence ;  the  random  collection  and  study 
of  facts  are  not  indeed  the  sole  factors  in  formu- 
lation of  theories.  There  is  always  something 
that  the  human  being  wants  to  know;  there  is 
thus  a  demand  for  knowledge  as  truly  as  there  is 
an  economic  demand.  Particularly  in  the  early 
development  of  a  science  the  demand  is  much 
greater  than  the  supply  of  material;  and  the  de- 
mand is  often  not  specific  and  over-simplified. 
Thus  the  inquiries  demanded  are  often  broad,  and 
later  it  is  found  that  they  break  down  into  a  series 

[vi] 


of  special  Inquiries.  In  the  early  history  of  a 
particular  science  there  is  therefore  a  wide  field 
to  be  surveyed  preliminary  to  the  verification  of 
special  hypotheses. 

The  analysis  of  complex  Issues  depends  some- 
what on  facts  and  the  more  complete  the  data  the 
better  will  be  the  analysis.  With  the  available 
facts  Incomplete,  however,  good  analysis  de- 
mands that  special  hypotheses  be  formulated  In 
such  a  way  that  they  can  be  later  proved  or  dis- 
proved by  facts.  The  merit  of  the  formulation 
depends  upon  a  number  of  factors,  especially  a 
certain  sagacity  for  the  significant  and  a  know- 
ledge of  the  trend  of  the  development  of  the 
sciences  as  well  as  the  popular  demand.  The 
greatest  source  of  error  In  valuations  and  In  con- 
clusions is  probably  prejudice  or  emotional  bias. 
In  the  absence  of  complete  data,  it  Is  thought  that 
the  most  effective  check  against  error  is  an  exam- 
ination of  the  sources  of  one's  own  prejudices. 

The  reader  may  be  annoyed  because  the  con- 
clusions which  follow  are  less  emphatic  than  he 
customarily  finds  and  because  a  good  many 
suppositions  and  probabilities  are  involved.  It 
seems  to  the  writer  that  while  such  Inconclusive- 
ness  as  Is  found  Is  regrettable,  yet  it  Is  Imposed  by 
the  magnitude  of  the  Inquiries  and  the  scarcity  of 
data.  Despite  these  limitations  there  is  value  In 
the    critical   estimates   of   the   various   theories. 

[vii] 


Suspended  judgment  is  quite  as  necessary  in  the 
development  of  knowledge  as  bold  theories,  and 
should  accompany  them. 

It  has  not  been  the  purpose,  particularly,  to  for- 
mulate a  treatment  of  the  sociological  questions 
which  would  show  them  in  their  proper  perspec- 
tive or  according  to  their  relative  importance  as 
a  set  of  general  sociological  principles.  The  work 
may  therefore  seem  somewhat  uneven.  The  em- 
phasis has  been  of  course,  to  a  certain  extent, 
according  to  importance,  but  it  has  also  been  the 
aim  to  present,  if  not  new  material  and  original 
considerations,  at  least  formulations  that  are  not 
widely  known  among  sociological  readers. 

It  has  unfortunately  not  been  possible  to  give 
credit  to  all  sources  for  the  information  and  con- 
clusions found  in  the  text.  No  one  indeed  ever 
honestly  knows  the  origin  of  his  ideas.  They 
come  as  a  result  of  a  body  of  information  gathered 
from  innumerable  sources  during  years  of  study. 
However,  to  many  readers  the  current  stock  of 
sociological  knowledge  will  be  familiar  and  it  will 
be  known  when  such  a  stock  of  information  has 
been  drawn  on. 

W.  F.  O. 


[riii] 


CONTENTS 
PART  I 

The  Social  Heritage  and  the  Original  Nature 

OF  Man 

PAOB 

1.  Social   Heritage 3 

2.  The  Original  Nature  of  Man    ...       7 

3.  The    Confusion    of    Culture    and    the 

Psychological  Nature  of  Man  .     .     11 

4.  Differentiation   of   Cultural  and  Psy- 

chological Factors 16 

5.  The    Overemphasis    of    the    Biological 

Factor 29 

6.  Some  Sociological  Concepts  Reexamined  .     40 

PART  n 

Social  Evolution 

1.  Conceptions  of  Social  Evolution       .     .     56 

2.  The  Biological  Factor  and  the  Cultural 

Factor  in  Social  Change  .     .     .     .61 

3.  Early    Records    of    Cultural    Develop- 

p  ment 66 

^  4.    The   Cumulative   Nature   of   Material 

Culture  and  its  Diversification       .     73 
5.     Inventions,    Mental   Ability   and   Cul- 
ture       80 


PA0X 

A  List  of  Some  Inventions  and  Discov- 
eries Made  Independently  by  Two 
or  More  Persons .90 

6.  The  Rate  of  Cultural  Growth  .     .     .103 

7.  Biological  Change  in  Man       .     .     .     .118 

8.  The  Correlation  of  Cultural  and  Bio- 

logical Change  ..,     .     .     ...     .     .^     .   130 

PART  III 
Cultural  Inertia  and  Conservatism 

1.  Various  Conceptions  of  the  Persistence 

OF  Culture     ......     ..     .   146 

2.  Survivals 150 

3.  The  Utility  of  Culture 154 

4.  Difficulties  of  Invention  and  of  Diffu- 

sion      ..........  159 

5.  Vested  Interests 166 

6.  The  Power  of  Tradition 170 

7.  Habit .  173 

8.  Social  Pressure 180 

9.  Forgetting  the  Unpleasant   .     .     .     .186 
10.  Psychological  Traits  and  Conservatism  190 

PART  IV 

Social  Maladjustments 

1.  The  Hypothesis  of  Cultural  Lag   .     .  200 

2.  Verification  by  the  Facts  of  Workmen*s 

Compensation  for  Accidents  .     .     .213 

3.  Illustrations:     Taxation,  Family,  Inter- 

national Relations,  Trade  Unions, 
Representative  Government,  Pueblo 
EhvELLERS 237 

4.  Reasons  for  Cultural  Lag      .     ,     ,     .  256 


5.  Correlation  between  Parts  of  Culture  265 

6.  Material  Culture  as  a  Source  of  Mod- 

ern Social  Changes     ..     .     .     .     .  268 

PART  V 

Adjustment  between  Human  Nature 
AND  Culture 

1.  The  Theory  of  the  Cave  Man  in  the 

Modern  City 284 

2.  Evidence  of  Lack  of  Adjustment:     Nerv- 

ousness AND  Insanity 312 

3.  Evidence  OF  Lack  OF  Adjustment:     Social 

Problems 331 

4.  Changing   Human   Nature  versus  Con- 

trolling Social  Evolution     .     .     .336 

5.  Suggestions  for  Better  Adjustments     .  346 


PART  I 

THE  SOCIAL  HERITAGE  AND  THE 
ORIGINAL  NATURE  OF  MAN 


SOCIAL  IHERITAGE 

When  a  child  is  born  into  the  world  he  is  born 
into  a  natural  environment,  a  heritage  of  nature. 
This  is  true  of  all  animals.  But  man  is  born  also 
into  a  social  heritage.  ^  This  is  a  heritage  that 
does  not  devolve  upon  a  particular  individual,  in 
the  manner  in  which  a  man  inherits  a  piece  of 
property.  This  heritage  is  social  and  is  common 
in  general  to  all  the  children  born  into  a  particu- 
lar group.  It  is  also  called  social  heritage  be- 
cause it  is  the  product  of  human  society,  the  re- 
sults of  many  social  achievements  during  the  ages 
that  man  has  been  on  the  earth.  It  differs  from  a 
heritage  from  nature  such  as  land,  water,  air, 
vegetation,  animals,  in  that  the  social  heritage  is 
the  product  of  human  social  endeavor  and  is  not 
the  gift  of  nature,  untouched  by  the  hand  of  man. 
A  group  of  new-born  infants  on  an  island  unin- 
habited by  man  would  be  without  a  social  heri- 
tage, although,  like  the  lower  animals,  they  would 

1  Graham  Wallas,  Our  Social  Heritage. 

[3] 


be  born  into  a  natural  environment.  The  social 
heritage  is  therefore  not  coextensive  with  envi- 
ronment. The  environment  of  man  may  be  said 
to  consist  of  two  parts:  natural  environment,  in- 
cluding air,  heat,  land,  water,  soil,  moisture,  vege- 
tation and  minerals ;  and  the  social  heritage,  con- 
sisting of  buildings,  technological  equipment,  so- 
cial organization,  language,  the  arts,  philoso- 
phies, science,  religions,  morals  and  customs. 

The  social  heritage  is  very  similar  in  meaning 
to  the  word,  culture,  as  used  by  sociologists 
and  anthropologists.  Culture  has  been  defined 
by  Tylor  as  "that  complex  whole  which  in- 
cludes knowledge,  belief,  art,  morals,  law,  cus- 
tom and  any  other  capabilities  and  habits  ac- 
quired by  man  as  a  member  of  society.''  ^  In 
this  definition  of  culture  the  use  of  material  ob- 
jects is  not  particularly  emphasized,  and  there  is 
a  tendency  to  think  of  culture  as  somewhat  re- 
moved from  material  objects.  However,  the  use 
of  material  things  is  a  very  important  part  of  the 
culture  of  any  people.  A  special  term,  material 
culture,  is  frequently  used,  giving  particular  em- 
phasis to  the  material  features  of  culture.  The 
word,  culture,  properly  includes,  as  does  the  term, 
social  heritage,  both  the  material  culture  and  also 
such  parts  of  culture  as  knowledge,  belief,  morals, 
law,   and  custom.     To  enumerate  in  detail  the 

2  E.  B.  Tylor,  Primitive  Culture,  Vol.  I,  p.  i, 

[4] 


variegated  subject  matter  of  culture  or  the  social 
heritage  would  include  a  very  long  list  indeed; 
such  an  enumeration  would  comprise  all  the 
diverse  parts  of  *'that  complex  whole"  of  which 
Tylor  speaks.  The  social  institutions  or  organ- 
izations are  very  important  parts  of  culture,  as 
truly  as  the  other  parts  that  have  been  specially 
mentioned. 

The  concept,  civilization,  is  very  closely  related 
in  meaning  to  the  concept,  culture.  Civilization 
is  used  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  To  some 
it  means  certain  finer,  choicer,  and  more  spiritual 
or  moral  achievements  of  mankind  and  is  thus 
contrasted  with  barbarism  or  savagery.  Civil- 
ization is  also  used  by  some  writers  to  refer  to  the 
conditions  of  society  where  it  is  organized  on  a 
civil  basis  as  contrasted  to  a  kinship  basis.  Civil- 
ization may  also  be  thought  of  as  *'that  complex 
whole"  in  its  recent  stage  of  development.  If 
culture  be  looked  at  historically  then  civilization 
is  the  late  phase  of  culture,  in  other  words,  modern 
culture. 

This  conception  has  been  further  described  by 
Herbert  Spencer  as  the  superorganic.  Spencer 
conceived  of  a  time  when  there  was  no  life  on  the 
earth;  all  was  inorganic.^  Then  followed  the 
inorganic  and  based  upon  it  came  the  organic,  and 
this  organic  developed  through  an  evolutionary 

®  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  I. 

Cs] 


process  to  its  highest  product,  man.  Finally, 
following  man  and  based  upon  man  came  the 
superorganic,  and  this  superorganic  is  also  devel- 
oping, he  said,  through  the  process  of  evolution. 
These  processes,  the  inorganic,  the  organic  and 
the  superorganic,  are  all  interrelated  and  based 
one  upon  the  other.  Very  probably  the  super- 
organic  began  with  man  or  shortly  after  man 
evolved.  It  may  be  that  some  of  the  higher  ani- 
mals have  something  like  the  beginnings  of  a 
superorganic.  For  instance,  certain  learned  ten- 
dencies may  be  passed  down  from  one  generation 
to  another  by  animals  as  a  sort  of  rudimentary 
social  heritage.  Thus  birds  may  learn  to  sing 
a  certain  note  from  another  bird.  The  question 
as  to  the  time  of  origin  of  the  superorganic,  or 
whether  the  higher  animals  other  than  man 
possess  it,  may  be  of  great  importance  for  some 
problems  of  science,  but  the  solution  of  this  ques- 
tion is  not  of  great  significance  for  the  purposes 
of  the  present  analysis.  The  terms,  the  super- 
organic,  social  heritage,  and  culture,  have  all  been 
used  interchangeably. 

The  social  heritage  is  different  in  different 
localities,  with  different  peoples  and  in  different 
eras.  It  also  grows  or  decays,  and  no  doubt 
there  are  definite  processes  describing  its  change. 
The  causes  of  this  variation  and  growth  are  of 

[6] 


greatest  interest,  but  our  first  purpose  mu_st  be  to 
differentiate  certain  concepts. 


m. 

THE  ORIGINAL  NATURE  OF  MAN 

Man  as  we  see  him  and  know  him  is  always  a 
product  of  two  factors,  heredity  and  environment. 
The  contribution  of  heredity  to  this  product  we 
call  original  nature.  The  fertilized  ovum  carries 
the  determinants  of  what  will  later  be  his  original 
nature.  The  germ  cell  develops  into  an  individ- 
ual with  definite  anatomical  and  physiological 
characteristics.  It  determines,  for  example, 
whether  the  individual  will  be  blond  or  brunette, 
male  or  female,  large-boned  or  small-boned.  But 
of  the  total  biological  equipment  developed  from 
the  fertilized  cell,  we  are  interested  primarily  in 
that  part  of  his  endowment  which  is  the  subject 
matter  of  the  study  of  psychology.  The  line  of 
demarcation  between  physiological  and  psycholog- 
ical behavior  is  not  clear-cut,  but  certain  parts  of 
the  body,  such  as  certain  glands  and  the  nervous 
,  system  appear  to  be  more  Intimately  and  consplcu- 
I  ously  related  to  the  behavior  found  in  social  phen- 
omena.    So  we  shall  use  the  term  original  nature 

[7] 


as   relating   to   man's   psychological   equipment. 

The  orginal  nature  of  man  is  described  In  detail 
in  the  textbooks  on  psychology,  but  these  descrip- 
tions are  too  long  for  summarization  here.  How- 
ever, In  general  the  contribution  of  heredity  to 
human  nature  is  an  organization  of  mechanisms 
that  responds  to  stimuli  In  part  or  as  a  whole 
along  specific  channels.  The  conception  of  orig- 
inal nature  Is  therefore  that  of  a  responding  mech- 
anism, living  matter  which  has  properties  of  activ- 
ity as  truly  as  gunpowder  has  the  property  of  ex- 
ploding or  hydrogen  and  oxygen  have  the  prop- 
erty of  uniting. 

The  mechanisms  active  In  reactions  are  sense 
organs,  nerve  centres,  motor  nerves,  dendrites, 
axons,  synapses,  cerebellum  and  cortex,  that,  with 
other  parts,  make  up  the  nervous  system  which  is 
connected  In  its  functioning  with  muscles,  blood, 
glandular  secretions,  etc.  The  behavior  of  these 
structures  is  quite  varied  and  complex.  But  classi- 
fications have  been  attempted  with  more  or  less 
success.  The  psychological  properties  of  man  are 
usually  spoken  of  as  reflexes,  instincts,  Impulses, 
sensations,  emotions  and  feelings.  The  varied 
reflexes  and  instinctive  tendencies  are  types  of 
responses  differing  In  degree.  The  more  simple, 
prompt  and  automatic  responses  are  called  re- 
flexes. The  Instincts  are  somewhat  more  com- 
plex,   involving    many    parts    of   the    organism. 

[8] 


The  instinctive  responses  are  also  more  delayed 
than  reflexes  Involving  a  series  of  bodily  prepar- 
ations and  adjustments.  Many  of  what  we  call 
motives  are  thought  to  spring  from  the  mechan- 
ism of  instincts.  The  drives  which  impel  the  be- 
havior of  man  and  the  activity  of  the  personality 
are  said  to  come  from  the  various  mechanisms, 
such  as  the  glands  and  nerves,  that  are  a  part  of 
the  machinery  of  Instinct.  The  wishes,  which 
have  sources,  too.  In  instinctive  equipment,  affect 
also  attention,  choice,  judgment,  habit  and 
thought.  While  the  capacities  of  man  to  behave 
are  varied  and  complex,  the  theory  Is  that  these 
reactions  can  be  analyzed  into  a  few  constituent 
elements,  very  much  as  matter  may  be  analyzed 
into  a  few  chemical  elements.  It  Is  the  combin- 
ations of  the  elements  that  give  the  variety. 

In  trying  to  see  social  phenomena  in  terms  of 
culture  and  original  nature.  It  Is  the  behavior  of 
man's  mechanism  as  a  whole  that  Is  particularly 
important,  rather  than  such  a  detailed  response 
as  the  reflex.  It  Is  rather  what  are  called  the 
motives  of  human  beings  that  are  Important  for 
social  behavior.  The  original  nature  of  man,  In 
addition  to  the  capacity  to  act,  has  the  capacity 
to  feel.  Emotion,  feeling  and  sensation  also  are 
a  part  of  the  equipment,  and  are  found  accom- 
panying various  responses.  Emotions  are  us- 
ually thought  of  as  part  of  that  response  which 

[9] 


we  have  called  instinctive.  The  behavior  seen  in 
social  life  can  be  fully  accounted  for,  no  doubt, 
only  by  the  whole  of  man's  psychological  nature, 
but,  it  is  thought,  emotion  and  instinct  are  quanti- 
tatively and  relatively  the  more  important  part 
of  this  equipment  for  social  behavior. 

Human  nature  is  generally  conceived  by  psy- 
chologists, fundamentally,  as  the  nature  of  behav- 
ing of  organized  living  matter  of  human  beings 
possessing  capacities  for  definite  reactions.  This 
has  not  always  been  the  view  of  human  nature. 
Primitive  man  thought  of  the  human  body  as  an- 
imated by  spirits.  Emotion,  feeling,  and  be- 
havior during  emotion  suggested  the  body  as  a 
dwelling  place  of  mysterious  spirits  which  sud- 
denly came  and  went.  Later  the  spirit  of  man 
was  thought  to  be  peculiar  to  man.  Human 
nature  was  greatly  different  from  animal  nature. 

The  work  of  such  evolutionists  as  Darwin,  Hux- 
ley and  Spencer  and  the  study  of  animal  psy- 
chology threw  a  flood  of  light  on  the  emotions 
and  instincts.  The  nature  of  man  was  seen  to  be 
very  much  like  the  nature  of  animals.  The  sur- 
vival value  of  instincts  was  appreciated.  The 
knowledge  of  the  origin  and  development  of  the 
emotions  took  away  much  of  the  mystery  sur- 
rounding these  qualities  of  man.  Researches  In 
physiology,  and  experimental  work  in  psycholog- 
ical laboratories  further  strengthened  the  idea  of 

[10] 


mechanism  and  response.  Animal  psychology 
and  physiological  psychology  have  added  greatly 
to  our  knowledge  of  human  nature,  yet  left  much 
of  our  curiosity  about  human  motives  and  human 
spirit  unsatisfied.  The  work  of  students  of  ab- 
normal behavior  as  seen  In  neuroses  and  psy- 
choses is  uncovering  a  wealth  of  material  on  dis- 
tinctly human  motives  and  desires.  From  all  of 
these  sources,  then,  we  are  learning  much  more 
about  our  original  nature  and  how  it  behaves. 


THE  CONFUSION  OF  CULTURE  AND  THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL  NATURE  OF  MAN 

The  presentation  just  made  of  the  two  factors, 
the  social  heritage  and  the  psychological  nature  of 
man,  indicates  quite  clearly  that  they  are  two 
distinct  and  separate  things.  In  fact,  to  the 
reader  they  doubtless  appear  so  distinct  that  he 
wonders  why  they  should  be  thus  differentiated, 
contrasted  and  compared.  They  seem  to  be  on 
two  different  levels,  one  the  organic  and  the  other 
the  superorganic.  The  objects  of  material  cul- 
ture are  certainly  clearly  differentiated  from 
biological  man.  A  house  will  never  be  confused 
with    a    human    being;    and    factories,    boats, 


machines,  vehicles,  clothing,  food,  are  clearly 
marked  off  from  muscles,  glands,  bones.  The 
material  objects  of  the  social  inheritance  are  dis- 
tinct from  the  material  organs  and  parts  of  man. 
But  the  social  heritage  is  not  wholly  made  up  of 
material  objects,  nor  does  the  nature  of  man  con- 
sist wholly  of  material  organs.  A  part  of  the 
social  heritage  consists  of  ways  of  doing  things, 
methods  of  making  material  objects,  ways  of  re- 
acting to  nature  and  material  culture,  and  habits 
of  organizing  socially.  So  also  a  part  of  the 
nature  of  man  consists  of  methods  of  reacting  to 
stimuli,  reflex  activities,  instinctive  drives,  habits, 
and  various  ways  of  behaving. 

It  is  the  activities  required  by  culture  and  the 
activities  occasioned  by  the  original  nature  of  man 
where  the  planes  of  the  superorganic  and  the  or- 
ganic meet.  Confusion  resides  where  these  two 
factors  affecting  behavior  occur  together,  and  it 
is  in  this  meeting  that  there  is  necessity  for  differ- 
entiation. The  communication  of  animals  by  in- 
stinctive and  untaught  sounds  may  be  called 
biological-activity,  whereas  the  communication  of 
men  by  a  spoken  language  may  be  called  a  cultural- 
biological-activity.  Language  is  a  feature  of  cul- 
ture, and  communication  by  language  could  not 
occur  without  a  culture.  It  is  possible  to  imagine 
at  least  the  material  objects  of  culture  as  existing 

[12] 


for  a  time  without  man  and  it  is  possible  though 
difficult  to  Imagine  men  existing  without  any 
culture,  but  actually  the  two  factors  occur  jointly. 
Some  individual  acts,  particularly  of  special 
organs,  such  as  breathing,  occur  often  without  In- 
fluence from  culture,  but  a  great  deal  of  individ- 
ual behavior  and  particularly  social  behavior 
takes  place  in  a  cultural  environment.  The  fac- 
tor, social  heritage,  and  the  factor,  the  biological 
nature  of  man,  make  a  resultant,  behavior  in 
culture.  From  the  point  of  view  of  analysis, 
it  is  a  case  of  a  third  variable  determined  by  the 
two  other  variables.  There  may  of  course  be 
still  other  variables,  as  for  instance,  climate, 
or  natural  environment.  But  for  the  present, 
the  analysis  concerns  the  two  variables,  the  psy- 
chological nature  of  man  and  culture. 

It  is  sometimes  desirable  to  know  how  much 
the  behavior  of  biological  man  In  a  cultural  en- 
vironment is  determined  by  activities  of  the  bio- 
logical equipment  and  how  much  It  Is  shaped  by 
culture.  It  has  been  said  that  civilization  is 
simply  a  veneer,  that  If  you  scratch  the  back  of  a 
civilized  man  you  discover  a  barbarian.  This  is 
simply  a  crude  way  of  stating  the  desirability  of 
keeping  clearly  in  mind  the  distinction  between  the 
cultural  and  the  biological.  The  traits  of  nations 
,and  peoples  differ,  and  one  wonders  how  much  the 

[13] 


differences  in  national  traits  are  due  to  the  var- 
iable, culture,  and  how  much  to  the  variable,  the 
biological  nature  of  man. 

The  psychologists  have  worked  for  many  years 
trying  to  segregate  from  the  environmental  In- 
fluences the  original  traits  of  human  nature.  The 
difficulty  of  distinguishing  original  nature  Is  in- 
dicated by  Woodworth  in  the  following  passage : 

John  Doe  is  a  strongly  built  man,  over  six  feet  high 
with  big  bones  and  muscles,  erect,  vigorous,  with  plenty 
of  color  in  his  face,  dark-haired,  blue-eyed,  clean-shaven 
with  a  scar  on  his  cheek,  broad  face  and  large  ears.  He 
is  easy-going,  even-tempered,  fond  of  children  and  also 
of  women,  rather  slangy  and  even  profane  in  his  talk, 
has  a  deep,  sonorous  voice  and  can  carry  the  bass  in  a 
chorus.  He  is  handy  with  tools,  can  drive  or  repair  an 
automobile,  is  a  fairly  good  carpet  salesman,  but  much 
prefers  out-of-door  work.  Rather  free  in  spending  his 
money,  he  has  never  run  into  debt  except  on  one 
occasion,  which  turned  out  badly  for  him.  Which  of 
these  traits  of  John  Doe  are  native  and  which  are 
acquired?  How  far  are  his  physical,  mental  and  moral 
traits  the  result  of  his  'original  nature'  and  hovi^  far  have 
they  been  ingrained  in  him  or  imposed  upon  him  by  his 
training  and  his  environment?* 

John  Doe's  big  muscles  are  partly  the  gift  of 

*  Robert  S.  Woodworth,  Psychology,  A  Study  of  Mental 
life,  p.  89. 

[14] 


his  Inherited  endowment,  but  part  of  the  size  of 
these  muscles  may  have  come  from  work  in  his 
youth  on  the  farm  or  In  the  blacksmith's  shop. 
While  it  is  difficult  to  measure  these  respective  in- 
fluences, we  know  each  influence  has  a  limit.  His 
fondness  for  children  is  due  in  part  to  an  inherited 
parental  instinct.  But  It  may  be  influenced  by 
experiences  in  his  own  childhood  or  with  his  own 
offspring. 

Psychologists  have  been  accustomed  to  using 
several  tests  for  determining  what  are  the  traits 
of  original  nature,  as  contrasted  with  traits  due 
to  culture,  training,  experience  or  habit.  The 
traits  that  the  individual  shows  at  birth  are 
very  likely  to  be  original  nature,  because 
of  the  limited  Influence  of  environment  on 
the  foetus.  The  newly  born  Infant  is  a  fruitful 
object  of  study  In  the  search  for  original 
nature.  But,  of  course,  just  as  all  traits 
are  not  developed  in  the  fertilized  ovum,  so  they 
are  not  all  developed  in  the  Infant.  Certain 
traits  and  features  do  not  appear  until 
later,  as,  for  Instance,  at  puberty.  The  longer  the 
period  of  development,  presumably  the  greater 
the  possibilities  of  environmental  influence.  An- 
other rough  criterion  of  original  as  contrasted 
with  acquired  traits  Is  the  learning  process. 
Traits  that  are  learned  show  a  large  cultural  In- 
fluence, while  many  that  are  not  learned  are  native. 

[15] 


Thus  a  bird  flies  without  being  taught  to  fly. 
Man  vocalizes  but  learns  to  talk.  Still  another 
test  that  is  sometimes  used  is  the  universality  of 
the  trait.  All  men  or  women  are  attracted  by 
the  opposite  sex;  we  say  the  sex  instincts  are  part 
of  the  original  nature.  Culture,  however,  is  uni- 
versal among  human  beings  also,  so  some  traits 
common  to  all  men  are  not  wholly  native  but 
partly  cultural,  as,  for  instance,  talking.  But 
when  traits  are  found  among  all  peoples  and  the 
higher  animals  as  well,  the  presumption  is  that 
they  are  inherited  and  part  of  original  nature. 
The  tests  for  original  nature  are  not,  however, 
always  definitive  and  infallible. 


4 


DIFFERENTIATION   OF   CULTURAL  AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL   FACTORS 

The  concept,  culture,  and  the  concept,  the  original 
nature  of  man,  have  been  set  forth  and  it  has  been 
claimed  that  there  is  a  confusion  of  these  two 
factors  in  social  behavior.  It  seems  desirable 
therefore  to  consider  some  instances  where  such 
confusion  exists,  and  we  shall  set  forth  several 
illustrations  and  at  least  one  in  some  detail.  Let 
us  consider  types  of  reaction  of  the  French  and  the 

[i6] 


Americans,  as  the  illustration  is  fairly  simple  in 
analysis.  For  instance,  Americans  consider  the 
French  as  thrifty  and  the  French  consider  Ameri- 
cans as  wasteful.  Such  an  observation  is  proba- 
bly true  despite  the  fact  that  the  comparisons 
are  often  made  between  wealthy  tourists  and  poor 
peasants.  But  what  are  these  traits  due  to?  To 
differences  in  the  biological  natures  of  the  peoples 
or  to  differences  in  their  cultures?  Theoretically, 
it  is  possible  that  such  behavior  as  practicing 
thrift  or  being  extravagant  may  be  determined  by 
the  biological  nature  of  man  or  by  a  cultural  en- 
vironment. In  approaching  this  problem  in  this 
particular  instance  we  examine  the  cultural  factor 
first. 

In  many  ways  the  cultures  of  these  two  peoples 
are  similar,  particularly  when  contrasted  with 
the  cultures  of  earlier  eras.  There  are,  however, 
some  striking  differences,  two  of  which  may  be 
noted  as  affecting  these  traits.  One  concerns  the 
development  of  the  steam  industry.  The  factory 
system  is  highly  developed  in  the  United  States. 
Coal  and  iron  are  abundant.  There  is  a  great 
deal  of  manufacturing.  Whereas  in  France 
there  is,  or  was,  not  very  much  coal  and  iron. 
The  factory  system  is  not  very  widespread.  The 
effect  of  the  use  of  artificial  power  in  making  ob- 
jects of  use  contrasts  markedly  with  the  use  of 
the  hands.     Wealth  and  riches  multiply  with  as- 

[17] 


tounding  rapidity  under  the  Influence  of  steam 
power  In  manufacturing  as  compared  with  the 
handicrafts,  or  as  compared  with  agriculture,  par- 
ticularly where  the  large,  power-driven  agricul- 
tural Implements  are  not  extensively  used.  In 
other  words,  in  the  countries  where  the  Industrial 
revolution  has  gone  far  there  is  a  good  deal  more 
wealth  than  In  countries  which  have  not  been  thus 
affected.  There  is  more  Wealth  to  consume  and 
the  purchasing  power  per  Individual  Is  greater. 
There  Is,  In  short,  less  occasion  to  be  thrifty  and 
more  opportunity  to  gratify  the  various  cravings 
that  can  be  answered  by  the  expenditure  of 
money.  The  rapidity  with  which  wealth  Is  cre- 
ated also  has  much  to  do  with  the  habit  of  spend- 
ing. In  the  United  States  the  development  and 
spread  of  manufacturing  have  been  very  rapid, 
particularly  since  1865.  Also,  the  extent  of  the 
use  of  advertising,  which  Is  rather  great  in  the 
United  States,  is  not  without  point  in  the  argu- 
ment, as  advertising  is  a  great  incentive  to  spend- 
ing. 

Another  difference  between  French  culture  and 
American  culture  is  the  presence  of  a  great 
amount  of  natural  resources  in  the  United 
States,  as  compared  to  the  population.  While 
natural  resources,  such  as  minerals,  forests,  soil, 
stnd  water  power,  have  not  been  classed  as  a  part 
of  the  social  heritage,  nevertheless  their  presence 

[18] 


in  greater  or  lesser  amount  is  not  without  effect 
upon  the  social  heritage.  Certainly  the  wealth  of 
a  nation  is  determined  in  large  part  by  the  abun- 
dance of  its  natural  resources.  The  rapid  coming 
into  use  of  vast  natural  resources  is  not  a  sit- 
uation to  encourage  thrift,  but  rather  tends  to 
produce  recklessness  and  waste.  The  phenom- 
enon of  exploitation  occurs  all  through  recent 
American  history. 

The  wealth  of  the  United  States  in  compari- 
son to  population  is  a  good  deal  greater  than  the 
wealth  of  France.  Comparable  statistics  of  real 
wages  are  difficult  to  find,  but  the  money  income 
per  capita  is  nearly  twice  as  great  in  the  United 
States  as  in  France;  the  ratio  in  19 14  was  $335  a 
year  to  $185  a  year.^  The  comparison  under 
discussion  could  be  presented  much  more  exhaus- 
tively and  measurements  could  be  made  with  some 
degree  of  completeness  and  accuracy.  The  situa- 
tion in  other  nations  where  there  is  variation  in 
these  factors  could  be  brought  in.  An  analysis 
of  the  French  settlement  in  Quebec  could  be  made. 
But  a  further  consideration  would  tax  the  patience 
of  the  reader.  The  observations  made  have 
probably  been  sufficiently  sound  and  full  to  demon- 
strate that  differences  in  culture  can  account  for 
much  difference  In  a  trait  like  thrift. 


United  States^  p.  85. 

[19] 


Turning  to  the  biological  factor,  there  is  of 
course  a  basis  for  thrift  in  the  mechanism  of  the 
human  body.  Some  psychologists  claim  there  is 
an  instinct  of  acquisition  and  it  has  been  said  that 
there  is  a  hoarding  instinct.  So  variations  in  the 
original  equipment  of  men  may  account  for  var- 
iations in  a  trait  like  thrift.  But  thrift  may  be 
much  more  complicated  on  its  psychological  side 
than  the  operation  of  a  single  hoarding  tendency. 
It  may  involve  conceptions  of  self,  or  love  of  dis- 
play, or  a  valuing  of  future  goods  more  than  pre- 
sent goods.  It  may  indeed  be  determined  largely 
by  the  ability  to  repress  many  other  instincts. 
Very  probably  it  is  quite  a  complicated  type  of 
behavior.  To  make  even  a  first  approximation  of 
what  thrift  is  psychologically  is  difficult. 

But  even  if  some  sort  of  an  approximation  Is 
made,  a  satisfactory  account  is  difficult  to  obtain 
due  to  the  present  lack  of  agreement  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  instincts  and  the  ignorance  in  specific 
cases  of  the  physiological  mechanism  of  the  in- 
stincts. That  is  to  say,  the  measurement  of  the 
biological  factor  in  thrift  depends  to  a  certain 
extent  on  the  analysis  of  its  mechanism.  Experi- 
ments have  been  made,  though,  on  the  relative 
strength  of  instincts  without  knowing  much  about 
their  mechanisms,  and  the  relative  strength  of 
desires  may  be  known,  with  little  being  understood 
as  to  their  nature  of  origin.     Psychological  tests 

[20] 


might  be  made  on  French  and  on  American  chil- 
dren, while  very  young  before  cultural  influences 
have  operated  much,  should  the  practical  or  the 
theoretical  importance  of  any  problem  warrant 
it. 

But  however  difficult  it  may  be  to  measure  a 
biological  trait  free  from  cultural  influences  and 
however  inadequate  the  present  state  of  informa- 
tion on  the  instincts  may  be,  it  is  not  to  be  implied 
from  these  remarks,  or  from  the  fact  that  the 
cultural  influences  can  be  somewhat  more  easily 
analyzed,  that  the  cultural  explanation  is  the  only 
true  one.  Indeed,  while  all  human  beings  seem  to 
possess  the  same  general  equipment  of  instincts, 
they  no  doubt  vary  in  their  strength,  just  as 
there  is  hereditary  variation  in  stature.  And  if 
individuals  vary  in  the  strength  of  instincts,  so 
collections  of  individuals  might  conceivably  vary. 
Such  variation  by  groups  should  not  be  assumed  as 
a  fact,  but  needs  special  investigation  in  each  case. 
The  general  question  of  racial  traits,  about  which 
there  is  so  much  feeling,  is  greatly  complicated  by 
the  phenomenon  of  culture.  But  with  reference 
to  the  particular  question  of  French  and  Ameri- 
can traits,  these  two  peoples  belong  to  the  same 
white  race.  The  northern  French  are  of  the 
same  general  subdivision  of  the  white  race  as  the 
old  American  stock.  This  conclusion  is  based  on 
certain  measurements  used  in  classifying  groups, 

[21] 


such  as  stature,  hair  color,  eye  color,  cephalic  in- 
dex, width  of  face  and  certain  other  general 
bodily  features.  From  such  measurements  it  is 
seen  that  the  northern  French  and  the  earlier 
native-born  Americans  belong  to  the  tall  racial 
type  found  in  northern  Europe  whose  centre  of 
dispersion  was  probably  the  Baltic  sea.  There  is 
a  great  deal  of  intermixture  among  the  racial 
types  of  Europe  and  purity  of  type  is  rare.  But 
there  are  striking  resemblances  in  the  measure- 
ments of  physical  traits  of  the  peoples  of  northern 
Europe.  It  would  therefore  seem  from  a  consid- 
eration of  the  biological  factor  and  the  cultural 
factor  that  the  differences  between  French  and 
Americans  in  regard  to  thrift  are  more  probably 
due  to  cultural  influence. 

In  some  instances  differences  can  be  traced  with 
great  certainty  to  the  cultural  factor  as  there 
appears  to  be  no  variation  in  the  biological  factor. 
Such  is  true,  for  instance,  in  the  manifestations 
of  hospitality  in  different  parts  of  the  United 
States.  The  southerners  are  traditionally  hos- 
pitable and  so  are  those  of  the  pioneer  west.  The 
phenomenon  of  hospitality  is  certainly  more  prom- 
inent in  these  agricultural  regions  than  in  the 
cities  and  towns  of  the  east.  The  culture  of  the 
south  and  of  the  west,  a  few  generations  ago, 
was  certainly  conducive  to  hospitality.  Food 
was  plentiful,  there  was  sufficient  room  in  the 

[22] 


houses;  there  was  no  overcrowding.  The  dis- 
tances between  farm  settlements  was  great. 
Travel  was  not  heavy  and  inns  were  few.  Fur- 
thermore, visitors  meant  "company"  and  associa- 
tions and  news.  In  the  towns  and  cities  of  the 
east  the  conditions  were  different  in  all  these  re- 
gards and  hence  hospitality  would  not  be  quite  so 
strikingly  manifested.  It  can  very  readily  be  seen 
how  a  type  of  behavior  called  hospitality  can  be 
determined  by  social  conditions. 

Of  course,  there  may  be  physiological  struc- 
tures determining  such  a  type  of  behavior  also. 
Some  persons  are  by  nature,  we  say,  penurious, 
while  others  are  generous  and  these  traits  are  not 
always  determined  by  the  size  of  the  pocketbook. 
Such  differences  may  be  occasioned  by  variations 
in  instinctive  tendencies,  as  hoarding  or  gregar- 
iousness,  or  by  sentiments  of  sociability.  But  in 
the  United  States  the  people  were  of  the  same 
racial  type,  that  is  at  least  until  the  immigration 
from  southeastern  Europe  set  in.  The  New 
Englanders  migrated  west;  and  the  south  and  the 
east  were  settled  in  the  main  from  England.  In 
other  words  the  racial  factor  appears  to  be  con- 
stant; the  variation  is  more  probably  in  the  cul- 
tural factor. 

Some  types  of  behavior  that  seem  largely  biolo- 
gical and  little  cultural  may  nevertheless  upon 
examination  be  found  to  be  largely  determined 

[23] 


by  the  social  conditions.  Pugnacity  and  fighting 
seem  to  suggest  immediately  the  original  nature 
of  man.  Yet  the  social  conditions  determine  in 
large  part  the  frequency  and  nature  of  its  mani- 
festations. The  same  peoples  will  at  one  age 
settle  their  quarrels  by  duels,  and  at  another  time 
by  a  different  method,  the  custom  of  dueling  hav- 
ing become  obsolete.  The  development  of  the 
police  system,  of  business  and  of  the  law  courts 
causes  the  instinct  of  pugnacity  to  find  other  out- 
lets. And  war  itself  while  It  certainly  has  a 
psychological  basis  manifests  itself  in  particular 
social  and  economic  settings.  If  war  were  dic- 
tated purely  by  the  Instincts  no  doubt  there  would 
be  a  certain  regularity  and  continuity  as  In  the 
functioning  of  hunger.  Head-hunting  In  Mela- 
nesia has  been  customarily  interpreted  as  due  to 
blood  revenge,  that  is,  a  rather  simple  and  direct 
manifestation  of  the  original  nature  of  man.  Yet 
Rivers,^  as  a  result  of  a  careful  study,  finds  that 
the  Idea  of  revenge  does  not  enter  Into  the  prac- 
tices at  all.  Head-hunting  Is  the  result  of  a  rather 
elaborate  social  ritual;  It  Is  to  be  explained  cul- 
turally rather  than  biologically. 

Illustrations  might  be  presented  in  great  num- 
bers, If  the  method  were  statistical  or  descriptive. 
But  the  foregoing  Illustrations  may  be  considered 

«W.  H.  R.  Rivers,  "Sociology  and  Psychology,"  Sociological 
Revinv,  Vol.  IX  (1916),  pp.  1-13. 

[24] 


as  representative  of  the  type  of  analysis  which  it 
Is  desirable  to  carry  in  mind,  namely,  that  social 
behavior  is  shaped  both  by  the  physical  heredity 
and  by  social  heritage.  Further  illustrations, 
however,  of  the  great  power  of  the  social  heritage 
to  cause  variations  in  manifestations  of  human  be- 
havior are  found  in  great  numbers  in  books  on 
customs,  such  as  Sumner's  Folkways.  In  this 
book  the  analysis  is  not  made  with  particular  con- 
sideration of  the  biological  element,  but  from 
such  a  treatise  one  is  greatly  impressed  by  the 
great  variability  in  culture  as  a  way  of  doing 
things,  and  particularly  of  the  power  of  culture  to 
select  and  magnify  for  special  display,  as  It  were, 
here  one  type  of  biological  reaction  and  there 
another  type. 

This  problem  from  the  point  of  view  of  analysis 
is  similar  in  several  respects  to  the  problem  of 
heredity  and  environment.  In  fact,  the  psycho- 
logical nature  of  man  and  culture  is  part  of 
heredity  and  environment.  The  stature  of  an 
individual  Is  certainly  affected  by  forces  of  hered- 
ity. Yet  It  Is  also  affected  by  the  food  one  eats 
and  by  the  diseases  of  one's  childhood.  Each  of 
these  influences  operates  to  effect  a  permanent 
result,  a  stature  which  is  permanent  for  a  life- 
time, subject  to  only  slight  diminution  after  the 
maximum  growth  is  reached.  The  influences  of 
environment  are  not  passed  on  to  the  next  gen- 

[25] 


eration  through  heredity.  In  like  manner  human 
behavior  is  in  part  the  result  of  the  influence  of 
the  original  nature  of  man  and  in  part  the  result 
of  the  influence  of  culture.  The  influence  known 
as  the  original  nature  of  man  is  passed  on  through 
heredity,  but  this  is  not  true  of  the  influence  of 
culture.  The  influence  of  culture  tends  towards 
a  certain  permanency  of  result  on  the  individual 
as  does  the  influence  of  food  on  stature.  Culture 
in  early  life  has  a  good  deal  to  do  with  shaping 
personality,  which  it  is  difficult  to  change  very 
much  in  later  life,  and  culture  does  tend  to  pro- 
duce even  in  the  adult  habits  which  resist  change. 
Just  as  it  is  desirable  to  segregate  the  factor  of 
environment  from  heredity,  so  it  is  desirable  to 
differentiate  the  influences  on  behavior  of  the 
psychological  nature  of  man  and  of  culture. 

In  discussing  the  variability  in  the  biological 
factor  and  the  variability  in  culture,  it  has  been 
said  that  quite  frequently  the  cultural  factor 
varies  but  the  biological  nature  of  man  is  con- 
stant. It  should  be  remembered  that  the  varia- 
tion in  the  biological  nature  may  be  conceived 
from  two  different  positions,  as  regards  in- 
dividuals within  a  sample  population  and  as 
regards  samples  of  population  in  different  periods 
or  in  different  areas.  It  is  the  variation  accord- 
ing to  the  samples  and  not  according  to  in- 
dividuals   that   is   meant   when   it   is   said   that 

[26] 


the  biological  factor  is  constant.  It  should 
certainly  be  remembered  that  Individuals  vary 
in  regard  to  any  particular  trait  In  any  sample 
population,  though  the  average  trait  of  a  sample 
does  not  vary  from  one  sample  to  another,  except 
as  such  variations  are  due  to  the  smallness  of  the 
sample.  Unless  this  point  Is  remembered  con- 
fusion may  arise  In  such  Illustrations  as  the  follow- 
ing. In  modern  civilization.  Individuals  are 
found  to  vary  In  their  mathematical  ability.  One 
Individual  can  not  count  above  ten  whereas  an- 
other Individual  Is  able  to  handle  a  tool  like  cal- 
culus. Such  a  difference  may  be  due  to  Innate 
capacity,  that  Is,  the  individual  who  can  not  count 
above  ten  may  have  a  mental  defect.  Such  an  in- 
dividual may  be  at  the  low  end  of  the  scale  on  a 
curve  of  distribution  of  mental  traits.  In  some 
primitive  cultures,  however,  an  Individual  can  not 
count  above  ten  not  because  he  Is  at  the  lower  end 
of  the  curve,  but  because  the  culture  of  these 
peoples  does  not  have  a  system  of  counting  that 
goes  further  than  ten  In  number.  In  another  and 
higher  culture  the  same  individual  might  be  able 
to  solve  problems  by  the  use  of  calculus.  Theo- 
retically, it  Is  conceivable  that  samples  of  these 
two  peoples  might  not  vary  biologically,  although 
their  cultures  do.  So  in  thinking  of  comparisons 
of  peoples,  It  is  the  samples  of  the  peoples  as  a 
whole,  thought  of  as  averages  or  frequency  dis- 

[27] 


tributions,  that  should  be  compared;  or  else  if 
Individuals  be  compared,  they  should  be  drawn 
from  the  same  relative  positions  in  the  curve  of 
distribution.  The  illustration  just  presented  is  of 
course  an  extreme  one.  Another  illustration  is 
that  an  Eskimo  and  a  civilized  European  may  be 
equally  uncleanly  in  their  habits;  but  in  the  case 
of  the  Eskimo  it  may  be  due  to  lack  of  cultural 
provisions  for  cleanliness  while  In  the  European 
It  may  be  due  to  an  Inferior  psychological  equip- 
ment. In  this  case  Individuals  compared  are  not 
from  the  same  relative  position  on  the  scale  of 
variation.  The  psychological  basis  for  cleanli- 
ness of  the  Eskimo  may  be  the  same  as  that  of  the 
European,  but  the  cultural  difficulties  of  keeping 
clean  are  much  greater  among  the  Eskimo. 

It  Is  therefore  seen  that  Individuals  or  popu- 
lations may  differ  biologically  and  that  cultures 
may  also  differ.  In  cases  where  cultural-blolog- 
ical-behavlor  differs  and  the  biological  factor  Is 
constant,  the  differences  are  cultural  and  the 
differences  may  be  characterized  as  differences  in 
cultural  traits.  On  the  other  hand  where  the 
differences  cannot  be  accounted  for  as  being 
due  to  culture,  they  may  be  characterized 
as  due  to  variation  in  psychological  traits. 
The  term,  cultural  trait,  does  not  refer  so  much 
to  the  material  features  of  culture  as  to  such 
parts  of  culture  as  knowledge,  custom,  belief,  art 

[28] 


and  the  various  ways  of  doing  things;  and  of 
course  does  not  mean  that  the  material  objects 
of  culture  have  traits  in  the  same  manner  in  which 
the  material  organs  and  substances  integrated 
into  the  human  body  have  traits.  Nevertheless 
the  term  is  a  useful  descriptive  term,  as  for  in- 
stance, in  the  statement  that  in  a  particular  situ- 
ation cleanliness  is  a  cultural  trait  not  a  racial 
trait,  or  in  the  case  where  the  people  of  a  nation 
who  do  not  change  biologically  over  a  period  of 
time,  at  different  periods  during  this  time  display 
quite  different  cultural  traits. 


THE  OVEREMPHASIS  OF  THE  BIOLOGICAL  FACTOR 

Popular  tendency  to  confuse  the  cultural  and 
the  psychological  or,  as  Kroeber  phrases  it,  the 
social  and  the  mental,  probably  results  in  an  over- 
emphasis of  the  psychological  and  an  under- 
emphasis  of  the  cultural.  This  is  particularly 
noticeable  in  accounting  for  the  traits  of  the  sexes. 
Women,  for  instance,  are  supposed  to  have  an 
absorbing  Interest  in  purely  personal  affairs  and 
relationships  while  men  are  more  interested  in 
objective  discussions  of  movements  and  events. 
This  difference  is  frequently  commented  upon  in 

[29] 


considering  the  entrance  of  women  into  politics 
and  into  business.  The  somewhat  intimate  rela- 
tionship between  women  and  children  is  supposed 
to  account  for  this  difference  on  biological 
grounds.  As  a  biological  explanation  it  is  a  bit 
mystical.  It  seems  more  plausible  to  seek  the 
explanation  in  the  differences  in  daily  activities 
of  men  and  women.  The  work  of  men  takes 
them  more  Into  the  world  of  events,  social  move- 
ments and  business.  Whereas  woman's  restricted 
sphere  of  the  family,  centring  around  husband 
and  children  and  social  friendships,  seems  more 
personal.  So  that  while  women  may  be  more 
interested  in  the  personal  than  men,  this  differ- 
ence is  either  wholly  due  to  culture  or  else  is 
greatly  accentuated  by  culture.  Women  are  said 
also  not  to  be  averse  to  methods  Involving  slight 
deceptions,  at  least  apparently  they  resort  more 
readily  than  men  to  subterfuge  or  other  less  direct 
but  Ingenious  ways  of  obtaining  their  ends.  This 
observation,  if  true,  may  be  intended  to  apply  to 
the  fields  of  the  more  purely  personal  relation- 
ships and  not  for  Instance  to  the  spheres  of  busl- 
;iess  activity.  This  Is  popularly  supposed  to  be  a 
feminine  trait,  meaning  a  hereditary  biological 
trait,  yet  close  observers  have  attributed  its 
origin  to  a  cultural  situation  where  men  hold 
economic  and  social  power.  Men  are  thus  more 
direct  and  frank  in  their  actions,  while  with  women 

[30] 


there  is  a  more  or  less  variable  pressure  to  be 
indirect  in  the  pursuit  of  their  aims.  And  even 
such  a  trait  as  modesty  which  seems  so  closely 
identified  with  the  distinctive  biological  character- 
istics of  women  is  certainly  greatly  emphasized  by 
social  conditions. 

A  great  many  of  these  so-called  feminine  traits 
are  analyzed  and  their  cultural  aspects  explained 
by  Mrs.  Coolidge  in  her  most  interesting  book, 
Why  Women  are  So.  Such  a  study  as  Mrs. 
Coolidge  has  made,  while  it  does  not  segregate 
and  measure  the  influence  of  original  nature  and 
of  culture,  certainly  does  demonstrate  quite  satis- 
factorily that  there  is  a  popular  tendency  to 
attribute  much  that  is  cultural  to  hereditary 
biological  factors.  Popular  opinion  describes  a 
large  assortment  of  traits  as  feminine,  perhaps 
a  slightly  smaller  number  as  masculine,  and  a  more 
or  less  vague  list  as  common  to  both  the  sexes.  If 
these  traits  were  considered  from  the  purely 
biological  point  of  view,  the  list  of  feminine  and 
of  masculine  traits  would  probably  be  much 
smaller  and  certainly  much  less  prominent,  or  if 
plotted  In  curves  there  would  be  great  overlapping 
of  the  curves.  The  great  division  of  labor  along 
sex  lines  found  all  through  society,  while  perhaps 
in  part  occasioned  by  biological  differences,  cer- 
tainly results  in  an  exaggeration  in  the  popular 
mind  of  the  biological  differences  between  the 

[31] 


sexes.  The  point  under  consideration  is  not  an 
inquiry  as  to  what  biological  differences  do  exist. 
There  are  morphological  differences,  quite 
probably  emotional  differences,  and  there  may  be 
indeed  some  intellectual  differences.  But  what 
should  be  pointed  out  is  that  these  emotional  and 
intellectual  differences  are  popularly  exaggerated 
by  reading  the  psychological  into  the  cultural  in- 
fluences, a  confusion  of  the  two  factors. 

There  are  several  reasons  why  cultural  traits 
tend  to  be  popularly  interpreted  as  biological 
traits.  The  effect  of  culture  on  an  individual  is 
carried  around  by  that  individual  in  the  forms  of 
habit,  training,  education,  technique,  conditioned 
reflexes.  These  acquired  ways  of  doing  things  are 
seen  as  part  of  an  individual  as  truly  as  his  physi- 
ognomy is.  The  association  is  almost  as  close. 
They  become  a  part  of  his  psychological  self  and 
are  generally  more  or  less  permanently  descrip- 
tive of  the  personality.  The  concept  of  the 
original  nature  of  man  does  not  frequently  appear 
in  the  ordinary  judgments  of  life.  It  takes  some 
special  training  and  imagination  to  see  the  original 
nature  of  man  beneath  his  cultural  exterior,  for  it 
Is  only  in  special  situations  in  life  where  such  pene- 
trating observation  is  called  for.  Man  as  nature 
plus  nurture  is  thus  popularly  seen  as  nature. 
Acquired  characteristics  are  thought  to  be  so  in- 
tegral a  part  of  an  individual  as  to  be  hereditary. 

[32] 


Indeed  it  required  special  research  to  disprove 
this.  So  it  seems  very  natural  to  interpret  cul- 
tural traits  as  psychological  traits. 

In  attempting  to  formulate  the  concepts  of 
the  social  heritage  and  the  biological  nature  of 
man,  it  has  been  seen  that  a  di.fficulty  lies  in  the 
confusion  of  these  two  ideas  due  to  the  general 
tendency  to  consider  the  cultural  influence  on  be- 
havior as  biological.  There  is  also  another 
source  of  confusion.  This  does  not  concern  be- 
havior so  much  as  the  products  of  behavior.  But 
the  results  are  similar  in  that  the  cultural  in- 
fluence is  obscured  and  the  biological  influence 
is  magnified.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  ap- 
pearance of  some  hitherto  undeveloped  object 
of  material  culture,  say,  a  steam  engine.  What 
are  the  factors  that  operated  to  make  the 
steam  engine?  Obviously  one  facto-r  is  mental 
ability.  Also  the  formerly  invented  and  pre- 
pared materials  that  go  to  make  up  the  steam 
engine,  and  the  existing  state  of  knowledge, 
are  another  factor.  These  two  factors:  are 
quite  different  in  nature  but  are  quite  def- 
initely two  general  factors  operating  to  pro- 
duce the  steam  engine.  It  could  not  be  produced 
without  the  mental  ability,  nor  could  it  be  pro- 
duced without  scientific  knowledge  and  without 
materials  in  a  certain  degree  of  previous  prepar- 
ation.    The  factor  of  mental  ability  is  always 

[33] 


recognized.  But  very  often  one  does  not  appre- 
ciate the  cultural  factor,  that  Is,  one  does  not 
think  how  dependent  an  invention  is  on  previous 
Inventions  and  on  the  previously  developed  state 
of  knowledge.  The  steam  engine  could  not  have 
been  Invented,  for  instance,  without  a  knowledge 
of  fire,  combustion,  vaporization,  the  metals,  the 
wheel,  the  piston,  valves,  the  screw  and  numerous 
other  Inventions  and  processes.  The  existing 
state  of  the  social  heritage  Is  thus  a  very  Im- 
portant factor  In  the  Invention  of  a  particular 
cultural  object.  The  cave  man,  had  he  the  abil- 
ity of  a  modern  genius,  could  not  have  Invented 
the  steam  engine,  living  as  he  did  on  the  plane 
of  culture  existing  during  the  last  ice  age.  Pre- 
sented in  this  manner.  It  Is  readily  seen  that  the 
cultural  factor  Is  necessary  and  as  important  as  Is 
the  factor  of  mental  ability.  But  popularly  there 
is  full  recognition  of  mental  ability  but  a  neglect 
of  cultural  influence.  When  Edison  makes  an 
Invention,  credit  Is  given  to  his  ability  and  rightly 
so  because  the  social  heritage  is  the  heritage  of 
many,  yet  only  a  few  utilize  it  to  make  discoveries 
and  Inventions.  The  variable  factor  Is  the  In- 
dividual and  Is  therefore  thought  of  as  the  causa- 
tive factor.  He  Is  not  thought  of  as  original 
nature  plus  the  social  heritage. 

In  a  somewhat  similar  way  the  culture  of  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies  is  seen  as  the  product  of 

[34] 


the  ability  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples.  The  de- 
pendence of  British  culture  upon  the  inventions 
and  achievements  of  other  peoples  is  not  called 
to  the  attention.  To  think  of  this  implies  a  cer- 
tain historical  and  cultural  knowledge,  not 
possessed  by  many.  Indeed  the  total  knowledge 
on  the  origin  and  diffusion  of  inventions  is  quite 
limited.  But  many  peoples  of  various  periods 
from  different  parts  of  the  world  have  been  asso- 
ciated with  the  development  of  the  modern  cul- 
ture possessed  by  the  British.  It  has  been  quite 
customary  to  attribute  the  Greek  civilization  in 
a  somewhat  complete  fashion  to  the  genius  of  the 
Greek  people.  Indeed  it  is  only  recently  that  re- 
search is  establishing  how  much  Greece  borrowed 
from  the  peoples  to  the  north,  the  east  and  the 
south.  Great  Britain  has  borrowed  many  times 
as  much  as  she  has  invented.  But  even  admitting 
a  differentiation  between  what  a  people  has  in- 
vented and  what  borrowed,  the  concept  of  cultural 
evolution  Is  not  conceived  in  any  full  sense.  That 
is  to  say,  it  is  not  seen  that  culture  would  have 
changed  and  increased  from  the  time  of  the 
Angles  and  the  Saxons  until  now,  more  or  less 
irrespective  of  the  particular  peoples  that  may 
have  been  associated  with  this  culture.  Such  an 
Idea  is  not  common,  and  indeed  it  is  seldom  noted 
in  intellectual  circles,  very  largely  for  the  reason 
that  at  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  the 

[35] 


laws  governing  the  growth  and  change  of  culture 
are  not  dearly  and  quantitatively  formulated. 
Culture  grows  because  of  mental  ability,  but  the 
existing  basis  of  culture  is  a  very  important  factor 
in  determining  the  nature  and  rate  of  growth  of 
culture. 

The  prevailing  status  of  general  opinion  is 
seen  from  the  fairly  complete  identification  of 
i:he  state  of  culture  of  a  people  with  their 
abilities.  The  Egyptians  produced  the  Egyptian 
culture,  the  Indian  culture  is  a  product  of  Indian 
ability,  as  the  European  culture  is  a  product  of 
European  ability.  And  the  Hottentot  culture 
is  an  index  of  the  ability  of  that  people.  So  pop- 
ular opinion  runs.  There  may  be  variation  in 
the  abilities  of  peoples  but  the  state  of  culture  is 
not  a  good  index.  The  varying  social  inherit- 
ances may  be  correlated  with  the  abilities  of  peo- 
ples, but  the  proof  is  not  clear  and  certainly  the 
correlation  is  not  vdry  close,  for  the  very  reason 
that  purely  cultural  or  historical  causes  are  such 
an  important  factor  in  determining  a  particular 
culture.  These  questions  of  the  relations  of  cul- 
ture to  mental  ability  and  of  the  causes  and  laws 
of  the  growth  and  change  of  culture  are  far-reach- 
ing and  will  be  considered  further  later  on.  But 
enough  has  been  said  to  show  that  the  purely 
cultural  influence  tends  to  be  obscured  and  over- 
shadowed by  the  biological  factor. 

[36] 


The  overemphasis  of  the  biological  influence 
as  contrasted  to  the  cultural  influence  has  certain 
roots  in  the  facts  of  everyday  life.  The  results 
of  the  training  are  seen  through  the  eyes  of  youth 
very  much  in  terms  of  personal  achievement. 
Honors,  prizes,  grades,  diplomas,  emphasize  this 
fact.  In  the  classroom  the  same  culture  is  pre- 
sented to  all,  the  variations  in  results  are  varia- 
tions in  personal  abilities.  Honors  or  diplomas 
are  not  given  to  the  textbooks  or  the  teacher. 
Variations  in  social  opportunity  are  seen  as  some- 
thing to  be  grasped.  And  this  utilization  of 
opportunity  for  a  greater  culture  is  interpreted 
in  terms  of  personal  ability.  Moral  training  of 
the  young  is  a  matter  of  doing  right  or  wrong,  of 
praise  or  blame,  an  emphasis  of  the  personal  and 
a  neglect  of  the  cultural.  Achievement  reflects 
the  glory  of  the  ego  and  the  hero  is  given  full 
credit.  There  is  no  particular  occasion  to  give 
the  credit  to  so  Impersonal  a  factor  as  culture. 
The  particular  political  party  in  power  claims 
credit  for  a  period  of  prosperity  even  though  it 
be  a  matter  of  crops  and  rainfall.  And  failure, 
particularly  in  the  other  fellow,  is  a  matter  of 
personal  inefficiency.  Especially  among  the 
wealthy  classes  is  it  customary  to  attribute  their 
position  almost  solely  to  ability  and  to  make  the 
converse  interpretation  for  those  not  at  the  top — 
a  very  comfortable  theory.     In  many  such  simple 

[37] 


dally  estimations  the  influence  of  culture  is  not  ap- 
preciated. Thus  a  mental  pattern  is  ready- 
made,  prepared  since  youth,  and  one  brings  such 
a  ready-made  pattern  to  the  study  of  sociology  or 
to  the  reading  of  history,  which  it  may  be  re- 
marked is  also  usually  written  from  this  same 
mental  pattern. 

In  intellectual  centres,  the  overemphasis  of  the 
biological  is  in  part  occasioned  by  the  prevailing 
status  of  the  various  sciences;  the  prestige  of 
biology  among  the  social  sciences  has  been  very 
great,  because  of  the  extraordinary  significance  of 
the  discovery  of  natural  selection  and  the  emphasis 
on  evolution  due  to  the  researches  of  Darwin  and 
Wallace.  The  significance  was  so  overshadowing 
that  it  seemed  to  cast  something  like  a  hypnotic 
spell  over  others  doing  research.  The  biological 
terminology  was  borrowed  quite  widely;  and  it 
became  almost  a  fad  to  refer  to  biological  causes 
and  to  make  biological  interpretations  for  many 
social  phenomena.  Of  recent  years  the  tendency 
to  get  away  from  this  spell  is  noticeable  but  the 
rise  of  the  eugenists  has  given  added  emphasis  to 
the  importance  of  biology  for  sociology. 

Eugenics  centres  attention  on  biological  varia- 
tion, with  the  purpose  of  improving  biological 
ability  and  eliminating  biological  inferiority. 
The  eugenists  are  so  impressed  with  the  impor- 
tance of  racial  stock  that  scant  attention  Is  given 

[38] 


to  the  social  heritage  and  there  is  very  little 
understanding  of  its  nature.  All  through  the 
writings  of  the  eugenists  is  found  the  implication 
that  a  particular  culture  is  quite  simply  and 
directly  the  ability  of  the  racial  stock.  They 
do  not  seem  to  realize  that  cultural  growth 
is  caused  largely  by  purely  cultural  causes. 
They  see  inventions  and  improvement  chiefly  in 
terms  of  mental  ability,  failing  to  appreciate  the 
extent  of  the  dependence  of  future  change  on 
existing  cultural  elements.  The  result  of  the 
spread  of  the  eugenics  idea  is,  like  the  discovery 
of  natural  selection,  an  overemphasis  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  biological  factor  in  social  progress. 
The  discussion  has  gone  sufficiently  far  to  show 
something  of  the  concepts  of  the  original  nature 
of  man  and  of  the  social  heritage,  and  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  such  a  delineation  for  sociology.  Hu- 
man behavior  never  occurs  except  in  a  cultural 
milieu  and  the  social  heritage  could  not  grow  ex- 
cept by  the  group  activities  of  biological  men. 
For  this  reason,  to  some  an  attempt  to  segregate 
these  factors  may  not  seem  necessary.  But  such 
an  attempted  segregation  is  quite  necessary,  for 
the  two  factors  meet  in  all  social  phenomena  and 
are  indeed  the  occasion  of  it.  An  understanding 
of  social  phenomena  and  the  handling  of  modern 
social  problems  makes  desirable  a  consideration 
of  these  two  factors,  in  very  much  the  same  way 

[39] 


as  there  is  occasion  to  know  something  of  the 
relative  influence  of  heredity  and  environment. 
In  describing  these  conceptions  it  has  been  shown 
that  popularly  and  in  intellectual  centres  the  ten- 
dency is  to  confuse  these  factors,  obscuring  the 
cultural  and  exaggerating  the  biological,  an  over- 
emphasis of  biology  and  a  neglect  of  sociology. 


« 


SOME  SOCIOLOGICAL  CONCEPTS  REEXAMINED 

The  concepts  of  the  social  heritage  and  the  in- 
herited nature  of  man  are  of  such  theoretical  im- 
portance, that  it  is  desirable  to  examine  some  of 
the  definitions  in  sociology  which  are  generally 
recognized  as  important,  to  see  whether  these  two 
concepts  throw  any  light  on  these  definitions.  It 
is  realized  that  the  discussions  of  the  scope  and 
function  of  sociology,  the  definitions  of  society, 
social  evolution,  social  mind,  etc.,  are  a  field  of 
considerable  magnitude  about  which  there  has 
been  much  controversy  for  many  years.  To  enter 
at  all  comprehensively  into  this  field  would  in- 
volve an  extensive  consideration  of  terminology 
and  the  discussion  of  many  writers.  There  will 
be  no  attempt  here  to  settle  these  moot  points. 

[40] 


The  purpose  is  rather  to  examine  some  of  these 
more  important  sociological  conceptions,  as  form- 
ulated by  certain  representative  sociologists,  to 
see  what  they  mean  in  terms  of  the  social  heritage 
and  of  the  original  nature  of  man,  and  particularly 
to  see  if  this  differentiation  helps  to  clarify  these 
problems. 

Of  the  founders  of  sociology,  Comte  was  freer 
from  the  confusion  of  the  biological  with  the 
sociological  factors  than  some  writers  who 
followed  him.  The  prestige  of  biological  science 
was  at  that  time  not  so  great,  and  Comte  "^  con- 
ceived of  sociology  a  good  deal  in  terms  of  what 
has  been  called  culture,  and  the  influences  he  con- 
sidered were  in  large  part  cultural.  He  speaks 
of  the  constancy  of  the  human  factor,  the  influence 
of  former  generations  as  a  source  of  modification 
of  the  social  movement,  and  the  preponderant 
importance  of  historical  analysis  and  the  auxiliary 
aspect  of  biological  considerations. 

To  Spencer  is  due  the  conception  of  the  funda- 
mental types  of  evolution,  the  organic  and  the 
superorganic.  In  the  organization  of  his  system 
of  the  sciences  he  recognized  the  difference  in 
nature  of  these  two  fields  of  evolution;  but  when 
he  came  to  work  out  the  development  of  the  super- 
organic  In  his  Principles   of  Sociology,  he  con- 

7  A.  Comte,  Thr  Positive  Philosophy,  Vol.  II,  Chap.  IV. 

[41] 


earned  himself  very  largely  with  a  consideration 
of  the  influence  of  the  biological  factor  on  the 
superorganic.  At  this  time  the  development  of 
biology  was  far-reaching  in  significance.  Spencer 
had  worked  a  great  deal  in  the  biological  field 
before  writing  his  Principles  of  Sociology  and 
biology  is  certainly  most  prominent  throughout 
his  sociological  writings.  Customs,  organiza- 
tions and  institutions  are  seen  as  the  result  of 
man,  physical,  emotional  and  intellectual.  There 
is  comparatively  little  account  of  such  cultural 
phenomena  in  terms  of  culture  itself. 

Giddlngs  has  not  been  concerned  particularly 
with  culture  as  such.  He  has  studied  the 
psychological  nature  of  society  and  association. 
To  him  sociology  is  the  study  of  society  and 
society  IS  the  result  of  such  psychological  ac- 
tivities as  like  response  to  stimuli,  interstlmula- 
tion  and  response,  concerted  activities  and 
consciousness  of  kind.  The  shift  in  recent  years 
has  been  somewhat  away  from  culture  and  history 
in  the  direction  of  the  psychological  nature  of 
society.  However,  these  excellently  laid  psycho- 
logical foundations  of  sociology  do  not  alone 
explain  a  particular  type  of  social  heritage.  It 
Is  quite  necessary  to  consider  the  historical 
process  entirely  apart  from  the  psychological 
nature  of  collective  behavior. 

[42] 


What  then  Is  the  relation  of  society  and  the 
social  heritage?  GIddlngs  defines  society  "as 
any  plural  number  of  sentient  creatures  more 
or  less  continuously  subjected  to  common  stimuli, 
to  differing  stimuli,  and  to  interstimulatlon,  and 
responding  thereto  In  like  behavior,  concerted 
activity  or  cooperation,  as  well  as  in  unlike  or 
competitive  activity;  and  becoming  therefore  with 
developing  intelligence  coherent  through  a  dom- 
inating consciousness  of  kind,  while  always  suffi- 
ciently conscious  of  differences  to  Insure  a 
measure  of  individual  liberty."  ® 

According  to  this  definition,  society  is  a  plural 
number  of  individuals  manifesting  group  behav- 
ior. Other  definitions  similarly  emphasize  the 
group  and  group  behavior.  Society  is  therefore 
different  from  the  social  heritage.  The  social 
heritage  may  affect  the  group  and  group  behavior 
but  it  is  probably  often  thought  of  as  the  product 
of  society.  The  social  heritage,  however,  is  not 
solely  the  product  of  human  association  occur- 
ring at  a  particular  period,  of  course,  but  Is  a 
certain  surviving  product  over  a  very  long  period 
of  time.  The  existing  social  heritage  plays  an 
important  part  in  creating  newer  forms  of  culture 
as  truly  as  does  collective  behavior.  It  may  be 
claimed  that  the  social  heritage  is  not  only  the 

®F.  H.  Giddings,  Descriptive  and  Historical  Sociology,  p.  9. 

[43] 


product  of  collective  activity  but  also  of  individ- 
ual activity,  particularly«»as  certain  objects  of  the 
material  culture  appear  to  be  the  result  of 
individual  activity;  but  in  such  cases  the  individ- 
ual functions  because  of  his  life  in  society.  The 
social  heritage,  especially  some  of  these  learned 
ways  of  doing  things,  such  as  social  organization 
and  rules  of  collective  procedure,  quite  directly 
concern  such  psychological  activities  as  response  to 
stimuli,  concerted  activity  and  consciousness  of 
kind,  as  truly  as  does  the  psychological  nature  in- 
herent in  man. 

Conceptions  of  society  should  therefore  not 
neglect  the  factor  of  social  heritage.  Society 
is,  according  to  Giddings'  definition,  a  plural 
number  of  psychological  human  beings  acting  in 
certain  variously  defined  collective  ways.  But 
this  definition  of  collective  behavior  says  nothing 
with  reference  to  the  cultural  media.  It  de- 
scribes rather  the  nature  of  social  human  behavior 
either  with  or  without  a  culture.  The  particular 
nature  of  the  culture,  however,  determines  the 
forms  of  the  concerted  activity  and  to  a  certain 
extent  the  amount.  For  instance,  within  or  be- 
tween societies  the  amount  and  nature  of  the 
fighting  that  occurs  will  depend  on  the  type  of 
culture.  Culture  certainly  conditions  the  re- 
sponse to  stimuli.  Giddings  has  therefore  em- 
phasized the  psychological  nature  of  society  and 

[44] 


his  account  of  society  tends  to  be  in  terms  of  the 
original  nature  of  man. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  how  some  of  the 
organismic  theories  of  the  state  and  some  of  the 
earlier  conceptions  of  the  social  mind  attempted 
to  deal  with  the  superorganic.  The  writers  of 
these  theories  did  not  confuse  the  cultural  and  the 
biological  in  the  manner  discussed  in  preceding 
paragraphs,  that  is,  by  interpreting  a  particular 
social  phenomenon  through  the  psychological  ac- 
tivity of  man.  Instead  they  confounded  the  na- 
ture of  the  whole  superorganic  of  a  particular  or- 
ganized people  with  the  biological  nature  of  man. 
This  they  did  by  distinctly  naive  analogies  such 
as  likening  the  transportation  system  to  the  circu- 
latory system  of  the  human  body.  These  at- 
tempts seem  fantastic  but  they  did  truly  imply 
an  Idea  of  the  superorganic  as  such.  The  reac- 
tion away  from  these  organismic  theories  swung 
far  away  from  the  purely  cultural  influences  and 
in  the  direction  of  the  psychological  Influences 
which  were  becoming  better  understood  through 
the  rise  of  the  biological  and  psychological 
sciences. 

What  does  the  social  mind  mean  in  terms  of 
the  psychological  nature  of  man  and  In  terms 
of  culture?  It  is  very  difficult  to  get  a  clear  idea 
of  the  social  mind  in  any  terms.  The  Idea  of 
the  social  mind  seems  to  have  arisen  from  notions 

C45] 


of  society  as  an  organism.  Spencer  has  likened 
the  deliberative  assemblies  of  modern  society  to 
the  cerebellum.  In  popular  conceptions  the  social 
judgments  show  the  operation  of  the  social 
mind.  Mob  activity  has  likewise  been  charac- 
terized as  a  manifestation  of  the  mob  mind. 
Giddings  has  defined  the  social  mind  "as  the  like 
responsiveness  to  stimulation,  the  concurrent  feel- 
ing and  intelligence,  the  consciousness  of  kind 
and  the  concerted  volition  of  two  or  more  indi- 
viduals." ^  He  thus  eliminates  the  idea  that  the 
social  mind  is  a  separate  entity  possessed  by  a 
group  but  not  by  the  individual,  to  which  most 
modern  writers  are  agreed.  But,  it  is  observed, 
the  innate  psychological  traits  are  particularly 
emphasized  in  this  definition.  These  psycholog- 
ical traits  function,  however,  in  cultural  media 
and  are  affected  by  cultural  experiences,  as  is 
true  of  the  individual  mind.  The  mind  of  the  In- 
dividual is  generally  thought  of  as  the  inherited 
mental  equipment  as  modified  by  learning  and 
training;  indeed  the  knowledge  and  education  as 
aspects  of  the  mind  are  sometimes  emphasized 
more  than  the  inherited  factor.  So  at  times  that 
part  of  our  social  heritage  known  as  knowledge, 
science  and  the  like  Is  thought  of  as  a  part  of  the 

»F.    H.    Giddings,  Descriptive   and  Historical  Sociology,  p. 
185. 

[46] 


mind  of  the  race,  perhaps  the  social  mind.  In 
any  case,  in  referring  to  the  social  mind,  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  purely  psychological  man- 
ifestations which  are  an  important  factor  of  what 
is  called  the  social  mind  are  much  affected  by  that 
inherited  portion  of  our  culture  known  as  knowl- 
edge, science,  belief,  custom,  etc. 

Are  ^'social  problems"  to  be  explained  in  terms 
of  culture,  of  the  original  nature  of  man  or  of 
both?  Many  courses  in  universities  and  colleges 
and  many  textbooks  in  sociology  deal  with  what 
are  called  social  problems,  such  as  problems  of 
industry,  labor,  the  family,  immigration,  the 
woman's  movement,  and  crime.  These  problems 
are  often  problems  of  adjustment  between  the 
social  heritage  and  the  original  nature  of  man. 
Sometimes  the  emphasis  is  rather  largely  on  the 
cultural  side,  as  for  instance,  in  an  issue  concern- 
ing the  compensation  of  workmen  for  injuries  be- 
cause of  industrial  accidents,  and  sometimes  the 
considerations  are  markedly  on  the  side  of  the  ori- 
ginal nature  of  man  as  in  the  divorce  problem 
and  in  the  treatment  of  mental  defect.  While 
often  these  problems  arise  from  interrelations  be- 
tween the  two  planes,  the  organic  and  the  super- 
organic,  the  term,  social  conditions,  can  be  used 
interchangeably  with  culture;  thus  when  the  social 
conditions  of  two  sections  are  said  to  be  different, 

[47] 


what  IS  probably  meant  is  that  the  cultures  are 
different,  leading  of  course  to  different  cultural 
manifestations  of  social  behavior. 

Kroeber  ^^  has  recently  made  an  attempt  to 
show  that  the  subject  matter  of  sociology  is  cul- 
ture, apparently  relatively  free  from  any  consider- 
ation of  the  organic  factor.  His  attempt  is  quite 
bold  considering  the  agreement  existing  as  to  the 
nature  of  society  and  the  acceptance  of  society 
as  the  subject  matter  of  sociology,  and  is  also 
significant  because  of  his  logical  and  consistent 
analysis  which  sets  forth  the  importance  of  cul- 
ture as  a  subject  of  science.  Briefly  his  thesis 
flows  from  his  classification  of  sciences  according 
to  planes,  the  inorganic,  the  vital  organic,  the 
mental  organic,  and  the  superorganic.  The  inor- 
ganic, including  chemistry  and  physics,  is  on  quite 
a  different  plane  from  the  vital  organic,  including 
biology.  Thus  the  biologist  accepts  life  and  ''in- 
quires into  its  forms  and  processes  as  such.'* 
That  is,  he  expresses  organic  life  in  organic  terms 
as  on  the  organic  planes.  It  may  be  possible  to 
express  life  in  terms  of  chemistry,  *'but  that  is  not 
the  first  task  of  the  biologist,  else  his  biology 
would  be  pure  physics  and  chemistry."  The  chem- 
ist and  the  physicist  may  be  on  one  plane  and 

10  A.  L.  Kroeber,  "The  Possibility  of  a  Social  Psychology," 
American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  XXIII  (1913).  No.  5,  p. 
633. 

[48] 


the  biologist  on  another,  but  it  does  not  follow 
by  analogy  that  the  planes  of  psychology  and  of 
culture  are  similarly  separated.  It  is  indeed  pos- 
sible to  exaggerate  the  planar  separations  of  bio- 
logy and  of  physics  and  chemistry.  Heredity 
may  be  classified  by  a  charting  in  organic  terms 
but  a  knowledge  of  the  effect  of  chemical  sub- 
stances on  mutations  would  not  be  without  inter- 
est for  biology.  Certainly  there  is  tremendous 
demand  for  an  understanding  of  the  interrelations 
of  culture  and  the  psychological  behavior  of  man, 
the  effect  of  culture  on  behavior  and  the  effect 
of  behavior  on  culture.  This  is  testified  by  the 
great  body  of  writing  and  the  number  of  courses 
of  study  on  these  interrelations,  both  in  sociology 
and  in  the  special  social  sciences.  Consider,  for 
instance,  criminology.  The  cause  of  crime  may 
be  economic  or  due  to  mental  defect;  and 
prison  reform,  probation  systems,  indeterminate 
sentences,  prison  discipline  and  self-government 
in  prisons  all  involve  interrelations  of  culture 
and  behavior.  Neither  can  it  be  maintained 
that  the  study  of  crime  is  the  domain  solely  of 
psychology  by  practice  or  by  theory.  And  even 
on  the  most  strict  theoretical  grounds,  particular 
cultural  forms  are  not  determined  solely  by  cul- 
tural forces  flowing  out  of  previous  or  contem- 
poraneous cultural  stages ;  a  very  important  crea- 
tive factor  is  the  psychological  nature  of  man. 

[49] 


It  Is  also  a  distinctly  limiting  factor  to  cultural 
forms.  It  is  true,  that  in  the  study  of  society, 
social  phenomena,  social  problems,  social  organi- 
zation, and  social  processes,  the  cultural  and  his- 
torical factors  have  been  neglected  and  there  has 
been  an  over-interpretation  in  terms  of  the  psy- 
chological and  the  biological  factors;  but  such 
a  condition  does  not  justify  a  swing  completely 
away  from  the  psychological  and  wholly  to  the 
cultural. 

In  conclusion,  then,  two  factors  In  social  phe- 
nomena have  been  recognized  and  their  signifi- 
cance for  analysis  shown.  Usually  the  cause  of 
the  phenomenon  is  Inaccurately  thought  to  be 
largely  biological  or  psychological  and  only 
slightly  cultural.  The  cause  of  unemployment, 
for  instance,  was  thought  by  many  to  be  due  to 
human  nature,  that  is,  to  laziness,  to  unwillingness 
to  work,  to  a  desire  to  loaf,  to  lack  of  ambition 
or  to  many  other  psychological  traits  of  the  un- 
employed. The  cultural  causes  of  unemployment 
are  not  the  first  to  be  seen.  But  as  a  result  of  in- 
vestigation it  is  found  that  a  vast  amount  of  un- 
employment Is  due  to  the  cyclical  and  seasonal 
nature  of  industrial  life,  and  to  a  particular  organ- 
ization of  business  which  could  be  greatly  im- 
proved by  a  good  system  of  employment  agen- 
cies. While  It  Is  a  fact  that  the  general  tendency 
is  to  overemphasize  human  nature  as  a  cause  in 

[50] 


the  whole  field,  still  the  preceding  analyses  do 
not  warrant  any  dogmatic  doctrines.  The  dogma 
of  the  pure  environmentalist  is  as  untrue  as  the 
dogma  of  the  biologist  as  previously  indicated  in 
the  study  of  crime.  The  investigation  should 
concern  both  factors  and  the  facts  in  each  case 
will  determine  the  relative  significance  of  each 
factor.  There  are  perhaps  several  reasons  why 
good  methodology  should  sanction  as  a  first  step 
a  consideration  of  the  cultural  factor.  In  the 
first  place  the  cultural  factor  is  directly  connected 
with  a  description  of  the  phenomenon;  a  descrip- 
tion being  necessary  before  an  analysis  of  causes 
is  undertaken.  An  account  of  the  cultural  factor 
is  in  part  a  history  and  an  account  of  contem- 
porary cultural  relationships.  Furtnermore,  it 
is  frequently  possible  to  make  such  an  account 
with  a  fair  degree  of  accuracy.  It  is  usually 
much  more  difficult  to  describe  the  factor  of  hu- 
man nature.  Human  nature  is  very  elusive;  our 
ignorance  of  its  laws  is  great;  measurement  is 
difficult;  and  prejudices  are  strong.  Further- 
more the  influence  of  the  factor,  human  nature, 
can  be  seen  usually  much  more  clearly  after  the 
cultural  factor  is  understood.  These  remarks, 
while  applying  specifically  to  analyses  of  partic- 
ular social  phenomena,  are  also  applicable  to 
accounts  of  cultural  development  in  general. 

[51] 


PART  II 
SOCIAL  EVOLUTION 


In  Part  II  the  discussion  will  concern  some  of  the 
ways  in  which  culture  has  grown  and  changed. 
There  was  a  time  when  culture  was  very  small. 
Now  it  is  very  great  and  wonderful.  We  call  it 
civilization.  How  has  civilization  grown  to  be 
what  it  is?  Has  the  psychological  development 
of  the  race  been  the  cause  of  its  growth?  Can 
the  nature  of  its  growth  and  change  be  described 
in  a  few  simple  processes?  Can  we  deduce  a  few 
leading  causes  or  laws  of  Its  evolution?  What 
of  Its  future  development?  Can  it  be  consciously 
directed  and  effectively  controlled?  These  ques- 
tions naturally  occur  to  the  mind  thinking  of 
social  evolution.  In  a  general  way  the  questions 
suggest  the  nature  of  the  inquiries  which  follow. 
They  have  been  the  subject  matter  of  investiga- 
tion of  sociologists  and  other  students  of  the 
social  sciences  for  many  years,  and  are  listed  here 
not  so  much  with  the  idea  of  giving  a  satisfactory 
answer  to  them,  but  rather  as  suggesting  the 
general  nature  of  the  topic  under  discussion. 
More  particularly  we  shall  raise  the  question 
whether  the  biological  evolution  of  man  is  an  es- 

[55] 


sentlal  factor  in  the  growth  of  civilization,  that 
is,  whether  culture  may  not  develop  when  there 
is  no  biological  change.  We  shall  also  try  to 
describe  in  broad  outline  some  of  the  processes 
by  which  civilization  has  come  about. 


CONCEPTIONS  OF  SOCIAL  EVOLUTION 

The  topics  referred  to  in  the  preceding  para- 
graph have  been  the  theme  of  a  study  known  as 
social  evolution.  The  publication  of  the  Origin 
of  Species,  setting  forth  a  theory  of  evolution  of 
species  in  terms  of  natural  selection,  heredity  and 
variation,  created  a  deep  impression  on  the  an- 
thropologists and  sociologists.  The  conception 
of  evolution  was  so  profound  that  the  changes  in 
society  were  seen  as  a  manifestation  of  evolution 
and  there  was  an  attempt  to  seek  the  causes  of 
these  social  changes  in  terms  of  variation  and  se- 
lection, very  much  as  changes  in  species  had  been 
accounted  for.  History  had  formerly  been 
largely  descriptive  of  events  of  a  political,  militar- 
istic, economic  or  personal  nature.  But  follow- 
ing Darwin  there  was  a  great  impetus  to  sociolo- 
gists to  seek  causes.  In  terms  of  processes  and 
laws,   of  more  generalized  social  changes  such 

[56] 


as  the  origin  and  development  of  social  institu- 
tions. The  tedious  task  of  recording  facts  and 
collecting  data  was  not  abandoned  but  greater 
emphasis  was  laid  on  the  search  for  causes.  Pre- 
liminary to  the  search  for  causes,  however,  at- 
tempts were  made  to  establish  the  development 
of  particular  social  institutions  in  successive 
stages,  an  evolutionary  series,  a  particular  stage 
necessarily  preceding  another.  The  search  for 
laws  led  to  many  hypotheses  regarding  factors 
such  as  geographical  location,  climate,  migra- 
tion, group  conflict,  racial  ability,  the  evolution 
of  mental  ability,  and  such  principles  as  varia- 
tion, natural  selection,  and  survival  of  the  fit.  A 
half-century  or  more  of  investigations  on  such 
theories  has  yielded  some  results,  but  the  achieve- 
ments have  not  been  up  to  the  high  hopes  enter- 
tained shortly  after- the  publication  of  Darwin's 
theory  of  natural  selection. 

The  inevitable  series  of  stages  in  the  develop- 
ment of  social  institutions  has  not  only  not  been 
proven  but  has  been  disproven.  For  illustration, 
the  history  of  a  particular  social  institution  among 
a  particular  people  may  show  a  series  of  forms; 
among  other  peoples,  though,  no  such  similar 
series  of  forms  has  appeared.  The  attempts  to 
find  laws  of  heredity,  variation  and  selection  in  the 
evolution  of  social  institutions  have  produced  few 
results  either  vital  or  significant.     These  results 

[57] 


are  in  the  main  only  analogous  and  Illustrative. 
Strong  claims  have  been  made  for  climate  and 
race,  but  for  many  of  the  generalizations  the  evi- 
dence is  not  authoritatively  conclusive.  The 
field  of  psychological  causes  is  in  the  stage  of 
being  opened  up.  Certainly  the  study  of  social 
evolution  is  still  in  the  process  of  its  early  de- 
velopment and  no  such  impressive  conclusions 
have  been  as  yet  forthcoming,  as  the  theory  of  ev- 
olution for  biology. 

The  facts  of  social  evolution  will  be  recorded, 
however,  In  greater  and  greater  number;  some  of 
the  work  that  has  already  been  done  will  serve  as 
foundation  for  further  researches;  and  eventually 
the  processes,  causes  and  laws  will  become 
clearer.  It  Is  hoped  that  the  analyses  which 
follow  will  add  something  to  the  knowledge  of 
this  field  of  Investigation. 

The  following  discussion  Is  more  accurately 
described  as  relating  to  the  development  of  cul- 
ture rather  than  of  social  evolution.  Social  evo- 
lution and  cultural  evolution  are  not  the  same,  as 
society  and  culture  are  not  the  same.  Culture 
may  be  thought  of  as  the  accumulated  products 
of  human  society,  and  includes  the  use  of  material 
objects  as  well  as  social  Institutions  and  social 
ways  of  doing  things.  Hence  cultural  change  Is 
the  change  In  these  products.  Social  evolution  is 
the  evolution  of  society  and  society  Is  usually  de- 

[58] 


scribed  in  psychological  terms,  such  as  sociability, 
gregariousness,  association,  response  to  stimuli 
and  consciousness  of  kind,  and  not  in  cultural 
terms.  If  society  be  thus  strictly  defined,  then 
social  evolution  would  mean  the  evolution  of  such 
mechanisms  of  association.  If  these  mechanisms 
of  association  be  conceived  in  purely  psychologi- 
cal terms,  that  is,  as  inherent  psychological  mech- 
anisms, then  it  may  be  questioned  whether  there 
has  been  any  social  evolution  in  many  centuries, 
for  the  inherited  biological  mechanisms  of  associa- 
tion may  not  have  changed  for  a  long  time. 
There  have  been  changes  in  response  to  stimuli, 
but  it  may  very  well  be  that  such  changes  are  in 
the  cultural  nature  of  the  stimuli  or  responses  and 
not  in  the  inherited  psychological  nature  of  the  re- 
sponses. It  may  be  that  there  has  been  change 
in  the  consciousness  of  kind,  but  the  question  is 
whether  such  change  has  been  in  the  cultural 
nature  of  kind  or  in  the  inherited  psychological 
nature  of  consciousness. 

If  social  evolution  be  interpreted  in  this  strict 
psychological  conception  of  society,  then  the  evolu- 
tion in  the  psychological  mechanisms  of  associa- 
tion becomes  essentially  biological  evolution ;  and 
hence  social  evolution  is  merely  a  phase  of  biolog- 
ical evolution.  But  social  evolution  is  usually  not 
so  narrowly  understood.  If  social  evolution 
means  changes  in  the  mechanisms  of  association 

[59] 


then  such  changes  may  be  quite  truly  cultural,  for 
there  are  cultural  mechanisms  of  association  just 
as  there  are  biological  mechanisms  of  association. 
Social  evolution,  in  such  case,  consists  largely  in 
the  evolution  of  social  organizations  and  social 
ways  of  behavior,  as  seen  in  religion,  art,  law, 
custom,  etc.  Social  evolution  thus  includes  a 
large  part  of  the  evolution  of  culture,  virtually 
all  but  material  culture.  And  if  the  objects  of 
material  culture  are  the  products  of  social  influ- 
ence and  behavior  then  the  evolution  of  the  whole 
of  culture  is  a  part  of  social  evolution.  Social 
evolution  in  addition  includes  the  possible  evolu- 
tion of  the  inherited  mechanisms  of  association 
which  are  not  part  of  the  field  of  cultural  evolu- 
tion. 

However  these  definitions  may  be  settled,^  and 
irrespective  of  the  overlapping  of  these  fields,  the 
subject  matter  under  discussion  in  the  pages  which 
follow  is  the  development  of  culture.  Even  from 
the  point  of  view  of  social  evolution  it  is  thought 
that  the  study  of  changes  in  culture,  rather  than 
in  society,  is  desirable  methodology  because  the 
influence  of  the  biological  factor  can  be  seen  more 
clearly.  In  the  previous  chapter  it  has  been 
pointed  out  that  confusion  has  resulted  from 
failure  to  segregate  the  cultural  and  the  biological 

iPor  further  discussion,  see  Ellwood,  "Theories  of  Cultural 
Evolution,"  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  XXIII,  No.  6. 

[60] 


factors.  The  writers  on  social  evolution  have 
seldom  attempted  to  differentiate  these  factors  in 
explaining  cultural  changes.  Frequently  authors 
have  seemed  to  assume  that  marked  cultural 
changes  have  been  due  to  a  biological  evolution  of 
inherent  mental  ability,  while  a  few  others  have 
recorded  cultural  changes  without  apparent  con- 
cern as  to  whether  these  changes  have  been  due 
to  changes  in  the  original  nature  of  man  or  not. 


THE    BIOLOGICAL    FACTOR    AND   THE    CULTURAL 
FACTOR  IN  SOCIAL  CHANGE 

Theoretically,  cultural  changes  may  be  ac- 
counted for  in  terms  of  changes  in  the  biological 
nature  of  man  or  in  purely  cultural  factors.  Thus 
Lowie's  explanation  of  the  origins  of  the  clan  as 
the  result  of  property  rights  and  of  modes  of  resi- 
dence after  marriage  is  a  study  of  a  purely  cultural 
cause  of  a  cultural  change.^  Such  a  change  to  a 
clan  form  of  organization  is  not  occasioned  by  a 
change  in  inherited  human  nature  but  may  have 
come  about  as  a  result  of  the  development  of 
property  and  a  change  in  residence  habits.     In 

2  Robert  H.  Lowie,  "Family  and  Sib,"  American  Anthropol- 
ogist, New  Series,  Vol.  XXI  (1919),  PP.  28-41. 

[61] 


this  explanation  nothing  is  said  or  implied 
regarding  the  change  in  the  biological  nature 
of  man.  Similarly  the  instability  of  the  modern 
family  and  the  recent  changes  in  the  family 
as  a  functioning  organization  may  be  explained 
wholly  on  a  cultural  basis.  These  changes 
are  due  largely  to  the  discovery  of  the 
uses  of  steam  and  its  application  to  mechanical 
industry,  the  rise  of  cities,  the  introduction  of 
women  into  industry  and  the  discovery  of  methods 
of  birth  control.  Changes  in  the  family  may 
thus  be  explained  without  reference  to  causes  due 
to  changes  in  the  biological  nature  of  man.  Man 
may  remain  biologically  the  same,  yet  important 
changes  in  a  social  organization  occur. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  causes  of  changes  in 
culture  may  be  sought  in  changes  in  the  biological 
nature  of  man.  Thus  SoUas  ^  seems  to  assume 
a  close  correlation  between  biological  evolution 
and  cultural  evolution,  implying  that  the  heights 
of  cultural  attainments  of  the  various  peoples  are 
indications  of  the  steps  in  their  biological  evolu- 
tion. For  instance,  he  tries  to  show  that  peoples 
to-day  with  cultures  very  similar  to  the  cultures 
of  the  peoples  living  during  the  ice  ages  in  Europe 
are  of  the  same  racial  type  as  these  earlier  peoples. 
Thus,  the  Bushmen  of  modern  times  are  the  same 

3W.  J.  Sollas,  Ancient  Hunters,  Chapters  VII,  IX  and  XII, 
»0d  pp.  302,  303. 

[62] 


peoples  racially  as  the  Aurignacians  of  the  last  ice 
age  in  Europe,  the  Aurignacians  having  migrated 
In  early  times  to  southern  Africa,  he  thinks.  His 
most  important  evidence  seems  to  be  that  their 
cultures  are  much  alike.  So  also  the  Australians 
are  the  Mousterians,  and  the  Eskimo  are  the 
Magdalenians.  Such  reasoning  leads  to  the  con- 
clusion that  among  the  peoples  possessing  simpler 
cultures,  the  heights  of  cultural  possibilities  are 
limited  by  the  stages  of  biological  evolution  of 
the  various  peoples.  So  we  have  an  Interpreta- 
tion of  cultural  evolution  In  terms  of  biological 
evolution.  In  fact  it  is  quite  usually  taken  for 
granted  that  the  civilized  peoples  are  superior 
biologically,  particularly  in  the  inherited  mental 
qualities,  to  our  ancestors  the  cave  men,  because 
we  have  a  superior  culture.  It  seems  to  follow  as 
a  corollary  that  our  superior  culture  is  due  to  our 
higher  mental  evolution,  i.  e.,  biological  evolu- 
tion. In  fact,  It  is  quite  generally  assumed  that 
the  status  of  the  culture  of  any  people  is  an  in- 
dex of  the  stage  of  their  inherent  mental  develop- 
ment as  a  race.  For  if  a  people  had  more  inher- 
ent mental  ability,  then  their  culture  would  have 
been  developed  to  a  higher  degree.  This  attitude 
is  what  Is  meant  when  it  Is  said  that  the  evolution 
of  culture  is  interpreted  in  terms  of  the  biological 
factor. 

Another    illustration    may    make    the    point 

[63] 


clearer.  A  number  of  anthropologists,  par- 
ticularly Lewis  H.  Morgan,  held  the  following 
theory  with  regard  to  the  origin  of  the  clan.* 
In  the  clan,  descent  is  reckoned  through  the 
mother  only,  kinship  being  counted  among  the 
relations  on  the  mother's  side  only  and  marriage 
is  exogamous.  This  peculiar  method  of  tracing 
kinship  was  supposed  to  be  a  stage  in  an  evolution- 
ary series.  Before  the  metronymic  stage  it  was 
thought  that  there  was  no  permanent  marriage 
of  pairs.  There  was  promiscuity  in  sexual  rela- 
tions. Eventually  man's  sexual  relations  became 
more  stable,  and  organized  sexual  relations 
emerged.  Tracing  descent  through  the  mother 
was  natural,  since  there  was  uncertainty  about  the 
father;  hence  kinship  on  the  father's  side  was  not 
counted.  In  so  far  as  such  a  change  from  a  state 
of  promiscuous  sexual  relations  to  a  family  tracing 
descent  through  the  mother  occurred  as  a  result 
of  evolution  in  the  inherent  sexual  nature  of  men 
and  women,  then  we  have  a  cultural  change 
accounted  for  in  biological  terms.  This  theory 
is  discredited  now  largely  as  a  result  of  the 
accumulation  of  additional  data.  There  is  no 
evidence  to  show  that  a  state  of  so-called  sexual 
promiscuity  ever  existed  and  there  are  many  prim- 
itive peoples  with  very  crude  cultures  who  count 
as  kin  the  blood  relatives  of  both  parents,  as  we 

*  Lewis  H.  Morgan,  Ancient  Society,  pp.  4.18,  4^3'^ 

[64] 


do.  A  change  from  promiscuity  to  the  organized 
family  could  have  occurred  without  any  biological 
change  in  the  inherent  sexual  nature  of  men  and 
women.  Culture  may  have  brought  about  differ- 
ent habits  without  a  change  in  the  germ  plasm. 

Culture  may  therefore  have  changed  possibly 
because  of  changes  in  the  biological  nature  of 
man  or  possibly  because  of  cultural  processes. 
There  is  of  course  a  psychological  side  to  cul- 
tural changes,  since  culture  could  not  change  ex- 
cept through  the  medium  of  human  beings.  A 
consideration  of  the  psychological  side  to  cultural 
change  unfolds  the  whole  question  of  the  relations 
of  psychology  and  sociology.  The  psychological 
factor  in  social  change  is  far-reaching,  with  many 
ramifications.  We  are  not  at  this  point  con- 
cerned with  this  whole  problem,  but  we  are  inter- 
ested particularly  in  the  relation  of  biological 
evolution  to  cultural  evolution.  We  wish  par- 
ticularly to  inquire  whether  biological  evolution 
in  man  has  occurred  during  the  growth  of  our 
culture  from  its  early  beginnings  in  the  glacial 
periods  to  its  modern  form  which  we  call  civiliza- 
tion. We  are  also  interested  in  asking  how,  if  cul- 
tural evolution  does  not  depend  on  biological  evo- 
lution, has  culture  grown,  and  particularly  by 
what  cultural  processes.  Both  these  questions 
will  be  considered  in  the  pages  which  follow. 
The  discussion  of  biological  evolution  will  be 

[65] 


postponed  until  we  have  considered  the  cultural 
factors  in  the  growth  of  our  civilization.  We 
shall  first  review  some  of  the  actual  facts  of  the 
early  evolution  of  our  culture.  This  is  desirable 
in  order  to  refresh  the  memory  of  the  reader  with 
certain  records  which  will  later  serve  as  material 
for  an  attempt  to  chart  some  of  the  processes  of 
cultural  growth  and  also  as  material  to  be  con- 
trasted with  biological  evolution.  Having  made 
this  review,  we  shall  discuss  some  of  the  processes 
of  cultural  growth  and  then  consider  the  possible 
relation  to  biological  evolution.  We  will  now 
pass  in  review  some  of  the  facts  of  the  origin  and 
development  of  our  culture. 


EARLY  RECORDS  OF   CULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT 

The  earliest  evidences  of  material  culture  are 
eoliths  or  *'dawn-stones.*'  These  eoliths  are 
rough  fragments  of  hard  stones  that  might  have 
been  used  as  cutting  implements  or  as  scrapers. 
They  have  been  found  in  considerable  numbers 
over  Europe,  but  so  far  no  remains  of  early  man 
have  been  found  with  them.  It  is  not  known 
positively  that  the  eoliths  were  broken  or  fash- 
ioned by  the  hands  of  an  animal.     It  is  possible 

[66] 


that  these  fragments  may  have  been  the  result 
of  forces  of  nature.  They  occur  in  deposits  dat- 
ing back  to  the  early  beginnings  of  the  Pleistocene 
period  and  possibly  well  back  into  the  Pliocene. 
The  Pleistocene  is  the  period  of  the  four  glacial 
and  the  corresponding  interglacial  and  postglacial 
periods.  Its  beginning  is  a  half-million  or  more 
years  ago. 

It  is  not  until  the  third  interglacial  period,  how- 
ever, that  stone  implements  are  found  which  are 
definitely  known  to  have  been  artificially  chipped. 
These  implements  are  made  apparently  from 
accidental  forms  by  a  few  retouches.  Five  or 
six  forms  have  been  classified;  planing  tools, 
scrapers,  drills  or  borers,  knives,  hammerstones 
and  hand  stones.  This  industry  is  called  the  Pre- 
Chellean  and  existed  125,000  years  ago  according 
to  Osborn's  estimate.*^  Others  have  dated  it  an- 
other 100,000  years  further  back.  But  certainly 
125,000  years  ago  there  was  a  material  culture. 
Observations  have  been  most  frequent  in  Europe, 
and  of  course  it  cannot  be  said  what  future  exca- 
vations may  show.  Only  slight  search  has  been 
made  in  Asia  and  the  finding  of  remains  of  early 
culture  Is  to  a  certain  extent  accidental. 

The  Chellean  stone  industry  was  fairly  highly 
developed  and  quite  extensive.  Its  date  was 
around  100,000  years  ago  according  to  Osborn. 

5  Henry  Fairfield  Osborn,  Mm  of  the  Old  Stone  Age, 

[67] 


The  following  references  to  the  stone  culture  are 
from  Osborn  unless  otherwise  noted.  The 
Chellean  Industry  is  in  two  phases,  the  early  phase 
showing  the  appearance  of  the  characteristic  al- 
mond-shaped **coup  de  potng^^  made  from  a  no- 
dule of  quartzite  or  flint,  rather  unsymmetrical, 
however,  and  with  uneven  edges.  There  were 
also  improved  scrapers,  planes,  and  borers.  In 
the  late  Chellean  period,  the  "row/>  de  poing*^  is 
more  oval,  longer  and  pointed,  but  flaked  on  both 
sides.  The  workers  were  still  dependent  on 
chance  shapes  of  shattered  fragments.  A  some- 
what larger  number  of  forms  appear,  disk  forms, 
curved  scrapers,  "pointes,"  borers,  pointed 
scrapers,  knives,  knives  with  coarse  boring-point 
at  one  end,  thick  scrapers,  and  certain  combin- 
ation tools.  Within  another  25,000  years  and 
towards  the  close  of  the  warm  interglacial  period, 
the  stone  industry  reached  a  high  degree  cf 
development  in  the  successive  phases  of  the  Acheu- 
lean  industry.  A  number  of  new  forms  appeared : 
choppers,  a  chisel-like  implement,  points  possibly 
used  as  darts  or  spearheads,  thin  and  flat  tri- 
angular pieces  and  the  Levallois  knife.  There 
was  an  improvement  in  technique  and  a  wider  use 
of  the  flakes. 

The  stonework  tells  only  what  they  did  have 
in  stone,  but  does  not  indicate  very  satisfactorily 
what  they  did  not  have.     Of  course  it  can  be  told 

[68] 


that  they  did  not  have  the  metals,  but  regarding 
such  items  as  clothing,  dwellings,  use  of  bone,  art, 
types  of  food,  the  record  is  more  or  less  blank. 
No  definite  inferences  can  be  made  either  as  to  the 
status  of  their  social  organization,  the  family, 
rules  of  marriage,  religious  ideas,  customs  and 
law.  It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  some 
considerable  development  of  these  features  of  cul- 
ture at  that  time  is  quite  possible.  The  abori- 
gines of  Australia,  for  instance,  have  a  crude 
stone  techriique  and  the  status  of  their  material 
culture  is  low,  yet  their  social  organization  is 
highly  developed  and  their  religious  beliefs  and 
practices  are  most  elaborate. 

Beginning  with  the  last  glacial  period  appeared 
the  Mousterian  culture,  some  50,000  or  more 
years  ago,  and  with  this  culture  there  have  been 
found  a  good  many  skeletal  remains  of  man. 
The  people  of  this  time  lived  in  caves  and  the 
climate  of  central  Europe  was  quite  cold.  There 
were  several  changes  in  stone  technique  and  some 
new  forms  Some  bone  anvils  from  the  foot  and 
leg  of  the  bison  and  the  horse  have  been  found 
and  also  some  few  bone  implements  of  the  awl 
type.  In  contact  with  the  Mousterian  culture 
appeared  the  Aurignacian  culture,  25,000  or 
30,000  years  ago.  The  Aurignacian  culture  in- 
cluded, in  addition  to  the  stone  tools,  a  number 
of  forms  in  bone  and  horn,  such  as  blades,  javelin 

[69] 


points,  smoothers,  wedges,  chisels,  awls  and 
needles.  There  was  also  that  odd  form,  ap- 
parently a  ceremonial  staff,  and  usually  called  a 
*^baton  de  commandement,**  Engraving  and 
drawing  were  fairly  well  developed  in  this  culture. 
These  arts  show  a  close  observation  of  the  animal 
form,  the  attainment  of  realism  in  a  few  lines, 
and  a  considerable  ability  to  portray  movement. 
Bas-reliefs  of  woman  and  a  spear-thrower  have 
been  found,  and  a  number  of  statuettes.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  rather  long  list  of  stone  implements 
used  in  industrial  life  and  the  somewhat  short 
list,  apparently  used  in  the  chase,  there  were 
found  in  this  culture  a  number  of  different  forms 
of  stone  implements  which  are  used  in  art.  Paint 
is  used  and  crucibles  for  mixing  red  and  yellow 
oxides  of  iron  have  been  found.  The  burial  po- 
sitions and  the  presence  in  graves  of  objects  use- 
ful in  life  suggest  religious  ideas.  They  lived  in 
grottoes  and  many  objects  are  found  around  the 
fire  hearth.  Much  discussion  has  centred  about 
the  question  of  whether  the  Aurignaclan  culture 
as  found  in  stations  in  Europe  was  autochthonous 
or  was  brought  in  from  the  south  along  the  shores 
of  the  Mediterranean.  There  is  a  good  deal  of 
evidence  to  support  the  latter  view. 

With  the  Solutrean  culture,  possibly  coming 
into  Europe  from  west  and  south-central  Asia, 
occurs  the  highly-developed  new  method  of  flak- 

[70] 


ing  stones  by  pressure  rather  than  by  blows. 
This  method  developed  the  fine  laurel-  and  wil- 
low-leaf patterns,  flaked  all  over  with  their 
smooth  edges.  Also  the  shouldered  point  and 
the  barbed  dart,  for  holding  in  the  flesh,  with  a 
stem  for  attachment,  is  found.  Animal  sculpture 
began  and  also  decorative  art  with  geometric 
patterns. 

The  culture  of  the  old  stone  age,  as  seen  in  the 
remains,  reached  the  apex  of  its  development  In 
the  Magdalenlan  period,  which,  according  to 
Osborn,  existed  around  16,000  years  ago.  The 
work  in  flints  was  not,  however,  extraordinarily 
skilled,  but  work  of  an  unusually  high  degree  of 
skill  In  bone,  ivory  and  horn  existed,  and  particu- 
larly elaborate  was  the  technique  of  the  harpoon 
with  double  rows  of  barbs.  There  was  an  un- 
precedented variety  of  drills  and  borers.  Many 
of  the  implements  were  richly  adorned.  The 
stone  lamp  was  used  and  there  is  evidence  of  the 
th rowing-stick  and  possibly  of  bows  and  arrows. 
Most  spectacular  was  the  art  In  drawing,  etching, 
painting  and  sculpture.  The  somewhat  lengthy 
treatises  that  have  been  written  on  the  art  of  the 
Magdalenlan  period  show  it  as  an  art  culture 
quite  comparable  with  later  art  periods  In  Greece 
and  Italy.  The  material  culture  of  the  Magda- 
lenlan period  Is  similar  to  that  found  among  the 
Eskimo  to-day.     In  fact.  If  the  material  culture 

[71] 


found  among  the  Eskimo  had  lain  buried  for  so 
long  a  time,  the  remains  would  be  very  similar  to 
those  of  the  Magdalenian  period,  with  not  so 
high  a  record  in  painting  and  drawing.  A  great 
deal  is  known  about  the  social  organization,  re- 
ligious beliefs,  literature,  science,  and  customs  of 
the  Eskimo ;  but,  of  course,  it  does  not  follow  that 
the  Magdalenian  culture  was  in  these  respects  the 
same,  for  the  material  culture  does  not  determine 
the  status  of  the  other  features  of  culture. 

Then  comes  the  neolithic  culture  with  polished 
flints,  the  axe,  the  hatchet,  the  pick,  pottery,  use 
of  seeds  and  grains  and  knowledge  of  agriculture, 
the  domestication  of  animals,  the  construction  of 
houses.  Later  appear  boats,  the  wheel,  and  the 
use  of  copper,  bronze  and  iron. 

From  neolithic  times  the  record  of  cultural 
iadvancement  is  generally  known.  At  the  dawn 
of  the  historical  period,  the  material  culture  con- 
tained nearly  all  of  the  fundamentals  of  our  own 
material  culture;  but  since  the  beginnings  of  his- 
tory the  elaboration  of  such  fundamentals  as 
housing,  agriculture,  manufacturing,  transpor- 
tation, clothing,  foods,  and  the  like  has  been  most 
striking.  There  have  also  been  since  the  begin- 
ning of  history  a  number  of  very  important  fun- 
damental inventions.  To-day  the  material  cul- 
ture is  quite  magnificent,  consisting  of  the  use  of 
a  great  diversity  of  such  objects  and  substances 

[72] 


as  factories,  machines,  agricultural  tools,  build- 
ings, engineering  accomplishments,  means  of 
transportation  on  land,  on  sea  and  in  air,  sanita- 
tion equipment,  munitions  for  warfare,  steam  en- 
gines, gasoline  engines,  electrical  plants  and  ap- 
pliances, explosives,  furniture,  heating  apparatus, 
clothing,  foods,  shoes,  household  utensils,  objects 
of  adornment,  jewelry,  medicines,  drugs,  chemi- 
cals, reading  matter,  printing,  etc.,  etc. 


THE    CUMULATIVE    NATURE    OF   MATERIAL    CUL- 
TURE AND  ITS  DIVERSIFICATION 

The  foregoing  pages  have  served  the  purpose 
of  calling  the  attention  of  the  reader  to  some- 
thing of  the  origin  and  development  of  the  super- 
organic,  particularly  on  its  material  side.  Look- 
ing at  this  growth  of  material  culture  from  its 
beginnings  there  are  several  processes  of  its  devel- 
opment that  are  seen  at  once  but  that  require 
some  consideration.  The  first  point  to  be  ob- 
served is  that  material  culture  accumulates.  The 
use  of  bone  is  added  to  the  use  of  stone.  The  use 
of  bronze  is  added  to  the  use  of  copper  and  the 
use  of  iron  is  added  to  the  use  of  bronze.  So  that 
the  stream  of  material  culture  grows  bigger.     The 

[73] 


lives  of  material  objects  vary;  some  are  much 
shorter  than  a  human  lifetime  and  others  much 
longer.  Indeed,  there  Is  no  special  relation  be- 
tween the  life  of  material  objects  and  the  lifetime 
of  human  beings.  Social  Inheritance  differs 
from  biological  inheritance.  We  come  into  these 
two  Inheritances  by  quite  different  methods.  It 
Is  remembered  that  acquired  characteristics  are 
not  inherited  and  that  each  human  life  begins 
where  its  predecessor  began  unless  there  be  muta- 
tions. The  biological  inheritance  of  each  succeed- 
ing Individual  is  more  or  less  the  same,  with  vari- 
ations, but  the  social  inheritance  may  be  quite 
different  and  much  greater  in  another  generation, 
due  to  Its  cumulative  nature.  The  cumulative 
nature  of  the  process  of  material  culture  lies  not 
in  the  life  of  the  particular  object  but  In  the  per- 
petuation of  the  knowledge  of  the  method  of 
making  the  object,  which  is  passed  on  from  gen- 
eration to  generation. 

This  cumulative  aspect  is  due  to  two  features 
of  the  cultural  process,  one  is  the  persistence 
of  cultural  forms  and  the  other  Is  the  ad- 
dition of  new  forms.  The  persistence  of  cul- 
tural forms  has  been  called  cultural  inertia  and 
is  so  important  a  phenomenon  as  to  warrant 
special  consideration  later.  But  in  general  a  cul- 
tural object  tends  to  persist  because  it  has  utility. 
The  cultural  object  itself  may  wear  out,  be  lost  or 

[74] 


destroyed,  but  the  knowledge  of  how  to  create 
it  continues  and  additional  ones  are  made,  be- 
cause they  possess  utility.  New  forms  may  be 
created  by  means  of  inventions.  The  rate  of 
accumulation  of  culture  depends  in  part  on  the 
frequency  of  inventions.  The  rate  of  inventions, 
their  cultural  determinants  and  the  dependence 
of  inventions  on  ability  make  a  most  important 
feature  of  the  cultural  process.  But  at  this  point, 
we  wish  to  point  out  only  the  cumulative  nature 
of  the  growth  of  material  culture  which  may  be 
said  to  be  one  very  important  process  of  the  evolu- 
tion of  material  culture. 

It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  not  all 
material  culture  is  accumulative  and  not  all  forms 
persist.  The  record  indeed  shows  that  the  use 
of  some  objects  declines  and  knowledge  of  making 
them  is  lost.  For  instance,  we  no  longer  chip 
flints  to  make  stone  implements  for  the  chase,  ex- 
cept in  isolated  spots.  Chipping  stones  does  of 
course  occur  in  the  various  uses  made  of  stone  to- 
day. The  bone  culture  of  the  Aurignacian  and 
the  Magdalenian  periods  probably  replaced  some 
use  of  stone  and  the  perfection  of  bronze  and  iron 
almost  wholly  replaced  it.  The  use  of  the  domes- 
ticated horse  is  being  replaced  though  not  wholly 
by  the  use  of  motor-driven  vehicles.  The  hunting 
cultures  are  being  lost.  It  has  been  said  that  the 
canoe  was  lost  by  some  of  the  island  peoples  of 

[75] 


Melanesia.  The  cultural  forms  may  be  lost  for 
various  reasons.  A  particular  form  may  be  lost 
because  of  the  invention  of  a  newer  form  which 
serves  the  purpose  better.  One  invention  may 
therefore  not  simply  be  added  to  the  existing 
number  but  may  replace  a  previous  invention. 
Climatic  changes  or  exhaustion  of  natural  mater- 
ials may  cause  a  loss.  The  culture  of  a  partic- 
ular people  may  suffer  a  loss  if  they  migrate  to  a 
new  geographical  location.  Thus  a  people  may 
give  up  their  hunting  culture  and  become  herders 
of  cattle. 

It  would  be  very  desirable  if  we  could  form 
some  quantitative  estimate  of  the  actual  extent  to 
which  material  culture  is  lost  and  to  which  It 
accumulates.  It  is  quite  possible  that  there  may 
be  a  tendency  to  overemphasize  its  cumulative 
nature  and  to  fail  to  recognize  the  amount  that  is 
lost.  The  material  cultures  possessed  by  a  people 
in  a  particular  location  will,  over  a  long  period 
of  time,  show  a  large  proportion  actually  lost. 
This  would  not  be  true  to  so  great  an  extent  for 
the  world  as  a  whole,  though.  However,  it  is 
certainly  more  accurate  to  refer  to  this  particular 
cultural  process  as  selectively  cumulative ;  and  by 
selective  accumulation  is  meant  the  fact  that  new 
forms  of  material  culture  are  added  and  some  old 
ones  discarded,  there  having  been  a  selection. 
The  additions  have  exceeded  the  discards,  so  that 

[76] 


the  stream  of  material  culture  of  a  particular 
people  has  widened  with  time.  Material  culture 
has  very  greatly  accumulated  if  we  add  together 
all  the  cultures  of  the  world. 

The  phenomenon  of  selective  accumulation  Is 
certainly  true  of  material  culture,  but  it  may  not 
be  true  for  other  parts  of  culture,  such  as  religion, 
science,  art,  law  and  custom.  Customs  may  be 
on!\*  slightly  accumulative.  The  selection  or  re- 
placement aspect  of  the  cultural  process  is  very 
noticeable  in  the  change  of  customs.  In  our 
modern  civilization  there  is  very  little  trace  of  the 
vast  number  of  customs  which  are  found  among 
primitive  peoples  and  which  our  ancestors  may  at 
one  time  have  practised.  Many  customs  are  corre- 
lated with  the  material  culture,  since  they  are  ways 
or  habits  of  using  the  objects  of  material  culture, 
so  the  accumulation  of  material  culture  means 
some  accumulation  of  customs.  Religion,  in- 
deed, as  seen  in  its  organized  forms  and  practices 
may  even  have  diminished.  There  certainly 
seems  to  be  less  organized  expression  of  religion 
in  modern  civilization  than  occurs  among  most 
peoples  with  primitive  cultures.  It  is  difficult  to 
make  such  generalizations  regarding  religion  for 
the  reason  that  there  is  disagreement  as  to  just 
what  type  of  behavior  should  be  called  religious 
behavior.  But  among  peoples  with  primitive 
cultures  what  may  be  called  religious  practices 

[77] 


seem  to  be  much  more  prevalent  m  connection 
with  such  activities  as  medicine,  warfare,  festi- 
vals, recreations,  social  organizations  and  morals 
than  with  us.  In  general  the  cumulative  aspect 
of  culture  is  probably  more  noticeable  with  ma- 
terial culture  than  with  those  other  parts  of  cul- 
ture. 

The  selective  nature  of  |:he  accumulation  of 
material  culture  does  not  always  mean  than  old 
forms  are  wholly  lost;  but  rather  that  they  are 
discarded  by  a  particular  group  or  part  of  a  group. 
They  may  continue  to  exist  elsewhere.  Peoples 
take  up  the  use  of  steam  in  manufacturing  but 
they  do  not  necessarily  abandon  agriculture. 
Railroads  did  not  mean  the  complete  disuse  of 
canals,  nor  do  automobiles  wholly  replace  horses. 
A  particular  social  group  may  abandon  completely 
an  old  form  for  a  new,  but  other  social  groups 
may  continue  to  use  the  old  forms.  This  means 
that  there  are  groups  functioning  in  two  different 
ways  where  there  was  only  one  method  of  func- 
tioning before.  Such  a  process  indicates  that 
material  culture  becomes  diversified.  The  com- 
plexity and  heterogeneity  of  modern  society  is 
to  be  accounted  for,  in  part,  by  the  fact  that  ma- 
terial culture  is  selectively  accumulative. 

The  material  culture  of  a  particular  people  or 
nation  thus  becomes  diversified,  resulting  in 
heterogeneity.     If  we  think  of  the  material  cul* 

[78] 


ture  of  the  whole  world,  the  diversification  is  very 
great  indeed.  Some  peoples  will  have  their  cul- 
ture undergo  considerable  change,  dropping  old 
systems  and  taking  on  new  ones,  while  other  peo- 
ples continue  to  use  the  older  systems.  Such  dif- 
ferences among  cultures  may  occur  because  of 
various  factors,  such  as  climate,  resources  of  na- 
ture, or  geographical  location.  Relative  degrees 
of  isolation  are  a  most  important  factor  in  such 
diversification.  The  discussion  of  these  factors 
leads  to  a  general  consideration  of  why  culture 
changes  and  why  it  does  not  change,  which  is 
taken  up  in  Part  III. 

Frequently  the  use  of  old  forms  of  material 
culture  is  proportionately  slight  and  of  less  social 
significance  than  the  use  of  the  newer  forms,  re- 
sulting nevertheless  in  complexity.  There  are 
many  interesting  consequences  of  this  hetero- 
geneity, which  have  effects  on  various  social  re- 
lations, such  as  government,  customs,  justice  and 
morality.  One  of  these  consequences  is  special- 
ization. A  particular  individual  will  not  become 
acquainted  with  the  whole  of  culture,  but  only  the 
part  which  he,  so  to  speak,  specializes  in.  This 
is  also  true  of  a  social  group  or  people. 


[79] 


INVENTIONS,  MENTAL  ABILITY  AND 
CULTURE 

The  addition  of  cultural  forms  that  accumulate 
is  the  result  of  invention  and  discovery.  That 
culture  grows  by  means  of  inventions  is  of  course 
universally  recognized.  But  it  is  not  clear  just 
how  inventions  occur.  It  is  quite  customary  to 
think  of  inventions  as  the  achievement  of  native 
ability,  for  inventors  have  a  high  degree  of  mental 
ability.  Hence  it  follows  that  an  improvement  in 
the  inherent  mental  ability  of  the  race  would  result 
in  an  increased  number  of  inventions.  This  is 
true.  But  the  truth  of  the  converse  statement 
does  not  follow.  An  increase  in  inventions  is  not 
always  the  result  of  an  improvement  in  the  inher- 
ent mental  ability  of  the  race,  for  there  are  other 
factors  in  the  production  of  inventions  in  addition 
to  ability.  An  increase  in  the  number  of  inven- 
tions may  flow  from  an  increased  mental  ability, 
but  the  increase  in  mental  ability  may  be  purely 
cultural  and  not  biological.  A  people  may  be 
more  able  because  of  training  and  not  because  of 

[80] 


change  in  the  germ  plasm.  In  Interpreting  the 
phrase,  mental  ability,  it  Is  seen  that  tho  word 
does  not  refer  exclusively  to  the  biological  ele- 
ment. An  individual's  mind  at  a  particular  mo- 
ment IS  the  result  of  both  nature  and  nurture. 
Variations  In  ability  may  result  from  variations 
in  nurture  as  well  as  from  variations  In  nature. 

In  another  sense  It  can  be  shown  that  Inventions 
are  the  result  of  Inherent  natural  ability.  In  any 
sample  of  population,  the  distribution  of  inherent 
mental  ability,  in  respect  to  any  one  mental  trait, 
conforms  more  or  less  closely  to  the  normal  prob- 
ability curve;  theie  are  only  a  few  individuals  with 
great  ability,  a  few  with  very  low  ability  and  a 
great  many  with  ordinary  ability.  Inventors  are 
found  In  an  upper  portion  of  the  curve.  They 
thus  have  more  inherent  ability  than  those  In  a 
lower  portion  of  the  curve.  So  that  In  this  sense 
superior  native  ability  is  responsible  for  inven- 
tions. Over  a  long  period  of  time  the  Inventors 
will  thus  come  from  an  upper  portion  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  native  ability.  While  this  is  true, 
yet  over  this  period  of  time  the  average  of  native 
ability  and  the  distribution  of  native  ability  may 
remain  the  same.  So  that  the  superior  ability  of 
Inventors  is  superior  only  with  respect  to  the  ex- 
isting Individuals  of  a  particular  distribution  at 
the  time,  and  not  necessarily  superior  In  the  sense 
of  increased  native   ability  with   respect   to   an 

[8i] 


earlier  population.  Of  course  over  any  long  per- 
iod of  time,  there  may  have  been  an  increase  of 
ability,  due  to  mutations.  And  cultural  achieve- 
ments play  an  important  part  in  selecting  muta- 
tions for  survival.  There  is  no  question  but  that 
mental  ability  plays  its  part  in  discovery,  but  it 
is  desirable  to  see  as  clearly  as  possible  just  what 
part  it  plays. 

The  dependence  of  inventions  on  mental  ability 
Is  more  frequently  spoken  of  than  their  depend- 
ence on  the  existing  status  of  culture.  A  certain 
general  dependence  on  the  cultural  antecedents  is 
easily  seen.  Thus  machines  employing  the  wheel 
can  not  be  constructed  or  invented  until  the  exist- 
ing culture  has  achieved  the  wheel.  Similarly  cer- 
tain technical  developments  could  hardly  occur 
without  the  knowledge  of  smelting  iron.  The 
flaking  of  flints  by  pressure  seems  dependent  on 
the  knowledge  of  shaping  stones  by  blows.  The 
underlying  cultural  achievements  necessary  for  the 
construction  of  a  modern  printing  press,  may  con- 
ceivably run  into  the  thousands  or  indeed  mil- 
lions. Thus,  if  a  cultural  base  at  any  one  time 
or  in  any  locality  be  described  generally,  it  is 
seen  to  possess  certainly  a  limiting  value  in  re- 
gard to  the  inventions  possible.  Where  an  in- 
vention depends  upon  a  series  of  inventions,  it 
seldom  occurs  that  a  single  Individual  will  make 
the  necessary  subsidiary  inventions  underlying  the 

[82] 


ultimate  invention.  The  old  saying  that  **neces- 
sity  is  the  mother  of  inventions"  is  only  a  half 
truth.  It  is  true  that  the  urgency  of  a  want  spurs 
to  greater  effort.  But  necessity  cannot  create 
in  addition  to  the  invention  the  underlying  cul- 
tural base.  In  earlier  times,  the  necessity  for 
quicker  transportation,  or  a  more  stable  food 
supply,  or  methods  of  preventing  the  deaths  of 
babies  was  perhaps  more  urgent  than  now,  but 
such  wants  did  not  produce  the  inventions.  Prim- 
itive medicine  in  many  diseases  was  powerless 
despite  deliberate  effort.  It  is  nearer  the  truth  to 
say  that  the  existing  culture  is  the  mother  of  in- 
ventions. 

A  relevant  question,  is,  how  far  a  given  cul- 
tural base  specifically  determines  a  particular  in- 
vention, assuming  a  constant  level  of  mental  abil- 
ity. Can  it  be  said,  for  instance,  that  the  devel- 
opment of  the  science  of  mathematics  had  reached 
such  a  stage  in  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth 
century  that  the  formulation  of  the  branch  of 
mathematics  known  as  calculus  was  inevitable? 
The  fact  that  Leibnitz  and  Newton  both  made 
this  achievement  is  suggestive  of  an  answer  in 
the  affirmative.  Had  the  development  of  biology 
been  of  such  a  nature  that  at  a  certain  stage  the 
discovery  of  the  principle  of  natural  selection 
must  necessarily  have  been  made?  Darwin  and 
Wallace  each  made  this  discovery  at  about  the 

[83] 


same  time.  The  difficulty  in  answering  the  ques- 
tion lies  in  describing  with  sufficient  fullness  the 
cultural  requirements  necessary  for  a  particular 
invention.  The  inability  to  describe  fully  the 
conditions  underlying  an  invention  has  led  to  the 
ascribing  of  an  accidental  or  chance  element  to 
inventions,  the  unknown  factors  being  called 
chance.  Chance  is  seen  when  one  inquires  at 
what  particular  moment  an  invention  is  deter- 
mined. Why  was  the  airplane  invented  just  when 
it  was?  Why  was  it  not  Invented  ten  years 
earlier?  The  airplane  was  dependent  on  a 
light  engine  with  great  power,  the  steam  engine 
of  course  not  being  satisfactory.  But  there  were 
many  other  factors.  It  is  difficult,  however,  to 
describe  the  cultural  conditions  fully  enough  to 
determine  very  closely  the  exact  time  at  which 
the  appearance  of  an  invention  is  due. 

However,  the  appearance  at  approximately  the 
same  time  of  several  inventions  of  the  same 
thing  is  very  impressive  evidence  of  the  power  of 
culture  in  determining  particular  inventions.  On 
this  point  Kroeber  writes : 

The  whole  history  of  inventions  is  one  endless  chain 
of  parallel  instances.  An  examination  of  the  patent-of- 
fice records  in  any  other  than  a  commercial  or  anecdotic 
spirit  would  alone  reveal  the  inexorable  order  that 
prevails  in  the  advance  of  civilization.     The  right  to  the 

[84] 


) 


monopoly  of  the  telephone  was  long  in  litigation;  the 
ultimate  deasion  rested  on  an  interval  of  hours  between 
the  recording  of  concurrent  descriptions  by  Alexander 
Bell  and  Elisha  Gray.  ...  The  discovery  of  oxygen  is 
credrted  to  both  Priestley  and  Scheele;  its  liquefaction 
to  CaiUetet  as  well  as   to  Pictet,  whose  results  were 
attained  in  the  same  month  of  1877  and  announced  in 
one  session.     Kant  as  well  as  Laplace  can  lay  claim  to 
the  promulgation  of  the  nebular  hypothesis.     Neptune 
was  predicted  by  Adams  and  by  Leverrier;  the  computa- 
tion of  the  one  and  the  publication  of  that  of  the  other 
had  precedence  by  a  few  months.     For  the  invention  of 
the  steamboat  gloiy  is  claimed  by  their  countrymen  or 
partisans   for  Fulton,  Jouifroy,   Rumsey,   Stevens,   Sym- 
mington  and  others;  of  the  telegraph,  for  Steinheil  and 
Mo^e;  m  photography  Talbot  was  the  rival  of  Daguerre 
and  Niepcft     The  doubly-flanged  rail  devised  by  Stevens 
was  reinvented  by  Vignolet.    Aluminum  was  first  prac- 
tically reduced  by  the  processes  of  Hall,  Heroult,  and 
t^owles.  .  .  .  Anaesthetics,  both  ether  and  nitrous  o\ide, 
were  discovered  in  1845  and  1846  by  no  less  than  four 
men  of  one  nationality.  .  .  .  Even  the  south  pole,  never 
before  trodden  by  the  foot  of  human  beings,  was  at  last 
reached  twice  in  one  summer.  .  .  .« 

No  doubt  a  striking  list  of  inventions  that  have 
occurred  only  once  could  be  made  but  such  a  rec- 
ord would  be  of  little  significance,  for  it  would 
not  imply  that  any  invention  might  not  have  been 

[85] 


invented  the  second  time.  For  if  an  invention 
has  been  once  made  and  has  become  widely  known 
there  is  no  occasion  for  a  second  invention.  It 
is  therefore  impressive  that  there  are  these  multi- 
ple instances  of  the  same  invention.  ''  That  some 
inventions  are  inevitable  seems  probable.  For  in- 
stance, given  the  boat  and  given  the  steam  engine, 
it  certainly  seems  highly  probable  that  the  two 
could  be  connected  in  the  steamboat.  On  the 
other  hand  the  inevitability  of  an  Invention  does 
not  seem  so  clear  when  one  inquires,  for  instance. 
Into  the  cultural  conditions  that  may  have  made 
the  invention  of  the  wheel  Inevitable, — the  wheel 
very  probably  having  been  Invented  only  once. 
It  may  have  been  that  the  pulling  of  a  load  by  a 
domesticated  animal  over  rolling  logs  led  to  the 
idea  of  the  wagon  wheel.  But  why  does  it  ap- 
pear to  have  been  Invented  In  only  one  place  in  the 
world?  Was  the  underlying  cultural  situation 
which  was  necessary  for  the  Invention  of  the 
wheel  In  existence  in  only  one  locality  and  at  only 
one  time?     The  answer  to  this  question  again, 

"^  A  longer  list  of  inventions  made  by  two  or  more  persons 
independently  has  been  compiled  by  Miss  Dorothy  Thomas, 
who  has  been  collecting  material  on  this  subject.  The  list 
appears  as  an  appendix  at  the  close  of  this  section.  No  doubl 
a  much  longer  list  could  be  collected  from  existing  records, 
and  a  still  longer  one  if  the  records  were  complete.  The  pur- 
pose is  not  so  much  to  find  a  complete  total  but  to  demonstrate 
a  great  prevalence  of  these  multiple  inventions  independently 
made. 

[86] 


no  doubt,  lies  In  a  more  complete  account  of  the 
cultural  conditions,  which  Is  of  course  difficult  to 
make.  But  certainly  rolling  logs  and  domesti- 
cated animals  are  not  an  adequate  account. 
There  may  also  be  Implied  certain  types  of  cut- 
ting Implements,  the  uses  of  metals,  types  of 
ground,  development  of  technical  forms,  a  social 
condition  creating  an  urgent  need,  etc.  Why  Is 
it,  for  instance,  that  In  early  times  only  one  half 
of  the  world  learned  to  drink  the  milk  of  domes- 
ticated animals?  To  give  a  cultural  account  of 
such  a  situation,  a  great  deal  must  be  known,  of 
course,  about  the  culture.  And  in  our  ignorance, 
we  may  speak  of  It  as  chance. 

Although  an  invention  is  dependent  on  the 
existing  culture  it  does  not  follow  that  the  same 
invention  demands  always  the  same  cultural  his- 
tory. Two  different  cultural  situations  may  re- 
sult in  the  same  invention  or  what  appears  to  be 
the  same  invention.  Thus  writing  may  be  made 
on  clay  tablets,  papyrus  or  on  stone.  Boas  cites 
as  an  illustration,  the  fact  that  though  pottery 
may  have  developed  from  basketry  in  Arizona, 
it  does  not  follow  that  this  is  the  sole  origin  of 
pottery.  And,  again,  the  social  organization  of 
primitive  tribes  is  often  characterized  by  a  de- 
finite number  of  subdivisions.  But  this  type  of 
organization  has  resulted  from  a  union  of  smal- 
ler divisions  as  in  the  case  of  the  Navaho  or  in 

[87] 


a  subdivision  of  a  larger  group  as  among  the  In- 
dians of  the  North  Pacific  coast  of  America. 
This  phenomenon,  sometimes  called  convergence, 
is  of  considerable  theoretical  significance,  and  has 
been  frequently  discussed.  It  seems  to  put  an 
emphasis  on  the  importance  of  a  cultural  need  and 
to  imply  that  there  are  various  ways  of  meeting 
the  need.  A  subdivided  large  group  may  repre- 
sent a  social  need  and  may  arise  by  union  or  par- 
tition. 

By  definition,  to  invent  is  to  contrive  something 
new.  But  in  trying  to  describe  the  particular 
new  thing  about  an  invented  object,  it  is  seen 
that  the  new  is  sometimes  quantitatively  incon- 
spicuous in  comparison  with  the  amount  of  old 
in  such  a  newly  invented  object.  In  the  telegraph, 
for  instance,  electricity,  coils,  batteries  and  cir- 
cuit are  all  known.  The  sound  contrivance  and 
the  code  seem  the  newer  features,  but  these 
indeed  have  cultural  predecessors  in  the  electric 
bell,  the  alphabet  and  signaling.  It  is  rather  the 
putting  together  of  certain  appliances  that  is 
new.  In  the  case  of  the  telegraph  as  in  the  case 
of  many  inventions  it  is  the  putting  of  an  idea 
in  use  for  social  purposes  that  gives  it  its  signi- 
ficance. 

The  social  heritage  of  a  particular  people  also 
grows  through  the  adopting  of  a  portion  of  cul- 
ture in  use  by  some  other  people.     The  culture 

[88] 


of  a  particular  locality  is  to  be  accounted  for, 
therefore,  either  by  invention  or  by  diffusion.  It 
is  much  easier  to  borrow  culture  than  it  is  to  in- 
vent it.  Diffusion  is  known  to  occur  even  where 
the  contacts  are  rare  and  the  distances  are  great. 
The  explanation  of  a  particular  culture  on  the 
basis  of  inventions  or  on  the  basis  of  diffusion, 
and  the  comparative  frequency  of  invention  and 
diffusion  have  been  a  central  theme  among  anth- 
ropologists for  years.  The  same  things  have 
been  invented  in  different  parts  of  the  world  at 
different  times.  But  diffusion  is  relatively  the 
much  more  common  occurrence.  Montelius  ®  has 
discussed  the  early  development  of  culture  in 
Sv/cden  and  shown  the  overwhelming  predomi- 
nance of  diffusion.  Isolated  communities  are  very 
good  illustrations  of  the  relative  influence  of  in- 
vention and  diffusion.  The  slowness  of  relatively 
isolated  cultures  to  change  has  been  likened  to 
stagnation.  The  growth  of  cultures  in  contact 
with  other  cultures  is  much  more  rapid.  The 
great  prevalence  of  diffusion  as  a  source  of  the 
cultural  growth  of  a  particular  people  is  further 
indication  of  the  importance  of  the  cultural  fac- 
tor as  compared  to  the  role  of  the  inventor's 
mental  ability. 

«0.  Montelius,  "Der  Handel  in  der  Vorzeit,"  Praehistorischt 
ZeitschrifU  Vol.  II  (1910). 

[89] 


A  LIST  OF  SOME  INVENTIONS  AND  DISCOVERIES  MADE 
INDEPENDENTLY  BY  TWO  OR  MORE  PERSONS* 


1.  Solution  of  the  problem  of  three  bodies.     By  Clairaut 

(1747),  Euler  (1747),  and  D'Alembert  (i747)- 

2.  Theory   of    the   figure   of   the   earth.     By    Huygens 

(1690),  and  Newton  (1680?). 

3.  Variability   of   satellites.     By   Bradley    (1752),    and 

Wargentin  (1746). 

®The  accompanying  list  of  duplicate  independent  inventions 
is  taken  from  an  article,  "Are  Inventions  Inevitable?  A  Note 
on  Social  Evolution,"  appearing  in  the  Political  Science  Quar- 
terly, Vol.  XXXVII,  No.  I.  The  list  is  collected  from  histories 
of  astronomy,  mathematics,  chemistry,  physics,  electricity, 
physiology,  biology,  psychology  and  practical  mechanical  inven- 
tions. The  data  are  thus  from  the  period  of  written  records, 
indeed  the  last  few  centuries,  and  largely  from  histories  of 
science.  The  various  inventions  and  discoveries  vary  greatly 
in  their  importance.  The  list  could  be  extended  by  further 
research. 

There  are  disputes  concerning  many  of  the  origins  in  the 
instances  listed.  Disputes  frequently  concern  priority,  a  mat- 
ter with  which  the  accompanying  discussion  is  not  concerned. 
Where  the  dates  are  doubtful  a  question  mark  has  been  placed 
after  the  date.  Occasionally  it  has  not  been  possible  to  get 
the  date.  The  most  serious  difficulty  in  making  the  list  is 
the  fact  that  the  contribution  of  one  person  is  in  some  cases 
more  complete  than  that  of   another.    For  instance,  Laplace's 

[90] 


4.  Motion  of  light  within  the  earth's  orbit.     By  Del- 

ambre  (1821?),  and  Bradley  (1728). 

5.  Theory    of    planetary    perturbations.     By    Lagrange 

(1808),  and  Laplace  (1808). 

6.  Discovery  of  the  planet  Neptune.     By  Adams  (1845), 

and  Leverrier  (1845). 

7.  Discovery  of   sun  spots.     By  Galileo    (1611),   Fab- 

ricus     (1611),     Scheiner     (1611),     and     Harriott 
(1611). 

8.  Law  of  inverse  squares.     By  Newton    (1666),  and 

Halley  (1684). 

account  of  the  nebular  hypothesis  is  in  more  scientific  detail 
than  Kant's.  Similarly,  H alley's  role  may  not  have  been  as 
important  as  Newton's  in  formulating  the  law  of  inverse 
squares.  It  is  sometimes  doubtful  just  where  to  draw  the  lines 
defining  a  new  contribution.  Our  guide  has  been  the  histories 
of  science,  and  where  there  are  differences  in  the  historical 
accounts  we  have  followed  the  general  practice.  The  case 
of  the  discovery  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood  has  been 
excluded,  as  there  seems  to  be  a  rather  wide  difference  in 
the  contributions  of  Cesalpino  (1571)  and  Harvey  (1616). 
Although  the  rule  has  been  to  exclude  such  cases  of  doubt, 
in  some  instances  where  they  have  been  included  a  question 
mark  has  been  placed  next  to  the  name.  In  several  cases 
the  independence  of  the  research  of  one  claimant  has  been 
questioned  by  another  claimant  or  by  his  followers.  In  the 
case  of  calculus  the  verdict  on  the  controversy  regarding 
Newton  and  Leibnitz  seems  to  be  that  both  justly  deserve 
the  distinction.  In  the  case  of  the  microscope,  telescope, 
thermometer,  steamboat  and  electric  railways,  claims  are  still 
matters  of  dispute.  In  a  few  cases  this  fact  has  been  indi- 
cated by  the  words  "claimed  by"  following  the  subject  of  the 
discovery  or  invention.  Most  of  the  cases  of  widely  different 
dates  have  special  explanations  as  in  the  case  of  Mendel  and 
the  discovery  of  the  elements  of  phosphorus.  It  has  also 
been  difficult  to  abbreviate  the  description  of  the  discovery 
ioto  a  short  title  suitable  for  a  list. 

[91] 


9.  Nebular  hypothesis.     By  Laplace  (1796),  and  Kant 

(1755). 

10.  Effect  of  tidal  friction  on  motion  of  the  earth.  By 
Ferrel  (1853),  and  Delaunay  (1853). 

11.  Correlation    between    variations   of   sun    spots    and 

disturbances    on    the    earth.     By    Sabine    (1852), 
Wolfe  (1852),  and  Gauthier  (1852). 

12.  Method  of  getting  spectrum  at  edge  of  sun*s  disk. 
By  Jannsen  (1868),  and  Lockyer  (1868). 

13.  Discovery  of  the  inner  ring  of  Saturn.     By  Bond 

(1850),  and  Dawes  (1850). 

14.  First  measurement  of  the  parallax  of  a  star.  By 
Bessel  (1838),  and  Struve  (1838),  and  Hender- 
son (1838). 

15.  The  effect  of  gravitation  on  movements  of 
the    ocean.     By    Lenz     (1845?),     and    Carpenter 

(1865). 

16.  Certain  motions  of  the  moon.     By  Clairaut  (1752), 

Euler  (1752),  and  D'Alembert  (1752). 


n 

17.  Decimal  fractions.     By  Stevinus  (1585),  and  Biirgi 
(1592),  Beyer?  (1603),  and  Riidolff?  (1530). 

18.  Introduction  of  decimal  point.     By  Biirgi   (1592), 

Pitiscus    (1608-12),   Kepler    (1616),    and    Napier 
(1616-17). 

19.  The  equation  of  the  cycloid.     By  Torricelli  (1644), 

and  Roberval  (1640). 

20.  Logarithms.     By  Biirgi  (1620),  and  Napier-Briggs 

(1614). 


21.  The  tangent  of  the  qxloid.     By  Viviani   (l66o?), 

Descartes  (1660?),  and  Fermat  (1660?). 

22.  Calculus.    By  Newton  (i 671),  and  Leibnitz  (1676). 

23.  The  rectification  of  the  semi-cubical  parabola.     By 

Van   Heuraet    (1659),   Neil    (1657),   and  Fermat 

(1657-9). 

24.  Deduction  of  the  theorem  on  the  hexagon.  By  Pas- 
cal (1639),  MacLaurin  (1719-20),  and  Bessel 
(1820). 

25.  The  principle  of  least  squares.     By  Gauss   (1809), 

and  Legendre  (1806). 

26.  The  geometric  law  of  duality.     By  Poncelet  (1838), 

and  Gergone  (1838). 

27.  The    beginnings    of    synthetic    projective    geometry. 

By  Chasles  (1830),  and  Steiner  (1830). 

28.  Geometry  with  an  axiom  contradictory  to  Euclid's 
parallel  axiom.  By  Lobatchevsky  (1836-40?),  Boy- 
lais  (1826-33),  and  Gauss?  (1829). 

29.  Lobatchevsky *s  doctrine  of  the  parallel  angle.     By 

Lobatchevsky  (1840),  and  Saccheri  (1733). 

30.  Method  of  algebraic  elimination  by  use  of  determi- 
nants and  by  dialitic  method.     By  Hesse  ( 1842),  and 

Sylvester  (1840). 

31.  A  treatment  of  vectors  without  the  use  of  coordinate 

systems.     By  Hamilton  (1843),  Grassman  (1843), 
and  others  ( 1 843  ) . 

32.  Principle  of  uniform  convergence.     By  Stokes  (1847- 

8),  and  Seidel  (1847-8). 

33.  Logarithmic  criteria  for  convergence  of  series.     By 

Abel,  De  Morgan,  Bertrand,  Raabe,  Duhamel,  Bon- 
net, Paucker  (all  between  1832-51). 

[93] 


34-  Radix  method  of  making  logarithms.  By  Briggs 
(1624),  Flower  (177O,  Atwood  (1786),  Leonelli 
(1802),  and  Manning  (1806). 

35.  Circular    slide    rule.     By    Delamain    (1630),    and 

Oughtred  (1632). 

36.  Method  of  indivisibles.     By  Roberval  (1640?),  and 

Cavalieri  (1635). 

37.  Researches  on  elliptic  functions.  By  Abel  (1826- 
29),  Jacobi  (1829),  and  Legendre  (181 1-28). 

38.  The  double  theta  functions.     By  Gopel  (1847),  and 

Rosenhain  (1847). 

39.  The  law  of  quadratic  reciprocity.  By  Gauss  (1788- 
96),  Euler  (1737),  and  Legendre  (1830). 

40.  The  application  of  the  potential  function  to  math- 

ematical theory  of  electricity  and  magnetism.  By 
Green  (1828),  Thomson  (1846),  Chasles,  Sturm, 
and  Gauss. 

41.  Dirichlet's  principle  in  the  theory  of  potentials.  By 
Dirichlet  (1848?),  and  Thomson   (1848). 

42.  Contraction  hypothesis.  By  H.  A.  Lorentz  (1895), 
and  Fitzgerald   (1895). 

43.  Mathematical  calculation  of  the  size  of  molecules. 
By  Loschmidt,  and  Thomson. 

m 

44.  Structure    theory.     By    Butlerow    (1888),    Kekule 

(1888),  and  Couper  (1888). 

45.  Law   of  gases.     By   Boyle    (1662),   and   Marriotte 

(1676). 

[94] 


46.  Discovery    of    oxygen.     By    Scheele    (i774))    and 

Priestley  (1774). 

47.  Liquefaction  of  oxygen.     By  Cailletet   (1877),  and 

Pictet  (1877). 

48.  Method   of   liquefying  gases.     By   Cailletet,    Pictet, 
Wroblowski    and    Olzewski     (all    between     1877- 

1884). 

49.  Estimation  of  proportion  of  oxygen  in  atmosphere. 
By  Scheele  (1778),  and  Cavendish  (1781). 

50.  Beginnings  of  modern  organic  chemistry.  By  Boer- 
have  (1732),  and  Hales  (1732). 

51.  Isolation  of  nitrogen.     By  Rutherford   (1772),  and 

Scheele  (1773). 

52.  That  water  is  produced  by  combustion  of  hydrogen. 

By     Lavoisier-Laplace      (1783),     and     Cavendish 

(1784). 

53.  Law  of  chemical  proportions.     By  Proust  (i 801-9), 
and  Richter? 

54.  The  Periodic  Law.     First  arrangement  of  atoms  in 

ascending  series.  By  De  Chancourtois  (1864), 
Newlands  (1864),  and  Lothar  Meyer  (1864). 
Law  of  periodicity.  By  Lothar  Meyer  (1869),  and 
Mendeleeff  (1869). 

55.  Hypothesis  as  to  arrangement  of  atoms  in  space.     By 
Van't  Hoff  (1874),  and  Le  Bel  (1874)- 

56.  Molecular  theory.     By  Ampere  (1814),  and  Avaga- 

dro  (1811). 

57.  Hydrogen  acid  theory.     By  Davy  and  Du  Long. 

58.  Doctrine     of     chemical     equivalents.     By     Wenzel 

(1777),  and  Richter  (1792). 

[95] 


59'  Discovery   of   elements  of   phosphorus.     By   Brand 
(1669),  Kunckel  (1678),  and  Boyle  (1680). 

60.  Discovery  of  boron.  By  Davy  (1808-9),  and  Gay- 
Lussac  (1808). 

61.  Discovery  of  ceria.     By  Hisinger  (1803),  Berzelius 

(1803-4),  and  Klaproth  (1803-4). 

62.  Process    for     reduction     of     aluminum.     By     Hall 

(i886),  Heroult  (1887),  and  Cowles  (1885). 

63.  Law  of  mass  action  of  chemical  forces.     By  Jellet 

(1873),     Guldberg-Waage     (1867),     Van't    Hoff 
(1877),  and  others. 

64.  Comparison  of  refractivity  of  equimolecular  quanti- 
ties by  multiple  function.  By  L.  V.  Lorenz  (1880), 
and  H.  A.  Lorentz  (1880). 

IV 

65.  Resistance  of  vacuum.     By  Torricelli-Pascal  (1643- 

6),  and  von  Guericke  (1657). 

66.  Air  gun.     By  Boyle-Hooke  (prior  to  1659),  and  von 

Guericke  (1650). 

67.  Telescope.  Claimed  by  Lippershey  (1608),  Delia 
Porta  (1558),  Digges  (1571),  Johannides,  Metius 
(1608),  Drebbel,  Fontana,  Janssen  (1608),  and 
Galileo  (1609). 

68.  Microscope.  Claimed   by   Johannides,    Drebbel   and 

Galileo  (1610?). 

69.  Acromatic   lens.     By    Hall    (1729),    and    Dolland 

(1758). 

70.  Principle  of  interference.  By  Young  (1802),  and 
Fresnel  (1815). 

[96] 


71.  Spectrum  analysis.     By  Draper   (i860),  Angstrom 

(1854),   Kirchoff-Bunsen    (1859),   Miller   (1843), 
and  Stokes  (1849). 

72.  Photography.  By  Daguerre-Niepce  (1839),  and 
Talbot  (1839). 

73.  Color  photography.  By  Cros  (1869),  and  Du 
Hauron  (1869). 

74.  Discovery  of  overtones  in  strings.     By  Nobb-Pigott 

(1677),  and  Sauveur  (1700-03). 

75.  Thermometer.  Claimed  by  Galileo  (1592-7?)', 
Drebbel?  (1608),  Sanctorious  (1612),  Paul  (1617), 
Fludd  (1617),  von  Guericke,  Porta  (1606),  De 
Caus  (1615). 

76.  Pendulum  clock.  Claimed  by  Biirgi  (1575),  Gal- 
ileo (1582),  and  Huygens  (1656). 

77.  Discovery  of   latent  heat.     By   Black    (1762),   De 

Luc,  and  Wilke. 

78.  Ice  calorimeter.     By  Lavoisier-Laplace  (1780),  and 

Black-Wilke. 

79.  Law  of  expansion  of  gases.     By  Charles  (1783),  and 

Gay-Lussac  (1802). 

80.  Continuity  of  gaseous  and  liquid  states  of  matter. 
By  Ramsay  (1880),  and  Jamin  (1883). 

81.  Kinetic  theory  of  gases.     By  Clausius   (1850),  and 

Rankine  (1850). 

82.  Law  of  conservation  of  energy.  By  Mayer  (1843), 
Joule  (1847),  Helmholz  (1847),  Colding  (1847), 
and  Thomson  (1847). 

83.  Mechanical  equivalent  of  heat.  By  Mayer  (1842), 
Camot  (1830),  Seguin  (1839),  and  Joule 
(1840). 

[97] 


84.  Principle    of    dissipation    of    energy.     By    Carnot? 
(1824),  Clausius   (1850),  Thomson   (1852). 

85.  Law    of    impact,    earlier    conclusions.     By    Galileo 

(1638),  and  Marci  (1639). 

86.  Laws   of   mutual   impact   of   bodies.     By    Huygens 

(1669),  Wallis  (1668),  and  Wren  (1668). 

87.  Apparent  concentration  of  cold  by  concave  mirror. 

By  Porta  (1780-91?),  and  Pictet  (1780-91?). 

88.  Circumstances  by  which   effect  of  weight  is  deter- 
mined.    By  Leonardo  and  Ubaldi. 

89.  Parallelogram  of  forces.     By  Newton   (1687),  and 
Varignon  (1725?). 

90.  Principle  of  hydrostatics.     By  Archimedes,  and  Stev- 
inus  (1608). 

91.  Pneumatic  lever.     By  Hamilton   (1835),  and  Bar- 
ker (1832). 

92.  Osmotic  pressure  methods.     By  Van't  Hoff  (1886), 

and  Guldberg  (1870). 

93.  Law  of  inertia.     By  Galileo,  Huygens,  and  Newton 

(1687). 

94.  Machinery  for  verifying  the  law  of  falling  bodies. 

By  Laborde,  Lippich  and  von  Babo. 

95.  Centre  of  oscillation.     By   Bernouilli    (1712),   and 
Taylor  (1715)- 


96.  Leyden  jar.     By  von   Kleist    (1745),   and   Cuneus 

(1746). 

97.  Discover}^  of  animal  electricity.     By  Sultzer  (1768), 
Cotuguo  (1786),  and  Galvani  (1791). 

[98] 


98.  Telegraph.     Henry  (1831),  Morse  (1837),  Cooke- 

Wheatstone  (1837),  and  Stelnheil  (1837). 

99.  Electric   motors.     Claimed   by   Dal   Negro    (1830), 
Henry       (1831),      Bourbonze      and      McGawley 

(1835). 

100.  Electric   railroad.     Claimed    by   Davidson,    Jacobi, 

Lilly-Colton     (1847),    Davenport    (1835),    Page 
(1850),  and  Hall  (1850-1). 
lOi.  Induction  coil.  By  Page  and  Ruhmkorff. 

102.  Secondary  battery.     By  Ritter  and  Plante  (1859). 

103.  Electrolysis     of     water.       By     Nicholson-Carlisle 

(1800),  and  Ritter. 

104.  Method  of  converting  lines  engraved  on  copper  into 
relief.  By  Jacobi  (1839),  Spencer  (1839),  and 
Jordan  (1839). 

105.  Ring  armature.    By  Pacinotti  (1864),  and  Gramme 

(i860). 

106.  Microphone.     Hughes    (1878),   Edison    (1877-8), 

Berliner  (1877),  and  Blake  (1878?). 

107.  The  phonograph.     By  Edison  (1877),  Scott?,  and 

Cros  (1877). 

108.  Self-exciting  dynamo.  Claimed  by  Hjorth  (1866- 
7),  Varley  (1866-7),  Siemens  (1866-7),  Wheat- 
stone   (1866-7),   Ladd    (1866),  Wilde   (1863-7)- 

109.  Incandescent  electric  light.  Claimed  by  Starr 
(1846),  and  Jobard-de  Clangey  (1838). 

no.  Telephone.     By  Bell  (1876),  and  Gray  (1876). 

111.  Arrest    of    electro-magnetic    waves.     By    Branley 

( 1 890-1),  Lodge   (1893),  and  Hughes   (1880). 

112.  Electro-magnetic  clocks.     By  Wheatstone   (1845), 

and  Bain  (1845). 

[99] 


113.  Printing  telegraphs.     By  Wheatstone  (1845),  and 

Bain  (1845). 

VI 

114.  Theory  of  infection  of  microorganisms.     By  Frac- 

astoro  (1546),  and  Kircher. 

115.  Discovery    of    the    thoracic    duct.     By    Rudbeck 

(1651),  and  Jolyff  and  Bertolinus  (1653). 

116.  That  the  skull  is  made  of  modified  vertebrae.     By 

Goethe  (1790),  and  Oken  (1776). 

117.  Nature  of  the  cataract.     By  Brisseau  (1706),  and 

Maitre-Jan  (1707). 

118.  Operation  for  cure  of  aneurisms.  By  Hunter 
(1775),  and  Anil  (1772). 

119.  Digestion  as  a  chemical  rather  than  a  mechanical 

process.     By  Spallanzani  and  Hunter. 

120.  Function  of   the  pancreas.     By  Purkinje   (1836), 

and  Pappenheim  (1836). 

121.  Solution  of  the  problem  of  respiration.  By  Priest- 
ley (1777),  Scheele  (i777)>  Lavoisier  (i777)> 
Spallanzani  (1777),  and  Davy  (i777)- 

122.  Form   of    the   liver   cells.     By    Purkinje    (1838), 

Heule  (1838),  and  Dutrochet  (1838). 

123.  Relation  of  microorganisms  to  fermentation  and 
putrefaction.     By   Latour    (1837),   and   Schwann 

(1837)- 

124.  Pepsin  as  the  active  principle  of  gastric  juice.  By 
Latour  (1835),  and  Schwann  (1835). 

125.  Prevention  of  putrefaction  of  wounds  by  keeping 

[100] 


germs  from  surface  of  wound.     By  Lister  {1867)^ 
and  Guerin  (1871). 

126.  Cellular  basis  of  both  animal  and  vegetable  tissue. 
Claimed  by  Schwann  (1839),  Henle  (1839?), 
Turpin    (1839?),    Dumortier    (1839?),    Purkinje 

(1839?),      Muller      (1839?),      and      Valentin 

(1839). 

127.  Invention     of    the    laryngoscope.     By     Babington 

(1829),  Liston  (1837),  and  Garcia  (1855)- 

128.  Sulphuric     ether    as     an    anaesthetic     By     Long 

{1842),  Robinson   (1846),  Liston   (1846),  Mor- 
ton (1846),  and  Jackson  (1846). 

129.  That  all  appendages  of  a  plant  are  modified  leaves. 

By  Goethe  (1790),  and  Wolfe  (1767). 


vn 


130.  Theory  of  inheritance  of  acquired  characteristics. 

By  E.  Darwin  (1794),  and  Lamarck  (1801). 

131.  Theory  of  natural  selection  and  variation.     By  C. 

Darwin  (1858),  and  Wallace  (1858). 

132.  Some    results   of    heredity.     By    Mendel    (1865), 
DeVries    (1900),    Correns    (1900),   Tschermarck, 

(1900). 

133.  Theory    of    mutations.     By    Korschinsky    (1899), 
and  DeVries  (1900). 

134.  Theory  of  the  emotions.     By  James   (1884),  and 
Lange  (1887). 

135.  Theory  of  color.     By  Young  (1801),  and  Helm- 
holz. 


[lOl] 


vin 

136.  Sewing  machine.     By  Thimmonier  (1830),  Howe 

(1846),  and  Hunt  (1840). 

137.  Balloon.     By    Montgolfier     (i783)»    Rittenhouse- 

Hopkins  (1783). 

138.  Flying     machine.     Claimed     by    Wright     (1895- 

1901),  Langley  (1893-7),  and  others. 

139.  Reapers.     By    Hussey    (1833),    and    McCormick 

(1834). 

140.  Doubly-flanged  rail.     By  Stephens  and  Vignolet. 

141.  Steamboat.     Claimed  by  Fulton   (1807),  JouiEFroy, 
Rumsey,  Stevens,  and  Symmington  (1802). 

142.  Printing.     By    Gutenberg     (1443),     and     Coster 

(1420-23). 

143.  Cylinder  printing  press.   By  Koenig-Bensley  (1812- 

13),  and  Napier  (1830). 

144.  Typewriter.     Claimed      by      Beach       (1847-56), 
Sholes?   (1875),  and  Wheatstone   (1855-60). 

145.  Trolley  car.     By  Van  Doeple   (1884-5),  Sprague 

(1888),  Siemans  (1881),  and  Daft  (1883). 

146.  Stereoscope.     By  Wheatstone   (1839),  and  Elliott 

(1840). 

147.  Centrifugal  pumps.     By  Appold   (1850),  Gwynne 

(1850),  and  Bessemer  (1850). 

148.  Use  of  gasoline  engines  in  automobiles.     By  Otto 
(1876),    Daimler    (1885),    and   Selden    (1879?). 


[102] 


H 

THE  RATE  OF  CULTURAL  GROWTH 

The  social  heritage  in  its  material  aspects  thus 
grows  through  inventions,  and  in  particular  areas 
by  diffusion,  and  is  selectively  accumulative.  It 
is  desirable  to  consider  somewhat  the  rapidity  of 
change  and  the  rate  of  growth  of  material  cul- 
ture. A  brief  perspective  of  the  growth  of  cul- 
ture from  its  beginnings  shows  that  the  change 
was  quite  slow  in  very  early  times.  Based  on  the 
finds  in  stonework,  the  development  of  the  mat- 
erial culture  of  the  Chellean  period  to  the  Acheu- 
lean  and  the  Acheulean  to  the  Mousterian  required 
an  interval  of  about  25,000  years  each,  accord- 
ing to  Osborn's  chronology.  From  the  begin- 
nings of  Aurignacian  culture  to  the  beginnings 
of  the  Magdalenian  was  a  period  of  some  10,000 
years,  though  it  is  not  clear  that  this  development 
took  place  in  Europe  by  means  of  inventions. 
The  neolithic  culture  appeared  in  Europe  5,000 
years  later.  From  neolithic  times  to  the  historic 
period  and  from  the  historic  period  on,  the 
[103] 


changes  in  material  culture  have  been  much  more 
rapid.  At  the  present  time  both  the  change  and 
the  accumulation  of  material  culture  are  quite 
rapid  and  may  be  measured  in  such  brief  intervals 
as  generations  or  even  decades. 

As  to  the  causes  of  the  changes  In  rate  of 
this  accumulation,  it  is  thought  a  most  important 
factor  is  the  extent  at  any  one  time  of  the  exist- 
ing material  culture.  This  point  Is  important 
and  the  relation  between  the  existing  technical 
equipment  and  the  number  of  Inventions  made 
should  be  examined.  It  would  seem  that  the 
larger  the  equipment  of  material  culture  the 
greater  the  number  of  Inventions.  The  more 
there  Is  to  Invent  with,  the  greater  will  be  the 
number  of  Inventions.  When  the  existing  ma- 
terial culture  is  small,  embracing  a  stone  tech- 
nique and  a  knowledge  of  skins  and  some  wood- 
work, the  number  of  Inventions  is  more  limited 
than  when  the  culture  consists  of  a  knowledge 
of  a  variety  of  metals  and  chemicals  and  the  use 
of  steam,  electricity,  and  various  mechanical  prin- 
ciples such  as  the  screw,  the  wheel,  the  lever,  the 
piston,  belts,  pulleys,  etc.  The  street  car  could 
not  have  been  Invented  from  the  material  cul- 
ture existing  at  the  last  glacial  period.  The  dis- 
covery of  the  power  of  steam  and  the  mechanical 
technology  existing  at  that  time  made  possible 
[104] 


a  large  number  of  inventions.  It  is  certainly 
true  that  when  the  material  culture  was  small 
inventions  were  few,  and  now  when  the  material 
culture  is  large  the  inventions  are  many,  though, 
of  course,  there  are  other  factors  than  the  num- 
ber of  elements  of  material  culture. 

In  the  preceding  pages  it  has  been  pointed  out 
that  the  material  culture  grows  by  accumulation, 
and  the  additional  point  is  now  made  that  the  size 
of  the  material  culture,  that  is,  the  number  of 
different  kinds  of  material-culture  objects  is  a 
factor  in  determining  the  number  of  inventions 
of  new  material-culture  objects.  In  general, 
growth  occurs  when  more  new  units  are  added 
than  there  are  disappearances  of  old  units.  And 
very  frequently  there  are  definite  relationships 
between  the  number  of  existing  units  and  the 
number  of  new  ones  produced.  These  relation- 
ships may  be  expressed  in  various  mathematical 
formulae,  which  describe  various  types  of  curves. 
The  fact  that  material  culture  is  accumulative, 
that  is,  new  inventions  are  not  lost  but  added  to 
the  existing  stock,  and  the  fact  (if  it  be  a  fact) 
that  the  larger  the  stock  the  greater  the  number 
of  new  inventions,  suggest  at  first  glance  the 
compound  interest  law.  It  is  recalled  that  with 
compound  interest  the  interest  is  not  spent  but 
is  added  to  the  principal  and  the  succeeding  sizes 

[105] 


of  the  growing  principal  mean  a  larger  amount 
of  Interest,  the  rate  of  interest  remaining  the 
same. 

If  any  newly  Invented  material  object  be  taken  as 
unit,  then  a  curve  representing  its  growth  for  the 
very  long  period  of  time  that  culture  has  existed 
would  presumably  have  an  upward  trend  although 
its  slope  might  be  small.  The  historical  record  of 
culture  would  seem  to  indicate  that  in  the  very 
early  times,  the  slope  was  probably  slight  but  in 
modern  times  probably  sharper,  at  least  there  are 
many  more  inventions  now  than  formerly.  The 
growth  of  material  culture  may  not  be  found  to 
lend  itself  to  statistical  and  graphical  represen- 
tation, but  by  speculating  as  to  its  possible  re- 
semblance to  the  compound  interest  curve,  we 
may  come  to  some  better  insight  into  the  nature 
of  the  growth  of  material  culture.  We  shall  dis- 
cuss the  compound  interest  curve  in  relation  to 
the  growth  of  culture,  but  using  it  as  a  standard 
only  for  purposes  of  comparison  not  description. 
One  difference  between  the  compound  Interest 
curve  and  the  possible  curve  of  growth  of  cul- 
ture has  already  been  noted,  namely,  that  the 
growth  of  material  culture  is  not  as  consistently 
accumulative  as  is  compound  Interest.  For  cer- 
tainly there  Is  some  loss  of  the  knowledge  of 
making  cultural  objects  for  the  world  as  a  whole 
[io6] 


and  much  more  loss  for  a  particular  locality  or 
people. 

Another  difference  is  that  the  units  of  money 
in  compound  interest  are  the  same,  whereas  the 
various  invented  material  objects  have  the  ut- 
most variety.  Regarding  the  point  that  the 
number  of  cultural  objects  is  a  determining  fac- 
tor in  the  number  of  new  inventions  somewhat 
as  the  size  of  the  principal  is  a  determining 
factor  in  the  amount  of  interest,  it  is  seen  that 
some  inventions  are  relatively  insignificant  while 
some  are  profoundly  significant  in  promoting  new 
inventions.  Thus  the  discovery  of  the  new  source 
of  power,  steam,  really  meant  that  a  whole  host  of 
inventions  involving  applications  of  this  power 
followed,  necessitating  many  rapid  changes  in 
material  culture.  Whereas,  the  invention  of  the 
turbine  engine  did  not  mean  nearly  so  many 
changes  as  did  the  invention  of  the  ordinary  steam 
engine.  Inventions  thus  differ  on  the  basis  of 
their  effect  on  possible  future  inventions.  This 
difference  in  the  nature  of  inventions  means  that 
the  curve  of  growth  of  material  culture  is  very 
irregular  in  its  upward  trend  and  not  as  smooth 
as  the  exponential  curve. 

The  facts  of  the  growth  of  material  culture 
seem  to  indicate  a  development  by  jumps. 
There  will  be  a  period  of  stability  or  of  rela- 
[107] 


tively  slight  change.  Then  occurs  a  fundamen- 
tal Invention  of  great  significance  which  precipi- 
tates many  changes,  modifications  and  other  in- 
ventions which  follow  with  relative  rapidity  for 
a  time.  These  rapid  changes  are  then  followed 
by  another  period  of  relative  stability — unless 
another  fundamental  discovery  be  made.  The 
adoption  of  the  domesticated  horse  from  the 
Spaniards  by  the  Plains  Indians  is  such  an  illus- 
tration, as  seen  from  the  record  of  changes  re- 
corded by  Wissler.  ^°  Certainly  the  discovery  of 
the  power  and  uses  of  steam  precipitated  many 
rapid  changes.  Accounts  of  the  changes  that 
have  followed  the  use  of  steam  have  for  many 
years  been  published  in  almost  all  branches  of 
social  science,  so  great  Is  the  number  of  these 
changes.  The  latter  part  of  the  generalization 
that  the  period  of  active  change  is  followed  by 
a  period  of  relative  stability  Is  not  verified  by  the 
industrial  revolution,  perhaps  because  the  period 
of  time  since  the  beginning  of  the  use  of  steam  as 
power  Is  short.  Indeed,  before  such  a  period  of 
stability  arrives,  some  other  significant  invention 
may  be  made. 

This  jump-like  nature  of  social  change  has  re- 
cently been  the  subject  of  comment  by  Professor 

10  Clark  Wissler,  "The  Influence  of  the  Horse  in  the  Devel- 
opment of  Plains  Culture,"  American  Anthropologist,  New 
Scries,  Vol.  XVI,  No.  i,  pp.  1-25. 

tio8] 


R.  A.  Lehfeldt  in  a  mathematical  paper  on  "The 
Normal  Law  of  Progress."  He  has  there  con- 
sidered three  sets  of  data,  British  trade  statistics, 
the  German  birth  rate,  and  the  growth  of  British 
population.  His  data  when  plotted  show  this 
period  of  stability,  then  a  rapid  change  followed 
by  another  period  of  stability.^^  Lehfeldt's 
problem  is  not  exactly  the  same  as  that  now  be- 
ing discussed.  His  data  do  not  represent  the 
accumulation  in  inventions.  They  rather  rep- 
resent the  statistical  measurements  of  a  limited 
effect  of  an  invention  or  a  few  inventions. 
Thus,  the  lowering  of  the  German  birth 
rate  may  be  due  largely  to  the  spread  of  the 
knowledge  of  the  newly  discovered  methods  of 
birth  control  and  the  statistical  formula  thus 
measures  the  rate  of  diffusion,  the  quantitative 
spread  of  a  single  social  change.  Similarly  the 
curve  of  the  growth  of  foreign  trade  measures 
the  rate  of  diffusion  for  a  particular  country 
of  the  effect  of  a  series  of  inventions  on  manu- 
facturing and  trade.  The  extent  of  change, 
therefore,  may  mean  the  spread  of  culture  and 

^^  Journal  of  the  Royal  Statistical  Society,  New  Series,  Vol. 
LXXIX,  (1916.)  An  equation  to  the  curve  describing  these 
data  he  has  worked  out  to  be  the  following: 

log  q  =  log  qo  +  kF,  (i) .  Where  F  (x)  =  -^  J^  -  x*^ 

q»  is  q  at  a  certain  moment  (the  period),  t  is  the  time  in  ycarj 
before  or  after  the  epoch  and  T  is  a  constant  period. 


I. 


amount  of  change  measured  In  terms  of  some  unit, 
rather  than  the  accumulation  of  inventions. 

It  seems  very  probable,  however,  that  the  rate 
of  cultural  growth  as  measured  in  terms  of  in- 
crease in  inventions  is  uneven,  slow  then  rapid, 
then  slow,  and  so  on,  because  of  the  difference  in 
the  fundamental  natures  of  inventions.  Such  a 
course  would  seem  to  be  particularly  true  with 
respect  to  a  restricted  portion  of  culture,  as,  for 
instance,  mechanical  development  of  steel  appli- 
ances. Combining  the  rates  of  growth  for  all 
portions  of  material  culture,  however,  might 
smooth  out  the  curve  somewhat. 

Another  difference,  therefore,  between  the  com- 
pound interest  law  and  the  growth  of  culture  lies 
in  the  fact  that  in  cultural  change  the  rate  of 
growth  is  not  constant  as  in  the  formula  for 
compound  interest.  The  fact  that  inventions 
vary  greatly  in  their  influence  on  further  cul- 
tural changes  makes  this  point  clear.  There  are, 
of  course,  many  variable  factors  affecting  the 
number  of  inventions  made  other  than  the  extent 
of  the  existing  material  culture,  as,  for  instance, 
the  hostility  shown  by  a  people  towards  innova- 
tions. Increased  populations  may  mean  more 
applied  mental  ability.  Increased  cultural  con- 
tacts resulting  in  diffusion  of  elements  may  re- 
sult in  greater  modifications.  The  larger  cul- 
[no] 


tural  base  may  not  only  mean  that  there  is 
more  material  culture  to  Invent  with;  but  It  may 
also  mean  that  It  is  easier  for  a  given  mental 
ability  to  invent  than  would  be  true  where  the 
material  culture  is  small.  This  would  affect  the 
time-rate  at  which  Inventions  would  be  made. 
In  other  words,  the  time  of  appearance  of  an  in- 
vention when  the  material  culture  is  large 
would  be  shorter  than  when  it  Is  small. 

The  number  of  existing  cultural  elements  is 
also  limited  as  a  determining  factor  in  the  pro- 
duction of  new  inventions  by  the  non-material 
culture,  as  for  instance,  the  social  attitude  to- 
wards the  new.  Thus  religion  may  discourage 
sculpture.  Religious  leaders  may  try  to  prevent 
discoveries  in  science.  The  social  attitude  will 
vary  in  different  periods  in  its  hostility  towards 
innovations;  or  it  may  specifically  encourage  dis- 
covery. Western  civilization  to-day  is  less  hos- 
tile to  change  than  In  the  Middle  Ages  or  than 
primitive  cultures.  We,  perhaps,  exaggerate  this 
lack  of  hostility,  and  only  in  some  respects  can  we 
be  said  to  welcome  change.  It  should  also  be 
noted  that  the  increasing  cultural  base  has  also 
probably  had  an  effect  on  determining  the  social 
attitude  towards  invention  as  truly  as  has  the  so- 
cial attitude  had  an  effect  on  determining  the  size 
of  the  cultural  base. 

[Ill] 


A  detailed  verification  of  the  foregoing  analy- 
sis by  data  on  inventions  is  desirable.  For  in- 
stance, a  statistical  record  of  inventions  year  by 
year  would  furnish  material  for  measuring  the 
rate  of  growth.  But  no  complete  record  of  in- 
ventions by  years  can  be  made.  A  partial  list  of 
such  inventions  by  years  would  show  the  record 
for  later  years  unduly  large  in  comparison  with 
earlier  years,  for  the  reason  that  records  are  fuller 
for  later  years. 

We  have  the  statistical  records  of  patents 
granted  by  the  United  States  patent  office  since 
1838,  and  this  record  is  valuable,  though  fragmen- 
tary, evidence.     A  patent  is  granted 

to  any  person  who  has  invented  or  discovered  any 
new  and  useful  art,  machine,  manufacture,  or  composi- 
tion of  matter  or  any  new  and  useful  improvement 
thereof,  or  any  new,  original  and  ornamental  design  for 
an  article  of  manufacture  not  known  or  used  by  others 
in  this  country  before  his  invention  or  discovery  thereof, 
and  not  patented  or  described  in  any  printed  publication 
in  this  or  any  foreign  country  before  his  invention  or 
discovery  thereof  or  more  than  two  years  prior  to  his 
application,  and  not  in  public  use  or  on  sale  in  the  United 
States  for  more  than  two  years  prior  to  his  application, 
unless  the  same  is  proved  to  have  been  abandoned.^^ 

The  number  of  patents  by  five-year  periods 

-^^  Rules  of  Practice  in  the  United  States  Patent  Office, 
Revised  July  17 ^  1907,  Rule  24,  p.  lo. 

[112] 


since  1840  granted  by  the  United  States  patent 
office  is  shown  in  the  following  table.  ^' 


1840 

4731870  . 

..  13,321  1900 

...  26,499 

1845 

5031875  . 

..  14,817  1905 

...  30,399 

1850 

993  1880  . 

..  13,947  1910 

...  35,930 

1855 

..  2,013  1885  . 

. .  24,233  1915 

...  44,934 

i860 

..  4,8191890  . 

. .  26,292  1920 

...  39,882 

1865 

..  6,616  1895  . 

..  22,057 

The  foregoing  series  shows  that  the  number  of 
patents  is  increasing  rapidly  but  the  rate  of  in- 
crease is  declining.  The  growth  in  the  number 
of  patents  granted  in  the  United  States  over  the 
eighty-year  period  from  1840  to  1920  is  repre- 
sented by  a  straight  line  with  sharp  upward  slope 
more  accurately  than  by  a  line  curving  upward. 
In  fact  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  any  growth 
under  actual  conditions  increasing  for  long  accord- 
ing to  the  compound  interest  law.  Such  an  In- 
crease in  money  for  a  long  time  Is  not  found. 
Malthus  said  that  population  tended  to  Increase  in 
a  geometric  progression;  but  it  is  only  a  tendency 
for  there  are  actual  checks.  Lehfeldt's  curves  of 
progress,  previously  referred  to,  curve  upward  for 
a  while  but  later  the  rate  diminishes  markedly. 

The  growth  of  culture  has  been  characterized 
by  Lowie  as  follows : 

"^^  Report  j>f  the   Commissioner  of  Patents  to   Congress  for 
Year  Endgd  ig20,  p.  7. 

[113] 


We  may  liken  the  progress  of  mankind  to  that  of  a 
man  a  hundred  years  old,  who  dawdles  through  kinder- 
garten for  eighty-five  years  of  his  life,  takes  ten  years  to 
go  through  the  primary  grades,  then  rushes  with  light- 
ning rapidity  through  grammar  school,  and  college. 
Culture,  it  seems,  is  a  matter  of  exceedingly  slow  growth 
until  a  certain  'threshold'  is  passed  when  it  darts  for- 
ward, gathering  momentum  at  an  unexpected  rate.^* 

Such  a  vivid  picture  of  social  change  makes  one 
wonder  about  the  future.  Will  the  rate  of  inven- 
tions continue  to  increase?  How  rapidly  will  the 
accumulation  of  material  culture  continue  ?  Many 
interesting  thoughts  are  stimulated  by  these  ques- 
tions. How  will  life  be  with  such  rapidity  of 
change,  as  indicated  by  the  projection  into  the  fu- 
ture of  these  processes?  At  the  present  time, 
parents  are  outdistanced  In  a  short  time  by  their 
children.  We  no  sooner  begin  to  get  adjusted  to 
a  change,  before  a  new  one  sets  in.  A  particular 
cultural  change  not  only  necessitates  an  adjust- 
ment to  it  on  the  part  of  individuals  but  it  de- 
mands sometimes  rather  far-reaching  adjustments 
in  other  parts  of  culture,  where  cultural  interre- 
lations are  widely  ramified,  as  Is  often  the  case. 
Furthermore  it  takes  a  rather  long  period  of  one's 
life  to  assimilate  through  education  the  existing 
culture.     If  our  social  heritage  accumulates  still 

1*  Robert  H.  Lowic,  Culture  and  Ethnology^  p.  78. 

[114] 


more  and  more,  the  length  of  time  required  to 
assimilate  this  increased  social  heritage  and  the 
difficulty  in  assimilating  it  will  be  even  greater. 
Will  it  take  forty  or  fifty  years  of  a  person's  life 
to  prepare  one  for  life?  Or  will  it  mean  in- 
creasing specialization  and  differentiation  in  hu- 
man activity  so  that  one  becomes  quite  narrowly 
a  specialist?  And  of  this  great  social  heritage, 
will  one  never  assimilate  any  but  that  narrow  por- 
tion in  which  one  specializes?  Will  the  speciali- 
zation become  narrower  and  narrower  and  take 
longer  and  longer  to  acquire?  It  is  difficult,  of 
course,  to  predict  the  future  course  of  material 
culture  even  in  very  general  terms.  The  preced- 
ing discussion  has  approximated,  it  is  thought,  a 
description  of  the  growth  of  material  culture, 
but  for  the  past.  Even  though  a  mathematical 
formula  were  constructed  to  fit  the  facts  of  cul- 
tural growth,  such  a  formula  would  only  be  des- 
criptive within  the  limits  of  past  experience. 
Extrapolation  might  prove  inaccurate.  But  from 
a  long-time  view  of  the  cultural  record,  if  the 
past  be  a  guide  to  the  future,  there  should  be  ex- 
pected a  greatly  increasing  cultural  growth  and 
much  more  rapid  social  changes. 

However,  there  are  conceivable  several  condi- 
tions which  might  result  in  a  slowing  up  of  cul- 
tural growth.  It  is  thinkable  that  the  number  of 
possible  inventions  might  be  limited,  for  instance, 

[115] 


by  the  satisfaction  of  human  needs  and  wants. 
The  material  culture  existing  to-day  meets  very 
satisfactorily  a  great  many  of  our  material  wants. 
Our  housing,  clothing,  foods,  transportation,  and 
much  other  equipment  seem  fairly  satisfactory. 
May  it  not  be  argued  that  our  wants  are  already 
well  met  by  the  abundance  of  the  existing  mater- 
ial culture?  Such  considerations  seem  very 
doubtful,  however.  A  writer  two  thousand  years 
ago  might  have  commented  that  the  material 
wants  of  human  beings  were  fairly  satisfactorily 
met  then,  as  there  were  houses,  clothing,  methods 
of  transportation,  etc.  Yet  improvements  pro- 
ceeded at  an  unprecedented  rate.  Another  point 
that  raises  doubt,  is  the  fact  that  though  wants 
may  be  described  in  psychological  terms  as  few, 
their  expression  in  cultural  terms  may  be  endlessly 
varied.  And  finally  it  is  highly  doubtful  whether 
definite  wants  are  important  determining  or  limit- 
ing factors  of  specific  cultural  forms.  The  ur- 
gency or  lack  of  urgency  of  a  want  is  conditioned 
in  its  production  of  inventions  by  the  existing  cul- 
ture. It  is  possible  that  cultural  growth  might 
be  limited  by  the  capacity  of  human  society  to  as- 
similate so  large  an  accumulation  of  culture. 
The  capacity  of  society  to  assimilate  culture  is, 
however,  greatly  increased  through  specialization 
resulting  in  differentiation.  If  cultural  forms  are 
increasingly  discarded,  there  would  result  change 
[116] 


without  so  much  accumulation.  But  such  specula- 
tions are  highly  imaginary. 

It  is  probable  that  the  social  development  of 
the  future  will  be  affected  by  changes  in  the  quan- 
tity and  nature  of  natural  resources  such  as  soil, 
minerals,  forests,  etc.  The  natural  environment 
has  always  had  an  effect  on  the  development  of 
material  culture,  and  very  broad  variations  in 
geographical  factors  have  been  a  conditioning 
element  in  the  production  of  new  cultural  forms. 
So  changes,  shortages,  or  discoveries  in  natural 
resources  will  have  an  effect  on  the  material  cul- 
ture of  the  future. 

In  the  preceding  pages,  enough  has  been  pre- 
sented to  show  roughly  something  of  a  picture  of 
the  growth  of  material  culture  from  its  beginnings 
to  the  present  time,  and  it  has  been  seen  that  cer- 
tain factors  inherent  in  culture  itself  may  be  the 
cause  of  this  particular  cultural  growth.  The 
writers  on  social  evolution,  it  is  recalled,  have  not 
kept  distinct  the  process  of  cultural  change  from 
the  process  of  biological  change.  Often  the  as- 
sumption has  seemed  to  be  that  the  cultural  evolu- 
tion was  caused  by  biological  evolution.  The 
foregoing  considerations  of  cultural  change  have 
been  made  without  reference  to  biological  evolu- 
tion. We  shall  now  discuss  briefly  some  facts 
and  principles  concerning  the  evolution  of  bio- 
logical man,  particularly  for  the  purpose  of  try- 


k. 


ing  to  get  a  brief  picture  of  the  biological  evolu- 
tion that  has  occurred  in  man  since  the  beginnings 
of  culture  and  also  some  idea  of  the  rapidity  of 
biological  evolution  as  compared  with  the  rapidity 
of  cultural  evolution.  Such  a  consideration  of 
biological  evolution  will  make  easier  an  appraisal 
of  the  biological  factor  in  social  evolution. 


SI 

BIOLOGICAL  CHANGE  IN  MAN 

The  remains  of  the  animal  who  formed  eoliths, 
if  indeed  these  stones  were  artificially  flaked,  have 
not  been  found.  The  remains  of  Pithecanthro- 
pus erectus  are  of  the  same  general  period  as  the 
eoliths,  but  no  eoliths  were  found  with  these 
skeletal  fragments.  There  is  some  doubt  as  to 
the  period  in  which  Pithecanthropus  lived,  but  he 
is  either  of  the  late  Pliocene  or  early  Pleistocene 
period,  a  half-million  years  or  more  ago.  The 
most  significant  measurement  of  this  find  is  his 
skull  capacity,  which  is  estimated  at  850-900  c.c. 
The  largest  simian  brain  case  is  600  c.c.  while  the 
skulls  of  men  living  to-day  average  1450-1500 
c.c.  These  comparative  measurements  indicate 
that  Pithecanthropus  was  a  ^'missing  link,"  in  the 
matter  of  skull  capacity  intermediate  between  ape 

[118] 


and  man.  This  find  was  made  In  Java  and  it  is 
not  known  that  man  descended  from  this  creature, 
or  rather  that  the  lineal  ancestor  of  man  at  this 
period  had  the  measurements  of  Pithecanthropus. 
Not  until  the  Mousterian  period,  50,000  yea'rs, 
more  or  less,  ago,  are  skeletal  remains  of  man  or 
man-like  creatures  found  with  a  sufficient  degree 
of  completeness  to  give  estimates  of  his  whole 
bodily  structure,  particularly  the  capacity  of  the 
skull.  The  Mauer  jaw  of  Heidelberg  man, 
closely  resembling  neither  the  jaw  of  apes  nor  of 
men,  was  found  dating  at  a  period  between  Pithe- 
canthropus and  the  Mousterlans;  but  It  cannot  be 
told  from  the  jaw  what  capacity  his  skull  was  or 
what  were  his  other  bodily  measurements.  Re- 
garding the  Plltdown  man,  there  is  such  disagree- 
ment that  we  may  pass  over  those  fragments 
without  consideration.  But  placed  at  the  begin- 
ning and  middle  of  the  last  glacial  epoch,  with 
the  Mousterian  culture  twenty  or  more  finds  have 
been  made,  some  fragmentary  and  some  more  or 
less  complete  but  all  resembling  each  other. 
These  finds  establish  man  without  doubt,  but  this 
man  differed  from  modern  man,  probably  more 
than  the  yellow  races  differ  from  the  blacks.  The 
capacity  of  his  skull  was  large,  larger  than  the 
average  of  modern  man  judged  by  the  small  num- 
ber of  skulls  that  could  be  measured.  This  is 
shown  from  the  following  measurements  on  six 

[119] 


skulls,  cited  from  Osborn:  Spy  II,  1723  c.c.  (prob- 
ably) ;  La  Chapelle,  1626  c.c;  Spy  I,  1562  c.c; 
Neanderthal,  1408  c.c;  La  Quina  (female),  1367 
c.c,  and  Gibraltar,  1296  cc  The  skulls  of  mod- 
ern man  vary  between  the  limits  of  950  c.c.  and 
2020  c.c  The  size  of  the  brain  is  considered  to  be 
correlated  with  mental  ability.  Such  a  correla- 
tion is  true  over  a  very  broad  range  of  life,  as 
seen  from  the  fact  that  the  anthropoids  have 
small  brains  and  men  have  large  brains.  But 
there  are  other  factors  than  the  size  of  the  brain 
determining  mental  ability.  The  structure  of  the 
brain  is  as  truly  important  as  the  size  and  weight, 
within  limits  of  normal  variation.  This  Nean- 
derthal type  had  skulls  somewhat  more  flattened 
than  modern  man,  with  protruding  brow  ridges 
and  prominent  face  but  small  chin.  Just  what 
significance  these  measurements,  as,  for  instance, 
rounded  chins,  have  for  mental  ability  is  not 
known.  The  literature  on  this  race  is  vast  and 
the  descriptions  and  analyses  of  the  various  meas- 
urements are  very  erudite  and  technical.  How- 
ever, it  is  permissible  to  observe  that  at  the  time 
many  of  these  discussions  were  made  there  was  a 
decided  expectancy  for  "missing  links"  and  a 
search  for  simian  characteristics.  The  Darwin- 
ian theories  created  such  a  situation.  And  if 
there  was  any  bias  in  these  accounts,  it  would 
probably  be  in  the  tendency  to  find  simian  resem- 
[120] 


blances.  But  no  one  questions  that  the  Neander- 
thals were  of  the  genus  homo.  Certainly  man 
was  living  in  Europe  50,000  years  ago  during  the 
earlier  part  of  the  last  ice  age.  But  how  direct 
our  descent  is  from  this  race  is  not  known.  In 
other  words,  it  is  not  possible  to  tell  positively 
from  the  evidence  of  this  race  whether  our  own 
ancestors  were  more  developed  or  less  or  differ- 
ent. Neanderthal  man  in  his  ancient  form  has 
not  survived  to-day. 

By  the  time  of  the  Aurignacian  culture,  there 
were  probably  several  types  of  men  living  in  Eu- 
rope, all  rather  closely  resembling  modern  man 
and  hence  differing  a  good  deal  from  Neander- 
thal man.  The  type  of  which  there  are  the  most 
finds  and  the  best  descriptions  is  called  the  Cro- 
Magnon.  The  Cro-Magnons  resembled  modern 
man,  especially  the  American  Indian,  quite 
closely,  particularly  in  the  facial  formations. 
They  were  taller  than  modern  man  and  their 
heads  were  larger.  The  skull  capacity  of  the 
"old  man  of  Cro-Magnon"  was  1590  c.  c.  and  of 
the  woman  1550  c.c.  The  Cro-Magnons 
found  at  Grimaldi  had  skulls  which  are  said 
to  average  1800  c.c.  The  skeletons  found 
for  periods  later  than  the  Aurignacian  were  some- 
what smaller  than  the  Cro-Magnons  and  with 
smaller  brain  cases.  The  anatomical  finds  of  man 
during  the  late  stone  age  and  the  neolithic  age, 

[121] 


though  varied,  resemble  quite  closely  the  measure- 
ments of  modern  men.  Modern  Europeans  seem 
to  be  somewhat  taller  and  larger  than  Europeans 
of  several  hundred  years  ago,  but  this  may  be  due 
to  purely  environmental  influences  such  as  a  better 
food  supply.  Man  is  to  be  compared  with  the 
domesticated  animals  rather  than  with  the  wild 
animals.  Domestication  means  a  more  continu- 
ous food  supply  which  has  an  effect  on  bodily 
measurements. 

From  skeletal  measurements,  therefore,  there 
is  strong  indication  of  evolution  in  man  since  the 
beginning  of  the  Pleistocene  period.  And  this 
evolution  had  developed  man  certainly  by  the  last 
ice  age,  from  50,000  to  25,000  years  ago.  But 
the  evidence  of  biological  evolution,  as  seen  in 
anatomical  measurements,  since  the  last  ice  age, 
is  certainly  very  slight,  if  existing  at  all.  It  is 
realized,  of  course,  that  measurements  of  bones 
are  only  one  of  many  possible  indices  of  variation. 
The  meagreness  of  these  data  as  indications  of 
evolution  of  mental  ability  is  also  appreciated. 
Other  criteria,  if  existing  for  this  long  period, 
might  show  other  and  different  evidences  of  evolu- 
tion. Considering  the  scantiness  of  skeletal  evi- 
dence and  the  absence  of  other  data,  it  seems  de- 
sirable to  inquire  briefly  into  what  is  known  in 
general  regarding  the  possible  rate  of  biological 
[122] 


change,  and  to  malce  certain  comparisons  with  the 
rate  of  cultural  change. 

The  question,  What  is  the  rate  of  biological 
change?  is  so  simplified  that  it  may  never  be  pos- 
sible to  answer  in  as  simple  a  manner.  The  rate 
of  biological  change  may  be  very  rapid  at  one  time 
and  very  slow  at  another.  Or  it  may  be  rapid  in 
one  species  and  slow  in  another.  Or  again  only 
one  part  of  the  bodily  mechanism  may  be  under- 
going change  and  the  other  parts  remain  stable, 
except  in  so  far  as  internal  readjustments  may  be 
occasioned.  And  then  of  course  it  will  be  difficult 
to  express  rates  of  biological  change  in  measur- 
able and  comparable  units.  All  these  difficulties, 
particularly  in  the  light  of  the  present  data,  mean 
that  the  most  that  can  be  expected  from  an  inquiry 
into  the  rate  of  biological  change  will  necessarily 
be  quite  general.  But  it  should  be  remembered 
that  the  purpose  for  which  this  knowledge  is 
wanted  in  the  present  discussion  is  to  make  com- 
parisons of  the  rapidity  of  change  in  man  with  the 
rapidity  of  cultural  changes.  It  is  known  from 
common  observation  that  biological  changes  are 
slow  as  seen  against  the  span  of  human  life. 
This  will  be  admitted  when  it  is  recalled  that  until 
Darwin's  discoveries,  a  little  over  a  half-century 
ago,  it  was  not  admitted  generally  that  the  species 
changed  at  all.  They  were  supposed  to  have 
[123] 


been  created  as  they  are  now.  It  was  assumed 
that  they  continued  to  exist  as  created  without 
change.  The  stability  of  plants  and  animals  was 
indeed  hardly  questioned  and  the  idea  of  biologi- 
cal evolution  came  as  a  shock. 

Since  the  records  of  biological  change  in  point 
of  time  are  few,  it  may  be  well  to  approach  the 
subject  by  a  brief  consideration  of  the  way  in 
which  changes  occur.  The  evidence  of  changes 
occurs  in  connection  with  the  study  of  heredity. 
This  study  of  heredity  has  already  developed 
quite  an  elaborate  technique  and  terminology,  and 
the  research  is  too  extensive  to  give  a  detailed 
summary.  But  briefly,  it  may  be  said,  the  pro- 
cess of  change  occurs  through  variations  and  a 
transmission  of  these  variations  through  heredity 
and  a  selection  of  particular  ones  favorable  to 
survival.  It  will  be  readily  seen  that  if  the  bodily 
variations  in  an  organism,  occurring  because  of 
use  or  disuse,  or  of  acquired  characteristics,  were 
transmitted  to  the  offspring,  then  the  rapidity  of 
biological  changes  would  be  great,  and  sociology 
would  be  of  the  utmost  importance  for  biology. 
But  acquired  characteristics  are  not  inherited;  and 
this  possible  source  of  change  is  eliminated  from 
consideration.  Individuals  vary,  of  course,  but 
there  are  limits  to  the  variation.  Within  these 
limits,  variations  are  transmitted  subject  to  cer- 
tain rules  of  inheritance.     But  if  these  limits  re- 

[124] 


main  the  same  there  is  no  change  of  species. 
Changes  are  sought,  therefore,  in  variations  that 
occur  without  these  usual  limits  of  variation  and 
that  are  inherited.     These  are  called  mutations. 

At  the  present  time  it  is  not  known  how  or  why 
these  mutations  occur,  though  much  is  known  con- 
cerning the  mechanism  of  their  transmission 
through  heredity.  A  number  of  mutants  have 
been  observed,  however.  The  most  extensive 
evidence  concerning  their  frequency  comes  from 
the  laboratory  of  Professor  T.  H.  Morgan,  who 
has  conducted  for  many  years  experiments  on  a 
fruit  fly,  Drosophila,  Morgan's  work  has  been 
chiefly  concerned  with  the  mechanisms  of  heredity 
and  not  primarily  with  the  rate  of  mutation.  He 
has  not  published  an  estimate  of  the  number  of 
mutations  observed  nor  of  the  number  of  flies  ex- 
amined for  mutations.  To  get  a  rate  of  muta- 
tions we  should  need  to  know  at  least  the  number 
of  flies  examined,  the  number  of  traits  of  the  fly 
observed,  and  the  number  of  mutations  found. 

Although  the  total  number  of  flies  examined  in 
his  laboratory  during  the  years  of  his  investiga- 
tions has  not  been  published,  Morgan  gave  me 
some  rough  idea  of  the  number.  He  said  lo,- 
000,000  as  an  estimate  would  be  conservative. 
He  did  not  think  there  had  been  as  many  as  30,- 
000,000.  No  actual  count  has  of  course  been 
made.     Such   estimates   are,   however,   for   flics 

[125] 


that  have  actually  been  observed  under  the  micro- 
scope. The  flies  are  examined  more  or  less 
closely  for  a  greater  or  smaller  number  of  traits, 
depending  on  the  particular  problem  in  hand. 
But  usually  the  investigators  look  over  the  eyes, 
the  wings,  the  body,  and  the  legs,  so  that  quite  a 
number  of  traits  are  observed  on  each  fly. 

With  regard  to  the  number  of  mutations,  Mor- 
gan has  written  as  follows ; 

The  most  extensive  evidence  is  from  Drosophila 
melanogaster.  One  of  the  first  mutants  that  appeared, 
viz.,  white  eyes,  has  appeared  anew  in  our  cultures  about 
three  times,  in  cultures  known  to  be  free  from  it  before 
and  not  contaminated.  The  eye-color  vermilion  has 
appeared  at  least  six  times;  the  wing  character  called 
rudimentary,  five  times;  cut  wing  has  been  found  four 
times;  truncate  wing  has  frequently  appeared,  but  has 
not  necessarily  been  always  produced  by  the  same 
change.  Certain  characters  such  as  notch  wings  .  .  . 
have  appeared  quite  often.  .  .  .^^ 

These  cases  are  mentioned  as  recurrent  instances, 
and  there  are  of  course  a  number  of  other  muta- 
tions that  have  occurred  only  once.  In  another 
paragraph,  Morgan  speaks  of  the  twelve  domi- 
nant mutations  that  have  occurred  in  Drosophila, 
These  of  course  may  have  occurred  more  than 

i«  Thomas  Hunt  Morgan,  The  Physical  Basis  of  Heredity, 
pp.  248,  249. 

[126] 


once.  Morgan  cautiously  concludes  that  muta- 
tions occur  infrequently.  Even  if  a  few  hundred 
mutations  have  been  observed  in  his  laboratory, 
we  could  not  arrive  at  so  exact  a  measure  as  a 
rate  of  mutations. 

It  is  difficult  to  make  an  estimate  of  the  number 
of  mutations  that  would  have  a  definite  meaning 
and  could  be  interpreted  clearly.  In  the  first 
place,  some  of  the  examinations  of  the  whole  fly 
were  done  fairly  rapidly,  the  search  being  made 
for  a  particular  mutation.  It  is  therefore  very 
probable  that  mutations  have  escaped  notice. 
Some  of  the  mutations  are  small,  and  it  is  not  al- 
ways easy  to  tell  when  a  change  is  a  mutation. 
Even  though  the  rate  of  mutations  in  Drosophila 
were  known,  it  does  not  follow  that  other  species 
would  have  the  same  rate. 

A  less  vague  estimate  of  the  number  and  fre- 
quency of  mutations  is  found  in  an  article  pub- 
lished by  F.  N.  Duncan.^^  A  large  number  of 
crosses  were  made  with  mutant  stock  of  Droso* 
phila  and  wild  stock.  A  uniformly  careful  exam- 
ination of  16,637  fli^s  of  the  F2  generation  was 
made,  and  three  mutations  were  found,  two  of 
these  three  being  of  the  same  character.  Of 
course,  three  is  a  very  small  number  to  make  a 
reliable  ratio,  as  we  know  from  the  theory  of 

1^  "An   Attempt   to   Produce    Mutations   through   Hybridiza- 
tion," American  Naturalist,  Vol.  XLIX,  pp.  575-582. 

[127] 


probabilities.  The  foregoing  material  is  much 
too  vague  and  fragmentary  to  form  an  accurate 
numerical  rate ;  but  it  does  give  us  some  informa- 
tion regarding  the  frequency  of  mutations,  which 
we  see  is  not  great. 

A  few  other  remarks  on  mutations  may  be 
made.  The  new  character  differs  from  the  old, 
sometimes  very  slightly  and  sometimes  by  a  larger 
amount.  It  seems  that  the  smaller  differences 
predominate  because  the  larger  mutations  entail 
considerable  organizational  adjustments,  which 
would  give  the  smaller  mutations  greater  chance 
of  surviving.  Extremely  large  differences  be- 
tween the  new  and  old  characters  would  thus  be 
rare.  These  smaller  mutations  mean  that  the 
development  is  likely  to  be  in  the  direction  of  the 
selection.  Professor  Morgan  states  the  idea 
clearly: 

Starting  at  any  stage,  the  degree  of  development  of 
any  character  increases  the  probability  of  further  stages 
in  the  same  direction.  The  relation  can  better  be  illus- 
trated by  specific  cases.  The  familiar  example  of  tossing 
pennies  will  serve.  If  I  have  thrown  heads  five  times 
in  succession,  the  chances  that  at  the  next  toss  of  the 
penny  I  may  make  a  run  to  six  heads  is  greater  than  if 
I  tossed  six  pennies  at  once.  Not  of  course  because  five 
separate  tosses  of  heads  will  increase  the  likelihood  that 
at  the  next  toss  a  head  rather  than  a  tail  will  turn  up, 
but  only  that  the  chances  are  equal  for  a  head  or  a  tail. 

[128] 


So  that  I  have  equal  chances  of  increasing  the  run  to 
six  by  that  throw,  while  if  I  tossed  six  pennies  at  once 
the  chances  of  getting  six  heads  in  one  throw  are  only 
once  in  sixty-four.  Similar  illustrations  in  the  case  of 
animals  and  plants  bring  out  the  same  point.  If  a  race 
of  men  average  5  feet  10  inches,  and  on  the  average 
mutations  are  not  more  than  two  inches  above  or  below 
the  racial  average,  the  chance  of  the  appearance  of  a 
mutant  individual  that  is  6  feet  tall  is  greater  than  in  a 
race  of  5-foot  men.  If  increase  in  height  is  an  advan- 
tage the  taller  race  has  a  better  chance  than  the  smaller 
one.  This  statement  does  not  exclude  the  possibility 
that  a  short  race  might  happen  to  beat  out  in  height  a 
taller  race,  for  it  might  more  often  mutate;  but  chance 
favors  the  tall.  In  this  sense  evolution  is  more  likely 
to  take  place  along  lines  already  followed,  if  further 
advantage  is  to  be  found  in  that  direction.^^ 

The  example  is  purely  hypothetical  as  regards 
the  size  of  mutations  and  the  conditions  of  sur- 
vival. The  illustration  shows  that  in  biological 
evolution  the  existing  stage  of  biological  develop- 
ment does  have  a  determining  effect  on  the  fu- 
ture development,  with  a  large  element  of  chance. 
Thus  there  is  a  certain  similarity  with  cultural 
growth,  where  it  was  observed  that  the  existing 
stage  of  culture  had  a  determining  effect  on  the 
number  and  the  nature  of  the  inventions. 

With  regard  to  the  survival  of  flies  with  mu- 

17  op.  cit.,  p.  268. 

[129] 


tant  characters,  the  opinion  among  the  workers  in 
Morgan's  laboratory  was  that  in  general  the  flies 
in  which  mutations  were  found  could  not  have 
survived  in  the  wild  state.  This  fact  may  be  of 
possible  significance  in  strengthening  the  guess 
that  culture  may  provide  an  environment  in  which 
probable  mutations  might  survive. 

But  the  especial  point  here  under  consideration 
is  the  rapidity  of  biological  change.  The  data 
on  Drosophila  are  the  most  extensive.  Other 
cases  of  change  are  seen  in  selective  breeding  ex- 
periments undertaken  for  practical  purposes. 
Some  apparently  remarkable  results  have  been  ob- 
tained. But  it  is  difficult  to  tell  how  much  is  due 
to  selection  and  crossing  and  how  much  to  muta- 
tion. Selection  will  of  course  increase  the 
chances  of  a  mutation  in  the  direction  of  the 
selecting.  It  is  questionable  whether  the  idea  of 
rate  of  biological  changes  can  be  expressed  any 
more  briefly  than  has  been  done  in  the  preceding 
summarization. 


8 


THE  CORRELATION  OF   CULTURAL  AND 
BIOLOGICAL    CHANGE 

The   particular   purpose    of    our    inquiry   is    to 
[130] 


compare  the  rate  of  biological  change  with  the 
rate  of  cultural  change.  Comparisons  would  be 
more  satisfactory  if  time  and  quantity  units  could 
be  found.  Realizing  these  inadequacies  in  meas- 
urement and  difficulties  in  conceptions,  there 
does,  however,  seem  to  be  meaning  and  truth  to 
the  statement  that  within  the  last  several  hundred 
years  the  number  and  rate  of  cultural  changes 
have  been  much  greater  than  the  number  and  rate 
of  biological  changes.  For  instance,  Japan  has 
made  remarkable  changes  in  her  culture  within  a 
few  decades.  It  would  have  been  impossible  for 
her  people  to  have  changed  biologically  in  this 
time.  Within  the  span  of  a  single  lifetime  a 
people  may  now-a-days  change  its  culture  greatly. 
Seen  in  this  general  way,  in  the  long  period  of  the 
beginnings  of  culture  there  may  have  been  some 
agreement  in  the  rate  of  biological  change  and  in 
the  rate  of  cultural  change ;  but,  in  the  latter  per- 
iod of  the  development  of  culture,  rates  of  biolog- 
ical change  could  not  possibly  have  kept  pace  with 
the  rates  of  cultural  change.  The  idea  may  be 
otherwise  expressed  by  saying  that  at  the  present 
time  inventions  are  more  frequent  than  mutations. 
Inventions  are  matters  of  record  in  the  patent 
offices.  But  it  is  questionable  whether  a  single 
definite  mutation  in  recent  man  can  be  pointed  to 
with  certainty.  Egyptian  biological  types  have 
persisted  as  shown  by  the  measurements  on  skele- 

[131] 


tons  from  the  pyramids  and  on  modern  skulls,  but 
how  greatly  has  culture  changed  since  that  time ! 

The  foregoing  examination  of  the  fragmentary 
record  of  the  evolution  of  man  shows  that  at  least 
as  far  back  as  50,000  to  25,000  years  ago,  man 
had  evolved  and  was  in  Europe.  There  may 
have  been  mutations  in  man  since  this  time.  The 
differentiation  into  types  which  may  have  taken 
place  since  that  time  would  seem  to  indicate  such 
mutations.  Very  lightly  pigmented  skin  appear- 
ing in  different  parts  of  the  world  has  been  spoken 
of  as  a  mutation.  There  may  also  have  been 
changes  in  the  structure  of  the  brain  or  of  the 
nervous  system.  It  is  recalled,  however,  that  the 
anatomical  measurements  of  man  25,000  years 
ago  compare  quite  closely  with  the  anatomical 
measurements  of  man  to-day.  There  may  have 
been  evolution  in  man  since  the  last  ice  age,  but  it 
seems  to  me  that  it  has  not  been  definitely  proved. 
That  some  changes  have  occurred  seems  theoreti- 
cally probable,  but  just  what  they  are  or  how 
significant  they  are  we  do  not  know.  If  four 
generations  be  reckoned  to  the  century  there  are 
then  100,000  generations  for  the  period,  which 
is  of  course  to  be  multiplied  by  the  population 
which  was  a  good  deal  smaller  before  the  develop- 
ment of  civilization  and  is  smaller  the  further 
back  one  goes.  But  just  what  these  possible 
changes  are  has  not  been  recorded.  The  number 
[132] 


of  characters  in  man  that  might  mutate  is  vast. 
Chance  probably  favors  the  smaller  mutations 
and  selection  has  probably  been  in  the  direction  of 
greater  mental  ability. 

While  the  biological  evolution  in  man  within 
the  past  25,000  years  is  problematical  and  has  not 
been  proved,  there  has  certainly  been  a  great 
development  in  culture,  which  in  recent  years  is 
very  remarkable.  If  the  biological  factor  has 
not  varied  over  recent  periods  of  time,  then  how 
could  it  account  for  the  great  variations  occurring 
in  a  culture  which  is  rapidly  changing?  To  the 
readers  who  have  hitherto  assumed  a  high  cor- 
relation between  biological  changes  and  cultural 
changes,  the  possibility  of  civilization's  growing 
to  what  it  is,  with  native  mental  ability  remaining 
constant  at  the  level  it  was  during  the  last  ice 
age  may  seem  surprising,  and  such  readers  may 
be  at  a  loss  to  account  for  the  great  development 
of  culture.  But  if  material  culture  grows 
through  selective  accumulations  and  inventions, 
in  which  the  preceding  stage  of  cultural  develop- 
ment plays  a  large  part  in  determining  the  extent, 
nature  and  rapidity  of  the  next  step  in  cultural 
development,  it  seems  to  be  possible  theoretically, 
for  the  development  of  culture  to  have  been  what 
it  has  been  without  the  occurrence  of  any  biologi- 
cal evolution  in  man  during  the  process.  In  other 
words,  if  modern  Europeans  could  have  been  set 
[133] 


back  to  the  last  ice  age,  but  without  their  culture 
and  acquired  knowledge,  it  is  open  to  question 
whether  the  development  of  culture  would  have 
been  more  rapid  than  it  has  been.  Such  a  ques- 
tion may  be  asked  and  though  present  informa- 
tion does  not  warrant  a  conclusive  answer,  one 
should  hesitate  to  guess  that  the  culture  would 
have  grown  any  more  quickly  than  it  has  grown. 
If  the  stability  of  human  nature  over  a  very 
long  period  of  time,  say  from  the  last  ice  age  to 
the  present  time,  could  be  fully  demonstrated,  the 
significance  of  such  knowledge  would  be  of  far- 
reaching  importance,  in  many  fields  of  thought 
and  speculation.  It  would  be  of  great  impor- 
tance for  ethics,  for  sociology  and  especially  for  a 
study  of  problems  of  adjustment  between  culture 
and  human  nature.  The  evidence  surveyed  in  the 
preceding  pages  suggests  very  strongly  that 
changes  in  human  nature  by  mutations  have  prob- 
ably been  slow  and  very  slight  over  a  long  period 
of  time.  There  were  very  probably  changes  in 
human  nature  preceding  the  last  ice  age,  but  it  has 
not  been  proven  that  there  have  been  any  changes 
since.  What  has  visibly  changed  and  to  a  great 
degree  is  the  cultural  expression  of  human  nature. 
But  this  is  very  probably  due  to  changes  in  cul- 
ture and  not  in  the  biological  nature  of  man. 
Commonly  the  term,  human  nature,  does  not 
mean  the  original  nature  of  man  but  the  cultural 

[134] 


expression  of  original  human  nature.  It  has  been 
said  that  it  is  the  culture  which  makes  it  human 
nature  instead  of  animal  nature.  Of  course,  the 
cultural  expression  of  human  nature  has  changed 
greatly.  Man  to-day  may  be  more  spiritual  and 
has  greater  ability.  But  this  spirituality  or  this 
ability  may  be  due  to  learned  tendencies  and  ac- 
quired modifications,  which  hold  only  for  the  ex- 
perience of  a  lifetime.  Experience  in  culture  pro- 
duces great  changes,  but  they  are  not  modifications 
in  the  original  nature  of  man,  nor  are  they  inher- 
ited. The  evidence  indicates  a  lack  of  correla- 
tion between  cultural  changes  and  biological 
changes,  if  not  before  the  last  ice  age  certainly  af- 
terward. 

There  is  another  subject,  closely  related  to 
social  evolution,  in  which  a  great  deal  of  work 
has  been  done,  bearing  on  the  question  of  the 
correlation  between  biological  variation  and  cul- 
tural variation.  This  is  the  subject  of  compara- 
tive ethnology.  So  extensive  has  been  the  re- 
search in  this  field  that  a  brief  summary  would 
require  as  lengthy  a  presentation  as  has  been  made 
of  social  evolution.  The  general  nature  of  some 
of  the  evidence  relating  to  race  and  culture  can  be 
seen,  however,  from  a  few  illustrations.  Con- 
sider, for  Instance,  the  data  from  the  American 
continent.  The  American  Indian  is  generally 
admitted   to  be   homogeneous   from  the  racial 

[I3S] 


standpoint.  Some  are  tall  and  some  are  short 
and  there  is  variation  in  head  form,  but  as  a 
whole  they  are  a  racial  type  with  a  fairly  close  re- 
semblance. Yet  the  culture  of  the  American  In- 
dian at  the  time  of  the  coming  of  the  white  men 
showed  very  great  variation.  The  culture,  for 
instance,  of  the  Northern  Athabascans  or  of  some 
of  the  California  tribes  shows  a  very  crude  ma- 
terial culture,  only  a  slight  development  of  social 
organization  and  a  low  development  of  art. 
These  are  small  wandering  bands  living  on  roots, 
herbs  and  game.  In  contrast,  there  is  a  high 
development  of  culture  along  the  North  Pacific 
coast,  a  culture  distinguished  with  prominence  in 
social  classes,  ceremonials,  decorative  and  dram- 
atic art,  boats  and  houses.  In  Central  America 
and  Southern  Mexico  were  highly  organized  so- 
cial systems,  elaborate  stone  temples,  agriculture, 
pottery,  a  numeral  system,  astronomical  knowl- 
edge, and  beginnings  of  writing.  Certainly  the 
variations  in  culture  are  great  for  a  people  of  a 
rather  homogeneous  racial  type.  But  it  may  be 
argued  that  even  within  a  people  of  the  same 
racial  type  a  slight  biological  variation  in  mental 
ability  may  account  for  vast  cultural  differences. 
But  this  remains  unproved,  for  the  American  In- 
dian and  the  variation  in  inherent  mental  ability 
is  unmeasured.  There  seems  to  be  no  particular 
correlation  between  the  bodily  measurements  on 

[136] 


stature,  head  form,  color,  or  facial  angle  with 
these  varying  degrees  of  cultural  develop- 
ment. 

It  may  then  be  asked,  How  is  this  great  cul- 
tural variation  to  be  explained?  This  is  a  ques- 
tion the  answer  to  which,  for  even  a  single  cul- 
tural trait,  can  only  be  made  after  a  definite  his- 
torical account.  The  cultural  history  should  cer- 
tainly first  be  known  before  jumping  to  the  rather 
obscure  biological  explanation.  There  are,  how- 
ever, certain  general  explanations  that  have  been 
found  to  be  of  quite  wide  significance  in  account- 
ing for  cultural  developments  and  hence  cultural 
variations.  Briefly,  some  of  these  are  the  fol- 
lowing. The  culture  of  a  particular  group  grows 
by  borrowings,  which  occur  through  cultural  con- 
tacts of  varying  degrees.  Geographical  isolation 
acts  thus  as  a  hindrance  to  the  spread  of  culture. 
Contacts  of  peoples  facilitate  the  spread  of  cul- 
ture. The  contact  in  one  group  of  two  different 
cultures  may  result  in  new  formations.  The  ex- 
isting cultural  base  of  a  group  not  only  has  an 
effect  on  the  future  inventions,  but  it  has  a  selec- 
tive effect  on  diffusion.  A  nomadic  group  is  not 
so  likely  to  borrow  pottery-making  as  an  agricul- 
tural community.  Some  things  spread  rather 
easily,  as,  for  instance,  the  use  of  tobacco.  The 
adoption  of  other  cultural  features  is  more  diffi- 
cult. The  adoption  of  the  gun  might  reduce  the 
[1373 


food  supply  and  cause  extensive  changes.  There 
is  in  the  culture  of  a  group  usually  a  fairly  close 
integration  or  interrelation  of  the  various  parts 
as  in  a  complicated  machine ;  and  a  single  change 
in  one  of  the  parts  necessitates  considerable  re- 
organization, thus  making  barriers  to  diffusion. 
Food  is  always  an  important  feature  of  the  cul- 
ture and  a  change  in  food,  as,  for  instance,  the 
introduction  of  maize,  usually  means  many  read- 
justments and  many  borrowings.  If  two  cultures 
are  widely  different  the  integration  of  each  may 
be  such  as  to  make  adoptions  difficult.  Other 
features  of  cultural  change  and  diffusion  might 
be  cited.  The  excellent  ethnological  work  of  the 
American  school  of  anthropologists  among  the 
American  Indians,  has  resulted  in  their  pointing 
out  many  purely  cultural  accounts  of  cultural 
variations,  and  has  led  to  a  considerable  develop- 
ment of  theory  of  cultural  diffusion. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  cultural  explana- 
tions of  cultural  differences,  one  other  point  of 
interest  may  be  mentioned.  Some  cultural  dif- 
ferences between  groups  are  so  great  as  to  be 
astounding.  This  is  particularly  true  where  com- 
parisons of  primitive  cultures  are  made  with  the 
highly  developed  modern  culture.  Certainly  one 
cause  of  this  great  discrepancy  is  the  differences 
in  the  rates  of  cultural  growth.  The  survey  of 
the  rise  of  culture  in  Europe  showed  it  to  have 

[138] 


been  very  slow  indeed  at  first,  gradually  getting 
faster  and  in  the  latter  phase  growing  with  great 
rapidity.  The  growth  of  a  culture  that  has 
reached  the  point  of  extremely  rapid  change  will, 
within  a  definite  period  of  time,  say,  five  hundred 
years,  be  immensely  greater  than  the  growth, 
within  the  same  time,  of  a  culture  that  has  not 
reached  the  stage  of  such  rapid  change.  If  such 
a  comparison  be  thought  of  as  a  race  between 
two  cultures,  the  one  will  in  the  same  period  of 
time  greatly  outdistance  the  other,  which  will 
seem  to  be  left  hopelessly  behind.  The  original 
disparity  between  two  such  cultures  may  have  been 
due  to  relative  degrees  of  isolation  or  other  cul- 
tural factors.  Theoretically,  once  such  a  great 
difference  is  established  between  two  such  cultures, 
it  seems  difficult  for  the  difference  to  be  lessened, 
for  the  reason  that  diffusion  of  culture  is  more 
difficult  where  the  differences  are  very  great.  It 
is  true  the  Japanese  took  over  in  large  part  west- 
ern culture,  and  China  may  do  so,  but  if  the  Jap- 
anese culture  had  been  in  the  neolithic  stage  it 
would  certainly  have  been  most  diflicult  for  it  to 
have  been  brought  up  quickly  to  the  stage  at- 
tained in  modern  Europe. 

SUMMARY 

The  presentation  of  the   analysis  of  some   as- 
[139] 


pects  of  social  evolution  has  been  quite  long  to 
read  and  somewhat  involved.  It  therefore  seems 
desirable  to  summarize  the  argument.  In  Part  I 
was  shown  the  necessity  of  segregating  the  biologi- 
cal factor  and  the  cultural  factor.  This  differ- 
entiation was  thought  to  be  desirable  for  the 
study  of  social  evolution.  Students  of  social  evo- 
lution do  not  generally  make  such  a  segregation 
of  factors ;  in  fact,  many  students  think  social  evo- 
lution is  caused  by  biological  evolution.  Good 
methodology  warrants  an  account  of  social 
evolution  in  terms  of  cultural  records  before 
recourse  is  had  to  the  more  obscure  biological 
causes. 

Accordingly  the  growth  of  material  culture 
since  its  beginnings  in  the  early  ice  ages  was  sub- 
jected to  analysis.  Material  culture  appears  to 
grow  by  means  of  inventions  which  are  seldom 
lost  but  which  accumulate.  Thus  the  material 
culture  grows  larger  and  larger.  As  the  material 
culture  grows  larger  more  inventions  are,  on  the 
average,  made.  The  extent  of  the  material  cul- 
ture base  is  a  factor  in  the  frequency  of  inven- 
tions. Thus  material  culture  tends  to  accumulate 
more  rapidly.  The  result  is  more  rapid  social 
change,  increased  specialization  and  differentia- 
tion. In  very  early  times,  material  culture  was 
small  in  amount  and  changed  slowly.  Such  was 
[140] 


the  condition  for  a  long  time.  Recently  the  ma- 
terial culture  has  grown  to  a  vast  amount  and  is 
changing  very  rapidly. 

Considering  now  the  biological  factor,  the  re- 
cords of  ancient  man  indicate  a  significant  evolu- 
tion from  the  early  Pleistocene  period  to  the  last 
glacial  period.  But  since  the  last  ice  age,  exter- 
nal measurements  make  it  seem  probable  that 
there  has  been  no  significant  evolution  in  these 
characters  in  man,  and  certainly  do  not  prove  it 
conclusively.  Studies  of  heredity  show  that  mu- 
tations occur  only  infrequently.  Probabilities  are 
that  some  change  has  taken  place  in  some  of  the 
many  characters  of  man  since  the  last  ice  age; 
but  the  incomplete  record  does  not  show  them  and 
nothing  is  known  as  to  what  characters  may  have 
changed  nor  their  significance.  Biological  change 
over  the  last  two  thousand  years  must  be  ex- 
ceedingly slight,  if  it  has  occurred  at  all. 

But  the  cultural  change  over  the  past  two 
thousand  years  has  been  extraordinarily  great. 
Therefore  there  appears  to  be  for  this  period 
no  correlation  beween  cultural  changes  and  bio- 
logical changes.  Cultural  evolution  is  thus  not 
to  be  accounted  for  by  biological  evolution.  In- 
deed, since  the  last  ice  age  it  may  be  that  the  vast 
cultural  growth  has  taken  place  without  any  sig- 
nificant biological  evolution  in  man.     Once  given 

[141] 


a  level  of  biological  equipment,  culture  may  go  on 
Increasing  at  a  rapid  rate  without  any  biological 
change.  The  significance  of  the  biological  fac- 
tor for  the  study  of  social  evolution  is  thus  some- 
what more  limited  than  is  usually  thought. 


CH2] 


PART  III 

CULTURAL  INERTIA  AND  CONSER- 
VATISM 


In  the  previous  discussion  we  have  been  con- 
cerned with  how  culture  changes.  We  wish  now 
to  inquire  into  why  culture  does  not  change.  It 
has  been  observed  that  culture  does  not  die  as 
human  beings  do  but  goes  on.  The  persistence  of 
culture  at  times  appears  so  strong  that  it  seems 
as  though  culture  actually  resists  change.  There 
certainly  is  a  resistance  to  change  as  any  modern 
social  reformer  will  testify.  Why  is  it  so  diffi- 
cult to  change  culture  for  those  who  wish  to  make 
progress?  Is  it  due  to  any  resisting  quality  in 
culture?  Or  is  it  due  to  traits  in  human  beings 
that  resist  social  change?  Is  the  slowness  of 
culture  to  change  a  hindrance  to  the  improvement 
of  social  conditions  or  a  measure  of  social  order 
and  stability?  In  the  pages  which  follow,  it  is 
proposed  to  consider  some  of  the  more  promin- 
ent and  more  frequently  cited  types  of  resist- 
ance to  change,  as,  for  instance,  the  so-called  sur- 
vivals, the  more  common  explanations  of  cultural 
inertia,  and  some  instances  of  modern  conserva- 
tism. The  examination  will  concern  both  cultu- 
ral and  psychological  factors.     It  is  hoped  that 

[145] 


such  an  inquiry  will  throw  more  light  on  the  na- 
ture of  the  social  heritage  and  social  change. 


VARIOUS  CONCEPTIONS  OF  THE  PERSISTENCE 
OF  CULTURE 

The  study  of  the  slowness  of  culture  to  change 
has  been  approached  by  the  various  writers  from 
several  different  points  of  view.  One  of  the  ear- 
lier conceptions  is  that  of  survivals.  Tylor  in 
his  Primitive  Culture  studied  at  length  cultural 
forms  that  had  apparently  persisted  beyond  their 
usefulness  and  these  he  called  survivals.  Exam- 
ples of  these  survivals  are  folklore,  proverbs,  cus- 
toms, superstitions,  and  magical  practices.  Thus, 
the  presence  among  European  peoples  of  super- 
stitions regarding  sneezing  is  found  to  date  back 
to  a  time  when  spirits,  which  were  thought  to 
reside  in  the  body,  passed  in  and  out  through  the 
breath  and  sneezing  was  thus  a  peculiar  manifes- 
tation of  some  spiritual  activity.  Hence  certain 
bodily  motions  were  performed  after  sneezing 
in  deference  to  the  spirit.  The  development  of 
science  has  shown  the  absurdity  of  such  beliefs 
yet  the  practices  continue  to  survive.  Tylor's 
main  purpose,  however,  was  not  so  much  to  note 

[146] 


or  explain  a  resistance  to  change  as  to  find  in 
these  survivals  evidence  of  the  evolution  of  cul- 
ture, and  to  show  that  culture  passed  through  cer- 
tain stages  In  the  course  of  evolution. 

The  idea  of  survivals  had  previously  been 
formed  in  biology  in  the  study  of  embryology. 
According  to  the  so-called  "recapitulation  theory" 
the  life  of  the  individual  Is  supposed  to  repeat  the 
history  of  the  species.  So  signs  of  gills  were 
observed  at  certain  stages  of  human  foetal  deve- 
lopment and  were  taken  as  an  Indication  that  the 
embryo  in  its  development  passed  through 
the  fish  stage  in  the  course  of  evolution.  Thus 
the  signs  of  gills  of  fishes  in  the  foetus  are 
a  survival  In  man  of  an  earlier  evolu- 
tionary stage.  In  a  somewhat  similar  way 
evidence  of  an  earlier  primitive  culture  survived 
into  the  modern  phase  of  culture.  Although  the 
evolution  theory  seems  to  have  been  the  occa- 
sion of  these  observations,  yet  it  did  appear  that 
certain  types  of  culture,  especially  certain  cus- 
toms, seemed  to  resist  change. 

Students  of  another  field  of  ethnology  and  with 
a  somewhat  different  purpose,  have  also  called 
attention  to  the  peculiar  persisting  quality  of  cul- 
ture. These  are  the  students  who  use  etymo- 
logy* and  particularly  kinship  terms,  to  gain  an 
insight  into  the  unwritten  history  of  an  earlier 
period.  The  early  Aryan  culture  of  Europe  was 
[1473 


studied  by  means  of  the  persistence  of  certain 
words  in  our  language.  For  instance,  the  word, 
pecuniary,  goes  back  through  the  Latin,  pecu- 
nium,  to  the  Sanskrit,  pagu,  meaning  cattle.  The 
etymology  of  certain  words  in  the  various  lan- 
guages shows  they  go  back  to  an  earlier  language 
possessed  by  the  Aryans;  and  in  this  way  the 
earlier  Aryan  culture  can  be  described.  Simi- 
larly, existing  kinship  terms  of  a  particular  peo- 
ple give  evidence  of  a  prior  family  or  marital  con- 
dition. Thus,  language  as  a  special  form  of  cul- 
ture has  a  certain  persistence,  as  the  simplified 
spelling  reformers  also  have  had  occasion  to  ob- 
serve. 

Recently,  the  modern  ethnologists  have  given 
the  name,  cultural  inertia,  to  the  apparent  slow- 
ness of  culture  to  change.  Their  observations 
cover  a  very  great  variety  of  phenomena,  from 
folklore  to  material  culture.  Such  observations 
are  particularly  noticeable  in  the  study  of  cul- 
ture areas,  and  the  influence  of  the  diffusion  of 
culture.  Sometimes  culture  does  not  spread  very 
quickly,  when  it  would  be  expected  to  if  judged 
on  the  basis  of  contact  through  geographical  lo- 
cation. For  instance,  the  cultures  of  the  Hopi 
and  of  the  Navaho  though  in  daily  contact  show 
little  tendency  to  merge.  A  people  will  migrate 
from  the  seacoast  inland  and  will  continue  to 
carry  certain  figures  of  the  sea  in  their  mythol- 

[148] 


ogies.  Boas  cites  from  Bogoras  the  case  of  the 
Chuckchee  who  became  nomadic  and  instead  of 
developing  the  light  tent,  continued  to  use  quite 
clumsily  a  complicated  structure  resembling  their 
former  permanent  dwellings.  ^  Ethnology  af- 
fords many  examples  of  what  appears  to  be  a 
sort  of  resistance  of  culture  to  change,  and  such 
a  tendency  is  seen  in  many  features  of  culture. 
Still  another  source  of  interest  in  the  slowness 
of  culture  to  change  is  the  modern  social  reform 
movement.  Modern  society  is  divided  into  more 
or  less  loosely  defined  groups,  called  conservative 
and  radical.  The  latter  group  are  much  im- 
pressed with  the  slowness  of  social  change.  For 
instance,  political  reformers  in  the  United  States 
worked  for  many  years  to  get  the  national  gov- 
ernment to  adopt  a  budget  system  to  replace  the 
old  haphazard,  uneconomical,  logrolling  method. 
The  old  United  States  National  Banking  system 
lasted  for  many  years  after  it  was  known  that 
a  centralized  system  of  credit  and  an  elastic 
bank-note  system  were  needed.  Industry  paid 
the  cost  of  several  severe  panics  before  the  Fed- 
eral Reserve  Banking  system  was  adopted.  The 
separation  of  the  executive  and  legislative  func- 
tions of  our  government  continues  to  exist,  des- 
pite the  fact  that  the  government  practically 
ceases  to  function  on  important  and  urgent  issues 

1  FraDz  Boas,  The  Mind  of  Primitive  Man,  p.  x6a. 
[149] 


when  the  President  and  Congress  are  of  a  differ- 
ent political  complexion.  The  inadequacies  and 
wastes  of  private  industry  which  is  run  for  profit 
rather  than  service  are  shown  in  various  reports, 
yet  the  system  continues  year  after  year  funda- 
mentally unchanged.  Such  claims  of  radicals 
and  liberals  to-day  show  the  great  importance  of 
cultural  inertia  and  furnish  abundant  evidence 
of  it. 

From  several  different  sources,  then,  there  ap- 
pears to  be  very  strong  persistence  of  culture. 
Such  conditions  call  for  explanation.  Such  an 
explanation  is  of  especial  importance  for  theories 
of  progress  and  of  particular  interest  to  those 
who  are  attempting  to  control  and  direct  social 
changes  towards  social  progress. 


2< 

SURVIVALS 

Our  first  consideration  of  cultural  inertia  will 
be  of  the  survivals  emphasized  particularly  by 
Tylor,  and  which  have  since  been  quite  widely 
discussed.  These  survivals,  it  is  recalled,  are 
frequently  old  customs  such  as  the  use  of  mistle- 
toe at  Christmas  time,  the  riderless  horse  at  a 
[ISO] 


funeral,  the  use  of  the  ring  in  the  marriage  cere- 
mony, children's  games  with  the  bow  and  arrow, 
and  various  superstitions,  magical  practices,  and 
proverbs.  A  mere  recounting  of  some  of  these 
old  customs  suggests  immediately  why  they  are 
thought  of  as  survivals.  Mistletoe,  because  of 
the  peculiarity  of  its  green  growth  in  a  leafless 
tree  in  the  winter,  presumably  possessed  certain 
magical  properties  which  were  of  religious  signi- 
ficance according  to  the  religious  ideas  of  early 
times.  It  was  used  in  ceremonies  of  the  Druids 
and  was  later  fused  into  Christmas  customs. 
With  better  knowledge  concerning  the  growth  of 
plants  and  with  changed  religious  concepts,  there 
is  no  longer  any  mystical  religious  significance  to 
this  pecuhar  plant.  Nevertheless  its  use  con- 
tinues in  our  Christmas  festival.  The  custom  is 
therefore  said  to  survive  beyond  the  period  of 
culture  in  which  its  relative  significance  was  great. 
Marett  has  spoken  of  this  process  which  results 
in  survivals  as  a  transvaluatlon  of  culture,  and 
the  particular  type  of  transvaluatlon  just  dis- 
cussed, he  calls  metataxis.  He  likens  this  pro- 
cess to  ''casting  out  of  the  parlor  the  unfashion- 
able bit  of  furniture  and  placing  it  downstairs 
in  a  corner  of  the  kitchen  or  of  the  children's 
play  room,"  or  again,  "these  fables,  proverbs  or 
the  leechcraft  prescriptions  In  vogue  to-day  among 

C151] 


the  folk  are  but  the  debased  product  of  yesterday's 
official  wisdom."  ^ 

As  Marett  has  pointed  out  and  as  Tylor  real- 
ized, these  old  customs  do  not  last  on  as  does  a 
fossil.  They  are  not  dead  in  the  sense  of  be- 
ing functionless  or  not  being  put  to  use.  Rather 
their  valuation  has  been  changed.  Their  use  is 
no  longer  in  the  parlor  or  living  room  but  is  now 
in  the  kitchen  or  the  children's  play  room.  They 
survive  in  the  sense  of  living  on  as  a  thing  of 
utility  rather  than  as  lasting  on  as  skeletal  re- 
mains. 

Thus,  it  is  easily  seen  that  though  bows  and 
arrows  were  useful  as  instruments  of  adult  war- 
fare, and  are  no  longer  of  use  in  modern  society 
for  such  a  purpose,  nevertheless  they  may  be 
useful  as  playthings  for  children.  Similarly,  pro- 
verbs may  have  at  one  time  been  the  highest  ex- 
pression of  wisdom,  yet  they  may  be  very  useful 
forms  of  expression  for  ideas  to-day,  even  though 
they  be  expressed  In  similes  of  the  chase,  or  in 
phrases  of  a  nomadic  life.  The  vitality  of 
Christmas  as  a  festival  may  be  less  in  our  modern 
city  life  with  our  changed  ideas  of  religion,  but 
still  It  may  serve  certain  purposes  of  social  life. 

The  usefulness  of  some  of  those  survivals 
called  superstitions  is  not  so  apparent.  Of  what 
use   or   purpose,   it  may  be   asked,    are   certain 

2  R.  R.  Marett,  Psychology  and  Folklore^  p.  109. 

[152] 


taboos  or  beliefs  in  luck,  or  certain  signs  and 
divinations?  Whether  these  survivals  be  so- 
cially useful  or  not  they  are  certainly  not  fossils, 
for  they  do  function  in  the  life  of  the  folk. 
Indeed,  they  may  not  only  not  serve  any  good 
social  end,  they  may  be  socially  harmful.  The 
use  of  certain  herbs,  roots  and  quack  medicines 
is  harmful.  The  planting  of  crops  according 
to  signs  of  the  stars  may  be  bad  agricultural 
practice.  Funeral  customs  may  be  injurious  to 
health.  Although  these  features  of  culture  are 
of  no  good  social  use  and  indeed  may  be  socially 
harmful,  it  can  be  maintained,  it  is  thought,  that 
they  possess  a  certain  utility,  that  is,  they  at- 
tempt to  supply  a  want  or  to  meet  a  psychologi- 
cal need.  A  person  is  sick  and  wants  to  do 
something  to  get  well.  If  he  hasn't  learned  of 
the  achievements  of  science  in  medicine  he  will 
follow  the  existing  cultural  practices  of  his  group. 
There  are  many  occasions  in  life  when  the  crav- 
ing to  know  the  future  is  very  strong.  Lacking 
a  conception  of  scientific  standards  of  prediction 
or  an  ability  to  apply  them,  one  may  very  easily 
use  mysterious  signs,  particularly  if  this  cultural 
practice  is  existing  and  easy  of  access.  Similarly, 
though  some  funeral  customs  may  be  harmful, 
they  may  be  a  means  of  meeting  individual  desire 
for  expressing  sorrow  or  of  meeting  the  group 
standards  in  this  regard.  As  seen  from  the 
[153] 


above  considerations,  it  is  maintained  that, 
though  objects  of  material  culture,  such  as  ruins, 
may  survive  as  fossils,  forms  of  culture  such  as 
customs,  beliefs,  religions,  survive  because  of 
a  utility  they  possess  in  meeting  psychological 
needs. 


THE  UTILITY  OF   CULTURE 

The  idea  of  utility  of  culture  can  be  assumed, 
it  would  seem,  in  nearly  all  cases  of  survival  or 
where  culture  exists.  Sometimes  the  material 
objects  of  culture  may  exist  without  being  used; 
but  nearly  all  cultural  forms  are  put  to  some 
use.  Utility  is  simply  another  word  for  useful- 
ness with  the  conception  of  good  and  bad  omitted. 
The  word,  wantability,  has  been  suggested  by 
Professor  Irving  Fisher  as  equivalent  In  mean- 
ing to  utility.  *  The  utility  of  the  cultural  forms 
means  that  they  satisfy  some  individual  or  social 
want.  Any  features  of  culture  other  than  mater- 
ial objects,  such  as  customs,  beliefs,  religious  prac- 
tices, folk  ways,  superstitions,  social  habits,  and 

3  Irving  Fisher,  "Is  Utility  the  Most  Suitable  Term?"  Amer- 
ican Economic  Revie^w,  Vol.  VIII   (1918),  No.  2,  p.  335. 

[154] 


philosophies  that  exist  may  be  said  to  have  util- 
ity to  satisfy  some  psychological  need. 

It  does  not  follow  of  course  that  the  psycholog- 
ical need  creates  the  cultural  form;  nor  indeed 
that  only  one  cultural  form  will  satisfy  a  parti- 
cular desire.  One  cannot  start  from  the  side  of 
desire,  assume  a  certain  set  of  desires,  and  pre- 
dict the  culture.  In  fact,  very  little  is  known 
about  the  etiology  of  desires.  They  are  very 
complex;  they  shift  and  change;  and  fuse  or 
pull  at  cross-purposes,  resulting  in  conflict.  Past 
cultural  experiences  play  a  part  in  directing  the 
motivation.  A  single  cultural  form  may  answer 
several  widely  differing  desires.  So  that  while 
a  knowledge  of  the  psychology  of  desires  does 
not  enable  one  to  account  for  a  particular  type 
of  culture,  nevertheless  a  knowledge  of  desires, 
once  a  cultural  form  is  attained,  does  yield  a 
fuller  understanding  of  its  use.  Thus  a  definite 
instance  of  a  burial  custom  or  of  a  taboo,  or  such 
a  custom  as  cowvade  may  be  accounted  for  his- 
torically, yet  it  may  be  so  strange  as  to  be  hardly 
understandable. 

In  such  a  case  a  knowledge  of  the  behavior 
of  desires,  say,  in  the  cases  of  mental  con- 
flict may  render  this  cultural  usage  more  In- 
telligible. Thus  to  see  individuals  eat  a  piece 
of  food  or  build  a  shelter  or  dance  does  not 


seem  strange;  the  desires  back  of  such  activities 
are  understood.  But  the  fascination  of  a  people 
for  a  myth  of  a  man  marrying  his  mother  or  an 
exogamous  taboo  or  the  feigning  of  sickness  by 
a  man  at  the  birth  of  his  child  is  not  so  easily 
understood  and  a  greater  knowledge  of  psychol- 
ogy would  certainly  help  to  understand  such  a 
cultural  form.  To  say,  therefore,  that  a  survi- 
val is  not  a  fossil  but  really  meets  a  psychological 
need  is  a  very  generalized  explanation  of  sur- 
vivals. It  cannot  be  predicted  what  cultural 
form  will  survive  and  what  cultural  form  will  not 
survive  because  the  psychological  need  is  not  the 
only  factor  and  because  we  do  not  know  enough 
about  psychological  needs.  There  are  also  cul- 
tural or  historical  reasons  why  a  particular  piece 
of  culture  survives.  The  particular  psychologi- 
cal desires  which  a  survival  tends  to  meet  must 
be  analyzed  in  each  particular  case. 

From  the  foregoing  analysis  of  survivals  it 
would  seem  that  there  is  no  particular  property 
of  culture  as  such  that  shows  a  peculiar  resist- 
ance to  change.  Culture  once  in  existence  tends 
to  exist  for  the  reason  that  it  has  utility,  very 
much  as  a  physical  mass  at  rest  tends  to  remain 
at  rest.  In  each  case  the  phenomenon  is  re- 
ferred to  as  inertia.  In  case  of  an  invention  of 
a  cultural  form  superior  in  utility,  there  is  a  dis- 
placement.    Thus  metal  weapons  replace  bows 

[156] 


and  arrows  and  archery  survives  only  as  a  chil- 
dren's game.  Literature  and  science  replace  folk- 
lore and  witchcraft  in  the  well-to-do  classes,  but 
the  replacement  is  slower  among  the  more  igno- 
rant folk.  It  seems  that  the  peculiarity  called 
survival  consists  not  so  much  in  any  new  principle 
of  resistance  to  change  but  rather  in  the  ex- 
tremely Interesting  way  in  which  it  furnishes  clews 
to  previously  existing  stages  of  culture.  The  sur- 
viving culture  occupied  a  place  of  importance  in 
an  earlier  culture  compared  to  its  unimportant 
place  In  modern  culture,  and  hence  helps  to  tell 
the  story  of  an  earlier  culture. 

Another  illustration  of  what  seems  to  be  an  im- 
pressive instance  of  cultural  resistance  to  change 
is  the  case  where  a  cultural  form  or  activity  is 
employed  for  one  purpose  at  one  time  and  later 
the  same  form  or  activity  serves  another  and  dif- 
ferent purpose.  The  same  piece  of  culture  per- 
sists through  several  different  usages.  Such  is 
the  case  to  a  certain  degree  in  survivals.  The  re- 
ligious significance  of  mistletoe  has  disappeared 
but  its  festival  use  remains.  Tylor's  account  of 
the  origin  of  drinking  to  one's  health  shows  that 
at  one  time  it  was  a  ceremony  performed  with 
a  mystical  fluid  in  connection  with  the  ceremony 
of  the  dead.  Its  use  is  now  quite  festive.  It 
seems  that  in  some  of  these  cases  of  persistence, 
the  culture  persisting  possessed  two  or  more  utili- 
[157] 


ties,  or  what  J.  B.  Clark  calls  a  bundle  of  utili- 
ties ;  at  one  time  the  one  utility  being  more  promi- 
nent than  another.  In  the  course  of  time  the 
first  utility  diminishes  in  significance  while  an- 
other increases.  Thus,  a  certain  rite  may  promote 
both  religious  and  social  activity.  But  the  once 
dominant  religious  appeal  may  give  way  to  the 
rise  of  the  expression  of  sociability.  Cultural 
forms  frequently  involve  many  different  psycho- 
logical responses  at  the  same  time.  The  church 
may  satisfy  certain  religious,  ethical  and  social 
needs,  religion  itself,  of  course,  being  a  complex 
of  psychological  motives.  It  is  thus  thinkable 
though  not  necessarily  probable  that  in  the  future 
the  church  may  become  a  social  or  ethical  insti- 
tution with  a  diminishing  religious  significance. 
Similarly,  the  family  as  an  institution  answers 
a  number  of  needs:  economic,  affectional,  pro- 
tective, recreative,  etc.  In  some  cultures  the  af- 
fectional element  has  been  slight,  affection  find- 
ing an  outlet  elsewhere,  and  the  economic  element 
has  been  strong;  in  other  cultures  the  economic 
element  has  been  slight  and  the  affectional  bond 
strong.  Furthermore,  the  same  activity  may  oc- 
cur from  different  motives.  Thus  one  may  steal 
to  establish  a  reputation  for  cleverness  or  bra- 
very as  is  true  in  some  cultures,  or  one  may  steal 
for  bodily  needs  as  sometimes  occurs  among 
slaves.  Therefore  the  same  cultural  form  or 
[158] 


activity  may  serve  different  psychological  needs 
at  different  times. 


4 

DIFFICULTIES  OF  INVENTION  AND  OF  DIFFUSION 

Cultural  forms  may  persist  apparently  because 
it  is  easier  to  use  an  existing  form  than  it  is  to 
create  a  new  one.  The  new  idea  is  expressed  in 
the  old  form.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  an  ex- 
pression of  the  foreign  policy  of  America,  was 
at  the  time  of  its  origin  a  doctrine  designed  to 
protect  the  United  States  from  the  indirect  ag- 
gression of  foreign  powers.  It  may  very  prob- 
ably change  its  meaning,  if  the  imperialistic  sen- 
timent in  the  United  States  should  grow,  and 
become  an  instrument  for  economic  aggran- 
dizement on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  This 
old  and  revered  doctrine  of  foreign  policy  might 
more  easily  be  expressive  of  the  new  ideas  of 
imperialism  than  some  new  document.  Thus  the 
difficulty  of  inventing  and  of  getting  the  invention 
adopted  and  the  ease  of  revaluing  an  old  cul- 
tural form  account  for  very  striking  persistences 
of  culture.     Lowie  cites  from  Boas  *  the  use  of 

*  Franz  Boas,  "The  Eskimo  of  Baffin  Land  and  Hudson 
Bay,"  Bulletin,  American  Museum  of  Natural  History,  Vol. 
XVII   (1907),  pp.  75,  357. 

C159] 


a  stone  lamp  by  the  Eskimo  of  Southhampton 
Island    as    such    a    case    of    cultural    inertia. 

Thus  the  Central  Eskimo  generally  make  lamps  and 
pots  out  of  soapstone.  In  Southhampton  Island,  where 
this  material  is  lacking,  they  have  not  devised  a  new  form 
but  have  at  the  expense  of  much  ingenuity  and  labor 
cemented  together  slabs  of  limestone  so  as  to  produce 
the  traditional  shape.^ 

The  difficulty  of  inventing  and  spreading  an 
invention  may  mean  that  new  demands  or  valua- 
tions are  met  by  the  use  of  old  forms,  it  being 
easier  to  transvalue  an  existing  form  than  to 
invent  a  new  one. 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  difficulty  of  in- 
venting, as  a  cause  of  cultural  inertia,  only  ap- 
pears as  a  factor  when  one  looks  backward  into 
the  past  after  the  Invention  has  been  made.  At 
a  particular  time  when  an  Invention  has  not  been 
made  or  conceived,  the  continued  existence  of 
culture  does  not  appear  as  anything  unusual. 
It  Is  rather  the  ordinary  thing,  as  was  previously 
expressed  by  saying  that  culture  once  In  exist- 
ence and  having  utility  continues  to  exist  until 
replaced  by  an  Invention  or  until  lost  through 
some  cause.  But  where  there  is  a  change  In 
the  use  of  an  old  cultural  form,  the  trait  called 
cultural  inertia   Is  prominent   and   the   explana- 

•  Robert  H.  Lowie,  Culture  and  Ethnology,  p.  59. 

[160] 


tlon  may  be  that  an  old  form  is  put  to  new 
uses  more  easily  than  a  new  form  is  invented. 

The  slowness  of  culture  to  change  also  seems 
notable  when  one  observes  that  the  culture  of 
one  people,  as  in  the  case  of  China  in  the  nine- 
teenth century,  seems  to  resist  outside  influences, 
that  is,  new  forms  existing  in  other  cultures  are 
not  adopted  or  utilized.  This  failure  is  some- 
times credited  to  the  inability  of  a  people  to 
take  over  a  higher  culture.  Such  a  characteri- 
zation is,  it  seems  to  me,  an  unsatisfactory  way 
of  expressing  it  because  the  implication  is  that 
the  cause  of  the  phenomena  lies  in  the  ability 
of  the  people,  or  lack  of  it,  whereas  the  difficul- 
ties may  be  largely  cultural.  Thus  the  Mexi- 
cans seem  slow  to  borrow  the  culture  of  the 
United  States.  The  culture  in  the  southern  Ap- 
palachian mountains  in  Tennessee,  Kentucky  and 
North  Carolina  seems  to  be  a  survival  of  an 
older  culture;  the  mountaineers  have  never  uti- 
lized the  advantages  of  modern  industrial  cul- 
ture about  them.  Where  diffusion  of  culture  is 
difficult,  there  seems  to  be  an  inertia  of  culture. 
This  apparent  cultural  inertia  is  partly  a  matter 
of  perspective.  From  the  vantage  point  of  an 
outsider,  it  seems  that  the  Hopi  are  slow  to 
change  their  culture,  but  the  Hopi  probably  are 
not  so  Impressed  with  this  point  of  view.  And 
froip  the  point  of  view  of  one  having  the  higher 
[i6i] 


material  culture  the  slowness  of  the  Mexican  or 
mountaineer  culture  to  change  may  seem  a  good 
indication  of  cultural  inertia.  Slowness  of  cul- 
ture to  change  not  only  varies  according  to  per- 
spective but  slowness  is  a  relative  term  and  im- 
plies a  standard  of  comparison.  But  even  grant- 
ing that  some  cases  of  cultural  inertia  may  be 
somewhat  Illusory  because  of  the  perspective,  still 
it  is  quite  true  that  a  vast  amount  of  cultural 
inertia  is  as  a  matter  of  fact  due  to  difficulties  of 
cultural  diffusion. 

What  cultural  difficulties  are  there  to  the 
spread  of  culture?  Some  of  these  have  already 
been  indicated  in  another  connection  in  the  pre- 
vious section.  A  record  of  these  difficulties 
leads  to  an  understanding  of  cultural  inertia  or 
why  culture  does  not  change  more  rapidly.  It 
is  very  easy  to  see  how  geographical  isolation  may 
act  as  a  barrier  to  the  Introduction  of  new  cul- 
tural ideas,  and  thus  the  isolated  culture  will  con- 
tinue to  exist  with  relatively  little  change.  A  cul- 
ture completely  isolated  would  depend  for  change 
on  inventions  within  itself;  where  it  is  not  iso- 
lated there  Is  the  opportunity  to  borrow  inventions 
made  in  many  different  areas.  The  culture  of  the 
isolated  regions  certainly  appears  inert  by  com- 
parison with  a  rapidly  changing  culture.  The 
culture  continues  because   of  its  utilities  and  is 

[162] 


relatively  unchanging  because  cut  off  from  new 
forms  and  ideas  from  the  outside. 

It  is  also  easily  seen  that  barriers  to  cultural 
dissemination  may  lie  in  climate  or  in  absence  of 
natural  resources.  The  absence  of  coal  and  iron 
greatly  hinders  the  introduction  of  the  modern 
machine  industry  and  the  various  correlated  fea- 
tures. Trade  and  exchange  greatly  lessen  these 
barriers. 

Cultural  forms  or  ideas  vary  greatly  in  their 
correlation  to  other  parts  of  culture.  Coffee- 
drinking  is  not  closely  dependent  on  other  fea- 
tures of  culture  nor  are  other  features  of  culture 
dependent  on  coffee.  Presumably  coffee-drink- 
ing could  spread  very  rapidly  over  large  areas, 
provided  coffee  could  be  secured.  Other  parts 
of  culture  that  are  more  strongly  interdependent, 
such  as  methods  of  transportation,  or  manufac- 
ture or  changes  in  food  production,  entail  a  great 
many  fundamental  changes  in  the  culture  into 
which  they  are  being  adopted.  Such  correlated 
changes  are  obstacles  to  diffusion.  Some  object 
of  material  culture,  say  A,  is  dependent  on  a 
number  of  other  objects  or  inventions,  say  B,  C, 
D,  E,  F.  It  would  be  difficult  for  such  an  object 
A  to  be  adopted  into  another  culture  which  did 
not  possess  B,  C,  D,  E,  F. 

Some  such  difficulties  of  diffusion  exist  between 

[163] 


two  cultures  where  there  is  considerable  disparity 
between  the  cultures,  one  being  much  more  ad- 
vanced in  technology  than  another.  The  greater 
the  difference  between  two  cultures  the  greater  the 
difficulty  of  cultural  diffusion.  There  are  so 
many  fundamental  parts  of  material  culture  with 
their  many  dependent  subsidiary  inventions,  that 
the  task  of  assimilating  them  is  immense.  To  the 
person  who  has  the  advantage  of  the  use  of  the 
higher  material  technology,  the  lower  material 
culture  seems  very  slow  indeed  in  changing. 

Another  difficulty  of  diffusion  lies  in  the  fact 
that  cultures  appear  to  have  a  certain  equilibrium 
or  balance,  like  that  of  an  elaborate  machine,  and 
in  such  a  case  the  introduction  of  a  new  cultural 
feature  of  a  fundamental  sort  will  necessitate  con- 
siderable readjustment  and  modification  of  the 
culture  as  a  whole.  This  statement,  of  course,  is 
very  general.  Culture  also,  it  is  admitted,  has 
the  appearance  somewhat  of  segmentation,  that  is, 
a  portion  can  be  changed  with  only  slight  effect  on 
the  whole.  Although  this  independence  of  cul- 
tural features  exists,  nevertheless  there  is  con- 
siderable interdependence  also.  Consider,  for  in- 
stance, in  our  own  culture  how  many  cultural  ob- 
jects are  dependent  on  rubber.  Imagine  the  rub- 
ber supply  cut  off  and  think  what  rearrangement 
and  readjustments  would  have  to  be  made.  Or, 
imagine  the  exhaustion  of  the  supply  of  lubricat- 

[164] 


ing  oils.  The  introduction  of  a  new  source  of 
machine  power  would  produce  profound  effects. 
Although  the  adoption  of  some  new  cultural  fea- 
tures does  involve  the  task  of  considerable  social 
rearrangement,  it  is  questionable  how  much  such 
entailment  and  difficulty  act  as  a  barrier  to  the 
importation  of  culture.  The  American  Indians  of 
Washington  Territory  argued  against  any  adop- 
tion of  culture  from  the  whites  because  of  the  de- 
structive effect  such  contacts  had  had  on  the  In- 
dians in  Oregon.  But  the  consequences  of  the 
borrowing  of  culture  are  not  always  seen  nor 
thought  out  beforehand. 

The  foregoing  illustrations  suffice  to  point  out 
certain  obstacles  to  the  diffusion  of  culture.  It 
can  be  readily  seen  from  these  considerations  that 
difficulties  of  diffusion  tend  to  bring  into  relief  the 
phenomenon  called  cultural  inertia.  In  all  these 
cases  the  existing  culture  continues  but  is  not 
changed  because  of  obstacles  to  the  importation 
of  new  cultural  elements.  In  some  cases,  such  as 
instances  of  isolation,  the  inertia  seems  most  pro- 
minent, but  the  prominence  of  the  inertia  lies  in 
the  contrast  of  comparison  rather  than  in  any 
special  quality  of  resistance  to  change  inherent  in 
culture. 


[165] 


SI 

VESTED  INTERESTS 

Modern  social  problems  are  an  especially  good 
field  for  the  study  of  factors  affecting  cultural 
changes.  For,  in  the  first  place,  there  is  a  wealth 
of  material,  because  at  the  present  time  many  so- 
cial problems  are  occasioned  by  the  frequent  cul- 
tural changes.  Furthermore,  the  student  of  mod- 
ern social  changes  has  a  certain  advantage  over 
the  student  of  changes  in  earlier  cultures  because 
of  the  greater  detail  and  fuller  record.  Of 
course  the  factors  in  modern  social  changes  are 
not  instantly  clear,  but  they  are  certainly  not  as 
obscure  as  the  forces  of  the  remote  past.  Very 
probably,  therefore,  an  examination  of  some  pres- 
ent-day changes  may  reveal  additional  factors  af- 
fecting cultural  change.  It  is  not  necessarily 
true,  though,  that  the  same  forces  operating  to- 
day to  effect  or  resist  cultural  change  have  oper- 
ated at  all  times  or  operated  In  earlier  cultures. 

One  factor  affecting  change  in  modern  society 
that  is  quite  easily  observed  Is  the  power  of  a  par- 
ticular economic  class.     Modern  society  Is  differ- 
entiated into  economic  classes.     Wealth  and  in- 
[166] 


come  are  quite  unequally  distributed,  so  that  one 
class  or  group  has  a  very  large  proportion  of  the 
total  amount.  And  there  is  plenty  of  evidence  to 
show  that  the  group  or  class  that  has  the  major 
portion  of  '*the  good  things  of  life''  Is  not  so 
eager  for  change  as  those  whose  incomes  and  ma- 
terial possessions  are  scant.  Those  who  derive 
exceptional  benefit  from  rent,  Interest  and  profits 
resist  changes  that  endanger  or  affect  adversely 
these  sources  of  income.  The  Interests  of  these 
groups  have  been  referred  to  as  "vested  Interests." 
Groups  not  benefiting  so  much  but  suffering  from 
the  existing  disposition  of  property  are  more 
likely  to  Institute  and  support  changes.  Two 
other  points  should  be  noted  In  this  description. 
One  is  that  the  possession  of  money  and  property 
in  modern  society  Is  closely  correlated  with  power. 
The  other  point  Is  that  economic  conditions  are 
closely  Interrelated  with  many  other  cultural 
features,  so  that  many  suggested  changes  to-day 
affect  the  economic  situation  and  the  effect  of  the 
economic  situation  In  modern  society  reaches  far 
into  other  fields  of  culture.  The  result  is  that  an 
economic  class  Is  In  powerful  opposition  to  a  great 
many  forces  of  social  change. 

It  Is  also  true,  however,  that  the  power  of  this 
economic  class  has  been  very  Influential  In  pro- 
moting change.     As  employers  they  are  In  large 

[167] 


part  responsible  for  business  enterprise,  which  has 
materially  transformed  the  American  continent  in 
a  very  short  while.  Of  course  this  material  prog- 
ress Is  not  to  be  accounted  for  wholly  as  a  result 
of  the  ability  of  the  class  of  entrepreneurs. 
Much  of  this  material  change,  through  inventions, 
was  inherent  in  culture;  that  is,  such  material 
changes  as  the  development  of  steam  and 
electrical  power  would  probably  have  oc- 
curred under  various  systems  of  property  distri- 
bution. Still,  in  the  past,  the  opposition  to  busi- 
ness enterprise  on  the  part  of  the  wealthier 
class  has  not  been  conspicuous  save  in  exceptional 
cases.  In  a  society  differentiated  into  social 
groups,  some  group  will  be  Identified  with  the 
forces  of  change  while  another  group  with  inter- 
ests more  highly  vested  in  the  existing  culture  will 
resist  the  forces  of  change. 

Opposition  by  the  vested  interests  to  change 
has  not  been  so  frequently  observed  among  the 
simpler  cultures.  However,  a  somewhat  similar 
opposition  to  change  among  peoples  with  more 
primitive  cultures  seems  indicated  by  Dr.  Parsons 
in  her  study  of  custom.^  She  points  out  that 
there  is  a  "will-to-power"  element  in  custom, 
which  resists  a  change  in  the  custom.  This  will- 
to-power  is,  however,  rationalized,  so  that  the 
true  motive  is  not  apparent.     Thus  certain  rules 

«E.  C.  Parsons,  Social  Rule. 

[i68] 


of  obedience  for  children  seem  designed  for  the 
comfort  or  power  of  the  adult.  The  perpetua- 
tion of  such  rules  may  have  utility  for  the  more 
powerful  class,  here  the  parents  and  adults. 
So  that  in  primitive  society  power  Is  unequally 
distributed.  The  elders,  males,  warriors,  reli- 
gious leaders,  may  have  much  power,  while  slaves, 
women,  or  children  have  little.  Such  distribution 
of  power  may  or  may  not  be  of  value  for  survival 
or  social  welfare.  The  ^Vested  interests"  of  these 
individuals  thus  favored  by  custom  do  not  ac- 
tually appear  as  inimical  to  change,  possibly  be- 
cause the  processes  of  change  among  primitive 
peoples  are  rare.  The  resistance  of  the  "vested 
interests"  to  change  is  more  evident  in  modern 
society. 

Those  who  have  "vested  Interests"  derive  a  dif- 
ferential advantage  under  existing  conditions  and 
if  they  are  likely  to  lose  this  advantage  to  others 
because  of  changes  in  the  situation,  then  the 
"vested  Interests"  will  offer  a  resistance  to  change. 
There  arc  of  course  "vested  interests"  in  various 
social  conditions,  other  than  the  purely  economic. 
There  are  "vested  Interests"  In  schools.  In 
churches,  in  political  organizations,  and  all  resist 
changes  that  shake  their  Interests. 


[169] 


THE  POWER  OF  TRADITION 

Another  reason  for  the  slowness  of  culture  to 
change  is  said  to  be  a  traditional  hostility,  inher- 
ent in  the  mores,  towards  the  new  among  some 
peoples,  particularly  those  with  the  simpler  cul- 
tures. Numerous  visitors  from  the  Occident  to 
the  Orient  have  written  of  interesting  illustrations 
of  reverence  for  the  past,  or  the  old,  and  of 
marked  hostility  to  innovations.  In  the  west,  on 
the  other  hand,  there  is  boasting  of  a  desire  for 
improvement,  of  a  willingness  to  experiment. 
Peoples  living  under  primitive  social  conditions 
are  said  to  have  a  reverence  for  the  past,  and  a 
strong  preference  for  doing  a  thing  the  way  it  has 
always  been  done.  It  appears  possible,  there- 
fore, for  the  mores  in  a  particular  culture  to  em- 
body a  specific  attitude  towards  change,  either 
hostility  towards  change  or  a  willingness  to 
change. 

To    the    traveler    from    modern    Europe    or 
America,  the  definite  hostility  to  change  on  the 
part  of  the  Orientals  or  tribes  with  primitive  so- 
cial conditions  is  a  strange  phenomenon.     But  the 
[170] 


strangeness  Is  due  to  his  own  ignorance  for  the 
usual  rule  Is  slowness  of  change,  the  exceptional 
is  the  rapidity  of  change  as  found  In  modern  wes- 
tern cultures.  Furthermore,  this  difference  be- 
tween the  reverence  for  the  traditional  and  open- 
mindedness  towards  the  experimental  Is  usually 
exaggerated.  The  willingness  in  modern  civiliza- 
tion to  experiment  is  only  partial ;  there  are  many 
suggestions  that  we  are  not  willing  to  try.  Fur- 
thermore, the  difficulties  of  trying  out  new  Ideas 
by  peoples  of  lower  material  cultures  is  not  ap- 
preciated by  the  glib  visitor.  No  doubt  some 
changes  that  are  occurring  escape  the  eye  of  the 
casual  traveler. 

There  are  various  reasons  why  the  mores  of 
modern  peoples  reveal  a  willingness  to  change.  In 
the  first  place,  the  rate  of  making  material  in- 
ventions is  much  greater  now  than  before  and  thus 
the  peoples  have  become  accustomed  to  changes 
through  the  appearance  of  these  Inventions,  the 
number  and  frequency  of  which  are  in  part  de- 
termined by  the  existing  cultural  accumulation. 
Furthermore,  experimenting  Is  made  more  sure  by 
knowledge.  In  the  absence  of  science,  experi- 
menting becomes  a  matter  of  haphazard  trial  and 
error,  the  error  sometimes  being  quite  probable 
and  costly.  The  fact  that  the  fear  of  failure 
may  have  been  greater  In  more  ignorant  societies 

[171] 


and  the  chances  of  success  more  probable  under 
the  advancement  of  knowledge  of  the  present 
time  is  a  factor  in  the  greater  readiness  to  experi- 
ment in  modern  times. 

Illustrating  the  possibility  of  a  variety  of  fac- 
tors that  may  account  for  a  readiness  to  accept 
change,  one  explanation  of  the  progressivism  of 
the  western  part  of  the  United  States  may  be 
cited.  It  has  been  claimed  that  the  natural  re- 
sources were  so  abundant  and  the  assurance  of  the 
growth  of  population  so  great,  that  the  chances 
of  failure  in  business  were  much  less  than  in  other 
parts  of  the  country.  Hence  there  was  a  sort  of 
willingness,  indeed  a  premium  on  trying  some- 
thing new,  an  experience  which  was  extended  to 
other  fields  than  business.  This  account  may  or 
may  not  be  true  but  it  is  clear  that  there  are  a 
number  of  reasons  why  in  modern  civilization 
there  is  a  welcome  for  improvements. 

A  very  common  explanation  of  why  the  so- 
called  primitive  peoples — not  primitive  peoples 
necessarily  but  peoples  with  primitive  cultures — 
revere  the  past  and  resist  change  places  the  cause 
as  fear  and  ignorance.  The  customary  ways  of 
doing  things  seem  safe  because  they  have  been 
tried.  Trial  to  the  best  of  limited  observation 
has  proven  success.  Perhaps  the  opinion  in 
primitive  cultures  is  not  so  rationalistic  nor  so 
explicit  as  the  foregoing,  but  is  summed  up  in 
[172] 


some  such  remark  as  "it  has  always  been  done." 
On  the  other  hand,  the  new  is  the  unknown,  and 
doubly  so  if  scientific  development  is  slight.  And 
if,  in  conjunction  with  the  trial  of  the  new,  there 
occurs  a  death,  disaster,  disease  or  an  unfortun- 
ate accident,  they  are  linked  as  cause  and  effect, 
as  has  been  frequently  noted.  A  fear  reaction 
follows  which  indicates  a  fear  of  the  new,  the  un- 
known. 

So  the  mores  in  a  culture  may  embody  a  defin- 
ite attitude  for  or  against  change..  The  fre- 
quency of  change,  however,  is  not  only  a  result  of 
such  an  attitude  but  also  a  cause.  If  inventions, 
which  are  in  part  determined  by  the  existing  ma- 
terial culture,  are  frequent,  a  people  becomes  ac- 
customed to  change  and  the  hostility  to  change 
tends  to  be  broken  down.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
material  culture  inventions  are  infrequent,  change 
may  be  rare  and  feared. 


7 

HABIT 

Slowness  to  change  in  modern  terminology  is 
called  conservatism.  Conservatism  is  considered 
an  attribute  of  a  people  of  a  particular  age  and 
locality  or  as  a  trait  of  a  special  class  of  individ- 
[173] 


uals.  Although  conservatism  certainly  has  im- 
portant cultural  factors,  it  is  often  thought  of  as 
a  psychological  trait.  Existing  accounts  of  con- 
servatism therefore  tend  to  be  psychological 
explanations.  A  consideration  of  some  of 
these  more  or  less  psychological  explanations 
of  why  culture  is  slow  to  change  will  be  under- 
taken. 

Before  discussing  certain  psychological  explana- 
tions of  the  slowness  of  culture  to  change,  it  is 
desirable  to  call  attention  to  certain  points  of 
methodology  involved  in  explaining  social  phe- 
nomena psychologically.  The  subject  was  dis- 
cussed somewhat  in  preceding  sections,  but  there 
are  so  many  aspects  of  the  relation  of  sociology 
and  psychology  that  the  treatment  never  seems 
completed.  The  point  has  been  taken  that  in 
analyzing  social  phenomena  the  explanation 
should  first  be  historical  or  cultural.  Very  often 
when  this  is  done,  there  seems  no  psychological 
problem  left.  But  it  is  true  that  every  cultural 
form  or  manifestation  of  behavior  has  its 
psychological  side  since  it  could  not  exist  except 
through  the  agency  of  human  beings.  But  be- 
cause prior  psychological  analyses  have  frequently 
led  theorists  astray,  we  are  hardly  justified  in  be- 
coming doctrinaire  in  our  devotion  to  the  his- 
torical method.  On  the  other  hand  there  are 
cases  where  a  special  knowledge  of  the  psychol- 

[174] 


ogy  of  behavior  makes  our  understanding  of  so- 
cial forms  and  social  behavior  more  complete 
than  would  be  the  case  if  the  cultural  factor  only 
were  considered.  For  Instance,  incest  taboos  and 
marriage  regulations  may  be  quite  fully  described 
historically  and  culturally,  yet  there  is  something 
decidedly  strange  about  incest  and  about  marriage 
prohibitions.  One's  curiosity  is  not  satisfied  by 
the  cultural  facts.  Psychology  may  be  able  to 
make  the  custom  much  clearer  by  its  researches 
into  mental  conflict  and  repression  of  desire  cen- 
tring around  the  relation  of  a  child  to  its  parent. 
Even  when  the  psychology  of  incest  Is  known,  it 
does  not  necessarily  follow  that  regulations  of 
incest  will  among  all  peoples  be  of  the  same  form 
and  of  the  same  degree.  The  cultural  situation 
may  be  a  factor  in  determining  the  particular 
form.  But  the  psychology  of  incest  may  also  be 
necessary  for  understanding  a  particular  form  of 
regulation  of  incest.  Another  Illustration  of  the 
value  of  psychology  is  In  the  prosecution  of  crime. 
Crimes,  no  matter  what  their  cultural  forms  may 
be,  are  not  understood  without  a  knowledge  of 
motives.  A  historical  description  of  the  crime 
helps  to  reveal  the  motive,  but  a  knowledge  of 
the  motive  also  helps  to  determine  the  facts, 
as  every  detective  knows. 

Having  pointed  out  certain  relations  between 
psychological  and  cultural  causes,  we  shall  now 
[175] 


examine  some  of  the  psychological  causes  of  con- 
servatism. Perhaps  the  most  commonly  noted 
psychological  trait  that  resists  change  is  habit. 
Habit  is  popularly  thought  of  as  the  doing  of  a 
thing  over  again  in  the  same  way,  that  is,  not  in 
a  new  way;  and  the  determining  force  of  this  re- 
petition, of  the  use  of  the  old  or  previously  used 
method,  is  supposed  to  come  from  within,  from 
psychological  or  physiological  sources.  It  there- 
fore follows  that  a  part  of  our  nature  predis- 
poses us  to  behaving  conservatively,  that  is,  do- 
ing things  in  the  same  old  way.  How  shall  we 
evaluate  this  factor,  habit,  in  cultural  inertia?  A 
number  of  points  may  be  noted. 

In  the  first  place  our  actions  are  not  wholly 
governed  by  desires  to  do  things  in  the  same  way. 
We  love  adventure,  we  are  restless,  we  like  to  try 
new  things  in  new  ways.  It  may  therefore  be  part 
of  our  nature  to  love  the  new  as  well  as  to  love 
the  old.  And,  if  the  problem  could  be  thus  sim- 
plified, what  we  should  want  would  be  some  sort 
of  quantitative  estimate  of  these  two  tendencies. 

It  should  also  be  observed  that  in  so  far  as 
habit  as  a  purely  psychological  factor  is  an  in- 
fluence in  slowing  up  cultural  changes,  it  oper- 
ated in  ancient  times  as  truly  as  now,  for  the 
psychological  mechanisms  of  habit  were  present 
as  truly  in  ancient  man  as  in  modern  man.  Of 
course  one  type  of  culture  may  call  forth  habitual 

C176] 


behavior  more  than  another  type,  but  such 
changes  in  habit  reactions  will  be  due  to  a  cul- 
tural factor  and  not  a  psychological  factor,  since 
the  variation  is  in  the  culture  and  not  in  the  ori- 
ginal nature  of  man. 

Furthermore,  a  good  deal  of  what  is  called 
habit  is  attributed  to  forces  inherent  in  the  ori- 
ginal nature  of  man  when  it  should  be  attributed 
to  culture.  The  doing  of  certain  activities  over 
and  over  again,  frequently  called  habits,  is  re- 
quired by  culture  and  not  by  inward  cravings. 
For  instance,  the  daily  routine  of  life  is  imposed 
in  large  part  by  the  processes  of  social  and  indus- 
trial life;  yet  this  is  the  type  of  activity  that 
causes  the  remark  that  man  is  a  creature  of  habit. 

A  culture  with  orderliness  and  routine  engen- 
ders repetition,  which  is  called  habit.  If  cul- 
ture were,  extremely  chaotic  and  continuously  so, 
would  the  force  of  habit  be  so  impressive?  A 
part  of  the  phenomenon  called  habit  instead  of 
being  a  cause  of  cultural  inertia  is  a  result. 

Perhaps,  also,  slowness  to  change  is  accredited 
to  habit  when  it  is  caused  by  ignorance.  If  an 
American  goes  to  Europe  it  will  take  him  some 
time  to  get  rid  of  his  peculiarly  American  ways, 
and  to  adopt  European  manners.  The  difficulty 
and  time  required  in  learning  these  new  customs 
is  due  in  part  to  their  strangeness  or  his  igno- 
rance, as  well  as  to  habit.     The  response  to  stim- 

[177] 


uli  along  new  lines  in  a  new  culture  often  has  to 
be  learned  through  knowledge,  and  in  ignorance 
the  response  is  along  the  old  familiar  channels. 
A  youth  leaving  home  and  the  high  school  for  col- 
lege makes  a  fairly  sharp  change  in  cultural  en- 
vironment. It  is  usually  estimated  that  it  re- 
quires the  whole  freshman  year  to  break  the  old 
habits  and  form  the  new.  There  seems  to  be 
a  "hanging  over"  of  old  customs,  resembling  the 
previously  discussed  survivals.  And  no  doubt 
the  old  habits  have  a  certain  utility,  meet  a  psy- 
chological need,  despite  the  fact  that  new  cus- 
toms are  superior. 

Nevertheless,  even  after  all  the  foregoing  qua- 
lifications and  misinterpretations  are  admitted, 
there  still  remains  the  psychological  phenomenon 
of  habit.  Certain  responses  to  stimuli  tend  to 
follow  a  previously  used  channel  somewhat  more 
readily  than  to  find  a  new  one.  That  habit  acts 
to  make  changes  in  social  conditions  slow  seems  to 
be  a  fact.  That  habits  operate  during  a  lifetime 
will  be  admitted;  but  at  death  these  habits  are 
broken  and  at  birth  new  habits  form.  But  the 
forces  that  made  habits  in  the  adult  make  habits 
in  the  young,  particularly  through  the  powerful 
influence  of  parents.  In  a  culture  that  is  rapidly 
changing,  social  forces  will  make  habits  in  the 
young  which  will  be  somewhat  different  from  the 
[178] 


habits  of  adults  because  culture  has  changed 
within  a  generation.  If  the  deaths  in  a  society 
occurred  all  at  one  time  and  the  births  all  at 
once,  the  change  in  culture  would  be  more  easily 
seen  and  such  an  abstraction  illustrates  the  idea 
of  the  influence  of  habits  in  conserving  culture. 
But  deaths  and  births  in  a  society  are  a  more 
continual  process.  Nevertheless,  the  dying  of 
influential  elders  speeds  up  somewhat  cultural 
changes. 

Education  is  a  force  which  conserves  culture 
from  one  generation  to  another,  that  is,  educa- 
tion in  a  very  broad  sense  as  the  learning  that 
takes  place  outside  the  schoolroom  as  well  as 
inside.  Education  is  thus  in  very  large  measure 
the  making  acquainted  of  the  young  with  the 
existing  culture,  and  tends  to  strengthen  the  force 
of  habit.  Education  of  course  can  be  made  in 
part  a  training  in  experimentation  and  invention 
or  even  in  spreading  the  newest  culture  instead  of 
the  old  and  thus  assist  cultural  changes,  but  such 
a  process  will  be  a  small  part  of  education  thus 
broadly  conceived.  A  knowledge  of  habit  does 
then  throw  some  light  on  why  culture  changes 
slowly.  It  is  well  to  remember,  however,  that 
habits  are  the  result  of  cultural  inertia  as  well 
as  its  cause,  and  that  the  purely  psychological  me- 
chanisms of  habit  were  the  same  ten  thousand 
[179] 


years  ago  as  they  are  to-day.  If  culture  con- 
tinues to  grow  with  an  increasing  number  of 
changes,  we  shall  become  habituated  to  change. 


SOCIAL  PRESSURE 

Another  type  of  resistance  to  change,  fre- 
quently discussed  by  social  psychologists,  is  so- 
cially enforced  conformity  to  group  standards. 
Individuals  are  forced  to  abide  by  existing  folk 
ways  and  rules  by  some  sort  of  social  pressure 
and  fear  of  ostracism  or  punishment.  Such 
forced  conformity  is  usually  to  the  existing  stand- 
ards and  hence  appears  to  hinder  change  in  the 
existing  culture.  Social  pressure  is  also  exerted 
in  times  of  social  change  to  force  conformity  to 
the  new  as  in  war  time  or  as  in  fashion  and  styles 
of  dress.  But  such  group  control  seems  to  be 
much  more  prevalent  in  maintaining  the  present 
order  by  cutting  off  deviations  from  existing  con- 
ditions and  by  restraining  those  who  want  to 
make  radical  changes. 

There  are  many  reasons  why  one  abides  by 
custom.     Habit  is  one  such  factor.     But  in  ad- 
dition to  habit,  conformity  to  custom  seems  to 
be  insisted  upon,  consciously  or  unconsciously  by 
[i8o] 


a  group  of  others.  One  hesitates  to  deviate 
from  a  code  of  manners.  A  pressure  to  conform 
is  felt  if  the  prescribed  regulation  is  broken. 
Conformity  is  found  not  only  in  connection  with 
folk  ways  and  customs,  but  social  rules  are  quite 
consciously  made,  as  in  legislative  enactments, 
and  departure  from  them  is  prevented  by  the 
force  of  police,  courts  and  penal  institutions. 
These  social  phenomena  have  been  described  and 
analyzed  as  a  form  of  social  control  by  Ross  and 
Giddings.  Giddings,  in  describing  the  forces  of 
social  control,  makes  use  of  statistical  terms, 
pointing  out  that,  in  society,  there  are  modes 
which  most  behavior  closely  resembles  and  that 
extreme  deviations  from  those  modes  are  not  al- 
lowed to  occur.  '^  Social  pressure  is  like  natural 
selection  in  biology.  Distributions  of  biological 
specimens  of  a  class  cluster  around  a  type  or  a 
mode.  The  reason  for  such  a  distribution  is 
thought  to  be  that  there  is  a  type  adaptation  and 
that  extreme  variations  from  type  are  eliminated 
by  environmental  forces.  Natural  selection  tends 
to  mold  a  type.  In  a  somewhat  similar  way,  in 
social  phenomena,  deviations  from  type  are  pre- 
vented by  distinctly  social  forces.  There  is  a 
social  pressure  which  makes  conformity  to  type. 
Thus  there  are  certain  rules  and  practices,  in  re- 

^F.  H.  Giddings,  Studies  in  the  Theory  of  Human  Society, 
Chap.  XII,  p.  Z97. 

[181] 


gard  to  the  employment  of  children  in  factories, 
which  approach  a  standard  or  type,  and  there 
is  a  group  force  tending  to  make  manufacturers 
and  parents  conform  to  this  type  as  determined 
by  law. 

Such  control  and  conformity  may  be  observed 
daily  but  the  question  is,  How  are  such  pheno- 
mena to  be  explained?  No  doubt  under  the 
term  social  control  many  diverse  phenomena  of 
various  origins  have  been  classified.  But  some 
of  the  more  conspicuous  factors  will  be  consid- 
ered, with  particular  references  to  their  psycho- 
logical and  cultural  nature.  There  is  a  distinct 
group  aspect  to  such  control.  It  is  as  though  the 
opinion  or  will  of  the  group  is  imposed  on  the 
individual.  Individuals  are  particularly  sensitive 
to  the  opinions  of  others  and  much  of  one's  ac- 
tion is  shaped  with  regard  to  the  possible  opinion 
of  others.  The  drive  to  such  behavior  of  indi- 
viduals may  be  quite  fundamental  and  have  its 
roots  in  gregariousness,  sociability  or  self-submis- 
sion. The  imposition  of  such  rules  of  behavior 
implies  a  purely  psychological  basis  of  collective 
behavior.  Also,  collective  effort  towards  the  do- 
ing of  anything,  other  than  the  simplest  like  re- 
sponse to  stimuli,  involves  teamwork  and  coop- 
eration. The  individual  who  interferes  with  such 
collective  effort  will  tend  to  experience  in  some 
form  of  expression  the  resentment  of  the  group. 
[182] 


The  cultural  expression  of  such  behavior  will 
vary  according  to  the  particular  type  of  culture. 
The  cultural  situation  may  be  so  ordered  that  for 
a  time  a  minority  or  a  single  individual  may 
thwart  the  unorganized  or  only  partly  realized 
desires  of  the  majority. 

Collective  activity  is  expedited  through  order- 
liness and  definiteness,  and  one  wonders  if  the  fact 
that  changes  may  disturb  the  orderliness  of  social 
organization  tends  to  make  changes  less  welcome. 
Civilization  is  orderly;  its  order  is  commented 
upon  with  pride.  But  is  the  order  in  society 
necessary  because  of  the  nature  of  culture  or  be- 
cause of  the  original  social  nature  of  man?  It 
has  been  said  that  habit  is  a  law  of  our  being 
because  habit  by  reducing  actions  to  the  auto- 
matic makes  it  possible  for  attention  and  con- 
sciousness to  be  fixed  on  choices  and  problems 
of  importance.  But  such  a  statement  unfortun- 
ately implies  that  the  supposed  purpose  is  the 
cause.  However,  social  order  does  in  a  some- 
what similar  way  expedite  social  activities.  Traf- 
fic along  a  crowded  highway  is  aided  by  regula- 
tions. Living  together  in  various  social  activities 
is  made  easier  by  the  knowledge  that  comes  from 
the  definiteness  and  repetition  of  organization. 

Such  organization  aids  prediction  and  facili- 
tates the  making  of  correct  judgment,  all  quite  de- 
sired in  the  business  of  living.     A  man  who  trans- 

[183] 


acts  business,  constructs  a  plan,  or  undertakes  a 
venture,  makes  his  judgments  on  a  great  many  of 
the  details  by  certain  surface  indications  without 
conducting  a  thoroughgoing  piece  of  research 
into  the  details.  Consider  the  employment  of  a 
new  employee.  A  very  few  data  are  often  all 
that  is  necessary  for  such  a  purpose.  Honesty, 
ability,  loyalty,  and  certain  other  qualities  are 
judged  from  the  few  data  as  indications,  without 
knowing  the  full  history  and  heredity  of  the 
individual  employed.  We  can  "size  up'^  a  person 
by  his  manners  or  his  dress  or  his  language, 
which  could  not  be  so  easily  done  if  customs  were 
changing  rapidly.  It  is  a  very  important  func- 
tion of  manners  that  they  do  facilitate  opinions 
and  judgments.  The  desire  for  certainty,  de- 
finiteness,  facility  and  knowledge  may  be  partly 
responsible  for  the  orderliness  of  organization 
and  resistance  to  changes  that  introduce  confu- 
sion. 

Of  course,  the  variations  in  the  degree  of 
organization  or  orderliness  are  due  more  to 
variations  in  the  cultural  situation  than  to  varia- 
tions in  human  beings.  One  cultural  situation  may 
mean  a  high  degree  of  order,  while  another  may 
mean  considerable  confusion,  with  no  fundamen- 
tal change  in  human  nature  of  the  people.  Still 
there  seem  to  be  certain  psychological  forces  that 
tend  to  produce  orderliness.     There  is  therefore 

[184] 


probably  a  social  pressure  towards  orderliness, 
a  tendency  to  prevent  deviations  in  the  direction 
of  social  confusion.  It  was  previously  pointed 
out  that  the  slowness  of  culture  to  change  was 
particularly  noticeable  in  language,  especially  in 
written  language.  It  is  not  wholly  clear  why 
language  is  so  slow  to  change,  but  it  would  seem 
that  no  purely  cultural  explanation  would  be  en- 
tirely satisfying.  The  psychological  utility  of 
orderliness  would  appear  to  be  in  large  part  the 
explanation  of  the  stability  of  language. 

Another  psychological  aspect  of  social  control 
lies  in  the  social  necessity  of  curbing  egotism 
and  selfishness.  The  functioning  of  one's  de- 
sires is  usually  quite  immediately  and  directly  in 
the  interests  of  one's  self  and  not  particularly 
in  the  interest  of  others.  One  usually  feels  one's 
own  desires  more  urgently  than  the  desires  of 
others.  In  fact  the  appeal  of  one's  own  desires 
often  overshadows  and  obscures  the  interests  of 
others.  It  sometimes  is  necessary,  therefore,  for 
others  to  impose  restrictions  on  the  selfish  desires 
of  the  individual.  The  individual  must  there- 
fore conform;  and  the  danger  of  deviating  from 
the  accepted  standard  lies  in  the  egotism  of  the 
particular  individual's  desires.  It  has  been  said, 
with  some  truth,  that  in  all  eccentricity  there  is 
a  grain  of  egotism.  Particularly  in  the  breaking 
of  customs  is  an  outlet  found  for  egotism,  and 

[185] 


in  the  requirements  of  custom  Is  likely  to  be  seen 
the  resentment  against  the  egotism  of  others. 
The  desirability  of  controlling  the  selfishness  of 
the  Individual  for  the  sake  of  the  welfare  of 
others  does  appear  as  a  factor  In  social  pressure. 
That  social  pressure  Is  a  force  which  frequently 
prevents  deviations  In  the  direction  of  the  new, 
the  stories  of  martyrs  Indicate. 


FORGETTING  THE    UNPLEASANT 

Another  psychological  process  that  strengthens 
conservatism  Is  the  tendency  to  forget  the  things 
that  are  unpleasant  to  remember,  a  tendency  fre- 
quently observed  by  psychoanalysts.  If  memory 
Is  thus  selective,  the  past  appears  really  brighter 
than  It  is  and  we  are  loath  to  change  from  the 
conditions  of  the  past. 

The  reader  may  be  skeptical  regarding  the 
accuracy  of  the  statement  that  there  Is  a  tendency 
to  forget  things  that  are  unpleasant  to  remember, 
especially  since  one  readily  recalls  a  number  of 
unpleasant  events  of  the  past.  We  learn  from 
the  unpleasant  experiences  of  life  certain  guid- 
ances for  the  future.  The  child  who  burns  his 
finger  on  the  stove  remembers  the  fact,  and  this 
[i86] 


remembrance  controls  his  actions  in  the  future. 
The  use  of  the  whip  is  of  value  to  the  animal 
trainer  as  truly  as  are  the  rewards  of  praise.  But 
the  statement  is  not  that  we  tend  to  forget  cer- 
tain events  that  were  unpleasant  at  the  time, 
but  rather  that  we  tend  to  forget  certain  events 
that  are  unpleasant  to  remember.  It  may  indeed 
yield  a  good  deal  of  satisfaction  and  pleasure 
to  recall  certain  events  that  were  painful  at  the 
time.  It  is  only  to  the  extent  that  unpleasant 
events  are  unpleasant  to  remember  that  we  tend 
to  forget  them. 

This  tendency  has  been  studied  somewhat  by 
the  use  of  experiments  but  the  observations  have 
been  most  abundant  where  psychoanalysis  has 
been  used.  With  psychoanalysts  such  forgetting 
Is  so  common  as  hardly  to  be  doubted.  The 
great  body  of  phenomena  of  conflict  and  repres- 
sion so  widely  observed  in  neurotic  characters 
results  In  the  forgetting  of  the  unpleasant.  We 
put  the  distasteful,  the  disagreeable  out  of  our 
mind.  We  seek  forgetfulness  by  will  power,  by 
seeking  pleasure  or  diversion,  and  by  various 
other  devices.  There  are,  of  course,  cases  of 
morbidness  and  compulsive  fears  where  one 
dwells  on  the  unpleasant,  but  these  have  been 
explained  on  the  basis  of  repression  and  by  no 
means  run  counter  to  the  tendency  to  forget  the 
unpleasant. 


Many  of  the  facts  of  life  and  of  history  are  in 
harmony  with  the  theories  of  the  repression  from 
consciousness  of  the  unpleasant.  For  instance, 
it  is  generally  agreed  that  childhood  appears  In 
retrospect  happier  than  it  really  was.  The  home, 
its  surroundings,  playtime,  food,  all  tend  to  be 
idealized  in  remembrance.  College  alumni  re- 
member the  good  old  days  at  college.  The  glor- 
ification of  the  past  is  seen  In  the  phrase  "the 
good  old  days."  We  love  to  remember  the  glor- 
ious events  of  war  and  not  the  errors.  We  re- 
member less  and  less  the  defects  in  our  national 
heroes,  recalling  their  noble  qualities.  George 
Washington  is  mythical  and  Lincoln  is  rapidly 
becoming  so.  All  these  illustrations  have  other 
psychological  factors  and  are  not  to  be  explained 
solely  by  a  tendency  to  forget  the  unpleasant. 
However,  these  and  many  other  Instances  do  con- 
form to  what  psychoanalysis  shows  to  be  true  in 
individual  lives.  If  the  past  is  glorified  by  such 
selective  forgetting,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  we 
would  not  want  to  change  from  these  conditions 
of  the  past.  And  in  so  far  as  our  wants  and 
wills  and  purposes  in  regard  to  changing  con- 
ditions operate  and  are  effective,  culture  will  be 
slow  to  change  because  of  this  purposeful  am- 
nesia. 

It  is  interesting  to  inquire  to  what  extent  cul- 
tural conditions  may  modify  this  tendency  to 
[i88] 


forget  the  unpleasant  things  ^nd  to  overesti- 
mate the  good  things  of  the  past.  Under  the 
hand  of  the  psychoanalyst  the  patient  is  made  to 
recall  these  experiences  that  are  unpleasant  to 
remember  and  after  working  out  a  more  whole- 
some attitude  towards  them,  the  past  is  no  longer 
unpleasant  to  remember,  the  result  supposedly 
being  a  wholesome  one  for  the  personality.  A 
person  may  find  it  distinctly  satisfying  to  recall 
some  painful  event,  if  by  recalling  it  he  can  pre- 
vent a  repetition  in  the  future.  In  other  words, 
when  there  is  a  way  out,  an  appreciated  knowl- 
edge gained  by  experience  or  a  prospect  of  im- 
provement, the  unpleasant  events  of  the  past 
are  not  so  unpleasant  to  remember.  And  so  it 
would  seem  that  if  there  is  a  prospect  of  im- 
provement in  social  conditions,  something  to  be 
gained  by  avoiding  a  repetition  of  these  objec- 
tionable situations,  the  past  may  be  less  glorified 
and  past  conditions  may  be  seen  more  nearly 
as  they  were.  In  a  rapidly  changing  culture, 
individuals  identify  themselves  with  these 
changes,  work  with  hope  for  improvement  and 
the  concept  of  '^better  times''  may  tend  to  re- 
place the  notion  of  "the  good  old  days." 


[1893 


lO 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  TRAITS  AND  CONSERVATISM 

The  element  of  fear  Is  another  psychological 
factor  In  human  beings  that  tends  to  cause  them 
to  resist  changes.  Fear  may  appear  too  strong 
a  word;  perhaps  anxiety  is  more  accurate,  or  the 
degree  of  fear  found  generally  in  uncertainty 
and  In  Ignorance.  The  fear  In  uncertainty  may 
be  the  reason  for  the  use  of  the  phrase,  "let  well 
enough  alone."  There  Is,  for  Instance,  some  such 
uncertainty  In  the  minds  of  voters  who  reject 
the  proposal  to  adopt  "proportional  representa- 
tion." Although  the  reasons  given  for  not 
adopting  the  new  may  often  be  rationalized  ex- 
pressions for  some  other  reaction,  still,  the  ele- 
ment of  uncertainty  is  manifested  noticeably  with 
regard  to  many  proposed  changes.  There  is 
more  human  risk  In  social  experimentation  than 
In  a  scientific  laboratory.  The  uncertainty  may 
be  particularly  prominent  because  of  the  high 
degree  of  Interdependence  and  orderliness  neces- 
sary In  social  organization. 

Since  human  beings  are  always  active  agents 
in  all  cultural  change,   these  changes  could  be 
[190] 


reviewed  against  the  background  of  each  and  all 
human  traits,  If  we  could  count  and  define  them 
all,  and  each  trait  appraised  In  regard  to  its  rela- 
tion to  cultural  change.  But  such  a  procedure 
would  be  more  an  exercise  than  of  practical  sig- 
nificance. So  only  some  of  the  human  traits  more 
conspicuously  affecting  the  stability  of  culture 
have  been  presented.  * 

There  are  also  psychological  factors  that  tend 
to  hasten  cultural  changes.  Curiosity  Is  probably 
such  a  factor,  and  Is  an  element  in  inventiveness. 
The  repression  of  desires  may  lead  to  a  rest- 
lessness that  furnishes  a  drive  for  change.  Pain 
in  many  instances  furnishes  an  impetus  to  change. 
We  not  only  love  regularity  and  orderliness  and 
act  according  to  habit,  but  we  also  love  adventure, 
we  love  to  travel,  we  have  an  ambition  to  im- 
prove. So  there  are  unquestionably  psychologi- 
cal bases  of  change  as  well  as  resistance  to  change. 
The  inquiry  of  this  chapter  has  been  rather  to  In- 
quire into  the  nature  of  the  more  apparent  resist- 
ances to  cultural  change.  However,  one  might 
conceivably  raise  the  question,  a  very  general  one 
indeed,  as  to  whether  human  nature  predomi- 
nantly resists  change  or  Is  essentially  change-lov- 
ing. Presumably  a  brief  general  answer  would 
be  practically  meaningless.  In  some  situations 
human  beings  want  to  change  and  in  others  they 

[191] 


do  not.  Running  over  a  long  list  of  psychologi- 
cal traits  and  examining  which  motives  facilitated 
change  and  which  impeded  change  and  then  total- 
ing the  results  would  probably  give,  if  it 
could  be  done,  an  uncertain  picture  due  to  the 
variety  of  changes  and  the  variety  of  those 
traits. 

It  is  also  remembered  that  in  any  large  sample 
of  the  population,  there  will  be  great  variation 
in  the  psychological  equipment  of  the  different 
individuals.  Some  individuals  are  by  original 
equipment  or  very  early  experiences  more  con- 
servative in  the  general  situations  of  life  while 
others  are  more  radical.  This  will  be  true  within 
virtually  the  same  general  environment.  For  in- 
stance, some  individuals  are  to-day  understand- 
ably radical  for  the  reason  that  *'they  have  noth- 
ing to  lose  but  their  chains."  There  are  occa- 
sionally others,  however,  who  are  very  well 
blessed  with  the  world's  goods  but  yet  are  gen- 
erally radical.  An  explanation  of  such  radical- 
ism may  very  well  be  largely  psychological,  as 
the  following  analysis  indicates.  The  world  is, 
with  difficulty,  bearable  to  such  radicals  not  be- 
cause of  any  material  situation,  but  because  of 
an  internal  conflict  of  whose  true  nature  they 
are  more  or  less  unconscious.  Radicalism  is 
often  found  with  certain  neurotic  tendencies. 
The  nervous  instability  which  predisposes  one  to 
[192] 


radicalism  is  probably  found  in  a  minority  of 
modern  population.  So  that  In  any  large  sample 
of  population  there  will  be  both  radicals  and  con- 
servatives, made  so  both  by  psychological  equip- 
ment and  by  the  cultural  situation,  the  latter  be- 
ing more  variable  over  time. 

SUMMARY 

We  have  now  examined  some  of  the  more  con- 
spicuous aspects  of  the  slowness  of  culture  to 
change.  And  out  of  this  analysis  comes  the  hy- 
pothesis that  culture  once  in  existence  persists 
because  it  has  utility.  Forces  that  produce 
changes  are  the  oTscovery  of  new  cultural  ele- 
ments that  have  superior  utility,  in  which  case 
the  old  utilities  tend  to  be  replaced  by  the  new. 
The  slowness  of  culture  to  change  lies  in  the  diffi- 
culties of  creating  and  adopting  new  ideas. 
These  difficulties  are  quite  numerous  and  usiially 
not  appreciated  by  observers.  An  examination 
of  some  of  the  more  frequently  cited  types  of 
survival  and  cultural  Inertia  does  not  indicate 
any  other  new  principle  of  cultural  stability,  such 
as  a  peculiar  resisting  quality  In  culture  to  change. 
The  understanding  of  cultural  inertia  lies  largely 
In  appreciating  the  various  difficulties  of  change. 
Some  difficulties  are  predominantly  cultural;  and 
others  are  psychological. 

[193] 


The  strangeness  of  cultural  survivals  does  not 
lie  in  any  mystical  principle  of  evolution.  These 
survivals  persist  not  as  fossils  but  because  they 
have  utility  and  there  are  usually  in  such  in- 
stances of  survivals  difficulties  and  utilities  mak- 
ing understandable  why  there  has  not  been  a  re- 
placement by  new  forms  and  new  ideas.  Cul- 
tural inertia  is  sometimes  exaggerated  due  to 
faulty  observation.  There  are  certain  instances 
of  seemingly  extraordinary  inertia,  where  the 
same  cultural  form  is  used  at  one  time  for  one 
purpose  and  later  for  a  quite  different  purpose, 
that  is,  a  cultural  form  has  persisted  so  long  that 
its  meaning  or  value  has  quite  radically  changed. 
Such  instances  arise  because  a  particular  form  has 
or  may  have  a  number  of  quite  different  utili- 
ties and  apparently  it  is  easier  to  use  an  old 
form  than  to  acquire  or  invent  a  new  one.  Per- 
haps the  most  numerously  observed  cases  of  cul- 
tural inertia  are  due  to  difficulties  of  diffusion 
of  culture.  A  comprehensive  and  far-reaching 
study  would  reveal  a  great  variety  of  difficul- 
ties of  a  purely  cultural  sort,  which  might 
or  might  not  be  classified  into  a  few  gen- 
eral types,  applicable  to  all  cultural  conditions. 
Detailed  studies  of  the  difficulties  of  diffusion 
make  in  particular  instances  the  strangeness  of 
cultural  inertia  appear  less  strange.  Particularly 
in  modern  times  can  the  processes  of  change  be 
[194] 


seen  frequently  and  in  great  detail.  In  modern 
society,  divided  into  classes,  those  classes  deriv- 
ing differential  benefits  from  existing  conditions 
tend  to  resist  any  change  that  will  lessen  those 
benefits.  Difficulties  of  changing  the  social  con- 
ditions are  also  found  to  have  a  prominent  psy- 
chological aspect  as  well  as  a  cultural  side.  Some 
of  the  more  conspicuous  psychological  resistances 
to  change  are  seen  in  the  phenomena  of  habit, 
the  social  pressure  for  conformity,  and  the  pro- 
cess of  forgetting  the  unpleasant  which  results  in 
a  distorted  view  and  admiration  of  the  past.  Of 
the  great  number  of  human  traits,  some  tend  to 
make  us  conservative  and  some  to  make  us  radi- 
cal. We  cannot  take  a  census  of  these  traits 
and  classify  them  with  regard  to  change.  There- 
fore only  a  few  have  been  discussed. 

The  preceding  analyses  are  not  comprehensive 
tut  are  in  the  nature  of  an  inquiry  into  some  of 
the  more  frequently  mentioned  aspects  of  the 
slowness  of  culture  to  change.  In  this  age  of 
great  change,  those  who  are  working  for  changes 
in  the  direction  of  progress  are  much  concerned 
with  the  obstacles  to  change.  It  is  hoped  that 
the  foregoing  discussion  throws  some  light  on 
the  subject.  There  remains,  however,  another 
very  important  nature  of  social  change  yet  to  be 
discussed.  This  will  be  done  in  Part  IV.  The 
thesis    is    there    advanced    that    the    source    of 

[195] 


most  modern  social  changes  to-day  Is  the  material 
culture.  These  material-culture  changes  force 
changes  In  other  parts  of  culture  such  as  social 
organization  and  customs,  but  these  latter  parts 
of  culture  do  not  change  as  quickly.  They  lag 
behind  the  material-culture  changes,  hence  we 
are  living  in  a  period  of  maladjustment. 


[196] 


PART  IV 
SOCIAL  MALADJUSTMENTS 


That  this  is  an  age  of  change  is  an  expression 
frequently  heard  to-day.  Never  before  in  the 
history  of  mankind  have  so  many  and  so  frequent 
changes  occurred.  These  changes,  it  should  be 
observed,  are  in  the  cultural  conditions.  The 
climate  is  changing  no  more  rapidly,  and  the 
geological  processes  affecting  land  and  water  dis- 
tribution and  altitude  are  going  on  with  their  usual 
slowness.  Nor  apparently  is  the  biological  na- 
ture of  man  undergoing  more  rapid  changes  than 
formerly.  We  know  that  biological  man  changes 
through  mutations  which  occur  very  rarely  in- 
deed and  we  have  no  biological  evidence  to  show 
and  little  reason  to  think  that  mutations  in  men- 
tal or  physical  man  are  occurring  more  frequently 
now  than  in  the  past.  These  changes  that  we 
see  taking  place  all  about  us  are  in  that  great 
cultural  accumulation  which  is  man's  social  heri- 
tage. It  has  already  been  shown  that  these  cul- 
tural changes  were  in  early  times  rather  infre- 
quent, but  that  in  modern  times  they  have  been 
occurring  faster  and  faster  until  to-day  mankind 
is  almost  bewildered  in  his  effort  to  keep  adjusted 
[199] 


to  these  ever-increasing  social  changes.  This 
rapidity  of  social  change  may  be  due  to  the  in- 
crease in  inventions  which  in  turn  is  made  pos- 
sible by  the  accumulative  nature  of  material  cul- 
ture. These  conclusions  follow  from  the  preced- 
ing analyses. 


THE  HYPOTHESIS  OF  CULTURAL  LAG 

This  rapidity  of  change  in  modern  times  raises 
the  very  important  question  of  social  adjustment. 
Problems  of  social  adjustment  are  of  two  sorts. 
One  concerns  the  adaptation  of  man  to  culture 
or  perhaps  preferably  the  adapting  of  culture  to 
man.  This  subject  is  considered  in  Part  V. 
The  other  problem  is  the  question  of  adjust- 
ments, occasioned  as  a  result  of  these  rapid  so- 
cial changes,  between  the  different  parts  of  cul- 
ture, which  no  doubt  means  ultimately  the  adap- 
tation of  culture  to  man.  This  second  problem 
of  adjustment  between  the  different  parts  of  cul- 
ture is  the  immediate  subject  of  our  inquiry. 
The  thesis  is  that  the  various  parts  of  modern 
culture  are  not  changing  at  the  same  rate,  some 
parts  are  changing  much  more  rapidly  than 
others;  and  that  since  there  is  a  correlation  and 
[200] 


interdependence  of  parts,  a  rapid  change  in  one 
part  of  our  culture  requires  readjustments 
through  other  changes  in  the  various  correlated 
parts  of  culture.  For  instance,  industry  and  ed- 
ucation are  correlated,  hence  a  change  in  industry 
makes  adjustments  necessary  through  changes  in 
the  educational  system.  Industry  and  education 
are  two  variables,  and  if  the  change  in  industry 
occurs  first  and  the  adjustment  through  education 
follows,  industry  may  be  referred  to  as  the  inde- 
pendent variable  and  education  as  the  dependent 
variable.  Where  one  part  of  culture  changes 
first,  through  some  discovery  or  invention,  and 
occasions  changes  in  some  part  of  culture  depend- 
ent upon  it,  there  frequently  is  a  delay  in  the 
changes  occasioned  in  the  dependent  part  of  cul- 
ture. The  extent  of  this  lag  will  vary  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  cultural  material,  but 
may  exist  for  a  considerable  number  of  years, 
during  which  time  there  may  be  said  to  be  a  mal- 
adjustment. It  is  desirable  to  reduce  the  period 
of  maladjustment,  to  make  the  cultural  adjust- 
ments as  quickly  as  possible. 

The  foregoing  account  sets  forth  a  problem 
that  occurs  when  there  is  a  rapid  change  in  a  cul- 
ture of  interdependent  parts  and  when  the  rates 
of  change  in  the  parts  are  unequal.  The  discus- 
sion will  be  presented  according  to  the  following 
outlines.  First  the  hypothesis  will  be  presented, 
[201] 


then  examined  and  tested  by  a  rather  full  consid- 
eration of  the  facts  of  a  single  instance,  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  several  illustrations.  Next  the  nature 
and  cause  of  the  phenomenon  of  cultural  malad- 
justment in  general  will  be  analyzed.  The  ex- 
tent of  such  cultural  lags  will  be  estimated,  and 
finally  the  significance  for  society  will  be  set 
forth. 

A  first  simple  statement  of  the  hypothesis  we 
wish  to  investigate  now  follows.  A  large  part 
of  our  environment  consists  of  the  material  con- 
ditions oPIife  and  a  large  part  of  our  social 
heritage  is  our  material  culture..  These  material 
things  consist  of  houses,  factories,  machines,  raw 
materials,  manufactured  products,  foodstuffs  and 
other  material  objects.  In  using  these  material 
things  we  employ  certain  methods.  Some  of 
these  methods  are  as  simple  as  the  technique  of 
handling  a  tool.  But  a  good  many  of  the 
ways  of  using  the  material  objects  of  culture  in- 
volve rather  larger  usages  and  adjustments,  such 
as  customs,  beliefs,  philosophies,  laws,  govern- 
ments. K)ne  important  function  of  government, 
for  instance.  Is  the  adjustment  of  the  population 
to  the  material  conditions  of  life,  although  there 
are  other  governmental  functions.  Sumner  has 
called  many  of  these  processes  of  adjustments, 
mores.  The  cultural  adjustments  to  material 
conditions,  however,  include  a  larger  body  of 
[202], 


processes  than  the  mores;  certainly  they  include 
the  folk  ways  and  social  institutions.  These 
ways  of  adjustment  may  be  called,  for  purposes 
of  this  particular  analysis,  the  adaptive  culture. 
The  adaptive  culture  is  therefore  that  portion 
of  the  non-material  culture  which  is  adjusted  or 
adapted  to  the  material  conditions.  Some  parts 
of  the  non-material  culture  are  thoroughly  adap- 
tive culture  such  as  certain  rules  involved  in 
handling  technical  appliances,  and  some  parts  are 
only  indirectly  or  partially  so,  as  for  instance, 
religion.  The  family  makes  some  adjustments 
to  fit  changed  material  conditions,  while  some  of 
its  functions  remain  constant.  The  family, 
therefore,  under  the  terminology  used  here  is  a 
part  of  the  non-material  culture  that  is  only 
partly  adaptive.  When  the  material  conditions 
change,  changes  are  occasioned  in  the  adaptive 
culture.  But  these  changes  in  the  adaptive  cul- 
ture do  not  synchronize  exactly  with  the  change 
in  the  material  culture.  There  is  a  lag  which 
may  last  for  varying  lengths  of  time,  sometimes 
indeed,  for  many  years. 

An  illustration  will  serve  to  make  the  hypoth- 
esis more  clearly  understood.  One  class  of 
material  objects  to  which  we  adjust  ourselves  is 
the  forests.  The  material  conditions  of  forestry 
have  changed  a  good  deal  in  the  United  States 
during  the  past  century.  At  one  time  th^  fprest§ 
[203]. 


were  quite  plentiful  for  the  needs  of  the  small 
population.  There  was  plenty  of  wood  easily  ac- 
cessible for  fuel,  building  and  manufacture.  The 
forests  were  sufficiently  extensive  to  prevent  in 
many  large  areas  the  washing  of  the  soil,  and 
the  streams  were  clear.  In  fact,  at  one  time  the 
forests  seemed  to  be  too  plentiful,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  needs  of  the  people.  Food  and 
agricultural  products  were  at  one  time  the  first 
need  of  the  people  and  the  clearing  of  land  of 
trees  and  stumps  was  a  common  undertaking  of 
the  community  in  the  days  of  the  early  settlers. 
In  some  places,  the  quickest  procedure  was  to  kill 
and  burn  the  trees  and  plant  between  the  stumps. 
When  the  material  conditions  were  like  these,  the 
method  of  adjustment  to  the  forests  was  charac- 
terized by  a  policy  which  has  been  called  exploi- 
tation. Exploitation  in  regard  to  the  forests  was 
indeed  a  part  of  the  mores  of  the  time,  and  de- 
scribes a  part  of  the  adaptive  culture  in  relation 
to  forests. 

As  time  went  on,  however,  the  population 
grew,  manufacturing  became  highly  developed, 
and  the  need  for  forests  increased.  But  the  for- 
ests were  being  destroyed.  This  was  partic- 
ularly true  in  the  Appalachian,  Great  Lakes  and 
Gulf  regions.  The  policy  of  exploitation  contin- 
ued. Then  rather  suddenly  it  began  to  be  real- 
ized in  certain  centres  of  thought  that  if  the  pol- 
[204] 


Icy  of  cutting  timber  continued  at  the  same  rate 
and  in  the  same  manner  the  forests  would  in 
a  short  time  be  gone  and  very  soon  indeed  they 
would  be  Inadequate  to  supply  the  needs  of  the 
population.  It  was  realized  that  the  custom  in 
regard  to  using  the  forests  must  be  changed  and 
a  policy  of  conservation  was  advocated.  The 
new  policy  of  conservation  means  not  only  a  re- 
striction in  the  amount  of  cutting  down  of  trees, 
but  it  means  a  more  scientific  method  of  cutting, 
and  also  reforestation.  Forests  may  be  cut  in 
such  a  way,  by  selecting  trees  according  to  their 
size,  age  and  location,  as  to  yield  a  large  quantity 
of  timber  and  yet  not  diminish  the  forest  area. 
Also  by  the  proper  distribution  of  cutting  plots 
in  a  particular  area,  the  cutting  can  be  so  timed 
that  by  the  time  the  last  plot  Is  cut  the  young 
trees  on  the  plot  first  cut  will  be  grown.  Some 
areas  when  cut  leave  a  land  which  is  well  adapted 
to  farming,  whereas  such  sections  as  mountain- 
ous regions  when  denuded  of  forests  are  poorly 
suited  to  agriculture.  There  of  course  are  many 
other  methods  of  conservation  of  forests.  The 
science  of  forestry  Is,  Indeed,  fairly  highly  devel- 
oped In  principle,  though  not  In  practice  In  the 
United  States.  A  new  adaptive  culture,  one  of 
conservation.  Is  therefore  suited  to  the  changed 
material  conditions. 

That  the  conservation  of  forests  In  the  United 
[205] 


States  should  have  been  begun  earlier  Is  quite; 
generally  admitted.  We  may  say,  therefore, 
that  the  old  policy  of  exploitation  has  hung 
over  longer  than  it  should  before  the  institution 
of  the  new  policy.  In  other  words,  the  material 
conditions  in  regard  to  our  forests  have  changed 
but  the  old  customs  of  the  use  of  forests  which 
once  fitted  the  material  conditions  very  well  have 
hung  over  into  a  period  of  changed  conditions. 
These  old  customs  are  not  only  not  satisfactorily 
adapted,  but  are  really  socially  harmful.  These 
customs  of  course  have  a  utility,  since  they  meet 
certain  human  needs ;  but  methods  of  greater  util- 
ity are  needed.  There  seems  to  be  a  lag  in  the 
mores  in  regard  to  forestry  after  the  material 
conditions  have  changed.  Or  translated  into  the 
general  terms  of  the  previous  analysis,  the  mate- 
rial conditions  have  changed  first;  and  there  has 
been  a  lag  in  the  adaptive  culture,  that  is,  that 
culture  which  is  adapted  to  forests.  The  ma- 
terial conditions  changed  before  the  adaptive  cul- 
ture was  changed  to  fit  the  new  material  condi- 


[206] 


tions.  This  situation  may  be  illustrated  by  the 
figure.  Line  i  represents  the  material  conditions, 
in  regard  to  forests  in  the  United  States.  Line 
2  represents  the  adaptive  culture,  the  policy  of 
using  the  forests.  The  continuous  lines  represent 
the  plentiful  forests,  with  the  sparse  population 
and  the  mores  of  exploitation,  the  dotted  lines, 
the  new  conditions  of  forests  which  are  small  in 
relation  to  the  population  and  the  new  policy  of 
conservation.  The  space  between  a  and  h  repre- 
sents the  period  when  the  old  adaptive  culture  or 
mores  exists  with  the  changed  material  conditions, 
and  is  a  period  of  maladjustment. 

It  is  difficult  to  locate  exactly  the  points  a  and 
h.  Consider  first  the  location  of  point  6,  or  the 
time  of  the  change  from  the  policy  of  ex- 
ploitation to  the  policy  of  conservation.  The  pol- 
icy of  conservation  of  forests  certainly  did  not 
begin  prior  to  1904,  when  the  first  National  Con- 
servation Congress  met.  It  was  during  Roose- 
velt's administration  that  many  active  steps  in 
the  direction  of  conservation  were  taken.  Large 
areas  of  national  forest  lands  were  withdrawn 
from  public  entry.  Gilford  Pinchot  was  very  ac- 
tive in  spreading  the  gospel  of  conservation,  and 
the  House  of  Governors  called  by  President 
Roosevelt  was  in  large  measure  concerned  with 
programmes  of  conservation.  About  this  time 
[207] 


many  books  and  articles  in  magazines  and  pe- 
riodicals were  written  on  the  subject.  The  con- 
servation movement  can  hardly  be  said  to  have 
started  in  any  extensive  manner  before  this  time. 
It  is  true  that,  earlier,  papers  had  been  read  on 
the  subject  before  scientific  societies  and  there  had 
been  some  teaching  of  scientific  forestry,  but  prior 
to  this  time  the  idea  of  forest  conservation  was 
little  known  and  the  movement  was  certainly  not 
extensive.  Nor  had  the  government  taken  any 
significant  steps  in  a  genuine  policy  of  conserva- 
tion. Indeed  it  might  be  argued  with  some  suc- 
cess that  we  have  not  yet  adopted  fully  a  policy 
of  conservation.  For  a  great  many  of  the  pri- 
vate holdings  are  still  exploited  in  very  much  the 
same  old  way.  Reforestation  is  still  largely  a 
matter  of  theory  in  the  United  States.  It  is  true 
that  the  government  has  taken  a  number  of  steps 
to  preserve  the  forests  but  the  conservationists 
are  far  from  being  satisfied  with  the  progress  of 
the  movement  to  date.  Certainly  we  have  not 
attained  the  high  mark  maintained  in  western 
Europe. 

It  is  also  difficult  to  locate  point  a,  that  is,  to 
determine  when  we  should  have  started  the  con- 
servation movement.  Some  features  of  conser- 
vation probably  should  have  been  instituted  per- 
haps early  in  the  last  century.  Thus  the  allot- 
ment of  permanent  forest  areas  might  very  well 

[208] 


have  been  done  coincidently  with  the  extension 
of  our  domain;  and  the  destruction  of  forests  on 
land  little  suited  to  agriculture  might  have  been 
prevented  as  the  population  spread  to  these  new 
regions.  At  the  time  of  the  Civil  War  the  popu- 
lation had  become  quite  large,  and  shortly  after- 
ward the  era  of  railroad-building  set  in  followed 
by  a  great  development  of  industry,  insuring  large 
population  and  concentration.  It  was  at  this 
time  that  the  wonderful  forests  of  the  Great 
Lakes  region  were  cut  down,  and  the  cuttings  in 
the  Appalachian  regions  increased  greatly.  Some 
close  observers  saw  at  that  time  what  develop- 
ment of  population  and  industry  would  take  place, 
but  the  relation  of  the  forests  to  such  a  condition 
was  not  appreciated.  If  scientific  forestry  had 
been  applied  then,  many  of  the  unnecessarily 
wasted  forests  would  still  exist  and  now  be  fur- 
nishing lumber.  There  would  not  have  been  such 
a  washing  of  soil  and  the  danger  of  floods  would 
have  been  less.  While  some  methods  of  forest 
conservation  might  have  been  applied  to  advan- 
tage shortly  after  colonial  days,  the  proper  time 
for  more  extensive  developments  of  conservation 
was  probably  in  the  era  following  the  Civil  War. 
The  population  was  becoming  large;  the  west  was 
being  settled;  the  Pacific  coast  had  been  reached; 
the  territorial  boundaries  had  been  fixed;  indus- 
tries, railroads,  factories,  corporations,  trusts  were 

[209] 


all  growing  with  rapidity.  The  east  was  in 
greater  need  of  conservation  of  forests  than  the 
Pacific  Northwest  or  Alaska;  nevertheless  very 
probably  for  the  whole  country,  though  its  stages 
of  development  were  unequal,  an  extensive  con- 
servation movement  should  have  been  instituted 
about  the  middle  of  the  last  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that 
there  has  been  a  lag  of  at  least  a  quarter  of  a 
century  'in  changing  our  forestry  policy. 

The  foregoing  discussion  of  forestry  illustrates 
the  hypothesis  which  it  is  proposed  to  discuss. 
It  is  desirable  to  state  more  clearly  and  fully  the 
points  involved  in  the  analysis.  The  first  point 
concerns  the  degree  of  adjustment  or  correlation 
between  the  material  conditions  and  the  adaptive 
non-material  culture.  The  degree  of  this  adjust- 
ment may  be  only  more  or  less  perfect  or  satis- 
factory; but  we  do  adjust  ourselves  to  the  mate- 
rial conditions  through  some  form  of  culture ;  that 
is,  we  live,  we  get  along,  through  this  adjust- 
ment. The  particular  culture  which  is  adjusted 
to  the  material  conditions  may  be  very  complex, 
and,  indeed,  quite  a  number  of  widely  different 
parts  of  culture  may  be  adjusted  to  a  fairly  ho- 
mogeneous material  condition.  Of  a  particular 
cultural  form,  such  as  the  family  or  government, 
relationship  to  a  particular  material  culture  is 
only  one  of  its  purposes  or  functions.  Not  all 
[210] 


functions  of  family  organization,  as,  for  instance, 
the  affectional  function,  are  primarily  adaptive 
to  material  conditions. 

Another  point  to  observe  is  that  the  changes  in 
the  material  culture  precede  changes  in  the  adap- 
tive culture.  This  statement  is  not  in  the  form 
of  a  universal  dictum.  Conceivably,  forms  of 
adaptation  might  be  worked  out  prior  to  a  change 
in  the  material  situation  and  the  adaptation  might 
be  applied  practically  at  the  same  time  as  the 
change  in  the  material  conditions.  But  such  a 
situation  presumes  a  very  high  degree  of  plan- 
ning, prediction  and  control.  The  collection  of 
data,  it  is  thought,  will  show  that  at  the  present 
time  there  are  a  very  large  number  of  cases 
where  the  material  conditions  change  and  the 
changes  in  the  adaptive  culture  follow  later. 
There  are  certain  general  theoretical  reasons  why 
this  is  so;  but  it  is  not  desirable  to  discuss  these 
until  later.  For  the  present,  the  analysis  will 
only  concern  those  cases  where  changes  in  the 
adaptive  culture  do  not  precede  changes  in  the 
material  culture.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  implied 
that  changes  may  not  occur  in  non-material  cul- 
ture while  the  material  culture  remains  the  same. 
Art  or  education,  for  instance,  may  undergo  many 
changes  with  a  constant  material  culture. 

Still  another  point  in  the  analysis  is  that  the 
old,  unchanged,  adaptive  culture  is  not  adjusted 

[211] 


to  the  new,  changed,  material  conditions.  It  may 
be  true  that  the  old  adaptive  culture  is  never 
wholly  unadjusted  to  the  new  conditions.  There 
may  be  some  degree  of  adjustment.  But  the  the- 
sis is  that  the  unchanged  adaptive  culture  was 
more  harmoniously  related  to  the  old  than  to 
the  new  material  conditions  and  that  a  new  adap- 
tive culture  will  be  better  suited  to  the  new  ma- 
terial conditions  than  was  the  old  adaptive  cul- 
ture. Adjustment  is  therefore  a  relative  term, 
and  perhaps  only  in  a  few  cases  would  there  be 
a  situation  which  might  be  called  perfect  adjust- 
ment or  perfect  lack  of  adjustment. 

It  is  desirable,  however,  not  to  make  the  anal- 
ysis too  general  until  there  has  been  a  more  care- 
ful consideration  of  particular  instances.  We 
now  propose,  therefore,  to  test  the  hypothe- 
sis by  the  facts  in  a  definite  case  of  social  change. 
In  attempting  to  verify  the  hypothesis  in  a  par- 
ticular case  by  measurement,  the  following  series 
of  steps  will  be  followed.  The  old  material  con- 
ditions will  be  described,  that  part  of  the  adap- 
tive culture  under  consideration  will  be  described, 
and  the  degree  of  adjustment  between  these  two 
parts  of  culture  shown.  Then  the  changed  ma- 
terial conditions  and  the  changed  adaptive  culture 
will  be  defined  and  the  degree  of  adaptation 
shown.  It  is  necessary  also  to  show  that  the  un- 
[212] 


changed  adaptive  culture  is  not  as  harmoniously 
adjusted  to  the  new  conditions  as  to  the  old  and 
not  as  harmoniously  adjusted  to  the  new  condi- 
tions as  is  a  changed  adaptive  culture.  Having 
made  such  a  series  of  descriptions,  the  next  step 
will  be  to  measure  the  lag,  which  should  be  done 
by  locating  the  point  of  change  in  the  material  cul- 
ture and  the  point  of  change  in  the  particular 
adaptive  culture. 


VERIFICATION   BY  THE   FACTS  OF  WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION  FOR  ACCIDENTS 

Sufficient  data  are  available  to  test  this  hypoth- 
esis by  a  study  of  workmen's  compensation  as  a 
means  of  dealing  with  industrial  accidents.  In 
studying  the  possible  delay  in  developing  work- 
men's compensation  in  the  United  States,  the  vari- 
ous steps  outlined  in  the  preceding  paragraph  will 
be  followed  but,  for  purposes  of  presentation,  not 
in  the  exact  order  there  listed. 

There  are  to-day  a  great  many  accidents  oc- 
curring in  industry.  Hoffman  estimated  that  in 
19 13  there  were  in  the  United  States  around 
25,000  fatal  industrial  accidents  and  700,000  in- 
dustrial accidents  causing  disabilities  lasting  four 
[213] 


weeks  or  longer.^  A  recent  estimate  by  Hook- 
stadt  of  United  States  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics 
places  the  fatal  industrial  accidents  at  28,000  in 
19 1 7  and  the  disabilities,  partial  and  total,  last- 
ing four  weeks  and  longer,  around  875,000.  He 
estimates  that  for  this  same  year  there  were 
3,000,000  temporary  total  disabilities  lasting  less 
than  four  weeks.  The  year  19 17  was  a  year  of 
unusual  industrial  activity,  however.  These  ac- 
cidents are  so  numerous  now,  not  solely  because 
our  population  has  grown  large,  but  because  so 
many  workmen  to-day  work  with  or  near  ma- 
chines which  are  dangerous  to  life  and  limb.  The 
accidents  fall  with  severity  upon  the  workmen 
and  their  families,  for  the  annual  earnings  of 
workmen  are  low  in  comparison  with  the  cost  of 
an  adequate  standard  of  living  and  there  is  little 
saved  for  a  crippled  life  or  for  a  period  of  tem- 
porary disability.  Furthermore,  since  these  in- 
juries are  due  in  large  part  to  the  nature  of  mod- 
ern industry,  it  is  not  just  to  make  the  workmen 
bear  all  the  financial  burden.  It  seems  fair  that 
industry  itself  should  bear  a  part  of  it.  If  indus- 
try doesn't  bear  the  burden,  much  of  the  cost 
eventually  falls  upon  the  State  in  the  form  of  sup- 
port to  the  aged,  cripples,  widows  and  young 
children. 

1  Frederick    G.    Hoffman,    "Industrial    Accident    Statistics," 
Bulletin,  No.  IS7,  U.  S.  Department  of  Labor,  p.  6. 

[214] 


So  the  States  of  the  United  States  have  passed 
workmen's  compensation  laws  which  provide  for 
payment  to  injured  workmen  according  to  the  na- 
ture of  the  injury.  These  compensation  laws 
make  a  fair  adaptation  to  the  industrial  accident 
situation  for  the  reasons  just  cited,  particularly 
as  the  financial  cost  of  these  injuries  falls  In  part 
upon  industry  rather  than  upon  the  workmen.  It 
is  therefore  a  better  adjustment  than  when  the 
cost  is  borne  by  the  workman.  It  Is  also  a  better 
adjustment  than  is  provided  for  by  the  most  ad- 
vanced employers'  liability  laws,  for  various  rea- 
sons. Under  these  laws  the  workman  to  recover 
must  sue  the  employer  unless,  as  In  some  cases, 
settlement  is  made  outside  the  courts.  Resort  to 
courts  means  always  delay  and  frequently  very 
long  delays.  The  Illinois  Employers'  Liability 
Commission  found  In  a  survey  that  only  fifty-three 
per  cent  of  the  injured  receiving  compensation 
were  paid  inside  of  two  years.  The  Ohio  Em- 
ployers' Liability  Commission  found  an  average 
delay  of  one  year  and  one-half  month.  ^  The 
costs  of  the  judicial  and  legal  machinery  are  high 
and  of  amounts  awarded  in  the  verdicts  rendered, 
a  large  part,  from  ten  to  fifty  per  cent,  goes  to 
defray  legal  expenses.     Under  workmen's  com- 

2  Carl  Hookstadt,  "Comparison  of  Experiences  under  Work- 
men's Compensation  and  Employers'  Liability  Systems," 
Monthly  Labor  Revieiv^  Vol.  VIII,  March,  1919,  No.  3,  pp. 
846-864. 

[215] 


pensation  acts  the  remuneration  is  almost  auto- 
matic. Workmen's  compensation  reaches  the  un- 
skilled workers  better  than  the  employers'  liabil- 
ity laws,  as  the  unskilled  worker  was  less  apt  to 
use  the  courts  than  the  skilled  worker.  Work- 
men's compensation  funds  provide,  also,  of  course 
for  a  much  larger  number  of  workmen  than  the 
very  few  who  were  helped  by  fraternal  or  benev- 
olent insurance  societies. 

Another  piece  of  evidence  of  the  suitability 
of  workmen's  compensation  laws  is  the  fact 
that  they  tend  to  reduce  the  number  of  accidents. 
Presumably,  this  is  so  for  if  the  costs  of 
accidents  are  made  part  of  the  immediate 
costs  of  production  such  costs  tend  to  reduce 
profits.  Accidents  being  expensive,  the  manage- 
ment of  industry  tries  to  reduce  this  source 
of  expense.  Certainly  it  is  a  fact  that  the 
"safety-first"  movement  in  the  United  States 
started  almost  from  the  beginning  of  the  work- 
men's compensation  period.  Accident  prevention 
campaigns  have  been  almost  contemporaneous 
with  the  period  of  enforcement  of  workmen's 
compensation.  It  is  not  true  that  workmen's 
compensation  laws  are  the  sole  causes  of  accident 
prevention.  The  loss  of  good  workmen  to  indus- 
try through  accidents,  for  instance,  without  any 
enforced  compensation  to  the  injured,  neverthe- 
less makes  it  good  business  policy  to  limit  the 

,[2l6] 


number  of  accidents.  Although  accident  pre- 
vention work  has  been  well  under  way  in  many 
industries  for  the  past  ten  years,  the  record  of 
accidents  is  not  sufficiently  complete  for  the  whole 
country  to  say  positively  that  there  is  a  diminish- 
ing frequency  of  accidents.  But  certain  special 
investigations  indicate  that  this  is  a  fact.  For 
instance  in  a  report  published  by  the  United  States 
Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  ^  it  is  shown  that  for  a 
group  of  iron  and  steel  plants,  about  25  per  cent 
of  the  industry,  both  the  frequency  and  severity 
accident  rates  fell  from  1907  to  19 17  and  have 
fallen  continuously  since  19 12.  The  frequency 
rate  fell  from  19 12  about  50  per  cent  and  the 
severity  rate  about  25  per  cent. 

The  present  workmen's  compensation  laws  in 
the  United  States  are  not  of  course  a  case  of  per- 
fect adaption.  These  laws  are  not  perfect. 
Many  of  them  are  optional  to  employers,  and 
many  of  them  do  not  provide  State  funds.  The 
compensations  for  the  various  injuries  are  too 
low.  There  are  many  more  details  that  could 
be  improved,  as,  for  instance,  the  medical  ser- 
vice and  the  waiting  period.  A  better  classifica- 
tion of  hazardous  occupations  could  be  made. 

Not  all  employees  are  reached  by  the  laws  as 

^Chaney  and  Hanna,  "The  Safety  Movement  in  the  Iron 
and  Steel  Industry,  1907  to  1917,"  Bulletin,  No.  234,  June,  X918, 
p.  16. 

[217] 


now  drawn,  In  most  cases  perhaps  not  over  75 
per  cent.*  The  list  of  industries  in  some  cases 
might  well  be  extended.  Indeed,  adequate  com- 
pensation laws  should  probably  cover  all  indus- 
tries and  all  employees,  and  it  is  probably  desir- 
able to  eliminate  the  so-called  hazardous  indus- 
tries from  the  terminology.  Furthermore  it  is 
possible  that  even  some  better  method  than  the 
present  compensation  laws  may  yet  be   found. 

Workmen's  compensation  laws  are  of  course 
not  the  sole  method  of  adjustment  to  the  accident 
problem  of  modern  industry;  nor  are  employers' 
liabiHty  laws.  Factory  inspection,  machinery 
safeguards,  rest  periods,  rates  of  speed  of  pro- 
duction, and  perhaps  prohibition  of  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  beverages,  are  all  adaptations  to  the 
accident  situation.  But  in  so  far  as  workmen's 
compensation  laws  alone  are  considered  as  the 
adaptive  culture,  it  is  true  that  they  are  not  a  per- 
fect adaptation  but  are  better  than  the  adaptive 
measures  that  immediately  preceded  them. 

We  have  now  described  the  new  material  con- 
ditions of  industry  making  the  accident  situation 
and  have  described  the  method  of  adjustment  to 
the  situation  as  shown  in  workmen's  compensa- 
tion laws.     The  degree  of  satisfactory  adaptation 

*  Carl  Hookstadt,   "Comparison  of  Experiences  under  Work- 
men's     Compensation      and      Employers'      Liability      Systems," 
Monthly  Labor  Review,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  3,  pp.  846-864. 
[218] 


between  the  material  culture  and  the  adaptive 
culture  has  been  shown. 

In  earlier  times  before  the  rise  of  modern  In- 
dustry with  complex  machines  driven  by  artificial 
power,  the  economic  activities  were  largely  agri- 
cultural. Such  manufacturing  as  was  done  was 
done  by  hand.  During  this  period  of  handicraft 
production  only  a  very  small  per  cent  of  the  popu- 
lation lived  in  towns  and  cities.  In  these  times 
the  accidents  of  Industry  were  few.  The  tools 
of  industry  were  simple  and  not  particularly  haz- 
ardous, either  on  the  farms  or  in  the  towns.  The 
relationship  between  master  and  servant  was  a  per- 
sonal one,  the  contact  being  quite  close. 

Since  under  such  material  conditions  the  acci- 
dents were  few,  individual  liability  seems  not  a 
bad  adjustment  to  such  accidents  as  did  occur. 
The  law  regarding  accidents  was  the  law  of  negli- 
gence and  was  a  branch  of  the  common  law.  In 
a  case  arising  under  the  law  of  negligence,  at- 
tempt was  made  to  find  the  individual  who  was  at 
fault  In  the  neglect  of  duty  in  causing  the  accident, 
and  damages  were  assessed  upon  the  guilty  party. 
For  Instance,  If  a  vicious  bull  was  loose  and  gored 
a  man,  damages  In  such  a  case  might  be  recovered 
under  the  law  of  negligence. 

The  adjustment  to  accidents  In  these  early  times 
was  shown  by  the  development  of  the  common  law 
of  negligence.  Suits  for  damages  for  injuries 
[219] 


sustained  because  of  the  employer's  negligence 
had  occurred  for  many  hundreds  of  years.  But 
with  the  development  of  industry  in  the  nine- 
teenth century,  certain  defenses,  particularly  that 
of  "common  employment'*  and  of  "contributory 
negligence"  were  developed,  which  employers 
sought  for  protection  against  suits  for  damages. 
The  first  cases  developing  these  defenses  were, 
In  the  United  States,  In  1841,  Murry  v.  South 
Carolina  Railroad  Co,,  and  in  England  Priestly  v. 
Fowler,  In  1837.^ 

One  of  these  defenses  Is  called  the  "assump- 
tion of  risk"  and  under  this  doctrine  the  master 
Is  not  liable  to  his  servant  for  injuries  occur- 
ring In  the  ordinary  risks  of  the  employment 
as  the  servant  assumes  these  risks  on  enter- 
ing his  employ.  Another  defense  Is  called 
"contributory  negligence,"  and  under  this  doctrine 
the  master  is  not  liable  If  the  servant  has  by  his 
own  negligence  contributed  In  any  way  to  the  oc- 
currence of  the  Injury.  And  finally  the  third  de- 
fense is  known  as  that  of  "common  employment" 
or  "the  fellow-servant  rule."  Under  this  prin- 
ciple the  employer  was  not  liable  If  he  could  show 
that  the  accident  was  the  result  of  negligence  on 
the  part  of  any  fellow-servant  of  the  Injured  em- 

^Lindley  D.   Clark,  "The  Legal  Liability  of  Employers  for 
Injuries   to  their  Employees  in   the   United   States,"   Bulletin, 
No,  ^4,  U,  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics, 
[220] 


ployee.  Therefore  if  the  employer  could  show 
to  the  court  that  the  employee^  assumed  the  risk 
on  entering  his  employ,  or  that  the  accident  oc- 
curred because  of  his  own  negligence  or  that 
of  any  fellow-servant,  he  would  not  be  liable  for 
the  accident.  This  legal  protection  to  the  em- 
ployer was  thus  very  formidable. 

The  common  law  therefore  proved  inadequate 
to  meet   the   situation   caused  by   the   accidents 
arising     from     the     development    of    industry. 
There   was   truly   a   maladjustment  because    of 
the    increasing    accidents    and    the    inadequacy 
of   the   law.     But   as   more   accidents  occurred, 
the  common  law  was  later  modified  to  a  consid- 
erable extent  by     statutory  enactments   and  by 
judicial   interpretation,    as   will   be   pointed   out 
in   following  paragraphs.     The   particular   pur- 
pose here  is  to  show  that  in  earlier  times  before 
the  increase  of  accidents  due  to  ^he  complexity 
of  machine  industry,  there  was  no  serious  lack  of 
adjustment  between  the  accident  situation  and  the 
common  law.     The  adaptive  culture  was  fairly 
well  suited  to  the  material  conditions.     This  is 
seen  from  the  descriptions  just  given  of  the  com- 
mon law  and  the  earlier  economic  conditions,  when 
the  tools  were  simple  and  the  accidents  were  few. 
It  is  now  necessary  to  measure  the  period  of 
maladjustment  between  the  adaptive  culture  and 
the  material  conditions,  that  period  which  may  be 
[221] 


temporarily  described  as  the  time  when  the  in- 
dustrial accidents  were  numerous  and  there  were 
no  workmen's  compensation  laws.  It  will  also 
be  necessary  to  show  that  the  adjustment  during 
this  period  was  less  satisfactory  than  in  the  pre- 
ceding period  and  in  the  period  which  followed. 
It  is  not  very  difficult  to  locate  the  upper  limit 
of  this  period.  Prior  to  19  lo  there  were  no  State 
workmen's  compensation  laws  in  force  in  the 
United  States.  The  national  government  had 
passed  a  law  applying  to  its  own  employees,  how- 
ever, in  1908.  Certain  State  benefit  and  com- 
pensation laws  quite  limited  in  scope  and  applica- 
tion had  been  passed  earlier:  Maryland  in  1902, 
United  States  Philippine  Commission  in  1905  and 
Montana  in  1909.  The  Maryland  and  the  Mon- 
tana laws  were  declared  unconstitutional,  however, 
as  was  also  the  general  workmen's  compensation 
act  of  New  York  of  19 10.  By  the  beginning  of 
19 12,  however,  five  State  workmen's  compensa- 
tion acts  were  in  force;  by  19 13  there  were  13 
States  with  acts  in  force;  by  19 14,  18  States;  by 
1915,  22  States;  by  1916,  29  States;  by  1917,  32 
States;  by  19 18,  35  States;  by  19 19,  37  States; 
by  1920,  40  States;  and  by  1921  two  more  States 
had  put  into  force  workmen's  compensation  acts.® 

•Carl  Hookstadt,  "Comparison  of  Workmen's  Compensation 
Laws  of  the  United  States  and  Canada  up  to  January  i,  1920," 
Bulletin,  No.  275,  U,  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics. 
[222] 


Only  SIX  of  the  48  States  In  January  1922  have  no 
workmen's  compensation  acts  In  force,  viz.,  Ar- 
kansas, Florida,  Mississippi,  Missouri,"^  North 
Carolina  and  South  Carolina,  States  not  very 
largely  Industrial.  Thus  In  less  than  a  decade 
compensation  laws  had  spread  through  nearly 
all  of  the  States  of  the  Union.  Indeed,  by  the 
close  of  19 1 5,  within  five  years  after  the  first 
State  law  was  put  In  force,  all  of  the  highly  In- 
dustrialized States  except  Pennsylvania  and  Dela- 
ware had  these  laws.  It  can  be  said,  therefore, 
that  within  two  or  three  years  of  19 15  this  par- 
ticular adaptive  culture  changed  to  fit  the  changed 
material  conditions.  Thus  point  h  of  the  Illustra- 
tive figure  Is  located  with  some  precision. 

To  locate  point  a  of  the  figure,  the  time  at 
which  the  material  conditions  changed,  is  some- 
what more  dlflUcult  for  the  reason  that  the  change 
in  the  material  culture  was  more  gradual  than  the 
change  in  the  adaptive  culture.  At  what  time 
can  it  be  said  that  industrial  accidents  became 
suflUciently  numerous  that  workmen's  compensa- 
tion laws  should  have  been  adopted?  Unfor- 
tunately there  are  no  statistics  of  the  number  of 
early  industrial  accidents.  Since  industrial  ac- 
cidents are  to  a  certain  extent  correlated  with  the 

7  Missouri  adopted  a  law  in  1919  but  it  was  repealed  by 
referendum  vote.  A  new  law  has  been  passed  in  1931  but  it 
had  not  been  put  into  force  during  1921. 

[223] 


growth  of  modern  industry,  some  sort  of  estimate 
as  to  time  can  be  made  by  observing  the  statistics 
of  the  growth  of  industry.  Good  criteria  of  the 
growth  of  industry  are  the  production  of  iron 
and  coal,  the  miles  of  railroads  in  operation  and 
the  percentage  of  the  population  that  is  urban. 
Such  records   are   seen   in  the  following  table. 


Percen- 

tage  of 

Pig  iron 

Coal 

produced. 
In    long 
tons 

Years 

Popula 

tion 

(coo's 

the    popu- 
lation 
living  in 
urban 
places  of 
8,000  per- 

IVfiles of 
railroads 
in    opera- 

produced, 
in   long 
tons 

omitted)  8 

tion  8 

(ooo's 
omitted)  8 

(ooo's 
omitted)  8 1 

sons  and 

over  9 

1790 

3.3 

1800 

5,308 

4.0 

x8io 

7,240 

4.9 

54 

1820 

9,638 

4-9 

20 

3 

1830 

12,866 

6.7 

as 

165 

286 

1840 

17,069 

8.5 

2,8 1 8 

287 

1,848 

1850 

23,192 

J2.5 

9,021 

564 

6,266 

i860 

31,443 

16.1 

30,626 

821 

13,045 

1870 

38,558 

20.9 

52,922 

1,665 

29,496 

1880 

50,156 

22.8 

93,267 

3,835 

63,823 

1890 

62,948 

29>i 

167,191 

9,203 

140,867 

1900 

75,995 

33Jt 

198,964 

13,789 

240,789 

1910 

92,175 

38.8 

249,992 

27,304 

447,854 

From  this  table  the  development  of  industry  is 
seen  to  be  gradual;  there  is  no  sharp  break  in  the 
curve  of  industrial  progress.  However,  in  the 
two  decades  from  1850  to  1870,  there  was  a  very 

^Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States,  ipso,  pp.  764,  801, 
802,  8ii. 
9  Reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Census,  Department  of  Commerce. 

[224] 


appreciable  beginning  of  Industrial  development. 
In  1870,  one-fifth  of  the  population  lived  in  cities 
and  towns  over  8,000  in  population.  A  million 
and  a  half  tons  of  pig  iron  and  about  30  million 
tons  of  coal  were  produced. 

Another  index  of  the  development  of  industry 
and  one  that  bears  a  closer  relation  to  the  esti- 
mation of  the  number  of  accidents,  is  the  number 
employed  in  gainful  industrial  occupations.  The 
census  classification  of  occupations  is  for  the  fol- 
lowing groups:  agriculture,  manufacturing  and 
mechanical  pursuits  (including  mining),  trans- 
portation and  trade,  professional  service,  domes- 
tic and  personal  service,  and  clerical  occupations. 
Of  these  classes,  those  engaged  in  manufacturing 
and  mechanical  pursuits,  transportation  and  trade, 
roughly  correspond  to  those  workers  to  whom 
workmen's  compensation  funds  are  potentially 
applicable.  Perhaps  some  of  those  engaged  in 
trade  are  not  peculiarly  liable  to  accidents  and 
are  not  covered  by  compensation  acts,  but  such  a 
number  probably  roughly  balances  with  others 
omitted  when  only  these  classes  are  counted. 
There  are  census  figures  showing  the  number  en- 
gaged In  these  classes  of  Industrial  occupations 
as  far  back  as  1870.  Thus  In  19 10  the  number 
of  males  10  years  old  and  over,  engaged  In  manu- 
facturing and  mechanical  pursuits  and  In  trans- 
portation and  trade,  was  15^^  million;  In  1900, 
[225] 


lo  million;  in  1890,  7%  million;  in  1880  about 
5  million;  and  in  1870,  y/2  million.  In  i860  and 
in  1850  there  were  no  doubt  smaller  numbers. 
The  census  classifications  prior  to  1870  are  not 
comparable  with  those  in  later  decades.  The 
records,  however,  show  that  in  i860  there  were 
iH  million  employees  in  manufacturing  industries 
and  in  1850  very  nearly  a  million.  The  figures 
since  i860  quoted  above  are  for  males  only,  as 
estimates  for  accidents  can  be  made  somewhat  bet- 
ter for  males  than  for  females;  and  since  the 
number  of  accidents  among  females  in  industrial 
pursuits  is  relatively  small,  perhaps  no  great 
error  is  involved  in  using  only  the  figures  for 
males. 

There  were  in  1870,  then,  3J/2  million  males 
engaged  in  these  industrial  occupations  in  the 
United  States.  If  the  accident  rate  per  thousand 
engaged  in  these  industrial  pursuits  was  known, 
this  rate  could  be  applied  to  the  3^  million  so 
employed  and  some  sort  of  estimate  of  the  num- 
ber of  accidents  could  be  made.  It  is  possible  to 
find  such  an  accident  rate  for  the  present  time, 
but  it  is  not  known  that  there  was  the  same  ac- 
cident rate  in  1870  that  there  is  now.  Still  such 
an  approximation  would  give  information  better 
than  none  at  all.  Hoffman  estimated  a  rate  of 
fatal  accidents  in  19 13  for  all  industrially  occu- 
[226] 


pied  males  of  0.73  per  thousand  occupied.^®  But 
in  getting  this  rate,  those  employed  in  agriculture, 
the  army,  the  navy,  and  a  group  of  "all  other  oc- 
cupied males"  were  included.  If  these  groups 
are  excluded  from  the  calculations  and  a  new  rate 
is  computed  it  will  correspond  somewhat  more 
closely  to  the  workers  who  would  be  affected  by 
workmen's  compensation  and  to  those  males  en- 
gaged in  manufacturing  and  mechanical  pursuits 
and  in  trade  and  transportation.  A  new  rate 
calculated  after  such  exclusions  are  made  is  found 
to  be  approximately  i.o  per  thousand  employed. 
If  this  same  rate  of  fatal  accidents  held  in  1870, 
there  were  3500  fatal  accidents  in  that  year. 
Hookstadt's  figures  for  19 17  show  that  disabili- 
ties lasting  four  weeks  or  longer  are  30  times 
as  numerous  as  the  fatal  accidents  and  the  disa- 
bilities lasting  less  than  four  weeks  are  100  times 
as  numerous  as  the  fatal  accidents.  These  rela- 
tive proportions  approximate  closely  those  found 
in  standard  accident  tables. 

If  these  ratios  held  in  1870,  then  there  were 
about  100,000  accidents  causing  disabilities  last- 
ing four  weeks  or  longer,  350,000  accidents 
causing  disabilities  lasting  less  than  four  weeks. 
It  would   seem   therefore    that   the   year    1870 

10  Frederick    G.    HoflFman,    "Industrial    Accident    Statistics," 
Bulletin,  No.  157,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics, 
[227] 


was  hardly  too  soon  to  have  developed  work- 
men's compensation  acts,  even  if  the  accident 
rates  were  a  good  deal  lower  than  the  esti- 
mates for  19 13.  Even  if  they  were  half  as 
low,  there  were  in  1870  a  fairly  large  number 
of  accidents.  Had  workmen's  compensation  acts 
been  in  force  in  the  United  States  from  1870  on, 
a  very  great  many  accidents  would  have  been 
cared  for  with  much  less  burden  to  the  worker. 
If  the  accident  rates  for  the  intervening  years  be- 
tween 1870  and  19 10  were  the  same  as  those 
quoted  above,  then  during  this  forty-year  period 
there  were  300,000  fatal  accidents  among  males 
engaged  in  industrial  occupations,  9,000,000  dis- 
abilities lasting  four  weeks  or  longer  and  30,000,- 
000  disabilities  lasting  less  than  four  weeks.  The 
total  number  of  industrial  accidents  over  this  pe- 
riod must  have  been  very  large,  even  If  the  acci- 
dent rate  In  the  earlier  years  was  lower  than  pres- 
ent-day rates.  The  earlier  accident  rates  may 
indeed  have  been  higher. 

Of  the  vast  number  of  accidents,  some  few  re- 
covered damages  through  the  courts  no  doubt. 
A  very  few  may  have  carried  insurance.  Rela- 
tives living  in  rural  districts  may  have  helped 
some  to  bear  this  burden;  and  for  a  very  large 
number  probably  the  varied  economic  opportu- 
nities of  an  expanding  country  helped  to  lighten 
the  burden.  If  workmen's  compensation  acts  had 
[228] 


been  in  force  from  1870  on,  many  accidents  that 
did  occur  would  never  have  occurred,  for  acci- 
dent prevention  campaigns  would  probably  have 
started  earlier.  From  a  table  published  by  the 
Prudential  Insurance  Company,  the  fatal  acci- 
dents per  million  of  population  in  the  years  1906- 
19 10  were  greater  for  the  United  States  than 
for  any  other  of  twenty-three  countries  for  which 
there  were  data,  and  was  very  nearly  twice  the 
number  recorded  in  Germany  and  in  England  and 
Wales.  The  United  States  was  the  last  of  the 
larger  western  nations  to  adopt  workmen's  com- 
pensation laws.  In  the  '8o's  acts  were  enacted 
in  Germany  and  in  Austria;  in  the  '90's  in  Nor- 
way, Finland,  Great  Britain,  Denmark,  Italy,  and 
France;  and  from  1900  to  19 10  in  New  Zealand, 
South  Australia,  Netherlands,  Greece,  Sweden, 
Western  Australia,  Luxemburg,  British  Colum- 
bia, Russia,  Belgium,  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
Queensland,  Hungary,  Transvaal,  Newfoundland, 
Alberta,  Bulgaria  and  Quebec;  and  since  19 10 
compensation  acts  have  been  enacted  in  a  number 
of  other  countries.  ^^  The  fact  that  the  United 
States  was  one  of  the  very  last  nations  to  enact 
compensation  laws  certainly  does  not  alone  ex- 
plain why  her  accident  rate  is  so  markedly  un- 

^^Lindky  D.  Clark,  "Workmen's  Compensation  Laws  of  the 
United  States  and  Foreign  Countries,"  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics  Bulletins,  Nos.  203  and  24.3,  p.  298,  and  p.  96,  respec- 
tively. 

[229] 


favorable  in  comparison  with  other  countries; 
but  it  is  very  probably  an  important  factor.  It 
seems  probable  that  if  compensation  laws  had 
been  enacted  here,  say,  in  1870,  or  earlier,  prob- 
ably a  large  number  of  accidents  that  did  occur 
would  never  have  occurred. 

The  year  1870  Is  the  earliest  date  for  which 
the  census  gives  occupation  statistics  that  are 
comparable  with  occupation  figures  for  late  years. 
It  is  possible  indeed  that  earlier  than  1870  indus- 
trial accidents  may  have  been  sufficiently  numer- 
ous to  warrant  compensation  laws.  But  prior  to 
1870,  industry  was  not  very  far  developed  as 
seen  from  the  statistics  in  the  previous  table. 
The  fact  that  the  first  suit  in  which  the  employer 
sought  protection  under  the  defense  of  "common 
employment'*  occurred  in  1841,  suggests  that 
prior  to  1840  there  was  not  much  pressure  for 
compensation.  In  1840  there  were  not  3000 
miles  of  railroads  in  operation  and  not  2  million 
tons  of  coal  were  produced.  Industry  when 
young  is  said  to  need  protection  but  financially 
there  is  little  reason  to  think  that  the  industry 
or  the  public  could  not  have  borne  the  buraen 
imposed  by  compensating  for  accidents  from  the 
very  beginning  in  this  country;  certainly  industry 
could  have  borne  the  burden  as  well  as  the  work- 
men. It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  the  mate- 
rial conditions  changed  so  that  workmen's  com- 
[230] 


pensation  systems  were  needed  at  least  between 
the  years  1850  and  1870.  The  material  condi- 
tions changed  therefore  in  the  period  1850-70, 
while  the  adaptive  culture  did  not  change  for  a 
satisfactory  adjustment  until  about   19 15. 

Since  during  this  Interval  from  the  period 
1850-70,  until  19 15,  there  were  changes  in  the 
adaptive  culture  as  well  as  In  the  material  culture, 
it  remains  to  show  that,  during  this  period,  there 
was  maladjustment,  namely,  a  less  satisfactory 
adjustment  than  in  the  years  which  preceded  and 
in  the  years  which  followed.  This  has  already 
been  partly  done  In  describing  the  degree  of  adap- 
tation during  the  earlier  and  late  periods. 
When  industrial  accidents  began  to  occur  with 
some  frequency,  the  injured  person  at  times  en- 
tered suit  against  the  employer  under  the 
common  law  of  negligence.  But  the  employer 
became  extraordinarily  well  protected  because 
of  the  development  of  the  defenses  of  *'assump- 
tion  of  risk,''  "contributory  negligence,"  and 
the  "fellow-servant  rule."  It  was  realized 
that  under  these  doctrines  It  was  very  difficult  for 
the  injured  employee  to  get  justice.  So  these  de- 
fenses were  modified  or  abrogated  by  statutory 
enactments  and  by  judicial  interpretation.  Now, 
if  these  old  defenses  had  been  completely  abro- 
gated, it  might  be  argued  that  a  fairly  satisfac- 
tory adjustment  would  have  been  made  to  the  ac- 
[231] 


cident  situation,  without  workmen's  compensation 
laws,  and  solely  through  improved  or  changed 
employers'  liability  laws.  It  is  therefore  of  im- 
portance in  the  analysis  to  ascertain  to  what 
extent  these  old  employers'  liability  laws  were 
modified  by  statutory  enactments. 

The  first  statutory  modification  of  the  com- 
mon law  of  employers'  liability  was  made  in  Ala- 
bama in  1885,^2  following  closely  the  British 
model  of  1880.  This  act  was  not  an  abrogation 
of  these  old  defenses  of  the  employers,  but  was 
only  a  modification  of  the  defense,  the  fellow- 
servant  rule,  and  enabled  the  representatives  of 
the  deceased  employee  to  recover  damages  for 
death  caused  by  negligence.  Although  this  Brit- 
ish act  made  only  a  partial  change  for  the  better 
in  the  common  law,  acts  following  this  model 
have  been  adopted  in  only  seven  States  of  the 
United  States.  These  enactments  were  made  at 
the  following  dates,  1885,  1887,  1893,  1893, 
1902,  1902  and  1907.  Twenty  States  have 
either  abrogated  or  modified  the  fellow-servant 
rule  for  railroads;  in  a  majority  of  these  States 
it  has  been  abrogated.  Nearly  all  of  these  acts 
applying  to  railroads  were  passed  after  1900. 
Three   States  have  special  laws  for  mines.     A 

i2Lindley  D.   Clark,  "The  Legal  Liability  of  Employers  for 
Injuries  to  their  Employees  in  the  United  States,"  Bulletin,  No, 
74,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics. 
[232] 


few  States,  notably  Oregon  and  Ohio,  have  made 
extensive  and  significant  changes  by  statutes  in 
the  common  law  of  employers'  liability.  How- 
ever, seven  States  have  made  no  change  whatso- 
ever. It  is  thus  seen  that  the  common  law  which 
was  hanging  over  Into  a  period  of  changed  ma- 
terial culture,  to  which  it  was  not  fitted,  was  un- 
dergoing change  by  the  State  legislatures.  But 
in  only  a  few  States  were  sweeping  changes  made 
in  the  common  law  that  applied  to  Industry  in 
general.  The  significant  changes  In  the  common 
law  came  in  for  the  most  part  around  the  begin- 
ning and  early  part  of  the  twentieth  century. 

As  to  the  extent  that  the  common  law  defenses 
were  modified  by  judicial  interpretation,  it  is  dif- 
ficult to  determine  quantitatively.  But  there  are 
some  ways  of  estimating  the  effectiveness  of  the 
modification  of  the  changes  In  the  common  law  of 
employers'  liability  both  by  statute  and  judicial 
Interpretation.  Figures  which  show  the  propor- 
tions of  the  total  number  injured  who  received 
compensation  under  modified  employers'  liability 
laws  would  be  such  an  indication.  Samples  of 
statistics  taken  in  New  York  and  in  Pennsylvania 
show  that  of  married  men  killed  in  industry  the 
families  from  one-quarter  to  one-third  received 
no  compensation  at  all.  ^^     Similar  proportions 

13  Crystal  Eastman,   fFork  Accidents  and  the  Lavi,  pp.  i2x 
and  271. 

[233] 


are  quoted  for  Wisconsin  by  the  Wisconsin  Bu- 
reau of  Labor  and  Industrial  Statistics.  ^*  In  a 
study  made  of  accidents  by  the  Labor  Depart- 
ment of  New  York,  out  of  902  accidents  investi- 
gated, 44  per  cent  received  no  compensation  at 
all,  not  even  medical  expenses.  ^^  More  compre- 
hensive statistics  are  found  in  the  records  of  the 
insurance  companies,  doing  employers'  liability  in- 
surance. In  New  York,  such  companies  reported 
a  payment  to  one  case  out  of  every  eight  re- 
porting injuries,  during  the  first  decade  of  the 
twentieth  century  after  New  York  had  passed  an 
employers'  liability  law.  These  statistics,  which 
were  collected  just  prior  to  the  passage  of  work- 
men's compensation  acts,  are  not  truly  represent- 
ative, because  many  accidents  were  no  doubt 
never  recorded  and  for  this  the  injured  were 
probably  not  compensated.  It  is  questionable 
whether  at  that  time,  in  States  other  than  Pennsyl- 
vania, New  York,  and  Wisconsin  as  large  a  pro- 
portion of  injured  received  settlement. 

The  awards  under  the  employers'  liability  laws 
were  often  very  inadequate.  In  a  study  of  902 
cases  of  temporary  disability  in  New  York,  397 
injured  employees  received  no  compensation 
whatever,  and  304  cases  recovered  from  the  em- 
ployers less  than  50  per  cent  of  the  money  loss 

14  Vol.  XIII,  p.  54. 

15  Crystal  Eastman,   Work  Accidents  and  the  Laiv,  p.  274, 

[234] 


of  wages  and  expenses.  ^^  Miss  Eastman  In  her 
study  of  employers'  liability  In  New  York  con- 
cludes that  only  a  small  proportion  of  injured 
workmen  get  substantial  damages  under  the  em- 
ployers' liability  law.  The  foregoing  figures  in- 
dicate that  in  those  States  where  the  common  law 
of  employers'  liability  was  considerably  modified, 
the  accident  situation  was  far  from  being  satis- 
factorily met  by  employers'  liability  law  both  In 
the  amount  recovered  and  in  the  number  of  In- 
juries reached.  Material  assembled  by  Hook- 
stadt  proves  quite  definitely  this  conclusion.  ^'^ 
Such  results  might  have  been  surmised  from  the 
fact  that  the  States  swung  so  rapidly  from  em- 
ployers' liability  to  workmen's  compensation 
laws.  But  even  if  a  very  large  number  of  In- 
jured employees  had  been  reached  by  the  opera- 
tion of  employers'  liability  laws  and  even  if  the 
awards  had  been  large,  this  system  would  have 
been  less  satisfactory  than  that  of  workmen's 
compensation,  because  of  the  delays  of  the  court 
and  legal  expense,  and  of  the  antagonisms  occa- 
sioned. 

It  is  therefore  quite  clear  that  between  the 
time  when  the  number  of  industrial  accidents  be- 
came significantly  large  due  to  the  growth  of  ma- 

1®  Crystal  Eastman,  fTork  Accidents  and  the  Laiu,  p.  274. 

17  Carl  Hookstadt,  "Comparison  of  Experience  under  W^ork- 
men's  Compensation  and  Employers'  Liability  Systems," 
Monthly  Labor  Revieiv,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  3,  pp.  846 — 864, 

[235] 


chine  industry  and  the  time  of  the  adoption  of 
workmen's  compensation,  there  was  a  very  unsat- 
isfactory adjustment  to  the  accident  situation. 
During  the  period  of  maladjustment,  the  old 
adaptive  culture,  the  common  law  of  employers' 
liability,  hung  over  after  the  material  conditions 
had  changed.  But  this  common  law  was  not 
wholly  unchanging.  It  was  being  modified  some 
as  time  went  on,  but  never  sufficiently  to  meet  the 
new  conditions  even  approximately.  In  conclu- 
sion, therefore,  of  the  investigation  of  this  partic- 
ular test  of  our  hypothesis,  the  delay  in  the  adop- 
tion of  workmen's  compensation  or  the  lag  in 
common  law  of  employers'  liability  after  the  ma- 
terial culture  had  changed  was  about  a  half- 
century,  from  1850-70  to  19 1 5.  The  investiga- 
tion might  have  included  other  arguments  and 
more  data.  Such  additional  data  would  have 
made  the  treatment  too  long  for  general  con- 
sideration, and  without  such  additional  investi- 
gation, it  is  thought  that  the  hypothesis  Is  suffi- 
ciently substantiated.  The  lag  might  have  been 
measured  somewhat  more  precisely  for  a  single 
State  than  for  the  United  States  as  a  whole. 


[236] 


ILLUSTRATIONS :  TAXATION,  FAMILY,  INTERNA- 
TIONAL RELATIONS,  TRADE  UNIONS,  REPRE- 
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT,    PUEBLO 
DWELLERS 

An  attempt  to  prove  the  hypothesis  with  data 
from  other  cases  of  supposed  maladjustment 
would  involve  in  each  case  a  somewhat  lengthy 
presentation  which  would  interest  only  the  reader 
who  is  especially  concerned  with  the  particular 
maladjustment.  A  number  of  cases  of  what  seem 
to  be  lags  in  the  adaptive  culture,  however,  may 
be  listed  quickly,  without  an  attempt  at  proof.  In 
all  these  cases,  however,  it  is  thought  that  a  lag 
could  be  measured  and  a  maladjustment  proven 
if  the  necessary  research  were  undertaken. 

The  general  property  tax.  One  such  case  of 
lag,  is  the  general  property  tax  in  the  United 
States.  Since  the  formation  of  the  various  States 
of  the  union,  State  revenues  have  been  raised 
largely  by  assessing  the  amount  of  general  pro- 
perty and  levying  a  tax  on  the  assessed  value  of 
the  general  property,  at  a  rate  established  at 
such  a  point  as  will  yield  the  necessary  revenue 
^o  meet  estimated  State  expenditures  for  the  en- 
[237] 


suing  year.  Although  such  a  system  of  taxation 
has  been  praised  highly  in  the  past,  it  is  now  quite 
generally  admitted  by  taxation  authorities  to  be 
unsatisfactory,  for  several  reasons.  Perhaps  the 
most  important  reason  is  the  fact  that  personal 
property  now  tends  to  escape  taxation  under  the 
general  property  tax.  According  to  the  theory 
of  the  general  property  tax,  it  is  a  just  tax  be- 
cause all  property  is  taxed.  But  in  practice  only 
realty,  i.  e.,  land  and  the  fixtures  thereto,  is 
reached.  Personal  property,  particularly  the  in- 
tangible personalty,  such  as  stocks,  bonds  and  the 
various  other  securities  largely  escape  taxation. 
This  is  definitely  shown  by  Seligman  in  his  Es^ 
says  on  Taxation,  from  which  the  following  facts 
and  quotations  are  taken. 

The  proportion  paid  [in  New  York  State]  by  personal 
property  has  decreased  steadily  almost  every  year  until 
according  to  the  last  figures  [191 1]  it  pays  but  five  per 
cent  of  the  State  taxation,  as  against  ninety-five  falling  on 
real  estate.  In  forty  years  the  valuation  of  real  estate 
has  increased  eight  billions  while  that  of  personalty  has 
increased  only  thirty  millions.  ...  In  California,  per- 
sonal property  was  assessed  in  1872  at  220  millions  of 
dollars,  in  1880  at  174  millions  and  in  1887  at  164  mil- 
lions— a  net  decrease  in  fifteen  years  of  56  millions. 
Real  estate  increased  during  the  same  period  from  417  to 
791  millions.     Personal  property  paid  17.31  per  cent,  real 

[238] 


estate  82.69  per  cent  of  the  taxes.  ...  In  Cincinnati 
the  valuation  in  1866  was:  realty,  $66,454,602;  per- 
sonalty, $67,218,101.  In  1892  the  realty  had  increased 
to  $144,208,810;  the  personalty  had  decreased  to  $44,- 
735)670.  .  .  .  These  figures  become  ridiculous  when 
it  is  remembered  that  in  our  modern  civilization  the  value 
of  personal  property  far  exceeds  that  of  real  estate,  as 
understood  by  the  taxing  power. 

Under  the  general  property  tax,  personal  pro- 
perty thus  tends  to  escape  taxation.  This  condi- 
tion was,  however,  not  always  so.  Under  early 
agricultural  conditions,  when  the  amount  of  per- 
sonal property  was  small  and  easily  visible  to  the 
tax  assessor,  personalty  was  taxed  in  fair  propor- 
tion to  realty.  But  with  the  growth  of  industry, 
corporations  and  modern  finance,  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  reach  all  personalty  for  taxation. 
Personalty  has  also  grown  in  the  western  States 
which  are  still  agricultural  and  the  "auditor  of 
Washington  tells  us  that,  if  a  true  valuation 
could  be  reached,  it  is  'clear  and  incontestable 
that  the  wealth  of  the  territory  in  personal  pro- 
perty, for  the  purposes  of  taxation  would  largely 
predominate  over  that  of  real  estate.'  "  Yet 
practically  none  of  our  States  has  discarded  the 
general  property  tax,  although  a  few  have  rem- 
edied the  situation  somewhat  by  a  more  or  less 
satisfactory  development  of  special  corporation 

[239] 


taxes,  inheritance  taxes  and  income  taxes.     S*;llg- 
man,  writing  in  19 19,  says: 

It  [the  general  property  tax]  is  the  cause  of  such  cry- 
ing injustice  that  its  alteration  or  its  abolition  must  be- 
come the  battle-cry  of  every  statesman  and  reformer. 

The  analysis  of  the  general  property  tax  seems 
to  show  that  when  the  material  culture  was  in 
its  economic  aspects  simple  agriculture,  this  tax 
was  suitable  to  those  conditions;  but  with  the 
changing  of  the  material  culture  from  simple  ag- 
riculture to  modern  industry,  the  general  property 
tax  was  a  maladjustment  for  the  reason  that  per- 
sonal property  escaped  taxation.  It  is  necessary, 
therefore,  to  abandon  the  general  property  tax  or 
to  alter  it  in  order  to  reach  property  that  es- 
capes taxation  under  the  general  property  tax. 
This  can  be  done  through  the  separation  of  State 
and  local  revenues,  by  the  development  of  cor- 
poration taxes,  inheritance  taxes,  income  taxes, 
and  various  special  taxes.  But  as  yet  only  a  very 
few  States  have  done  this.  The  lag  in  this 
adaptive  culture  has  certainly  been  a  number  of 
years. 

The  family.  Another  case  that  seems  to  show 
a  good  many  lags  in  the  adaptive  culture  is  the 
delay  in  adjustment  of  the  family  to  modern 
machine  industry.  Under  earlier  agricultural 
conditions,  the  family,  it  is  generally  admitted, 
[240] 


had  worked  out  a  fairly  satisfactory  adjustment 
to  these  conditions.  The  family  was  an  economic 
institution  as  well  as  an  affectional  and  biological 
one.  In  fact,  under  agricultural  conditions,  it 
was  a  most  significant  unit  in  society  possessing 
in  addition  to  biological  and  economic  functions, 
many  other  functions  such  as  recreational,  edu- 
cational, protective  and  religious.  Woman's 
economic  function  was  most  important,  and  a 
woman  of  ability  was  of  great  economic  value  to 
the  farm.  Marriage  was,  in  part,  the  taking  of 
a  business  partner,  and  early  marriage  was  of 
economic  advantage  because  it  was  entering  busi- 
ness early.  The  wife's  duties,  spinning,  weaving, 
sewing,  preparing  foods,  the  manufacture  of  dif- 
ferent articles,  and  various  other  tasks  around 
the  farm,  were  quite  comparable,  in  economic  re- 
turn, with  the  husband's  work.  The  education 
that  was  necessary  for  life  and  business  success 
was  acquired  in  large  part  in  the  home,  with  the 
exception  of  such  elementary  book  education  as 
the  three  r's.  It  was  an  excellent  institution  for 
supervising  the  activities  of  children  because  the 
child's  future  life  as  an  adult  was  to  be  spent  on 
the  farm.  Divorce  was  a  particularly  serious  event 
because  it  meant  a  rupture  to  so  many  economic 
and  social  activities.  The  agricultural  family 
was  also  In  a  fortunate  position  to  render  protec- 
tion to  the  dependent  kin.     The  functioning  of 

[241] 


the  family  under  these  conditions  indicates  an 
excellent  adjustment  between  the  family  as  a  so- 
cial organization  and  the  material  culture,  though 
no  doubt  there  were  tyrannies,  repressions  of  in- 
stincts and  resistances  to  new  ideas. 

The  immediate  effect  of  the  growth  of  large- 
scale  production  meant  taking  from  the  home  an 
increasing  number  of  economic  functions  and 
placing  them  in  factories.  This  was  particularly 
true  of  the  work  which  was  formerly  woman's 
share.  The  services  performed  by  the  family  liv- 
ing in  a  modern  city  apartment  illustrate  what  a 
great  change  has  taken  place  in  the  functions  of  the 
family.  Such  profound  changes  in  the  economic 
functions  of  the  family  and  the  creation  of  new 
forms  of  economic  activity  meant  that  new  adjust- 
ments would  have  to  be  made  by  the  family,  since 
it  was  hardly  possible  to  stop  or  change  signi- 
ficantly the  march  of  material  progress. 

The  educational  function,  for  instance,  can 
not  now  be  performed  as  satisfactorily  by  the  fam- 
ily as  was  once  possible.  The  diversification  and 
the  specialized  technique  of  industry  and  the 
transfer  of  occupations  from  the  home  to  the  fac- 
tory have  meant  the  necessity  of  special  voca- 
tional and  trade  education  outside  the  home. 
Manual  training  which  was  formerly  quite  readily 
learned  at  home  must  now  be  taught  in  city 
schools.  The  technical  efficiency  demanded  by 
[242] 


modern  Industrial  life  has  necessitated  changes  in 
the  curricula  of  the  schools.  These  are  all 
special  adjustments  of  education  to  the  changed 
material  conditions.  The  juvenile  court  has 
arisen  as  an  adjustment  agency  to  the  changed 
material  conditions  through  the  failure  of  the 
family  to  make  the  proper  adaptation.  With  the 
Industrial  revolution  came  the  great  growth  of 
cities,  little  adapted  to  child  life.  The  congestion 
of  cities  was  accompanied  almost  nowhere  with 
adequate  development  of  play  space  for  children. 
Coupled  with  these  conditions  was  the  breaking 
up  of  homes  and  the  drawing  of  mothers  Into  in- 
dustry. 

The  factory  immediately  brought  children  to 
work  within  its  walls,  with  unsatisfactory  results, 
and  a  better  adjustment  was  made  through  child 
labor  laws  and  compulsory  school  laws,  with  In- 
spectors and  attendance  officers.  Such  special 
laws  were  unnecessary  under  the  old  material  con- 
ditions. Special  forms  of  State  insurance  and 
various  types  of  pensions  seem  a  desirable  form 
of  adjustment  to  the  new  conditions  which  face 
the  family.  The  agricultural  family  with  a  rela- 
tively more  stable  abode  was  very  well  suited 
for  caring  for  widows,  the  aged,  and  dependent 
kin.  There  were  rooms  and  food,  and  light 
tasks  to  be  done.  But  with  the  scattered  and 
more  migratory  family  living  in  congested  cen- 
[243] 


tres,  such  care  of  dependents  can  be  effected  in 
fewer  families  and  with  more  difficulty.  Women 
have  not  become  satisfactorily  adjusted  to  these 
new  material  conditions  of  the  factory  system. 
Their  work  as  producers  has  largely  been  taken 
away,  so  that  many  are  idle,  or  do  work  which 
is  only  slightly  productive  of  substantial  economic 
values;  or  else  they  go  into  industry  under  such 
chance  conditions  as  they  may  find.  The  intro- 
duction of  women  into  industry  may  call  for  spe- 
cial adaptations  in  regard  to  such  matters  as  sani- 
tary conditions,  hours  of  labor,  and  maternity  in- 
surance. A  somewhat  wider  life  for  woman 
outside  the  home  seems  desirable,  since  so  many 
of  the  home  occupations  are  now  found  outside 
the  family.  The  extension  of  the  franchise  to 
women  is  only  a  minor  step  in  that  direction. 
Finally,  the  reduction  of  the  economic  function 
of  the  family  together  with  other  functions  has 
rendered  the  marriage  union  of  man  and  woman 
less  stable. 

It  is  thus  seen  that  the  change  from  agriculture 
to  the  modern  factory  system  has  necessitated 
changes  in  the  family  organization.  There  is 
abundant  evidence  to  show  that  the  old  agricul- 
tural family  organization  is  no  longer  adapted  to 
industrial  life  as  seen  in  modern  cities.  Many 
functions  which  were  performed  reasonably  sat- 
isfactorily by  the  family  in  farm  life  have  been 
[244] 


or  are  being  taken  over  by  the  State,  by  industry, 
by  special  organizations.  Special  organizations 
have  been  developed  to  perform  functions  affect- 
ing women,  children,  education,  dependency,  rec- 
reation, etc.  In  these  cases,  it  is  no  doubt  diffi- 
cult to  measure  the  delay  in  each  case  in  develop- 
ing the  new  forms  for  performing  these  func- 
tions. But  it  seems  quite  clear  that  there  has 
been  a  delay.  Few  would  maintain  that  child  la- 
bor laws,  compulsory  education,  vocational  and 
industrial  education,  playgrounds,  and  social  in- 
surance, for  instance,  have  been  developed  as 
promptly  as  they  should.  The  material  culture 
has  gone  forward,  while  the  adaptive  culture  has 
lagged  behind. 

International  relations.  Many  writers  have 
argued  that  changes  in  international  relations 
have  not  kept  pace  with  the  industrial  changes 
affecting  the  United  States.  The  theory,  which, 
however,  is  not  wholly  accepted,  runs  somewhat 
as  follows.  In  early  times  the  United  States  was 
more  or  less  physically  isolated  from  many  of  the 
other  nations,  particularly  the  nations  of  Europe. 
Problems  of  international  relationships  were  not 
in  general  pressing  with  the  United  States,  except 
on  certain  critical  issues.  The  policy  of  no  en- 
tangling alliances,  though  a  somewhat  brief  and 
inaccurate  descriptive  phrase,  indicated  a  fairly 
satisfactory  form  of  relationship,  it  would  seem. 

[245] 


A  high  organizational  development  of  activity 
and  efficiency  was  not  particularly  urgent  in  the 
State  Department  of  our  government,  nor  espe- 
cially in  the  consular  and  diplomatic  service.  In 
time  material  changes  occurred  which  have,  in 
part,  destroyed  this  isolation.  With  the  steam 
engine,  boats  now  cross  the  Atlantic  Ocean  in 
a  few  days,  whereas  formerly  the  period  of  cross- 
ing was  measured  in  weeks.  Cables  have  been 
laid  and  the  wireless  telegraph  developed. 
Newspapers  carry  immediately  records  of  events 
in  other  countries.  Most  important  is  the  growth 
of  foreign  trade  as  measured  by  the  volume  of 
Imports  and  exports.  Foreign  investments  are 
growing,  as  is  also  foreign  travel.  The  natural 
resources  of  the  world  are  being  appropriated  in 
one  way  or  another.  Because  of  these  material 
changes  other  nations  are  brought  closer  as 
neighbors  and  their  activities  are  of  increasing 
concern  to  the  United  States.  The  changed  mate- 
rial conditions  are  apparent,  while,  it  is  claimed, 
our  International  policies  and  organizations  of 
foreign  relations  have  not  been  developed  suffi- 
ciently to  meet  these  changed  conditions  satis- 
factorily. This  Is  a  debatable  point;  but  there  Is 
some  evidence  to  Indicate  that  the  efficiency  of 
the  diplomatic  and  consular  service  and  of  the 
State  Department  has  not  In  the  past  been  ade- 
quate to  meet  properly  the  problems  arising  from 

[246] 


the  changed  material  conditions.  Until  the  re- 
cent great  war  the  mass  of  the  population  of 
the  United  States  was  ignorant  of  and  indifferent 
to  foreign  relations.  And  even  after  the  war 
there  is  a  strong  feeling  that  we  should  concern 
ourselves  less  with  foreign  relations.  Aside  from 
the  merits  of  a  particular  League  of  Nations, 
there  is  much  indifference  to  such  a  project 
even  though  it  has  been  introduced  under  excep- 
tionally dramatic  conditions.  There  is  certainly 
some  evidence  that  the  older  mores  hang  over 
into  the  new  conditions,  and  that  a  proper  adap- 
tive culture  has  not  been  developed. 

Trade  unions.  The  theory  of  industrial 
unions  for  wage-earners  is  another  illustration. 
Employees  in  modern  industry  have  found  it  to 
their  advantage,  it  is  usually  admitted,  to  organ- 
ize into  labor  unions.  Hitherto  these  organiza- 
tions have  been,  with  few  exceptions,  along  trade 
or  craft  lines.  The  organization  of  workers  in 
a  trade  has  meant  greater  bargaining  strength 
than  the  individual  laborer  has,  and  the  workers 
have  used  such  collective  bargaining  power  to  their 
advantage  In  matters  of  hours  of  labor,  wages 
and  working  conditions.  There  are  of  course 
some  who  are  opposed  to  any  labor  organiza- 
tions In  the  Interests  of  Industry  or  of  society. 
But  granting  the  general  point  of  view  in  favor 
of  labor  organization,  it  seems  questionable 
[247] 


whether  organization  along  craft  lines  is  the  type 
of  organization  which  gives  the  desired  strength 
to  compete  with  the  recently  developed  powerful 
organizations  on  the  side  of  capital.  Very  large 
corporations  and  trusts  began  to  grow  up  in  the 
last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  in- 
fluence of  financial  organizations  became  quite 
powerful.  This  consolidation  developed  through 
various  interlocking  devices  between  the  different 
corporations  and  other  industrial  and  financial  or- 
ganizations. The  strength  of  capital  became 
very  great  through  these  powerful  organizations 
which  have  grown  greatly  during  the  past  quar- 
ter- or  half-century.  The  strength  of  craft  unions 
seems  less,  relative  to  the  power  of  capital, 
now  than  at  the  time  when  capital  was  less 
highly  organized.  It  would  seem  that  the 
strength  of  labor  would  be  greater  and  more  able 
to  cope  with  these  large  industrial  organizations 
if  labor  were  organized  along  industrial  lines 
rather  than  trade  lines.  From  this  labor  point 
of  view,  therefore,  the  trade  unions  are  not  as 
satisfactorily  adapted  to  the  large  industrial  com- 
binations as  would  be  industrial  unions.  It  is 
true  that  the  affiliations  of  unions  in  city.  State 
and  national  organizations  have  remedied  some- 
what such  deficiencies.  But  it  seems  probable  that 
labor  unions  would  have  become  more  powerful 
if  the  organization  had  developed  a  number  of 
[248] 


years  ago  direcdy  along  industrial  lines.  In  this 
illustration  the  adaptive  culture  considered  is  the 
organizations  of  labor,  and  the  culture  to  which 
adjustment  is  being  made  is,  in  part,  the  develop- 
ment of  industry. 

Representative  legislative  government.  It  is 
also  argued  that  the  present  forms  of  repre- 
sentative legislative  assemblies  are  not  as  satis- 
factorily adjusted  to  modern  social  conditions 
as  they  were  in  earlier  times.  Representation  in 
the  United  States  is  now  on  the  basis  of  localities. 
The  principle  of  locality-representation  was  highly 
important  before  the  development  of  rapid  trans- 
portation. Localities  that  are  relatively  Isolated 
have  local  differences  and  interests  peculiar  to  the 
local  group.  Hence  the  Interests  of  a  people  liv- 
ing in  various  localities  relatively  Isolated  need 
to  be  presented  by  representatives  chosen  on  the 
basis  of  locality.  The  railroad,  the  postal  serv- 
ice, telephone,  telegraph,  newspapers,  travel, 
trade  and  the  spread  of  business  development 
have  all  tended  to  reduce  the  barriers  that  ac- 
centuated locality  interests.  Mere  physical  dis- 
tance, of  course,  still  Is  a  barrier.  The  wards  of 
a  city  have  not  so  many  distinct  local  interests 
as  for  instance  do  the  various  States  of  so  large 
an  area  as  the  United  States.  Localities  within 
States  are  midway  between  these  two  extremes. 
Locality-representation  in  so  large  a  country  as 
[249] 


the  United  States  was  even  more  Important  in  early 
times  than  other  forms  of  representation  because 
wealth  was  fairly  equally  distributed  and  there  was 
a  good  deal  of  homogeneity  in  occupations.  In 
modern  society  the  Interests  of  the  people  are  dif- 
ferentiated on  the  basis  of  economic  classes  and  of 
occupations  as  well  as  on  the  basis  of  locality. 
There  are  of  course  many  of  these  classes.  And 
It  would  seem  that  a  sampling  for  purposes  of 
representation  should  take  Into  consideration  such 
a  differentiation  of  Interests.  Theoretically  it  is 
possible  for  random  sampling  by  locality  to  yield 
representation  of  classes;  but  practically  the  re- 
presentation of  special  Interests  Is  not  propor- 
tional In  the  United  States.  Proportional  repre- 
sentation Is  a  device  to  meet  this  situation.  It 
is  difficult  to  say  whether  It  is  a  satisfactory  de- 
vice as  it  has  not  been  adequately  tested  In  mod- 
ern legislative  assemblies.  Other  changes  In  the 
nature  of  representation  have  also  been  sug- 
gested. 

It  Is  true  that  In  the  United  States  at  the 
present  time  legislative  bodies  are  not  the  most 
highly  admired  of  the  governmental  organs,  par- 
ticularly in  our  States  and  cities.  This  Is  cer- 
tainly not  due  wholly  to  the  principle  of  locality- 
representation.  One  reason,  for  instance,  for  the 
rise  of  the  executive  In  comparison  to  the  legis- 
lature and  of  his  power  over  legislation  is  prob- 
[250] 


ably  the  fact  that,  upon  the  executive  attention 
Is  more  readily  focused  and  responsibility  more 
easily  fixed  than  on  a  large  group  of  representa- 
tives, In  this  age  when  there  are  so  many  de- 
mands on  a  voter's  time.  Furthermore,  the 
newspaper  has  to  a  certain  extent  usurped  some  of 
the  functions  of  legislative  representatives.  The 
executive  can  frequently  determine  the  various 
opinions  from  newspapers  as  well  as  from  elected 
representatives.  Important  government  policies 
are  announced  at  times  in  notices  to  the  press  or 
in  speeches  delivered  elsewhere  than  in  legislative 
halls.  There  are,  of  course,  many  other  criticisms 
of  our  legislatures.  The  functioning  of  modern 
legislatures  has  been  frequently  criticised  by  stu- 
dents of  political  science,  and  the  causes  traced  to 
various  special  factors.  Although  there  may  be 
particular  causes,  a  fundamental  trouble  may 
be  due  to  the  great  changes  that  have  occurred 
in  the  material  conditions  of  life.  It  is  argued 
that  representation  by  localities  was  adjusted  in 
a  fairly  satisfactory  manner  to  the  pioneer  condi- 
tions of  the  first  part  of  the  last  century;  but 
since  that  time  our  material  culture  has  greatly 
changed  while  the  nature  of  our  representation 
and  the  organization  of  the  assemblies  have  re- 
mained substantially  the  same.  Just  what 
changes  in  the  representative  assemblies  should 
be  made,  we  do  not  know.     The  material  culture 

[251] 


has  changed,  and  there  Is  evidence  that  the  adap- 
tive culture  Is  not  adjusted  satisfactorily.  Poli- 
tical scientists  do  not  appear  to  be  certain  just 
what  changes  in  the  adaptive  culture  should  be 
made.  The  conditions  of  modern  legislation  do 
suggest  the  need  of  change,  however,  and  further 
research  might  substantiate  the  hypothesis,  men- 
tioned here  all  too  briefly. 

Pueblo  dwellers.  Another  possible  illustration 
from  a  different  culture  may  be  observed  among 
the  Hopi  Indians  of  Arizona.  These  Indians 
are  pueblo  dwellers  and  live  on  the  tip  end  of  three 
long  mesas — flat  table-lands  that  run  down  into 
the  desert  from  the  north  like  three  great  fingers. 
The  inducements  to  live  at  the  mesas  are  the  per- 
manent springs  of  water  found  at  the  foot  of  these 
mesas.  The  few  springs  and  streams  that  are 
found  elsewhere  in  this  semi-desert  region  are  not 
permanent;  the  region  shows  the  beds  of  many 
streams  now  dry.  It  Is  not  clear  why  the  HopI 
live  on  top  of  the  mesas  rather  than  at  the  foot, 
but  there  is  some  reason  to  think  that  such  a 
location  provides  good  defenses  in  time  of  war- 
fare. It  appears  to  be  a  sort  of  natural 
fortress,  rather  difficult  to  attack  and  a  good  place 
to  store  the  limited  and  precious  supplies  of 
grain.  It  Is  known  that  In  earlier  times,  the 
Hopi,  an  agricultural  people,  were  greatly  har- 
assed by  the  various  nomadic  bands  of  other  In- 
[252] 


dian  tribes  of  this  region.  Their  folklore  and 
history  furnish  evidence  of  this.  It  certainly  ap- 
pears that  such  a  location  of  dwellings  is  a  very 
good  adaptation  to  a  condition  of  warfare  Initiated 
by  powerful  nomadic  tribes.  But  the  question 
artses,  Why  do  they  live  on  top  of  these  mesas 
now  that  there  Is  a  condition  of  peace  enforced 
by  the  United  States  government?  The  HopI 
have  not  been  subject  to  attack  since  the  Navaho 
last  went  on  the  warpath  and  were  effectively  dis- 
persed by  Kit  Carson,  who,  in  the  'sixties,  scat- 
tered them  and  deported  large  numbers.  Such 
a  location  of  dwellings  does  not  appear  now  In 
times  of  peace  to  be  the  best  adaptation.  The 
mesas  are  several  hundred  feet  high.  Women 
must  toil  daily  up  this  ascent  with  their  heavy 
jugs  of  water  and  the  men  with  their  corn  and 
firewood.  It  Is  a  long  climb  for  the  children 
who  go  to  the  government  schools  which  are 
built  at  the  foot  of  the  mesas.  However,  these 
pueblo  dwellers  are  now  beginning  to  move  their 
habitations  to  the  foot  of  the  mesas.  But  why 
didn't  they  move  down  before  this?  Probably  a 
strong  incentive  to  move  down  is  the  trading 
stores  and  the  government  schools  which  have 
been  built  below.  But  It  would  seem  that  if  they 
had  moved  down  a  half-century  earlier,  they 
would  have  been  saved  much  labor  and  Incon- 
venience.    The  danger  of  attack,  if  this  was  the 


/ 

cause  of  living  on  top  of  the  mesas,  has  not  Ex- 
isted for  fifty  years.  A  custom,  whatever  may 
once  have  been  Its  justification,  seems  to  have 
lagged  after  the  conditions  had  changed. 

The  foregoing  Illustrations  have  been  cited  as 
cases  that  upon  Investigation  would  probably 
show  lags  in  the  adaptive  culture  and  degrees  of 
maladjustment.  A  great  many  more  such  cases 
from  modern  social  problems  could  be  listed.  If 
one  should  attempt  to  verify  the  hypothesis  from 
data  in  each  of  these  illustrative  cases  and  to  meas- 
ure In  years  the  time  of  the  lag,  the  following  dififi- 
culties  would  be  encountered. 

It  is  difficult  to  show  that  the  adaptive  culture 
IS  at  one  time  adapted  and  at  another  time  not 
adapted,  and  particularly  to  measure  the  degree 
of  adaptation.  Thus  to  show  that  legislative  as- 
semblies chosen  on  the  basis  of  locality-represen- 
tation are  satisfactorily  adapted  at  one  time  and 
not  at  another  is  not  easy  to  do.  And  it  Is  hard 
to  prove  that  the  United  States  has  at  the  pres- 
ent time  a  less  satisfactory  organization  for 
handling  relationships  with  other  nations  than 
In  the  past.  It  frequently  seems  to  be.  In  these 
cases,  a  matter  of  argument  and  opinion  rather 
than  a  matter  of  fact.  Adaptation  Is  a  condition 
of  degree,  complete  lack  of  adaptation  or  perfect 
adaptation  being  rare.  The  lagging  adaptive  cul- 
[254] 


ture   will   of   course   have   some   utility   of   the 
nature  discussed  In  Part  III. 

Furthermore,  thinking  in  terms  of  an  ideal,  the 
adaptive  culture  is  never  wholly  harmoniously 
adapted  to  the  material  conditions,  for  the  reason 
that  there  is  no  ideal  limit  to  this  harmonious  re- 
lationship. For  instance,  workmen's  compensa- 
tions, or  feminism,  or  conservation  of  forests, 
may  be  more  satisfactory  than  former  mores,  but 
who  shall  say  that  these  adjustments  are  ideal? 
When  we  can  think  of  better  adjustments,  that  is, 
when  we  make  inventions  in  the  adaptive  culture, 
the  old  adaptive  culture  will  appear  to  lag,  since 
it  will  take,  in  a  purely  physical  way,  some  time 
for  an  invention  to  spread  or  be  adapted,  even 
after  it  has  been  thought  out  or  applied  once. 

It  should  not  be  assumed,  of  course,  that  every 
suggested  improvement  in  the  adaptive  culture  is 
a  real  improvement.  There  are  many  social  re- 
forms in  the  air  to-day,  but  certainly  not  every 
such  suggested  reform  is  desirable  or  will  prove 
satisfactory.  Thus  there  are  various  plans  for 
dealing  with  unemployment  and  some  are  quite 
impracticable.  Every  suggested  improvement 
does  not  prove  that  there  is  a  lag. 

Another  difficulty  encountered  in  measuring  lag  is 
that  changes  are  sometimes  quite  gradual.    Where 
a  change  in  the  material  culture  or  in  the  adap- 
tive culture  is  abrupt,  it  is  easy  to  locate  the 
[25J] 


point  of  change.  But  this  Is  not  always  tlie  case. 
When,  for  Instance,  did  machine  Industry  reach 
such  a  point  In  its  development  In  the  United 
States  that  It  could  be  called  an  Industrial  na- 
tion? At  what  point  had  Industry  developed  so 
that  workmen^s  compensation  was  desirable  be- 
cause of  Industrial  accidents?  In  such  cases  the 
development  of  adaptation  or  maladjustment  Is 
gradual  and  the  ends  of  a  period  of  maladjust- 
ment will  be  somewhat  indeterminate.  But  of 
course  such  an  Indeterminate  nature  of  a  lag  does 
not  mean  that  the  lag  is  any  less  real. 

Another  possible  difficulty.  In  determining  a  lag 
In  adaptive  culture,  lies  ih  the  task  of  defining  the 
two  variables,  particularly  In  defining  the  adaptive 
culture.  In  any  particular  form  of  culture  which 
Is  adjusted  to  material  conditions,  not  all  of  this 
particular  form  Is  adaptive  to  the  material  con- 
ditions. Thus,  It  Is  hard  to  describe  just  how 
much  of  the  family  organization  is  subject  to 
variation  because  of  a  change  In  the  economic  sys- 
tem. 


4 

REASONS  FOR  CULTURAL  LAG 

Up  to  this  point  in  the  consideration  of  the  hy- 

[256] 


pothesis,  there  has  been  little  attempt  to  general- 
ize. A  number  of  particular  cultural  situations 
have  been  partially  described,  and  it  is  clear  that 
there  are  many  cases  where  material  conditions 
have  changed  and  where  the  culture  that  was  ad- 
justed to  the  old  material  conditions  has  lagged 
appreciably  behind.  More  and  more  such  cases 
might  be  collected  but  at  the  cost  of  considerable 
time  for  the  reader.  Rather  than  an  enumera- 
tion of  more  cases,  it  is  desirable  to  consider  the 
causes  of  such  lags  to  see  if  the  causes  are  suffici- 
ently general  to  give  an  indication  of  how  wide- 
spread these  cultural  lags  are.  Such  a  considera- 
tion of  causes  may  give  as  good  an  idea  of  how 
extensive  the  phenomenon  may  be  as  does  the 
more  tedious  method  of  considering  individual 
cases. 

A  general  inquiry  into  causes  can  best  be  ap- 
proached by  citing  a  number  of  specific  causes. 
It  would  be  possible  here  to  make  a  thorough- 
going analysis  of  causes  In  a  single  Instance,  but 
that  would  hardly  give  us  the  scope  of  causes  that 
is  desired.  These  causes  cited  will  be  listed  with- 
out any  particular  significance  as  to  sequence. 

Scarcity  of  invention  in  the  adaptive  culture. 
Sometimes,  the  adaptation  of  a  culture  to  changed 
material  conditions  necessitates  what  might  be 
called  an  Invention  In  the  adaptive  culture.  Lack 
of  change  in  governmental  forms,  for  instance, 
[257] 


may  be  due  to  lack  of  inventions.  It  has  been  prev- 
iously pointed  out  by  others  that  in  the  field  of 
government  there  is  a  marked  lack  of  inventive- 
ness. Our  city  governments  followed,  for  in- 
stance, certain  earlier  town  models  and  made  cer- 
tain borrowings  from  State  governments.  The 
rise  of  cities  following  the  industrial  revolution 
has  created  new  conditions  to  which  our  city 
governments  have  not  been  well  adapted.  So 
acute  an  observer  as  the  distinguished  author  of 
The  American  Commonwealth  has  said  that  the 
most  conspicuous  failure  in  government  in  the 
United  States  was  in  the  government  of  cities. 
Of  recent  years  there  has  been  a  good  deal  of  ex- 
perimenting with  forms  of  city  government;  but 
for  a  long  while,  during  an  era  of  unprecedented 
corruption  and  bad  government,  there  was  a 
dearth  of  new  ideas.  The  commission  form  of 
government  itself  was  an  invention  almost  by  ac- 
cident. Quite  conceivably  some  new  form  or 
method  of  representation  in  legislative  bodies 
would  bring  an  improvement.  The  growth  of 
industrial  accidents  because  of  the  use  of  modern 
machines  necessitated  an  invention  in  the  adap- 
tive culture,  which  is  called  workmen's  compen- 
sation. However,  the  lack  of  knowledge  of  the 
invention  was  not  the  cause  of  the  delay  in  de- 
veloping workmen's  compensation  in  the  United 
States,  for  Germany  had  the  plan  in  1884,  as  has 

[258] 


already  been  pointed  out.  Some  adjustments  to 
material  culture  may  be  made  without  any  special 
invention.  Thus  the  family  makes  certain  ad- 
justments to  industry  without  involving  a  special 
invention;  although  such  adaptations  as  play- 
grounds, juvenile  courts  and  pension  systems  may 
be  called  inventions. 

Mechanical  obstacles  to  adaptive  changes. 
What,  is  perhaps  more  frequently  true  is  that  the 
invention  in  adaptive  culture  is  known  but  there 
is  difficulty  in  getting  the  invention  adopted. 
Some  one  in  comparing  invention  and  diffusion 
has  made  the  remark  that  it  is  easier  to  spread 
butter  than  it  is  to  make  it.  It  is  not,  however, 
as  easy  to  spread  culture  as  it  is  to  spread  butter. 
A  good  deal  that  was  said  in  Part  III  regarding 
resistance  of  culture  to  change  is  applicable  here 
to  the  special  case  of  lag,  as,  for  instance,  habit, 
love  of  the  past,  and  various  utilities  of  the  old 
culture.  There  does  seem  to  be,  however,  at 
times  a  purely  physical  or  mechanical  obstacle  to 
the  spread  of  some  forms  of  culture.  For  in- 
stance, in  the  United  States  most  State  legislatures 
meet  only  every  two  years  and  frequently  for 
short  and  limited  periods.  For  this  reason  alone 
it  takes  some  time  for  statutory  enactments  to 
spread  throughout  the  States.  The  management 
of  a  subway  once  attempted  to  get  the  passengers 
to  enter  the  end  doors  of  the  cars  and  go  out 
[259] 


the  centre  doors,  for  the  purpose  of  expediting 
traffic.  The  plan  was  given  up,  and  one  of  the 
difficulties  seemed  to  be  the  vast  number  whose 
habits  had  to  be  changed,  particularly  during 
rush  hours.  In  a  democracy  such  as  we  have  in 
the  United  States,  the  people  have  to  become 
familiar  with  proposed  reforms  before  they  are 
sanctioned.  This  takes  time,  as  every  practical 
reformer  knows.  It  involves  setting  up  exten- 
sive machinery  of  education  and  propaganda.  In- 
deed the  obstacles  to  the  spread  of  any  inven- 
tion in  the  non-material  culture  are  many. 

The  heterogeneity  of  society.  A  good  many 
of  these  special  obstacles  to  changes  arise  because 
society  is  heterogeneous,  consisting  of  many 
classes  and  groups.  The  need  of  the  change  in 
the  adaptive  culture  is  felt  by  only  one  class  or 
group,  whereas  the  change  must  be  made  by  the 
society  as  a  whole'.  For  instance,  workmer^^s 
compensation  laws  are  passed  by  representatives 
of  the  whole  group,  whereas  they  apply  to  only 
a  special  class  in  the  whole  group.  Very  prob- 
ably if  the  whole  group  were  made  up  exclusively 
of  workers  liable  to  injury  in  industry,  there 
would  not  have  been  so  long  a  delay  in  the  adop- 
tion of  such  laws.  Changes  in  the  adaptive  cul- 
ture work  at  times  for  the  interests  of  one  group 
but  against  the  interests  of  another  group.  A 
great  many  proposed  reforms  to-day  are  for  the 
{260] 


purpose  of  providing  better  adjustments  for 
classes  who  are  not  the  rich  and  powerful  classes. 
Many  of  these  proposed  reforms,  such  as  reme- 
dies for  unemployment,  cost  money  which  must 
be  raised  by  taxation  or  fall  as  a  burden  on  the 
wealthier  classes,  who  do  not  appear  to  derive  a 
special  benefit  from  them.  It  is  this  raising  of 
money  which  is  an  obstacle.  The  class  situa- 
tion in  modern  society  Is  therefore  a  source  of  re- 
sistance to  some  changes  in  file  adaptive  culture. 
It  is  not  clear,  however,  that  the  heterogeneity  of 
society  is  a  source  of  resistance  to  changes  in  the 
material  culture.  Perhaps  to  a  certain  extent  it 
is  so.  In  so  far  as  social  classes  are  causes  of 
lags  in  the  adaptive  culture,  such  causes  would 
presumably  be  more  frequent  in  modern  society 
than  in  primitive  society. 

The  closeness  of  contact  with  material  culture. 
Another  general  reason  why  the  adaptive  por- 
tions of  the  non-material  culture  lag  behind  the 
changes  in  the  material  culture  Is  the  fact  that 
the  relationship  between  the  adaptive  culture  and 
the  material  culture  is  not  very  close,  but  several 
steps  removed.  Thus  the  form  of  a  city  govern- 
ment Is  not  so  close  to  industry  as  the  corporate 
organization  of  Industry  Itself.  And  a  general 
philosophy  like  the  laissez  faire  doctrine  is  a  lit- 
tle further  removed  from  the  machinery  of  indus- 
try than  are  labor  policies.     Governmental  or- 

[261] 


ganizations  would  be  expected  to  adjust  them- 
selves somewhat  more  slowly  to  industrial  changes 
than  organizations  of  labor  and  capital.  Trusts 
would  be  expected  to  develop  rather  quickly  with 
changes  in  industry.  In  so  far  as  the  absence  of 
closeness  of  contact  is  responsible  for  a  delay  in 
the  changes  of  the  adaptive  culture,  this  cause 
would  operate  in  any  state  of  society,  whether 
it  be  changes  from  hunting  to  domestication  of 
animals  or  from  agricultural  to  industrial  condi- 
tions. 

The  comiection  of  the  adaptive  culture  with 
other  parts  of  culture.  Another  cause  of  delay 
in  the  adjustments  is  the  fact  that  the  particular 
adaptive  culture  is  sometimes  correlated  with 
some  other  part  of  the  non-material„culture,  as 
perhaps  the  non-adaptive  non-material  culture. 
The  mores  of  exploitation  may  be  related  to  busi- 
ness in  general  as  well  as  to  a  particular  situa- 
tion like  forestry.  If  exploitation  continues  a 
good  policy  in  business  though  not  in  forestry, 
presumably  exploitation  in  regard  to  forestry 
would  be  more  difficult  to  change  because  the  ex- 
ploitation is  a  general  policy  which  continues  sat- 
isfactorily applicable  to  other  parts  of  culture 
such  as  business.  If  the  adaptive  culture,  x,  is 
correlated  with  another  part  of  culture,  z,  as 
well  as  with  the  material  culture,  y;  then,  if  y 
changes  and  z  does  not  change,  x  will  be  more 
[262] 


slow  to  change  than  would  be  true  If  it  were  not 
correlated  with  the  third  factor,  z.  Thus  the 
position  of  women,  x,  is  adapted  to  the  industrial 
situation,  y;  but  it  is  also  related  to  the  family- 
husband-children  situation,  z.  The  industrial 
situation,  y,  changes,  but  the  family-husband- 
children  situation,  z,  remains;  therefore  it  would 
seem  that  changes  in  the  position  of  women,  x, 
would  be  slowed  up  some  in  its  adjustment  to  in- 
dustry, y,  beckuse  of  the  correlation  between  x 
and  z  and  the  fact  that  z  Is  stable.  Another 
illustration  Is  the  fact  that  the  desirability  of  In- 
dividualism as  a  general  policy  In  education,  the 
family,  or  in  business,  may  make  It  difficult  to 
give  it  up  In  government  or  social  reform. 

Group  valuations.  Still  another  reason  why 
some  forms  of  non-material  culture  are  slow  to 
change  appears  to  be  the  strong  position  they  oc- 
cupy in  the  valuations  of  the  group.  This  is  par- 
ticularly true  of  morals,  mores  and  some  customs. 
Customs  become  mores  because  of  the  strong  ap- 
proval of  them  as  a  policy  by  the  group.  The 
group  decides  that  certain  ways  of  doing  things 
are  right  and  there  Is  group  pressure  to  enforce 
conformity.  Certain  emotional  values  of  appro- 
val become  attached  to  these  ways  of  doing 
things.  These  emotional  values  of  group  ap- 
proval appear  to  be  forces  resisting  change,  per- 
haps partly  because  of  habit,  conditioned  reflexes, 

[263] 


social  pressure,  love  of  the  past  through  forget- 
ting the  unpleasant,  and  perhaps  the  recogni- 
tion that  these  ways  of  doing  things  have  worked 
in  the  past.  It  is  possible  the  group  approval 
may  attach  itself  somewhat  more  strongly  to 
these  ways  of  doing  things  as  seen  in  morals, 
customs  and  institutions  than  to  material  objects. 
It  is  of  course  true  that  individuals  love  the  soil 
or  a  ship,  or  hate  a  drug,  but  group  valuations 
of  institutions  and  mores  are  very  strong.  Thus 
the  family,  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
a  political  party,  individualism,  monogamy,  all 
seem  to  be  protected  by  a  group  pressure  or  ap- 
proval which  constitutes  a  distinct  force  operat- 
ing at  least  for  a  time  against  modification. 
This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  saying  that  institu- 
tionalism  resists  change. 

There  seem  to  be  various  special  reasons  why 
adaptive  non-material  culture  is  slow  to  adjust 
to  changed  material  conditions.  The  purpose  of 
this  essay,  however,  is  not  so  much  to  ascertain 
causes,  as  to  establish  the  fact  of  maladjustments 
between  material  culture  and  the  adaptive  non- 
material  culture  due  to  lags  in  the  adaptive  cul- 
ture. The  consideration  of  causes  was  primarily 
for  the  purpose  of  seeing  whether  they  were  of 
such  a  general  nature  as  to  make  the  phenomena 
widespread.     Of  counse,  the  phenomenon  of  lag 

[264] 


would  be  found  only  in  a  situation  of  cultural 
change.  Since  it  Is  In  recent  times  that  cultural 
changes  are  so  frequent,  the  lags  in  adaptive 
culture  are  expected  to  be  a  problem  of  only 
modern  times.  In  very  early  times  changes  were 
not  sufficiently  numerous  and  frequent  to  give  rise 
often  to  any  very  significant  problem  of  this  na- 
ture, though  the  Hebrews  after  migrating  to  the 
"promised  land"  had  difficulty,  as  recorded  In  the 
Old  Testament,  In  giving  up  mores  of  the  old  no- 
madic life  and  adjusting  to  the  new  agricultural 
conditions. 


THE  CORRELATION  BETWEEN  PARTS  OF 
CULTURE 

The  problem  of  a  harmonious  adjustment  be- 
tween the  material  culture  and  the  adaptive  cul- 
ture appears  to  be  a  part  of  a  larger  problem, 
namely,  the  harmonious  adjustment  of  all  parts  of 
a  culture  In  a  period  of  change.  This  problem 
may  be  stated  in  the  form  of  certain  questions. 
How  closely  correlated  are  the  various  parts  of 
culture?  How  nice  an  adjustment  Is  necessary  or 
desirable  between  the  different  parts  of  culture? 
And  to  what  extent  Is  this  adjustment  maintained 


in  periods  of  cultural  change?  These  questions 
are  altogether  too  large  to  be  considered  In  any 
detail.  And  It  Is  questionable  whether  any  sort 
of  quick  general  answer  can  be  given  upon  which 
reliance  can  be  placed.  Hobhouse  attacked  this 
problem  In  part  in  the  volume,  The  Material  Cul- 
ture and  Social  Institutions  of  the  Simpler  Peoples. 
He  attempted  to  correlate  social  institutions  with 
material  cultures.  The  correlation  did  not  ap- 
pear to  be  very  great.  The  data  of  ethnology 
show  a  great  many  possible  combinations  between 
different  parts  of  culture.  For  instance,  there  are 
hunting  peoples  with  polygamy  and  monogamy, 
and  pastoral  cultures  with  polygamy  and  polyan- 
dry. The  position  of  women  may  be  high  or  low 
In  hunting  cultures  and  equally  high  or  equally 
low  in  agricultural  conditions.  Tracing  descent 
through  the  father's  side  only  is  found  in  a  great 
variety  of  cultural  conditions,  so  also  is  descent 
traced  through  the  mother's  side.  Finer  analyses 
will  no  doubt  show  closer  interrelations  between 
some  parts  of  culture.  Thus  while  polygamy 
or  monogamy  is  found  in  a  variety  of  cultural 
situations  it  may  be  true  that  the  functions 
performed  by  the  family  are  closely  related  to  the 
economic  conditions,  as  is  claimed  by  Grosse.^^ 
Lowie  has  shown  some  significant  changes  that  oc- 

18  Ernest  Grosse,  Die  Formen  der  Familie  und  dU  Formen 
der  Wirtschafu 

[266] 


curred  when  the  Chukchee  changed  from  seal- 
hunting  and  fishing  to  reindeer-breeding.^^  WIss- 
ler  has  described  certain  changes  that  occurred 
among  the  Plains  Indians  after  the  Introduction 
of  the  horse. 2^  Private  ownership  of  large- 
scale  industry  is  correlated  with  some  form  of 
labor  union.  Some  parts  of  culture  appear  to  be 
quite  closely  interdependent,  whereas  other  parts 
appear  more  or  less  independent.  Various  parts 
of  the  non-material  culture  are  correlated  with 
each  other  as  well  as  with  the  material  culture. 
No  satisfactory  presentation  of  this  larger  gen- 
eral problem  can  be  made  here;  we  shall  do  well 
Indeed  to  present,  In  so  short  a  space,  the  smaller 
problem  of  the  maladjustment  between  material 
culture  and  certain  adaptive  cultures. 

It  does  seem  to  be  true,  however,  that  people 
can  live,  society  can  exist,  under  very  varied  com- 
binations of  different  parts  of  culture.  Thus 
there  are  possible  many  different  degrees  of  ad- 
justment. But  varied  conditions  under  which 
people  live  furnish  evidence  as  to  what  are  the 
most  harmonious  combinations.  Society  can  ex- 
ist without  unemployment  insurance,  but  unem- 
ployment insurance  may  be  a  much  better  social 
condition.     People  can  live  in  periods  of  consider- 

19  Robert  H.  Lowie,  Primitwe  Society,  pp.  198-201. 

20  Clark  Wissler,  "The  Influence  of  the  Horse  in  the  Devel- 
opment of  Plains  Culture,"  American  Anthropologist,  New 
Series,  Vol.  XVI,  No.  i,  pp.  1-25. 

[267:1 


able  social  maladjustments,  but  it  does  not  follow 
that  such  a  life  Is  the  most  satisfactory  or  that  ef- 
fort should  not  be  made  to  make  better  adjust- 
ments in  the  social  heritage. 


MATERIAL  CULTURE  AS  A  SOURCE  OF 
MODERN  SOCIAL  CHANGES 

There  remain,  however,  a  few  other  considera- 
tions to  be  made  in  inquiring  how  generally  the 
hypothesis  of  lag  may  justifiably  be  applied.  It 
has  been  shown  that  when  the  material  culture 
changes  there  are  frequently  lags  in  the  old  adap- 
tive culture  before  changes  providing  satisfactory 
adjustment  have  been  made.  It  Is  not  to  be  im- 
plied, of  course,  that  changes  may  not  be  made  in 
the  non-material  culture  and  that  part  which  is 
adaptive  to  material  conditions  while  the  material 
culture  remains  constant.  Indeed,  it  is  conceiv- 
able that  a  change  may  first  occur  in  non-material 
culture  and  later  the  material  culture  be  adjusted 
to  such  a  change.  Thus  religion  may  change  and 
an  adaptation  affecting  material  conditions  may  be 
made  to  the  religious  ideas,  as  In  the  develop- 
ment of  taboos  against  the  use  of  certain  animals 
as  foods  or  the  development  of  architecture  in 
[268] 


houses  of  worship.  There  may  be  progress 
in  science,  to  be  followed  by  changes  in  the 
material  culture,  which  may  be  thought  of  as 
adaptations  of  material  culture  to  science.  Mor- 
alists may  argue  that  the  material  culture  is  ad- 
justed to  moral  principles,  rather  than  a  moral 
adjustment  to  the  material  conditions.  There 
are,  therefore,  some  changes  in  the  non-material 
culture  that  precede  and  to  which  the  material 
culture  is  later  adjusted,  and  we  wish  to  know 
whether  in  our  modern  culture  most  of  the  initial 
changes  are  in  the  material  culture  or  in  the  non- 
material  culture. 

Concerning  the  question  of  whether  in  modern 
times  the  initiation  of  the  vast  cultural  changes 
that  are  taking  place  so  rapidly  lies  more  largely 
with  the  material  culture  or  with  the  non-material 
culture,  it  should  be  recalled  that  there  are  a  great 
many  changes  occurring  in  the  material  culture 
because  of  inventions.  As  an  illustration,  there 
are  thousands  and  thousands  of  different  types  of 
machines  for  production,  all  recently  invented. 
Many  changes  are  being  made  in  the  material  fac- 
tors In  transportation,  by  means  of  steam,  electric- 
ity and  gasoline,  by  land,  sea  and  air.  There 
are  new  types  of  dwellings;  and  the  variety  of 
new  types  of  consumption  goods  is  bewildering. 
Why  are  there  these  multitudinous  changes  in  ma- 
terial  culture   to-day?     And  more   particularly, 

[269] 


are  these  changes  in  material  culture  consequent 
to  changes  In  the  non-material  culture  and  adap- 
tive to  the  various  forms  of  non-material  culture  ? 
It  certainly  does  not  appear  that  the  uses  of 
steam,  or  electricity,  or  gasoline  are  undertaken 
for  the  purpose  of  making  adjustments  to  a 
changed  form  of  social  organization,  or  a  particu- 
lar concept  of  morals,  or  to  a  religious  doctrine 
or  to  any  other  form  of  non-material  culture. 
These  material  inventions  appear  to  be  made 
and  adopted  with  the  idea  of  satisfying  Individual 
wants,  because  they  bring  comfort,  rest,  speed, 
enlightenment,  or  wealth.  The  power  of  steam 
saves  human  energy  and  steam  is  used  instead  of 
the  human  arm  to  turn  machines.  But  the  intro- 
duction of  steam  makes  changes  in  home  pro- 
duction, the  growth  of  cities,  changes  In  the 
position  of  women,  new  causes  of  war.  It  has  its 
effect  upon  the  birth  rate,  the  functions  of  the 
church,  and  the  nature  of  education.  If,  for 
illustration,  there  had  not  been  discovered  these 
sources  of  power  for  turning  wheels,  that  is,  if 
we  were  still  producing  by  the  energy  or  power  of 
human  beings  and  domesticated  animals  only, 
cities  would  have  been  few,  concentration  of  pro- 
duction in  factories  would  not  have  taken  place, 
production  would  be  largely  on  the  farms 
and  In  the  home,  the  position  of  women  would 
'have  been  much  as  of  old.  Some  changes  would 
£270] 


have  occurred  in  education,  in  religion  and  in 
morals.  But  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that 
the  Influences  on  non-material  culture  flowing 
from  the  use  of  steam  have  been  profound. 
There  Is  no  reason  to  think  that  steam  was 
adopted  In  order  to  make  an  adjustment  to 
some  part  of  the  non-material  culture. 

Certainly  a  large  part  of  the  non-material  cul- 
ture appears  to  be  by  nature  a  method  of  adjust- 
ment either  to  material  culture  or  to  natural  en- 
vironment or  to  both.  The  phrase,  ways  of  do- 
ing things.  Is  a  generalized  characterization  of  a 
large  part  of  non-material  culture.  Social  organ- 
ization, customs  and  morals  are  the  means  of  a 
collective  way  of  doing  things,  in  large  part  to 
and  with  the  natural  environment  and  material 
culture,  either  simply,  directly  and  individually, 
or  somewhat  Indirectly,  remotely  and  collectively. 
Such  methods  of  behavior  would  therefore  pre- 
sumably change  if  the  natural  environment  or 
the  material  culture  changed.  While  Initial 
changes  may  occur  through  Invention  In  social 
institutions,  religions,  laws,  etc.,  one  would  hardly 
expect  the  material  culture  to  change  frequently 
for  the  purpose  of  making  adaptations  to  these 
ways  of  doing  things. 

But  some  forms  of  non-materigl  culture  are  ways 
of  doing  things  valuable  for  their  own  ends  and 
not  particularly  concerned  with  material  condi- 
[271] 


^tions.  Thus  art  serves  aesthetic  desires,  relatively 
free  from  considerations  of  material  culture. 
The  sex  Instinct  functions  with  little  relation  to 
material  culture.  Religion  as  a  form  of  culture 
meets  certain  needs,  Irrespective  of  material 
culture.  And  social  organization  may  not  only 
be  a  way  of  adjustment  to  material  conditions 
but  it  may  serve  independently  certain  other 
human  desires  such  as  the  desire  for  sociability. 
So,  much  of  non-material  culture  has  purposes 
quite  its  own,  which  may  be  attained  with  very 
little  use  of  material  culture  in  almost  any  en- 
vironment. This  difference  in  the  nature  of  the 
parts  of  non-material  culture  led  us  In  the  analysis 
to  the  segregation  of  the  part  which  Is  more 
closely  adapted  to  material  culture;  and  this  was 
called  adaptive  culture.  While  it  Is  true  that 
much  of  non-material  culture  is  not  highly  adapted 
to  material  conditions,  it  Is  also  true  that  the 
material  culture  is  not  adapted  to  such  types  of 
non-adaptive  non-material  culture.  In  other 
words,  we  should  not  expect  frequent  changes  In 
material  culture  to  be  made  for  purposes  of  ad- 
justment to  types  of  non-material  culture,  such  as 
religion,  art,  ceremonies  and  literature. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  know  whether  there 

IS  anything  in  the  nature  of  material  culture  or  of 

non-material  culture  which  would  make  a  greater 

frequency  of  inventions  In  one  or  the  other.     The 

[272] 


accumulative  nature  of  material  culture  resulting 
in  increasing  cultural  base  was  thought  to  be  in 
part  responsible  for  the  great  number  of  material 
changes  to-day.  Is  the  non-material  culture  simi- 
larly accumulative  resulting  in  increased  cultural 
base  ?  The  non-material  culture  is  so  diverse  that 
it  is  difficult  even  to  make  a  general  guess.  But 
religion  does  not  appear  to  be  particularly  accumu- 
lative, neither  is  the  family  organization.  Art, 
literature,  government  seem  to  be  somewhat  ac- 
cumulative but  probably  not  so  much  so  as  ma- 
terial culture.  Science  seems  to  be  rather  highly 
accumulative.  The  cumulative  aspect  of  cus- 
toms, mores,  and  'Vays  of  doing  things'*  would 
appear  to  rest  in  part  on  the  cumulative  nature  of 
material  culture.  It  may  therefore  be  that  the 
increasing  cultural  base  as  an  immediate  factor 
in  producing  inventions  or  change  may  be  more 
characteristic  of  material  culture  than  of  non- 
material  culture.  There  are  of  course  other 
factors  affecting  inventions  and  change,  and  in 
earlier  times  the  non-material  culture  may  have 
been  quite  heterogeneous  and  complex  while  the 
material  culture  may  have  been  simple. 

Evidence  as  to  the  susceptibility  to  change  of 
the  different  parts  of  culture  may  be  drawn  from 
studies  In  the  diffusion  of  culture.  Which  is  the 
more  easily  adopted  by  a  people,  the  material 
culture  or  the  non-material  culture?  Wissler, 
[273] 


whose  studies  of  the  culture  areas  of  the  Ameri- 
can Indian  furnish  excellent  perspectives  of  the 
borrowing  of  cultures  by  one  tribe  from  another, 
remarks  :^^ 

The  term  culture  as  used  by  anthropologists  gen- 
erally includes  such  groups  of  traits  as  social  organiza- 
tion, ceremonial  activities,  art  and  material  culture.  Of 
these  it  appears  that  social  organization  is  less  readily 
changed  in  contrast  to  the  last.  It  is  food,  shelter  and 
transportation  complexes  of  material  culture  that  the 
intruding  group  will  take  over  bodily.  Then  the 
chances  are  that  one  by  one  the  associated  ceremonies 
always  found  intimately  connected  with  food  production 
will  be  taken  over  to  displace  those  now  made  useless, 
and  ultimately  drag  in  their  social  counterparts.  Even 
a  superficial  view  of  the  data  so  far  accumulated  by 
anthropologists  will  show  how  well  this  hypothetical 
picture  fits  the  facts  for  several  culture  centres. 

While  Wissler's  generalization  may  be  true  for 
the  data  he  has  dealt  with,  a  statement  that 
material  culture  spreads  more  easily  from  one 
group  to  another  than  other  features  of  culture, 
such  as  social  organization  and  ceremonies,  is 
probably  only  true  in  general,  or  on  the  average. 
There  are  many  exceptions  and  qualifications. 
Some  ceremonies  and  religious  movements  have 

21  Clark  Wissler,  "Aboriginal  Maize  Culture  as  a  Typical 
Culture  Complex,"  Amsrican  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  XXI, 
March,  1916,  p.  661. 

[274] 


swept  over  areas  with  great  rapidity.  But  the 
statement  that  material  culture  Is  borrowed  first 
and  non-material  culture  later  suggests  that  Ithe 
adoption  of  Inventions  In  material  culture  will 
be  somewhat  earlier  than  changes  In  the  non-ma- 
terial culture,  and  that  obstacles  to  change  are 
found  In  connection  with  non-material  culture  that 
are  not  found  with  the  material  culture. 

The  foregoing  analysis  has  been  undertaken  for 
the  purpose  of  inquiring  whether  there  is  anything 
In  the  nature  of  culture  which  would  indicate 
whether  the  vast  number  of  cultural  changes  tak- 
ing place  to-day  were  Initiated  largely  in  the  field 
of  material  culture  or  in  the  field  of  non-material 
culture.  If  the  foregoing  analysis  is  sound,  it 
would  seem  that  a  preponderant  number  of 
changes  are  begun  In  the  material  culture  causing 
changes  In  the  non-material  culture.  And  while 
there  may  be  some  changes  occurring  In  the  non- 
material  culture,  not  initiated  or  caused  by  changes 
in  the  material  culture,  these  changes  do  not  in 
themselves  very  frequently  precipitate  changes  in 
the  material  culture.  It  therefore  follows  that  if 
to-day  a  great  number  of  the  cultural  changes 
occurring  are  started  by  changes  in  the  material 
culture,  thereby  causing  changes  in  the  non- 
material  culture,  particularly  adaptive  culture,  the 
hypothesis  of  lags  is  widely  applicable.  Whether 
this  lag  is  appreciable  in  length  of  time  or  in 

[275] 


severity  of  effect  can  only  be  told  in  each  instance 
by  analysis  and  measurement. 

These  considerations  give  prominence  to  ma- 
terial culture  as  a  factor  in  the  changing  society  of 
to-day.  This  prominence  is  due  to  three  facts. 
First  is  the  great  accumulation  of  material  cul- 
ture. Second,  the  material  culture  is  changing  so 
frequently  and  so  rapidly.  And  third,  the  ma- 
terial culture  causes  so  many  changes  in  other 
features  of  society.  The  magnitude  of  material 
culture  to-day  is  very  striking.  Greece  had  devel- 
oped a  non-material  culture  to  a  high  degree, 
comparing  well  with  our  own.  But  the  material 
culture  of  Greece  was  much  less  advanced.  The 
material  culture  of  modern  society  is  also  much 
more  elaborate  than  the  material  culture  of  so- 
called  primitive  peoples.  Among  these  peoples 
the  environment  and  natural  resources  were  of 
very  great  significance  to  them,  determining  within 
limits  their  food  supply,  their  shelter,  their  cloth- 
ing. Climate,  geographical  conditions,  and  nat- 
ural resources  made,  for  instance,  many  differ- 
ences between  the  pueblo  dwellers  of  Mexico  and 
the  Eskimo  of  the  north  or  the  Indians  of  the 
plains.  Material  culture  to-day,  particularly  since 
the  development  of  trade,  is  conquering  limita- 
tions imposed  by  climate.  And  on  account 
of  its  size  and  increased  significance,  adjust- 
ments not  only  have  to  be  made  to  geograph- 

[276] 


ical  conditions  as  was  true  in  primitive  culture, 
but  we  must  also  make  adjustments  to  ma- 
terial culture.  From  the  point  of  view  of  ad- 
justments, then,  material  culture  is  replacing  in 
significance  to  a  certain  extent  the  geographical 
environment  of  old.  But  there  is  this  distinction, 
the  material  culture  to-day  changes  frequently 
whereas  the  changes  in  geographical  conditions 
are  slow.  This  makes  problems  of  adjustment 
ever-recurring. 

The  very  fact  that  material  culture  is  to-day 
undergoing  such  rapid  changes  means  that  it  is 
significant  as  a  cause  of  social  phenomena.  In 
the  analysis  of  causes  of  any  phenomenon,  it  is 
the  factors  that  are  variable  that  are  said  to  be 
causes.  The  variability  of  modern  material  cul- 
ture is  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  prominence  of 
the  modern  doctrine  of  the  economic  interpreta- 
tion of  history.  Ethnologists  are  as  a  rule  not 
so  much  impressed  with  the  theory  of  the  eco- 
nomic interpretation  of  history  as  are  students  of 
modern  culture,  and  perhaps  for  the  reason  that 
the  material  culture  was  neither  so  large  nor  so 
variable  in  primitive  society  as  in  the  modern  era. 

A  recognition  of  the  significance  of  material 
culture  in  modern  society  need  not  identify  one 
with  what  is  sometimes  called  materialism.  Con- 
trasts are  made  usually  between  the  material  and 
the  ideal,  spiritual  or  religious  in  reference  to 
[277] 


life's  values  rather  than  In  reference  to  sociologi- 
cal factors.  One  can  recognize  the  influence  of 
material  culture,  without  of  course  denying  the 
influence  of  other  cultural  factors.  And  one  may 
work,  of  course,  towards  shaping  material  cul- 
ture to  ends  and  purposes  that  may  be  in  accord 
with  the  ideals  and  the  spirit.  It  is  only  by  a 
recognition  of  the  significance  of  material  culture 
that  social  reformers  can  hope  in  a  practical  way 
to  modify  or  direct  it. 

SUMMARY 

The  development  of  the  hypothesis  considered 
in  this  chapter  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
Material  culture  in  changing  causes  other  social 
changes  in  what  was  defined  as  adaptive  culture. 
But  frequently  there  is  a  delay  in  the  changes 
thus  caused,  so  that  the  old  adaptive  culture  hangs 
over  into  the  new  material  conditions.  This  lag 
in  the  adaptive  culture  produces  a  period  of  mal- 
adjustment, which  is  less  harmonious  as  an  adap- 
tation than  the  period  which  precedes  or  follows. 
This  hypothesis  was  considered  carefully  in  the 
case  of  workmen's  compensation  for  industrial  ac- 
cidents. The  lag  in  the  old  adaptive  culture  was 
measured  in  years  and  the  hypothesis  was  verified 
by  the  facts.  It  was  thought  that  similar  proof 
could  be  given  In  many  such   instances,   and  a 

[278] 


number  of  such  probable  cases  were  cited.  The 
further  application  of  the  hypothesis  by  data  and 
statistics  was  abandoned  on  account  of  the  limita- 
tions of  space,  and  some  considerations  as  to  na- 
ture and  causes  were  undertaken  to  inquire  how 
widespread  was  the  situation  described  in  the  case 
of  workmen's  compensation. 

It  was  thought  probable  from  the  nature  of 
material  culture  and  its  changes,  and  the  nature 
of  non-material  culture  and  its  changes,  that  at 
the  present  time  a  great  many  initial  changes 
were  occurring  in  the  material  culture  which  were 
causing  changes  in  other  parts  of  culture.  Spec- 
ial forces  and  causes  were  thought  to  exist  which 
caused  changes  in  certain  parts  of  non-material 
culture  to  spread  less  rapidly  than  changes  in  the 
material  culture.  There  are,  therefore,  a  great 
many  instances  where  the  material  culture  changes 
first  and  the  other  social  changes  which  it  causes 
follow  later.  In  some  cases  these  lags  may  be 
so  brief  as  to  be  insignificant,  but  in  a  great  many 
cases  the  lags  causing  maladjustments  may  be  so 
long  as  to  be  socially  very  significant.  The  ex- 
tent of  the  lag  and  the  severity  of  the  maladjust- 
ment should  be  measured  in  each  instance.  The 
great  size  of  material  culture  to-day,  its  rapidity 
of  change,  and  its  significance  as  a  source  of  other 
changes  in  society  make  the  material  culture  in 
modern  society  play  a  most  important  part. 

[279] 


Since  lags  in  social  movements  causing  social 
maladjustments  follow  changes  in  material  cul- 
ture, and  since  there  are  many  rapid  changes  in 
material  culture,  it  follows  that  there  will  be  an 
accumulation  of  these  lags  and  maladjustments. 

According  to  the  analysis  made  in  Part 
II,  the  growth  of  material  culture  was  shown 
to  become  faster  and  faster.  If  the  ma- 
terial culture  should  continue  to  accumulate  and 
change  with  increasing  rapidity,  it  would  seem 
that  the  cultural  lags  will  pile  up  even  more  than 
at  the  present  time.  Such  a  development  creates 
quite  a  task  for  those  who  would  direct  the  course 
of  social  progress,  the  task  of  eliminating  these 
maladjustments  by  making  the  adjustments  to  ma- 
terial changes  more  rapid.  It  is  thinkable  that 
the  piling  up  of  these  cultural  lags  may  reach  such 
a  point  that  they  may  be  changed  in  a  somewhat 
wholesale  fashion.  In  such  a  case,  the  word 
revolution  probably  describes  what  happens. 
There  may  be  other  limiting  factors  to  such  a 
course  of  development;  and  our  analysis  is  not 
sufficiently  comprehensive  and  accurate  to  make 
definite  prediction.  But  certain  trends  at  the 
present  time  seem  unmistakable. 


[280] 


PART  V 

ADJUSTMENT  BETWEEN  HUMAN  NA- 
TURE AND  CULTURE 


\ 


In  the  preceding  chapter,  the  discussion  con- 
cerned the  harmonious  adjustment  of  the  different 
parts  of  the  social  heritage,  particularly  during  a 
process  of  rapid  social  change.  It  was  there 
shown  that  a  number  of  social  problems  arise 
because  the  different  parts  of  culture  change  at 
unequal  rates.  In  the  present  chapter  we  wish  to 
consider  some  of  the  problems  that  arise,  not 
from  the  lack  of  adjustment  of  the  various  parts 
of  culture,  but  from  the  lack  of  adjustment  be- 
tween human  nature  and  culture.  Since  the  publi- 
cation of  the  Origin  of  Species,  there  has  been  a 
great  deal  of  discussion  of  the  adaptation  of  man 
to  environment.  Our  problem,  though,  deals  not 
with  the  whole  of  environment  but  with  that  part 
which  is  called  culture:  and  the  concern  is  not 
with  man  as  a  whole,  but  with  man's  inherited 
psychological  equipment.  Furthermore,  the  em- 
phasis in  the  problem  is  not  wholly  on  the  adapta- 
tion of  human  nature  to  culture,  but  on  the  ad- 
justment between  human  nature  and  culture,  which 
includes  the  possibility  of  an  adaptation  of  culture 
to   human   nature.     Naturally,    the    question    i§ 

[283] 


raised  as  to  how  satisfactory  an  adjustment  be- 
tween human  nature  and  culture  exists,  particularly 
when  we  consider  the  possibilities  of  making  bet- 
ter adjustments.  The  question  is  such  a  broad 
one,  that  its  many  phases  ramify  into  a  large 
number  of  special  hypotheses,  which  may  in  time 
be  verified  by  detailed  data.  No  detailed  study 
is  to  be  made  here,  however.  Our  purpose  is 
rather  to  chart  the  problem  and  draw  such  con- 
clusions as  the  general  analysis  and  present  status 
seem  to  warrant. 


THE  THEORY  OF  THE  CAVE  MAN  IN  THE 
MODERN  CITY 

Evolution  in  man.  The  problem  can  best  be 
outlined  by  approaching  it  from  the  point  of  view 
of  social  evolution,  developed  in  Part  II.  The 
consideration  of  social  evolution  there  made  con- 
cerned the  possible  changes,  in  the  course  of  time, 
in  human  nature  and  in  culture.  Man  has  been  on 
the  earth  for  50,000  years  or  possibly  for  several 
hundred  thousand.  Skeletal  remains  indicate  that 
his  evolution  has  been  slow.  The  evidence  we 
have  of  the  way  biological  evolution  takes  place 
confirms  the  view  as  to  the  slowness  of  evolution. 
Mutations  are  infrequent.  It  was  claimed  in  th? 
[284] 


second  chapter  that  no  proof  had  been  made  that 
there  had  been  any  significant  biological  evolution 
of  man  since  the  last  glacial  period.  It  is  of 
course  possible  that  there  may  have  been  signifi- 
cant changes  in  man's  biological  nature  since  that 
time,  although  we  do  not  have  conclusive  proof; 
and  it  would  seem  probable  that  there  may  have 
been  some  mutations,  but  of  just  what  significance 
it  is  not  known.  The  whole  question  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  biological  evolution  in  man  for  sociol- 
ogy has  been  confused  by  the  vast  cultural  changes 
that  have  taken  place.  But  it  seems  possible  for 
the  tremendous  cultural  evolution  since  the  last 
ice  age  to  have  occurred  without  any  significant 
biological  change.  Human  nature  as  thought  of 
in  terms  of  hereditary  equipment  may  very  prob- 
ably be  fundamentally  the  same  now  as  in  the  last 
glacial  period.  Indeed  in  many  respects  man's 
psychological  nature  is  quite  similar  to  that  of  the 
anthropoids.  It  certainly  is  true  that  man's  na- 
ture is  much  more  like  that  of  the  cave  men  than 
the  appearance  of  cultural  differences  would  lead 
one  to  think.  The  apparent  differences  may  be 
cultural,  acquired  since  birth  in  the  course  of  a 
lifetime.  The  fact  that  this  is  diflUcult  to  con- 
ceive lies  in  our  ignorance  of  the  cultural  process 
and  our  failure  to  understand  the  power  of  cul- 
ture. 
Cultural  evolution.  On  the  other  hand,  cul- 
[285] 


tural  change  is  not  so  slow  as  biological  change, 
especially  In  modern  times.  In  early  times,  to  be 
sure,  the  rate  of  cultural  change  was  very  slow. 
Man  for  a  very  long  time  was  in  the  rough  stone 
age,  probably  for  hundreds  of  thousands  of  years. 
Then  culture  developed  quickly  through  the  neo- 
lithic age  and  through  the  use  of  metals  up  to  the 
high  mechanical  achievements  of  to-day.  That 
the  latter  stages  of  this  cultural  development  oc- 
curred without  any  significant  biological  changes 
Is  practically  certain. 

The  primitive  nature  of  man  and  the  artificial 
nature  of  civilization.  The  course  of  cultural 
evolution  and  of  biological  change  in  man  as  set 
forth  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs  throws  some 
light  on  the  problems  of  adjustment  between 
human  nature  and  modern  culture.  Man  Is  the 
same  biologically  as  he  was  in  the  late  ice  age, 
while  his  culture  has  suddenly  become  vastly  dif- 
ferent. The  problem  may  be  popularly  ex- 
pressed as  that  of  cave  men  trying  to  live  in  a 
modern  city.  Suppose  we  could  place  a  group 
of  Cro-Magnon  men  in  a  modern  city.  What 
would  be  some  of  the  difficulties  of  adjustment 
for  them?  It  Is  fairer  to  Imagine  a  group  of 
their  children  being  brought  up  in  a  modern  city. 
Can  we,  being  biologically  the  same  as  Cro- 
Magnon  men,  adjust  ourselves  to  the  sedentary 
life  demanded  of  office  workers?  If  we  suffer 
[286] 


from  indigestion,  can  it  be  due  to  the  fact  that  we 
do  not  eat  the  food  that  the  cave  men  ate;  or 
that  we  do  not  take  the  muscular  exercise  which 
the  life  of  the  primitive  hunter  demanded?  Do 
we  have  difficulties  in  adjusting  ourselves  to  our 
institution  of  marriage  and  a  rigid  sex  code? 
May  these  difficulties  be  due  to  our  primitive  na- 
ture which  may  have  been  adjusted  In  the  age  of 
the  cave  dwellers  and  anthropoids  to  a  more  pro- 
miscuous expression?  May  our  wanderlust  ten- 
dencies be  traced  to  the  fact  that  primitive  men 
were  wandering  hunters  ?  Is  the  monotonous  and 
specialized  work  on  a  machine  for  many  hours  a 
day  for  every  week  in  the  year  and  for  many  con- 
secutive years  the  type  of  life  to  which  our  equip- 
ment is  naturally  adapted?  These  questions  sug- 
gest the  nature  of  the  problem  of  adjustment  as 
it  is  popularly  conceived  and  suggest  the  Idea  that 
modern  civilization  Is  essentially  artificial,  that  Is, 
not  like  the  culture  of  the  hunting  peoples  which 
is  assumed  to  be  more  natural. 

It  is  claimed  that  a  great  many  social  problems 
such  as  war,  crime,  sexual  phenomena  and  disease 
arise  because  of  the  inability  or  difficulty  of  the 
original  nature  of  man  to  adapt  itself  to  modern 
conditions  and  cultural  standards.  So  also  it  is 
claimed  that  much  of  our  unhappiness,  nervous- 
ness and  insanity  is  traceable  to  the  same  general 
causes.     Certainly  human  nature  is  at  the  bottom 

[287] 


ot  many  of  our  social  and  individual  ills  in  the 
sense  that  if  human  nature  were  only  different 
these  problems  would  not  exist.  If  we  were  less 
selfish,  less  passionate,  less  pugnacious,  more  rea- 
sonable, more  kindly,  and  more  tolerant,  our  social 
problems  would  not  be  so  numerous  nor  so  diffi- 
cult, and  it  is  quite  possible  that  certain  standards 
of  civilization  are  set  rather  high  for  our  primi- 
tive nature  to  conform  to. 

Evidently  to  understand  the  problem  of  adapta- 
tion we  must  know  what  human  nature  is  like  and 
we  must  understand  the  nature  of  modern  culture 
and  the  extent  of  its  artificiality.  Can  it  be  that 
we  are  really  cave  people  trying  to  adjust  our- 
selves to  factory  life?  This  strange  but  plausible 
theory  may  be  taken  as  a  point  of  departure  for 
a  critical  estimate  of  the  problems  of  adaptation 
between  human  nature  and  culture.  As  pre- 
viously indicated,  two  assumptions  may  be  taken 
as  strongly  probable;  one  Is  that  modern  man  Is 
biologically  very  much  the  same  as  the  men  of 
the  old  stone  age,  and  the  other  is  that  modern 
civilization  Is  recent,  of  short  history,  and  very 
different  from  the  hunting  culture.  While  this 
much  of  the  theory  Is  sound,  as  appears  from  the 
analysis  of  Part  II,  the  remaining  parts  of  the 
theory  we  have  not  examined.  This  will  be  done 
in  the  following  paragraphs. 

The  adaptation  of  cave  man.  It  Is  true  that 
[288] 


man,  or  some  creature  much  like  man,  lived  for 
many  hundreds  of  thousands  of  years  hunting 
wild  animals,  gathering  herbs,  nuts  or  fruits,  and 
inhabited  trees  or  caves.  There  must  have  been 
some  measure  of  adaptation  to  this  environment 
and  type  of  life,  but  it  should  not  be  too  readily 
assumed  that  the  adaptation  was  perfect.  It  may 
have  been  only  a  partially  satisfactory  adaptation, 
however;  we  do  not  know  very  much  about  what 
this  life  was  like.  On  the  physical  side,  for  in- 
stance, it  was  an  outdoor  life  as  contrasted  with 
life  in  our  modern  houses.  The  cave  men  lived 
a  much  more  physically  active  life  than  modern 
office  workers.  Certain  surmises  can  be  made 
regarding  the  type  of  food  eaten  and  the  type  of 
physical  activities  engaged  in.  But  guesses  as  to 
the  instinctive  life,  as  to  how  much  they  fought, 
loved,  hated,  feared,  or  were  gregarious,  are 
probably  wide  of  the  mark.  At  least  speculation 
by  theorists  as  to  how  peoples  with  primitive  cul- 
tures function  psychologically  has  often  been  far 
from  the  facts  as  observed  by  field  workers.  So 
we  have  very  little  basis  to  go  on  for  forming  an 
estimate  of  the  psychological  adaptation  of  primi- 
tive man  of  very  early  cultures. 

Objection  should  also  be  made  to  the  use  of  the 
phrase,  "cave  man,"  as  biologically  or  psycho- 
logically descriptive  of  man.  A  description  in 
terms  of  instincts,  capacities  and  mechanisms  is 

[289] 


preferable.  The  term,  "cave  man,"  suggests  a 
type  of  cultural  life  rather  than  a  biological 
equipment.  Any  description  of  human  nature  in 
terms  of  cultural  activities  is  misleading,  for  it  is 
conceivable  that  the  psychological  equipment  may 
function  equally  well  in  a  thousand  different  cul- 
tures. Satisfactory  adaptation  is  not  necessarily 
confined  to  any  one  type  of  cultural  life,  even 
though  that  may  have  been  the  type  of  life  exist- 
ing for  hundreds  of  thousands  of  years.  Thus 
one  may  take  exercise  in  a  gymnasium  as  well  as 
in  the  hunt.  And  many  different  stimuli  may 
arouse  fear  as  satisfactorily  as  a  wild  beast.  As 
a  descriptive  term  "the  cave  man"  is  bad  because 
of  the  misleading  associations  that  inevitably 
come  to  mind,  as  a  result  of  childhood  tales  or 
novel-reading  or  Sunday  supplements  to  the  news- 
papers, or  what  not.  These  associations  are  just 
as  misleading  as  popular  notions  about  savagery 
and  barbarism  are  false.  Though  we  may  be 
cave  people  trying  to  live  in  a  modern  city,  we  are 
little  the  wiser  for  this  knowledge  because  we 
know  little  of  what  the  cave  man  is  biologically 
and  psychologically. 

The  slowness  of  the  biological  process  o£ 
adaptation.  Another  point  in  the  theory  of  the 
cave  man  in  the  modern  city  is  that  our  biological 
nature  is  not  adapted  to  civilization  because  of  the 
comparatively  short  time  that  we  have  been  living 
[290] 


in  civilization.  If  the  adapting  is  all  to  be  done 
from  the  biological  side  then  certainly  the  two 
or  three  thousand  years  of  civilization  and  the  one 
hundred  and  fifty  years  of  industrialism  are  not 
long  enough  times  to  make  biological  adaptations, 
acquired  characteristics  not  being  Inherited  and 
mutations  occurring  rarely.  But  it  does  not  fol- 
low that  there  is  not  adaptation.  Such  an  as- 
sumption Is  wholly  from  the  biological  side. 
Adaptations  may  be  made  on  the  side  of  culture. 
And  the  two  thousand  years  of  civilization  In 
Europe  are  conceivably  not  too  short  a  time  for 
culture  to  be  adjusted  to  man. 

The  artificiality  of  modem  civilization.  Fur- 
thermore, the  argument  stresses  the  fact  that 
modern  civilization  is  very  different  from  the  cul- 
ture of  the  ice  ages  and  that  the  amount  of  this 
difference  is  an  indication  of  the  lack  of  adapta- 
tion. This  great  difference  may  simply  appear 
to  be  different  in  physical  outlines.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  the  functioning  of  instincts,  the 
difference  may  not  be  so  great  as  the  objective 
measurements  of  the  material  culture  would  indi- 
cate. Thus  one's  appetite  may  be  satisfied  by  any 
one  of  a  very  great  number  of  foods.  The  type 
of  material  culture  does  not  necessarily  cause 
variations  in  the  extent  to  which  we  are  pug- 
nacious or  become  angry.  We  love  irrespective 
of  the  particular  fashion  of  courtship.  We  may 
[291] 


rind  adventure  in  modern  life  as  truly  as  it  was 
found  in  the  hunter's  life.  Monotony  is  by  no 
means  confined  to  the  modern  factory;  unques- 
tionably routine  existed  in  the  primitive  life  of 
man.  It  may  be  that  the  instinctive  life  of  mod- 
ern men  is  greatly  different  from  that  of  cave  men, 
but  the  theory  based  merely  on  the  objective  dif- 
ferences between  modern  and  early  culture  does 
not  of  itself  prove  such  a  great  difference. 

Instinctive  activities  of  modern  and  ancient 
man.  Perhaps  the  method  of  testing  the  theory 
under  consideration  that  most  readily  comes  to 
mind  is  that  of  comparing  the  emotional  and  in- 
stinctive life  of  man  in  ancient  society  with  that 
of  man  living  in  modern  society.  Such  a  method 
implies  a  listing  of  the  different  instincts  and  a 
consideration  of  the  functioning  of  each  one  both 
in  the  hunting  cultures  and  in  modern  industrial 
society.  If  such  a  comparison  could  be  made  it 
would  yield  the  information  we  want.  But  think 
of  the  difficulties  of  making  such  a  comparison. 
Lists  of  instincts  and  emotions  have  been  made, 
but  such  a  list  tells  us  little  about  their  nature, 
interrelations,  or  relative  significance.  It  is  even 
difficult  to  describe  adequately  the  emotions  and 
instincts  involved  in  a  single  act;  how  much  more 
difficult  is  it  then  to  characterize  even  roughly  the 
instincts  and  emotions  involved  in  the  many 
different  acts  of  a  people.  We  have  no  statis- 
[292] 


tical  record  of  the  behavior  of  the  instincts  of 
man  from  the  hunting  cultures,  or  of  man  In  mod- 
ern civilization.  Perhaps  the  best  that  could  be 
done  In  comparing  the  life  In  modern  and  ancient 
cultures  Is  to  point  out,  roughly,  certain  obvious 
differences  In  cultural  activities,  leaving  to  sur- 
mise the  Instincts  Involved.  But  In  such  a  com- 
parison, which  of  the  early  cultures  shall  we 
choose  and  which  type  of  the  very  heteroge- 
neous modern  society?  These  comparisons  will 
at  best  be  fragments  and  guesses,  as  the  fol- 
lowing illustrations  Indicate. 

For  instance,  with  some  individuals  in  modern 
life  there  Is  probably  greater  intellectual  activity 
involving  concentration,  thought,  sustained  atten- 
tion and  concern  with  abstractions,  than  would  be 
found  among  primitive  hunters;  though  primi- 
tive hunters  probably  functioned  much  more  fre- 
quently along  these  lines  than  Is  commonly  sup- 
posed. Laborers  who  work  twelve  hours  a  day 
seven  days  a  week  doing  the  same  tasks  In  the 
steel  mills  may  have  a  smaller  variety  of  emo- 
tional and  instinctive  reactions  expressed  in  daily 
behavior  throughout  a  year  than  did  the  men  of 
the  simpler  hunting  cultures.  The  emotion  of 
fear  may  not  find  as  frequent  expression  In  mod- 
ern times  as  formerly,  but  it  may  be  that  the 
great  prevalence  of  anxiety  in  modern  life  Is  an- 
other form  of  fear  expression.     In  some  classes  of 

[293] 


modern  society  fighting  is  less  frequent,  though 
irritation  and  temper  may  be  other  forms  of  ex- 
pression of  pugnacious  tendencies.  Tendencies 
towards  gregariousness  may,  on  the  other  hand, 
find  more  frequent  expression  in  modern  cities 
than  among  the  small  hunting  bands  of  former 
times.  As  for  example,  the  sex  instinct  func- 
tions in  ways  not  natural  to  the  hunting  peoples 
where  large  numbers  are  unmarried,  as  among  the 
male  groups  working  as  migratory,  casual  la- 
borers in  some  sections  of  the  United  States. 
Similarly  the  instincts  of  soldiers  in  prolonged 
trench  warfare  probably  do  not  function  as 
among  primitive  hunters.  It  is  thus  possible  to 
make  some  random  observations,  but  they  are 
far  from  being  a  complete  picture  and  are  sub- 
ject to  error. 

Civilization  may  afford  a  better  adaptation. 
A  conclusion  in  the  theory  we  are  considering 
is  that  we  are  less  satisfactorily  adapted  on  the 
psychological  side  to  civilization,  because  we  are 
after  all  cave  men  and  because  civilization  is  new 
and  different.  Although  our  natures  may  be  much 
the  same  fundamentally  as  that  of  the  cave  peo- 
ple, and  although  modern  culture  is  recent  and 
different,  it  does  not  follow  from  such  theoretical 
considerations  that  we  are  less  satisfactorily 
adapted.  If  the  adaptation  were  wholly  a  biologi- 
cal adaptation,  this  would  be  more  probable;  but 
[294] 


the  culture  that  has  grown  may  have  become  a 
more  rather  than  a  less  satisfactory  adjustment 
for  human  nature.  Indeed  this  would  seem  to 
be  true  if  culture  were  simply  the  result  of  hu- 
man needs.  If  culture  were  solely  the  result  of 
desires,  then  the  longer  the  history  of  culture, 
presumably  the  more  satisfactorily  desires  would 
be  met.  And  If  adaptation  be  the  satisfaction 
of  desires,  then  we  should  expect  modern  civili- 
zation to  afford  a  better  adaptation  to  human 
nature  than  the  hunting  cultures  of  the  stone  ages. 
The  easy  gratification  of  wishes,  however,  may 
not  be  the  best  adaptation  for  our  organisms. 
Growth  and  development  within  a  life-time,  for 
instance,  may  proceed  best  with  some  effort,  some 
denial  or  struggle.  The  collective  whole  of  our 
desires  may  find  a  better  adaptation  than  by  a 
ready  yielding  to  the  immediate  individual  im- 
pulses. 

It  Is  also  somewhat  questionable  to  what  ex- 
tent culture  as  a  whole  may  in  its  growth  come 
to  satisfy  more  and  more  adequately  our  desires. 
There  is  some  relationship  between  culture  and 
human  needs,  but  it  is  not  easy  to  state  what 
this  relationship  is.  Many  single  material  in- 
ventions are  adopted  because  they  answer  a  par- 
ticular desire  or  render  a  specific  comfort.  But 
the  adjustments  they  occasion  may  be  many  more 
than  the  particular  immediate  adjustment  at  their 

[295] 


first  adoption.  Thus  steam  was  used  because  it 
saved  a  certain  amount  of  human  effort;  but  the 
cultural  changes  precipitated  by  the  widespread 
use  of  steam  concerned  many  other  needs  than 
that  of  labor-saving.  The  effects  of  a  material 
Invention  are  not  only  far-reaching;  but  It  seems 
Impossible  to  foresee  the  full  social  consequences, 
and  these  unforeseeable  consequences  may  be 
much  greater  than  the  Immediate  desire  gratified 
by  Its  adoption.  Inventions  and  discoveries  may 
create  unpredictable  situations  that  may  Indeed 
be  even  dangerous.  Thus  a  hunting  people  may 
by  the  adoption  of  the  gun  kill  off  Its  food  sup- 
ply; just  as  we  may  create  inventions  that  may  ex- 
haust our  natural  resources. 

In  a  previous  analysis  of  cultural  growth,  It  was 
pointed  out  that  the  nature  of  Its  future  growth 
depended  a  great  deal  upon  the  past.  What 
was  called  the  cultural  base  plays  a  very  large 
part  In  determining  what  the  future  trend  will 
be.  This  fact,  therefore,  limits  the  effort  of  hu- 
man will  and  desire  In  creating  new  forms.  It 
Is  not  as  though  human  desire  were  unlimited  In 
creating  as  It  wills.  These  considerations  make 
one  less  assured  that  the  growth  of  culture  Is 
towards  the  greater  satisfaction  of  desire  or  to- 
wards a  better  adaptation.  From  such  general 
considerations  It  Is  difficult  to  say  whether  we 
should  expect  modern  civilization  to  afford  a  bet- 

[296] 


ter  adaptation  to  the  original  nature  of  man  than 
the  simple  cultures  of  food-gatherers  and  hunters. 
It  may  or  it  may  not.  Perhaps  some  parts  of 
our  heterogeneous  culture  may  afford  a  better 
adaptation  and  some  parts  may  not.  The  ques- 
tion can  probably  be  better  answered  by  consider- 
ing specific  instances  and  problems  rather  than 
by  such  general  consideration. 

What  is  meant  by  adaptation  or  adjustment  be- 
tween culture  and  human  nature  is  a  question 
which  must  have  occurred  to  the  reader  in  fol- 
lowing the  preceding  analysis.  The  idea  is  taken 
over  from  biology.  We  say  that  a  polar  bear 
is  adapted  to  the  environment  of  the  Arctic  circle, 
but  not  to  life  at  the  equator.  It  means  a  har- 
mony In  the  functioning  of  all  parts  of  an  ani- 
mal's equipment  in  a  certain  environment.  The 
question  here  arises  as  to  what  is  such  a  proper 
functioning  of  human  nature  in  a  given  environ- 
ment. Probably  any  definition  which  covers  all 
such  situations  would  be  so  general  as  to  be  of 
little  value.  More  light  will  be  thrown  on  the 
conception  of  adjustment,  when  the  repression  of 
the  instincts  Is  discussed  later  on.  It  should  be 
observed  that  one's  notion  of  adaptation  In  some 
cases  depends  somewhat  on  one's  attitude  towards 
life,  one's  idea  of  progress,  or  one's  religious 
beliefs. 

Human  nature  changes  within  a  lifetime.    An- 

[297] 


other  point  in  the  foregoing  theory  of  human  na- 
ture about  which  there  may  be  confusion  is  the 
idea  of  its  slowness  to  change  over  a  long  period 
of  time.  When  it  is  said  that  man  has  probably 
not  changed  much  in  thousands  of  years,  what 
is  meant  is  that  the  part  that  is  passed  on  by  hered- 
ity has  probably  not  changed  much.  Mankind 
may  not  change  over  a  long  period  of  years,  yet 
there  may  be  very  great  changes  occurring  in  an 
individual  during  a  lifetime.  But  such  changes 
are  acquired  characteristics  and  are  not  trans- 
mitted by  heredity.  The  apparently  extremely 
great  variations  of  human  nature  within  different 
generations  are  in  part  deceptive,  because  what 
is  thus  seen  to  be  varied  is  not  alone  human  na- 
ture, but  the  cultural  expression  of  human  na- 
ture. In  our  modern  culture  an  individual  may 
utilize  opportunities  in  higher  education  and  de- 
velop to  a  considerable  extent  the  personality 
of  the  student  or  the  scholar.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  born  into  a  situation  where  the  opportu- 
nities to  read  and  to  write  were  denied,  a  person- 
ality different  in  some  respects  would  be  devel- 
oped. To  say  that  we  are  cave  people  trying  to 
live  in  a  modern  city  means  that  we  bring  to 
modern  culture  a  human  equipment  that  is  rel- 
atively fixed  over  centuries,  but  not  wholly  fixed 
within  a  generation.     This  indicates  how  it  is 

[298] 


possible  for  the  same  human  nature  to  appear  so 
different  in  two  very  different  cultures. 

Partial  use  of  the  instinctive  equipment.  An- 
other source  of  difficulty  in  getting  a  clear  mean- 
ing out  of  the  theory  that  we  are  cave  people 
living  in  a  modern  city  lies  in  differences  in  the 
understanding  of  the  requirements  of  human  na- 
ture. Must  our  instinctive  equipment  be  fully 
employed?  The  point  at  issue  may  be  set  forth 
in  the  following  manner.  Men  of  the  old  stone 
age  had  a  muscular  system  that  fitted  them 
excellently  for  running,  climbing,  hitting  and  for 
performing  the  various  acts  involved  in  hunting 
and  getting  food.  We  have  this  same  muscular 
equipment.  But  many  of  us  no  longer  run,  climb 
or  hit.  We  are  carried  about  in  vehicles  and 
spend  a  great  deal  of  time  sitting  at  a  desk.  We 
probably  do  not  make  use  of  this  muscular  equip- 
ment as  fully  as  did  the  primitive  hunter.  It 
was  a  very  necessary  mechanism  in  adapting  him 
to  his  environment.  In  the  adaptation  of  the 
modern  office  worker  to  his  envii^onment  the  va- 
ried assortment  of  muscles  is  less  actively  em- 
ployed. Failure  to  exercise  adequately  our  mus- 
cles is  said  to  involve  serious  consequences  affect- 
ing kidneys,  blood  pressure  and  digestion. 
Using  the  muscles  is  found  to  have  distinctly  bene- 
ficial effects  upon  our  health.  If  we  take  the 
[299] 


proper  amount  of  exercise  we  feel  better  and 
stronger  and  the  different  bodily  organs  function 
more  satisfactorily.  So  it  has  become  necessary 
to  devise  some  artificial  means  of  exercising. 
This  physical  equipment  of  muscles  cannot  with 
safety  be  allowed  to  fall  into  disuse. 

There  comes  down  to  us  from  our  remote  an- 
cestors not  only  a  set  of  muscles,  but  also,  it  is 
said,  a  group  of  instincts,  such  as  the  sex  instinct, 
the  pugnacious  instinct  and  the  gregarious  in- 
stinct. These  instincts  were  of  adaptive  and  sur- 
vival value  for  the  early  primitive  hunters  just 
as  truly  as  were  their  muscles.  Fear  and  pug- 
nacity alike  saved  life.  The  sex  instinct  created 
and  perpetuated  it.  There  was  safety  In  num- 
bers drawn  together  by  sociability  and  gregar- 
ious tendencies.  In  modern  culture,  some  of  our 
industrial  occupations.  In  contrast  to  the  hunting 
life,  apparently  do  not  need  such  a  rich  and  va- 
ried equipment  of  Instincts  for  their  requirements. 
Consider,  for  instance,  the  factory  workers,  or 
factory  "hands"  as  they  were  classified  In  the 
enumerations  of  the  earlier  censuses.  The  re- 
quirements of  factory  work  could  be  met  by  a 
much  less  varied  and  rich  assortment  of  instincts 
than  the  human  being  possesses.  Just  as  the  fac- 
tory extracts  for  its  use  from  a  wonderful  mus- 
cular endowment  only  a  portion  of  the  muscles, 
so  apparently  the  factory  life  requires  not  all  of 
[300] 


the  instinctive  tendencies  and  aptitudes.  What 
is  desired  of  them  is  that  they  become  automatic 
like  the  machines,  mere  factory  hands.  Some 
types  of  modern  cultural  environment  need  only 
a  part  of  the  inheritance  of  instinctive  tendencies. 
It  has  been  found  that  In  the  case  of  muscles,  to 
let  them  fall  into  disuse  is  detrimental  to  the  or- 
ganism. Does  the  parallel  hold  true  In  regard 
to  the  instincts?  Is  it  harmful  not  to  make  use 
of  the  instincts? 

The  problem  of  the  cave  man  and  modern  civ- 
ilization raises  the  question  as  to  whether  only 
the  partial  use  of  man's  equipment  is  a  bad 
adaptation.  Does  the  passive  role  or  the  lack  of 
use  of  some  of  the  instinctive  tendencies  result 
in  harmful  consequences  to  the  individual,  and  is 
it  thus  a  sign  of  lack  of  adjustment  between  hu- 
man nature  and  culture?  The  problem  as  for- 
mulated above  is  plausible  partly  because  of  the 
analogy  drawn  between  the  situation  with  regard 
to  the  muscles  and  the  situation  in  regard  to  the 
instincts.  Analogies  are  often  deceptive.  For 
general  analysis,  what  Is  needed  Is  more  light 
thrown  on  the  nature  of  this  psychological  equip- 
ment, a  significant  portion  of  which  is  the  in- 
stincts. 

The  nature  of  the  instincts.     The  study  of  the 
instincts  has  a  long  history  and  much  has  been 
written  on  the  subject,  but  we  are  interested  in 
[301] 


the  matter  only  as  It  bears  on  the  theory  under 
discussion.  That  some  of  our  behavior  is  Instinc- 
tive Is  seen  from  our  tendencies  to  fight,  to  love,  to 
be  afraid,  and  we  speak  of  an  Instinct  to  fight, 
the  sex  instinct,  and  of  an  Instinct  of  flight.  Just 
how  much  of  our  behavior  Is  Instinctive  is  a  mat- 
ter of  doubt,  but  that  a  very  large  portion  Is 
either  simply  Instinctive,  or  the  result  of  blends 
or  conflicts  of  these  original  Instinctive  tenden- 
cies more  or  less  modified  by  habit  and  learning, 
all  will  admit.  Thus  scientific  research  may  re- 
ceive Its  Impulse  In  part  from  an  instinct  of  curi- 
osity and  an  explorative  tendency.  Some  reli- 
gious activity  arises  from  fear  and  an  instinctive 
tendency  to  abnegate   self. 

The  instincts  were  at  one  time  thought  of  as 
more  or  less  mysterious  entities  residing  in  the 
body.  This  idea  resembles  somewhat  the  ear- 
lier notion  of  the  feelings,  called  at  that  time  hu- 
mors. Thus  when  a  person  was  In  a  bad  humor, 
some  such  spirit  or  humor  was  in  possession  of 
the  body.  But  it  Is  now  agreed  that  instinctive 
behavior  Is  more  in  the  nature  of  a  reaction  of 
the  body  or  various  parts  of  It  to  stimuli.  Thus 
there  Is  a  recognition  of  a  stimulus,  an  accom- 
panying emotion,  and  a  motor  reaction.  There 
are  in  all  individuals  these  tendencies  to  action, 
functioning  In  response  to  stimuli.  The  external 
bodily  behavior  during  emotion  and  Instinctive 
[302] 


action  has  been  frequently  described,  particularly 
in  the  case  of  fear  and  anger.  Recently  physio- 
logical-psychologists have  also  learned  a  good 
deal  about  the  internal  changes  that  occur  during 
certain  emotional  states.  The  ductless  glands, 
particularly  the  thyroid,  pituitary  and  the  adre- 
nals, pour  out  secretions  which  produce  numerous 
internal  modifications,  promote  activity  and  are 
probably  related  to  the  emotional  states.  We 
therefore  conclude  that  the  energy,  drive  and 
motivation  necessary  to  that  great  portion  of  hu- 
man activity  originating  from  the  instincts  are  in- 
herent in  the  response  of  the  various  parts  of  the 
body  to  react  to  stimuli  and  we  know  that  certain 
emotional  states  and  desires  or  wishes  accompany 
these  responses. 

All  this  mechanism  of  instinct  is  part  of  the 
original  equipment  of  men,  endowed  by  heredity, 
as  truly  as  are  the  muscles.  We  think  the  whole 
of  this  equipment  functioned  in  the  primitive 
hunter.  Is  there  a  satisfactory  functioning  of 
these  mechanisms  in  the  life  of  the  factory  worker 
or  the  city  dweller?  Just  as  we  may  have  ungrat- 
ified  desires,  may  we  not  have  repression  of  the 
instincts?  May  not  certain  parts  of  our  equip- 
ment need  exercise  in  instinctive  activity  as  truly 
as  the  muscles  need  exercise?  Does  modern  civ- 
ilization provide  outlets  for  these  desires,  or 
exercise  for  this  part  of  our  equipment?  We 
[303] 


are  chiefly  interested  in  the  nature  of  the  instincts 
as  they  relate  to  these  questions. 

Variability  in  the  stimuli  to  behavior.  One 
problem  of  the  nature  of  the  instincts  that  bears 
directly  on  our  theory  concerns  the  nature  of 
the  stimuli  that  arouse  our  desires  and  set  off 
this  instinctive  activity,  particularly  as  to  whether 
these  stimuli  are  external  or  inside  the  body. 
Thus  we  might  have  the  capacity  for  anger  or 
for  response  to  music,  but  unless  we  come  in  con- 
tact with  these  external  stimuli  we  may  feel  no 
particular  discomfort  because  of  any  lack  of  func- 
tioning of  the  pugnacious  instinct  or  of  our  talent 
for  music.  There  are  really  two  questions  here. 
One  is  whether  the  tendency  to  feel  anger  is 
dependent  on  some  external  stimulus.  And  the 
other  is  whether  the  failure  of  the  equipment  to 
function,  in,  say,  a  pugnacious  manner,  is  a  poor 
adaptation  between  culture  and  original  nature. 
We  shall  consider  now  only  the  first  question. 
If  we  consider  hunger  or  sex  rather  than  anger, 
the  dependence  of  the  desire  on  the  external  stim- 
ulus is  not  so  clear.  Hunger  may  be  caused 
by  internal  bodily  conditions  as  truly  as  by  the 
smell  or  sight  of  food.  The  absence  of  food 
from  the  stomach,  conditions  affecting  the  se- 
cretion of  gastric  juice,  contracting  motions  of 
the  walls  of  the  stomach,  and  perhaps  other  fac- 
tors force  the  individual  to  desire  food  and  to 
[304] 


act  to  get  It.  There  may  be  some  connection  here 
with  an  external  stimulus  but  the  bodily  condition 
is  a  large  factor  In  producing  the  activity. 

The  status  of  the  seminal  vesicles,  the  prostate 
gland,  the  distended  bladder,  the  ovaries  or  the 
pituitary  and  thyroid  glands  may  arouse  sex  ex- 
citement without  the  presence  of  the  sexual  ob- 
ject. Perhaps  the  status  of  the  adrenals,  of  the 
liver,  or  of  the  thyroid  may  determine  In  part  the 
threshold  of  the  reaction  to  the  anger  stimulus. 
It  is  true  In  some  cases  that  the  bodily  prepara- 
tion is  such  as  to  make  the  slightest  of  external 
stimuli  capable  of  setting  off  the  train  of  instinc- 
tive activity.  In  such  cases,  desires  may  be 
thought  of  as  arising  from  within  the  body.  No 
doubt  the  different  Instinctive  tendencies  vary  in 
their  dependence  on  bodily  status  and  external 
stimuli. 

Where  the  variation  In  Internal  preparation  Is 
great  and  the  dependence  on  bodily  status  is  im- 
portant, any  failure  to  find  an  outlet  or  satisfac- 
tion for  such  Instinctive  craving  would  seem  the 
poorer  adaptation.  On  the  other  hand,  If  the 
dependence  Is  largely  on  the  external  stimuli, 
the  lack  of  functioning  of  the  instinct  may  occa- 
sion no  particular  distress. 

The  variability  in  response  to  stimuli.  The 
operation  of  the  Instinctive  equipment  In  any  cul- 
ture depends  upon  the  stimuli  to  arouse  the  ac- 
[305] 


tivity.  It  should  be  observed  that  the  arousing 
of  an  instinct  is  generally  not  confined  to  a  par- 
ticular stimulus,  but  it  may  be  made  active  by  a 
great  variety  of  stimuli.  Observe,  for  instance, 
the  number  of  situations  that  will  arouse  fear. 
The  ease  with  which  an  instinct  mechanism  may  be 
conditioned  to  react  solely  to  a  secondary  stimu- 
lus, which  in  the  first  instance  had  nothing  to  do 
with  precipitating  the  reaction,  is  testimony  to  the 
great  abundance  of  stimuli  to  instinctive  behav- 
ior. In  general,  then,  the  fact  that  modern  civi- 
lization is  different  from  the  hunting  cultures 
does  not  Imply  necessarily  that  any  lack  of  use 
of  the  human  Instinctive  equipment  is  due  to  lack 
of  stimuli.  There  are,  it  is  observed,  variations 
in  the  prevalence  of  stimuli  for  a  particular  type 
of  activity  in  modern  culture.  Thus  isolation  re- 
moves many  stimuli,  whereas  we  say  there  is  a 
great  deal  of  stimulation  and  temptation  In  a 
city.  But  remembering  the  part  bodily  prepara- 
tion may  play  In  instinctive  behavior,  it  does  not 
appear  probable  that  any  lack  of  exercise  of  the 
instinctive  equipment  in  modern  culture  would  be  • 
due  to  lack  of  stimuli,  save  in  exceptional  situa- 
tions. 

What  seems  more  probable  is,  not  the  lack  of 
stimuli,  but  denial  of  the  response.  Instinctive 
behavior  consists  In  the  attention  to  the  stimuli 
and  also  in  the  response  in  some  motor  reaction. 

[306] 


A  natural  response  to  stimuli  that  arouse  pug- 
nacity is  fighting.  The  craving  is  not  only 
aroused  but  there  is  also  a  satisfying  of  the  de- 
sire. Desires  may  be  satisfied  sometimes  in  vari- 
ous ways  and  sometimes  the  demands  are  quite 
specific.  An  angry  person  gets  some  satisfaction 
in  venting  anger  on  various  objects  or  persons 
rather  than  on  the  particular  stimulus.  Competi- 
tive games  involving  muscular  exercise  probably 
relieve  somewhat  the  tension  of  anger  and  may 
mean  also  the  utilization  of  glycogen  poured 
into  the  blood  during  anger.  Anxiety  which  con- 
tains an  element  of  fear  finds  outlets  in  many 
different  ways.  The  fact  that  neurotics  express 
^anxiety  in  the  very  safest  of  situations  is  an 
indication  of  the  ease  with  which  an  outlet  is 
found.  There  is  a  great  variety  of  outlets  pos- 
sible for  the  instinct  of  curiosity.  To  the  extent 
to  which  there  are  varieties  of  cultural  responses 
to  an  instinctive  tendency  it  is  difficult  to  repress 
an  instinct,  and  the  lack  of  adaptation  to  culture 
due  to  the  repression  of  instincts  is  less  probable. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  such  a  thing  as  repression 
of  instinctive  tendencies;  there  are  wants  that 
are  not  satisfied.  In  fact,  tendencies  to  react 
are  inhibited  by  thousands  every  day.  Such  re- 
pression occurs  whenever  we  have  occasion  to 
show  self-control,  make  a  choice,  and  whenever 
we  concentrate  or  fix  our  attention.  These  many 
C307] 


instances  are  relatively  unimportant  compared  to 
the  repression  of  strong  motives,  however.  In 
the  hunting  cultures,  the  more  powerful  desires 
were  repressed.  Wherever  there  is  group  life 
such  control  must  indeed  take  place.  In  primi- 
tive cultures,  the  rigidity  of  custom  and  the 
strength  of  taboos  Imply  attempts  to  control  the 
instincts.  Outlets  in  particular  directions  are  for- 
bidden. But  there  are  no  comparative  censuses 
of  the  repression  of  instincts  in  primitive  culture 
and  in  modern  culture. 

The  inhibition  of  natural  response  to  stimuli. 
Another  aspect  of  the  nature  of  Instincts  that  is 
of  importance  for  the  theory  we  are  discussing 
is  what  happens  when  the  natural  completion  of 
an  instinctive  act  Is  prohibited,  when  a  desire  is 
aroused  but  not  satisfied.  The  answer  to  this 
question  by  psychologists  is  not  clear  and  posi- 
tive. On  the  one  hand,  it  is  argued  that  certainly 
in  some  cases  nothing  of  particular  importance 
happens.  As  long  as  the  stimulus  is  present 
there  is  a  tension  or  feeling  of  unrest  but  with 
the  removal  of  the  stimulus  the  mechanism  ceases 
to  be  active.  In  cases  of  Inhibition  involved  in 
many  minor  instances  of  choice,  or  control  or  at- 
tention, this  may  be  so.  On  the  other  hand.  It  Is 
argued  that  in  the  case  of  certain  stronger  in- 
stincts the  prohibition  of  the  accompanying  motor 
reaction  may  leave  something  like  a  more  or  less 

[3081 


permanent  tension,  permanent  until  some  dis- 
charge occurs.  Therefore  repressed  desires 
though  forgotten  live  on  in  the  mechanism  and 
continue  to  be  sources  of  motivation,  seeking 
other  outlets,  continuing  the  feeling  of  unrest  and 
producing  nervousness.  There  is  some  evidence, 
aside  from  psychoanalytic  sources,  that  certain 
activities  continue  even  after  the  removal  of  the 
stimulus,  as  in  the  frequently  cited  case  of  the 
hunting  dog  that  has  lost  the  scent.  Also,  though 
the  external  stimuli  may  be  removed  there  may 
still  exist  certain  internal  stimuli.  In  cases 
where  repressed  Instincts  continue  to  be  a  dis- 
turbing factor,  the  repression  of  Instincts  Is 
of  more  serious  consequence  than  when  the  desire 
or  activity  simply  ceases. 

To  organize  these  questions  that  arise  from 
the  nature  of  Instinct  In  such  way  as  to  yield  the 
answers  demanded  by  our  theory  Is  difficult. 
Perhaps  we  may  find  in  the  prevalence  of  func- 
tional nervous  diseases  Indices  of  the  harmful 
extent  to  which  repression  of  the  Instincts  Is 
carried  In  modern  civilization.  We  shall,  there- 
fore, after  summarizing  the  argument,  take  up 
for  consideration  neurosis  and  psychosis. 

Summary  of  argument.  We  have  In  the  pre^ 
ceding  paragraphs  formulated  the  problem  of  ad- 
justment between  modern  culture  and  human  na- 
ture a?  seen  from  the  approach  of  social  evolu- 
[309] 


tion  and  have  made  some  critical  observations  on 
this  theory  of  adjustment.  The  theory  may  be 
summarized  as  follows.  For  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  years  man  lived  as  a  primitive  hunter 
in  a  crude  culture.  In  a  few  hundred  years  cul- 
ture has  radically  changed  Into  an  elaborate  civil- 
ization. But  man  has  not  changed  very  much 
biologically  within  many  thousands  of  years.  A 
radically  and  recently  changed  culture  and  a  con- 
stant human  nature  would  therefore  seem  to 
indicate  a  lack  of  adjustment  between  the  human 
nature  of  the  cave  people  and  artificial  civiliza- 
tion. But  our  general  analysis  indicated  that  so 
simple  a  formulation  should  not  be  taken  uncrit- 
ically. 

Although  culture  has  become  greatly  different 
and  although  it  is  probably  true  that  the 
original  nature  of  man  has  not  changed  much  in 
many  thousands  of  years,  it  does  not  follow 
merely  from  these  assumptions  that  there  is  un- 
usual lack  of  adaptation,  for  several  reasons. 
In  the  first  place  it  is  not  necessarily  true  that 
human  nature  was  perfectly  adjusted  to  the  cul- 
ture of  the  cave  people.  The  relatively  short 
period  of  civilization  may  not  be  of  special  sig- 
nificance from  the  point  of  view  of  adaptation, 
because  the  adaptation  need  not  be  on  the  biolog- 
ical side  alone,  and  because  culture  may  be  bent 
to  fit  human  nature.     The  great  difference  be- 

[310] 


tween  civilization  and  the  culture  of  primitive 
hunters  and  food  gatherers  may  be  largely  ap- 
parent; a  difference  in  appearance  between  two 
cultures  may  exist  yet  human  nature  may  func- 
tion in  somewhat  the  same  manner  and  to  the 
same  degree.  Furthermore,  to  state  that  human 
nature  is  constant  or  has  not  changed  over  a 
long  period  of  time  refers  only  to  the  original 
nature  that  is  passed  on  by  heredity.  Human 
nature  varies  between  individuals  and  may  be 
changed  greatly  within  a  lifetime.  And  finally, 
although  human  nature,  as  thought  of  in  terms 
of  instinctive  activities,  may  be  somewhat  im- 
perative in  Its  demands  on  culture  for  opportuni- 
ties of  outward  expression,  by  virtue  of  the  part 
the  internal  mechanism  of  the  organism  plays 
in  creating  desires,  it  does  not  follow  that  there 
is  lack  of  adaptation.  The  fact  that  the  external 
stimuli  of  action  are  almost  unlimited  in  number 
and  the  fact  that  cultural  expression  of  the  in- 
stincts may  find  so  many  varied  outlets  reduce 
somewhat  the  chances  of  lack  of  adaptation  im- 
plied In  the  original  statement  of  the  theory. 

The  foregoing  theory  of  the  adjustment  of  hu- 
man nature  and  civilization  from  purely  gen- 
eral considerations  hardly  justifies  an  uncritical 
reliance  upon  it.  There  may  be  a  good  deal  of 
truth  In  It  or  there  may  not.  It  is  hard  to  prove 
either   way    from   general   considerations.     The 

[311] 


theory  docs  seem  to  form  a  very  good  back- 
ground to  problems  of  human  nature.  But  it 
is  so  general  as  to  be  dangerous  as  a  social  philos- 
ophy or  as  a  working  principle  if  applied  in  a 
specific  case  without  attention  to  the  specific  prob- 
lem. It  is  somewhat  like  the  principles  of  natu- 
ral selection,  struggle  for  existence,  and  survival 
of  the  fittest  in  biology.  Such  principles  play 
their  part  in  evolution;  but,  as  a  general  philoso- 
phy of  life,  it  is  hard  to  tell  just  how  applicable 
they  are  in  a  definite  instance.  Any  general  prin- 
ciple must  undergo  careful  consideration  in  any 
specific  application.  It  seems  desirable,  there- 
fore, to  make  some  observations  on  particular 
cases  of  lack  of  adaptation,  and  see  whether  such 
special  analyses  correspond  to  the  theory. 


2i 


EVIDENCE  OF  LACK  OF  ADJUSTMENT: 
NERVOUSNESS  AND  INSANITY 

Evidences  of  lack  of  adaptation  to  environment 
on  the  part  of  physical  man  are  found  in  death, 
disease,  chronic  fatigue,  etc.  Similarly  we  think 
evidences  of  lack  of  adjustment  between  culture 
and  the  psychological  equipment  of  man  are 
found  in  nervousness  and  insanity.  Also  a  good 
[312] 


many  different  social  problems  reveal  a  lack  of 
harmony  between  psychological  man  and  culture, 
but  first  we  shall  be  concerned  with  neuroses 
and  functional  psychoses  as  indices  of  such  malad- 
justment. Nervous  symptoms  we  would  natur- 
ally expect  as  evidence  of  psychological  malad- 
justment. 

Our  inquiry  is  not  concerned  with  acci- 
dental Injury  to,  nor  with  the  actual  organic  dis- 
eases of,  the  central  nervous  system,  nor  with  the 
hereditary  mental  defects  popularly  known  as  fee- 
ble-mlndedness.  But  after  the  foregoing  types 
are  subtracted  there  remain  a  number  of  kinds  of 
nervous  disorders  such  as  hysteria,  morbid  com- 
pulsions, anxiety-neuroses,  paranoia,  melancholia, 
manic-depressive  cases,  where  there  may  not  be  a 
permanent  impairment  of  structure  but  where  the 
difficulty  seems  to  lie  in  the  functioning  of  the 
structure.  In  any  case,  these  so-called  functional 
disorders  appear  to  be  occasioned  or  modified  by 
the  cultural  environment  and  by  psychological 
causes  rather  than,  or  in  addition  to,  physical  or 
physiological  factors.  Such  an  analysis  does  not 
necessarily  rule  out  the  hereditary  factor  In  the 
functional  disorders.  In  any  group  of  persons,  the 
susceptibility  of  inherited  equipment  to  nervous 
disorders  will  vary.  Tendencies  or  predisposi- 
tions towards  nervous  instability  are  inherited. 
But  the  actual  development  of  these  disorders 
[313] 


will  also  depend  upon  the  cultural  environment. 

The  nature  of  functional  nervous  disorders. 
Accepting,  therefore,  the  point  that  many  ner- 
vous disorders  are  evidences  of  psychological  mal- 
adjustment occasioned  by  cultural  influences  op- 
erating psychologically  rather  than  physically,  we 
may  next  inquire  into  the  nature  of  these  nervous 
disorders.  For  our  purposes  it  is  not  necessary  to 
develop  a  systematic  account  of  the  theory  of 
nervous  diseases;  it  Is  desirable  to  utilize  only 
such  considerations  as  throw  light  on  the  problem 
of  the  adjustment  of  human  nature  and  culture. 

A  trait  common  to  the  patients  suffering  from 
functional  Insanity  Is  the  strangeness  of  their 
mental  outlook.  ^  Their  views  of  many  phe- 
nomena appear  unreal  to  the  person  In  mental 
health.  This  trait  is  very  notable  in  acute  cases 
of  neuroses  and  Is  perhaps  present  to  greater  or 
less  extent  In  mild  neuroses.  A  knowledge  of  the 
mental  content  of  these  patients  reveals  the  fact 
that  they  live  mentally  in  an  essentially  unreal 
or  Imaginary  world.  For  Instance,  the  perse- 
cutory and  grandiose  conceptions  of  the  para- 
noiac and  the  morbid  doubts  of  the  compulsion 
neurosis  are  essentially  fantasies.  The  conditions 
and  situations  of  life  which  they  see  appear  very 
different  to  them  from  what  they  do  to  well  per- 
sons. 

^Bernard  Hart,  The  Psychology  of  Insanity, 

[314] 


Another  trait  that  appears  to  be  present  or  to 
have  been  present  in  these  disorders  is  mental 
conflict,  a  fact  of  some  significance  for  the  theory 
under  discussion.  Such  a  mental  conflict  is  more 
easily  seen  in  the  cases  of  neurotics  and  has  been 
observed  in  the  functional  psychoses.  The  his- 
tory of  these  cases  frequently  reveals  the  onset 
of  the  disorder  at  a  period  of  conflicting  desires, 
and  an  analysis  of  the  mental  content  shows  evi- 
dences of  such  a  conflict.  Thus  one  may  have 
very  strong  libidinous  desires,  the  gratification  of 
which  may  be  incompatible  with  certain  other  de- 
sires bound  up  with  social  standards  and  such 
conflicting  impulses  may  lead  to  mental  dis- 
ease. 

The  trait  of  unreality  and  the  trait  of  mental 
conflict  are  connected  if  it  can  be  shown  that  one 
set  of  the  cravings  involved  in  the  conflict  finds  ex- 
pression in  this  play  of  imagination  which  makes 
the  conceptions  of  unreality.  It  is  true  that  the 
imaginative  world  is  frequently  so  constructed  as 
to  furnish  a  partial  fulfillment  of  desires  involved 
in  the  conflict.  Thus  the  unreal  world  of  the 
neurotics  becomes  intelligible,  especially,  if  we  ad- 
mit the  use  of  a  number  of  mental  devices  such 
as  symbolism,  rationalization,  projection,  compen- 
sation, displacement  and  various  other  distortion 
mechanisms.  It  would  take  us  too  far  afield  here 
to    describe    these    mental   traits,     Descriptions 

[315] 


may  be  found,  however,  in  a  number  of  books.  ^ 
It  Is  indeed  quite  conceivable  that  the  world  of 
the  insane  is  the  mental  expression  of  the  crav- 
ings involved  in  mental  conflicts. 

Factors  in  mental  conflict.  Our  Interest  lies 
chiefly  in  the  nature  of  these  conflicts.  What 
are  the  desires  that  are  found  in  conflict  In  the 
functional  nervous  diseases?  What  instincts  arc 
involved?  Can  these  conflicts  be  seen  in  terms 
of  the  original  nature  of  man  and  culture?  In 
the  cases  that  Freud  has  studied  he  finds  one  ele- 
ment In  the  conflict  practically  always  to  be  the 
sex  desires.  ^  Sex,  however.  Is  conceived  by 
Freud  to  be  a  force,  much  more  complex  and 
given  a  much  wider  meaning  than  Is  understood 
by  the  average  man;  for  Instance,  he  designates 
as  sex  many  manifestations  of  affection.  He  also 
sees  sex  closely  bound  up  with  fear,  anger,  dis- 
play, art,  religion,  and  various  Instinctive  ten- 
dencies. Jung  along  with  Freud  calls  one  ele- 
ment In  his  conflict  the  libido,  but  Jung  defines 
the  libido  as  much  more  comprehensive  even  than 
Freud's  sex.  *  It  seems  to  be  somewhat  similar 
to  what  is  ordinarily  called  the  soul  or  spirit 
of  man,  a  sort  of  life  force.  Adler  sees  the 
conflict  as  arising  from  the  constitutional  limlta- 

2  Bernard     Hart,     Psychology    of    Insanity.    H.    W.    Frink, 
Morbid  Fears  and  Compulsions. 

'  Sigmund  Freud,  A   General  Introduction  to  Psychoanalysis. 
•*  Carl  G.  Jung,  Collected  Papers  on  Analytical  Psychology, 

[316] 


tlons  and  defects  of  man's  equipment  along  vari- 
ous lines  and  attempts  to  compensate  psychologi- 
cally for  these  defects  as  they  are  related  to  the 
various  desires  of  life.  ^  Hart,  Rivers  and  vari- 
ous other  writers  think  that  sex  has  been  stressed 
too  much  as  a  factor  in  the  conflict  or  else  that 
further  research  will  show  other  instincts  than 
sex  as  strong  factors  in  the  conflict.  ^  Kempfs 
theory  is  that  a  conflict  exists  between  the  crav- 
ing of  various  autonomic  segments.  Such  a  con- 
flict results  when  access  to  the  projicient  motor 
apparatus  is  denied  one  portion  of  the  stimulated 
autonomic  apparatus  by  various  other  integrated 
parts  of  the  autonomic  system  that  dominate  the 
neural  paths.  "^  We  do  not  know  just  what  the 
relationship  is  between  the  stimulation  of  the 
autonomic  functions  and  the  arousing  of  the  in- 
stincts. The  behavior  that  we  call  insane  occurs 
when  some  autonomic  segment  hitherto  prevented 
from  access  to  certain  nerve  paths  gets  a  control 
over  the  projicient  motor  apparatus.  Kempf  s 
theory  of  the  autonomic  functions  is  not  appar- 
ently incompatible  with  the  account  of  the  in- 
stincts previously  set  forth. 

The  forces  in  the  conflict  most  frequently  dis- 
cussed by  the  authors  just  mentioned  are  in  the 

5  Alfred  Adler,  The  Neurotic  Constitution. 
« Bernard    Hart,    The   Psychology    of    Insanity.    W.    H.    R. 
Rivers,  Instinct  and  the  Unconscious. 
^  Edward  J.  Kempf,  Psychopathology, 

[317] 


nature  of  individual  cravings  and  impulses,  while 
the  other  factors  In  the  conflict  opposed  to  these 
cravings  are  forces  that  are  like  the  desires  to 
conform  to  social  codes,  seldom  discussed  by  psy- 
chopathologlsts.  These  social  forces  in  the  con- 
flict are  quite  important  from  the  standpoint  of 
culture,  and  we  wish  now  to  inquire  into  their 
nature.  Freud  speaks  of  the  force  opposing  the 
sex  as  a  censor.  The  censorship  operates,  to 
make  us  conform  to  social  standards.  Kempf 
thinks  of  the  cravings  of  an  autonomic  segment 
as  being  opposed  by  an  Integration  of  other  auto- 
nomic segments  that  have  a  more  complete  con- 
trol over  the  cerebro-splnal  paths.  These  inte- 
grated autonomic  segments  slowly  built  up, 
he  thinks,  are  the  sources  of  one's  personal- 
ity, one's  self  that  functions  as  an  accepted 
social  being.  So  it  would  seem  that  the  op- 
posing forces  are  certain  tendencies  that  mo- 
tivate social  behavior,  that  respect  and  conform 
to  social  codes  and  moral  standards.  These  ten- 
dencies may  of  course  have  certain  springs  of 
action  in  the  gregarious  Instinct,  in  sociability  or 
in  the  instinct  of  self-assertion.  We  do  not  know 
what  the  Instinctive  or  mechanistic  basis  may  be, 
but  certainly  they  are  the  forces  that  make  us  con- 
form to  group  life,  that  make  us  sensitive  to 
the  opinions  of  others.  It  follows,  therefore, 
that  the  nature  of  social  codes  and  group  stand- 

[318] 


ards  gives  the  particularistic  direction  to  these 
forces.  Just  what  accepted  conduct  is,  cultural 
standards  play  a  part  in  determining.  So  in  a 
sense  culture  seems  to  be  in  part  lined  up  against 
certain  cravings  that  are  rather  close  to  what  is 
thought  of  as  original  nature. 

Comparison  of  the  theory  of  original  nature 
and  culture  and  the  theory  of  neuroses.  The 
theory  of  neuroses  that  we  have  been  discussing 
does  seem  to  be  in  conformity  with,  and  even 
supplements,  the  theory  that  artificial  civilization 
produces  maladjustments  with  the  original  na- 
ture of  man.  The  theory  of  the  primitive  hunter 
in  the  modern  factory  sets  forth  the  argument 
that  the  psychological  equipment  of  man  in  the 
hunting  cultures  functioned  fairly  well,  but  that  in 
modern  factory  life  it  is  only  partially  used,  re- 
sulting in  overuse  of  some  parts  of  the  equipment 
and  under-use  of  other  parts,  occasioning  malad- 
justment. The  theory  of  the  neuroses  we  have 
discussed  shows  the  great  prevalence  in  neuroses 
of  mental  conflict  between  certain  instinctive  crav- 
ings strongly  suggestive  of  original  nature  and 
forces  that  strive  to  conform  to  cultural  stand- 
ards. As  far  as  I  know  these  two  theories  have 
not  been  systematically  compared,  although  Freud 
strongly  suggests  various  implications  of  this  na- 
ture in  his  Reflections  on  War  and  Death,  and 
superficial  connections  have  been  obvious  to  sev- 
[319] 


cral  writers.  To  compare  these  two  theories 
more  fully  necessitates  a  more  detailed  considera- 
tion of  theories  of  the  neuroses;  and  as  one  In- 
quires into  the  details  of  the  etiology  of  neuroses, 
the  writers  break  up  into  rival  groups  with  the 
claims  of  no  one  group  substantiated. 

There  are,  however,  a  good  many  who  would 
agree  that  in  so  far  as  psychoneuroses  and  func- 
tional psychoses  are  not  hereditary  the  founda- 
tions for  them  are  frequently  laid  by  the  environ- 
mental influences  affecting  the  life  of  the  child  and 
the  infant.  That  the  influences  of  childhood  are 
powerful  in  shaping  the  adult  should  not  appear 
strange;  but  ordinarily  the  full  significance  of  in- 
fluences at  this  time  is  not  appreciated  by  adults 
and  certainly  not  to  the  extent  that  some  students 
of  neuroses  demand  for  them.  The  parents  are 
agents  that  are  particularly  powerful  in  influenc- 
ing the  child;  and  probably  the  medium  of  their 
great  influence  is  affection.  According  to  Freud's 
theory  the  foundations  are  laid  for  future  neu- 
roses in  childhood,  although  the  precipitating 
agencies  may  be  the  strains  occurring  in  adult  life. 

Closer  analysis  of  the  causes  of  neuroses  shows 
that  the  sex  instincts  seem  most  frequently  in- 
volved. According  to  Freud's  evidence,  at 
least,  it  Is  not  the  repression  of  the  instincts  in 
general  or  of  any  particular  part  of  the  original 
nature  of  man  that  is  found  in  the  etiology  of 
[320] 


neuroses,  but  quite  specifically  the  repression  of 
the  sex  Instinct.  For  instance,  Freud  has  some- 
where said  that  whenever  the  sex  life  Is  func- 
tioning normally  there  is  never  a  neurosis,  or 
words  to  this  effect,  although  he  does  not  claim 
that  when  the  sex  instinct  Is  not  functioning  nor- 
mally there  is  necessarily  a  neurosis.  There  may 
be,  however,  some  question  as  to  just  what  the 
normal  functioning  of  sex  is.  But  the  derange- 
ment that  is  claimed  to  occur  in  certain  cases 
of  conflict  involving  the  sex  motives  does  not  fol- 
low, as  would  ordinarily  be  thought,  because  of 
sexual  continence  or  particularly  because  of  the 
failure  to  gratify  the  sexual  desires  with  reference 
to  the  sexual  object.  The  situation  is  much  more 
complicated;  there  are  various  outlets  to  sex, 
and,  strange  to  say,  the  trouble  is  frequently 
traced  back  to  the  sex  life  of  childhood.  While 
it  is  true  that  psychoanalytic  evidence  stresses 
the  repression  of  only  one  part  of  man's  psycho- 
logical equipment,  sex,  nevertheless  there  seems 
to  be  a  very  close  relationship  of  sex  to  such  na- 
tive tendencies  as  self-assertion,  anger,  fear,  and 
various  other  motives.  Other  researches  may 
show  lack  of  adjustment  of  other  instincts  than 
sex.  It  is  also  to  be  remembered,  that  even  If 
the  non-hereditary  influences  that  lay  the  founda- 
tion for  neuroses,  are  effective  in  childhood,  nev- 
ertheless the  precipitating  factors  in  adult  life 
[321] 


commonly  associated  with  emotional  shock, 
strain,  overwork,  etc.,  may  involve  a  repression 
of  various  other  parts  of  man's  psychological 
equipment. 

The  cultural  influences  of  child  life.  Another 
interest  in  comparing  these  two  theories  is  to  in- 
quire what  are  the  cultural  conditions  that  make 
neuroses.  Are  the  conditions  found  in  the  simp- 
ler cultures  of  the  hunting  peoples  as  likely  to 
develop  neuroses  and  psychoses  as  the  modern  so- 
cial conditions?  Unfortunately  the  psychopath- 
ologlsts  do  not  answer  these  questions.  There 
is  still  controversy  as  to  the  causes  of  mental  dis- 
ease. Psychopathologlsts  are  concerned  as  prac- 
ticing physicians  with  helping  the  Individual  and 
not  in  altering  the  social  system.  There  has  been 
little  development  of  preventive  medicine  in  the 
field  of  mental  disease.  So  it  is  naturally  difficult 
to  describe  the  cultural  conditions  that  favor 
these  disorders.  From  the  foregoing  analyses  it 
would  appear  that  the  cultural  conditions  affect- 
ing neuroses  are  of  two  sorts.  One  is  the  con- 
ditions influencing  early  child  life  and  supposedly 
laying  the  basis  of  any  future  nervous  trouble 
that  may  develop.  The  other  is  the  Immediate 
specific  situations  that  precipitate  the  outbreak  of 
the  disorders. 

In  regard  to  the  conditions  affecting  child  life, 
the  theories  are  somewhat  elaborate  and  by  no 
[322] 


means  generally  accepted  or  proved.  These 
theories  are  set  forth  in  the  literature  previously 
cited.  In  general  they  concern  misdirected  pa- 
rental affection,  including  the  much  discussed  GEdi- 
pus  complex,  lack  of  harmony  in  the  family  life 
of  parents,  bad  personal  habits  in  connection  with 
the  various  openings  to  the  body,  the  so-called 
erogenous  zones,  the  lack  of  information  or  bad 
education  in  matters  of  sex,  the  over-accentuation 
of  prudery,  shame  and  disgust.  It  is  also  conceiv- 
able that  such  physical  conditions  as  poverty, 
overcrowding,  bad  housing,  school  systems  and 
general  neglect  of  children  may  be  factors. 
Some  of  these  influences  may  appear  to  be  prev- 
alent in  modern  social  conditions,  but  there 
Seems  to  be  no  reason  why  many  of  them  might 
not  be  found  surrounding  the  child  life  in  the 
hunting  cultures.  These  factors  do  not  seem  to 
be  correlated  with  the  broad  classifications  of 
economic  cultures,  such  as  the  hoe  cultures,  the 
domestication  of  cattle,  land  economy,  the  handi- 
crafts or  machine  industry.  It  is  possible  that 
with  some  kinds  of  family  life  in  modern  times 
children  may  be  thus  adversely  affected,  but  such 
'conditions  do  not  appear  to  be  a  necessary  part 
of  such  great  characteristics  of  modern  civiliza- 
tion as  the  great  increase  in  material  culture  and 
the  adjustment  thereto.  About  the  life  of  chil- 
dren in  the  primitive  cultures  our  knowledge  is 
[323] 


meagre,  but  the  affection  of  parents  and  adults  for 
children  is  frequently  commented  upon  by  the 
traveler,  the  missionary  and  the  ethnologist. 
The  period  of  nursing  is  usually  long.  Sex  is 
taken  more  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  less  at- 
tended by  shame  and  prudery. 

The  cultural  influences  of  adult  life.  Regard- 
ing the  precipitation  of  neuroses  and  psychoses  in 
adult  life,  it  is  commonly  admitted  that  events 
and  conditions  of  adult  life  play  their  part  in 
causing  functional  nervous  diseases,  even  grant- 
ing that  the  groundwork  may  be  found  in  hered- 
ity and  early  child  life.  That  especial  condi- 
tions surrounding  adult  life  can  bring  on  neuroses 
is  seen  from  the  great  number  of  mental  disorders 
that  were  brought  on  by  the  soldier's  life.  These 
cases  were  at  first  called  shell  shock,  but  were 
later  shown  to  be  functional  nervous  disorders, 
in  which,  by  the  way,  the  sex  element  is  said  to  be 
not  so  obvious  nor  so  impressive. 

Another  indication  that  cultural  conditions  are 
correlated  with  the  frequency  of  mental  disorders 
is  seen  from  the  fact  that  such  frequencies  are 
greater  in  urban  than  in  rural  districts.  For  in- 
stance, the  rejections  of  drafted  men  with  nervous 
diseases  for  military  service  in  the  recent 
war  were  greater  for  men  from  the  urban  dis- 
tricts as  the  following  ratios  show.  The  ra- 
tios are  the  percentages  of  rejections  in  rural 
[324] 


districts  divided  by  the  percentages  of  rejections 
in  urban  districts,  so  that  a  ratio  less  than  i  indi- 
cates a  greater  prevalence  in  urban  districts. 
Hysteria,  1.44;  psychoses,  i.oo;  psychoneuroses, 
0.95;  constitutional  psychopathic  states,  0.81; 
neurasthenia,  0.81;  dementia  praecox,  0.76;  gen- 
eral paralysis  of  the  insane,  0.67.  ^  The  differ- 
ences are  even  greater  when  the  larger  cities  are 
compared.  It  should  be  remembered  that  much 
of  the  urban  area  consists  of  small  towns  and 
also  that  the  population  of  cities  is  built  up  re- 
cently In  part  by  migrations  of  adults  from  rural 
districts. 

Evidence  leading  to  the  same  general  con- 
clusion Is  presented  In  a  survey  of  first  ad- 
missions to  hospitals  for  the  insane  in  nine  States 
of  the  United  States  in  19 19  as  shown  in  the  fol- 
lowing table.  * 

Rates  of  First  Admissions  from  Urban  and  Rural 
Districts 

Rates  per  100,000  of  population 
of  same  environment 

Urban  Rural 
Senile      , 7.2       5.4 

With    cerebral    arteriosclerosis 3.3       1.4 

8  Love  and  Davenport,  Defects  in  Drafted  Men,  pp.  351-2. 

9  Pollock   and   Furbush,   "Mental  Diseases  in  Twelve  States, 
1919,"  Mental  Hygiene,  Vol.  V,  April,  1921,  No.  2,  pp.  353-389. 


Rates  per  160,000  of  population 
of  same  environment 

Urban  Rural 

General   paralysis 8.6      2.0 

Alcoholic 2.8      0.6 

Manic-depressive      10.5       6.8 

Dementia   praecox 19.4       9.5 

All    psychoses 68.2     36.0 

One  wonders  whether  the  work  in  modern  fac- 
tories and  mills  brings  on  mental  disorders. 
Long  hours  of  monotonous  work  is  the  situation 
where  one  expects  only  a  partial  use  of  the  psy- 
chological equipment.  Numbers  of  psychopaths 
have  been  enumerated  in  industry  but  it  is  proba- 
ble a  number  of  such  cases  would  be  found  in 
any  random  sample  of  the  population.  Of  the 
rejections  of  drafted  men,  the  eastern  manufac- 
turing sections  showed  high  proportions  of  cases 
of  neurasthenia,  hysteria,  neurosis,  dementia  prae- 
cox, psychasthenia  and  psychoneuroses,  but  there 
were  other  classes  of  mental  disorders  in  not  such 
high  proportions.  In  such  a  classification  there 
are  other  factors  than  occupations,  that  make 
comparisons  not  very  trustworthy.  If  labor  in 
factories  and  mills  was  a  factor  in  producing  such 
disorders,  it  would  be  expected  that  there  would 
be  greater  proportions  among  men  than  among 
women,  since  there  are  much  larger  numbers  of 
men  working  in  industry  than  women,  but  the  sex 

[326] 


differences  in  total  mental  disorders  as  seen  in 
hospital  records  are  not  great. 

It  is  customary  to  think  of  strain  as  a  condi- 
tion favorable  to  the  development  of  nervous 
breakdown.  But  one  wonders  what  strain  is  in 
psychological  terms.  Is  it  due  to  overwork  and 
does  it  imply  the  overuse  of  some  instincts  and 
the  under-use  of  others?  Is  it  due  to  the  great 
stimulation  of  ambition  to  utilize  the  opportuni- 
ties occurring  in  a  competitive  environment  and 
in  a  changing  culture?  Is  it  the  long-continued 
application  to  a  single  task?  Or  is  it  due  to  the 
restrictions  and  impositions  of  moral  conduct  In  a 
stimulating  atmosphere  ?  Perhaps  the  strain  ari- 
ses from  some  crisis  involving  the  affections? 

Mental  disease  in  primitive  life.  In  regard  to 
conditions  affecting  psychoses  and  neuroses  among 
people  living  in  simple  cultures,  we  do  not  have 
much  Information.  Cases  of  hysteria,  insanity 
and  homosexuality  have  been  observed  among 
these  peoples,  but  we  do  not  know  in  what  pro- 
portions. The  psychopathologists  have  not  in- 
vestigated cases  among  the  primitive  cultures, 
and  the  anthropologists  are  not  psychopatholo- 
gists. Freud,  however,  has  a  theoretical  trea- 
tise, Totem  and  Taboo,  dealing  with  primitive 
culture.  One  thinks  from  reading  this  book  that 
Freud  considers  the  various  factors  which  he 
finds  operating  in  neurotics  also  present  among 
[327] 


primitive  peoples.  That  customs,  taboos,  exten- 
sive marriage  regulations,  do  impose  considerable 
restriction  on  the  desires  of  peoples  in  the  sim- 
pler cultures  is  certain.  In  fact,  a  familiarity  with 
the  different  customs  of  primitive  cultures  im- 
presses one  with  the  remarkable  adaptability  of 
human  nature  to  restrictions  on  conduct.  In  his 
Totem  and  Taboo,  Freud  tries  to  explain  such 
primitive  institutions  as  animism  and  exogamy 
in  terms  of  the  mechanisms  operating  In  the  neu- 
rosis. Even  though  strong  repressions  and  mo- 
tives interrelated  as  in  neuroses  are  found  among 
peoples  with  primitive  cultures,  it  does  not  follow 
that  they  will  work  out  into  functional  nervous 
disorders.  These  mental  diseases  are,  it  is  gen- 
erally admitted,  frequently  a  matter  of  degree. 
That  is,  the  types  of  conduct  of  the  psycholog- 
ically Insane  are  also  present  in  the  so-called  nor- 
mal individual  only  to  a  less  degree.  There  are 
also  various  outlets  for  the  energies  Involved  in 
mental  conflict.  The  peoples  with  primitive  cul- 
tures sometimes  socialize  tendencies  that  would  be 
repressed  In  modern  societies.  Thus  the  sha- 
mans, the  religious  leaders  among  the  American 
Indians,  are  in  some  tribes  selected,  for  instance, 
because  of  the  ability  to  experience  hallucinations 
and  because  of  their  queer  behavior. 

Mental  diseases  in  modern  life.     That  nervous 
disorders  exist  in  modern  socle^'  to-day  in  large 
[328] 


numbers  is  a  fact.  The  third  census  of  the  Na- 
tional Committee  for  Mental  Hygiene  shows  that 
on  January  i,  1920,  in  the  hospitals  In  the  United 
States  the  number  of  patients  with  mental  dis- 
eases was  about  i  to  every  450  of  the  popula- 
tion. ^^  There  are  numbers  of  insane  not  in 
hospitals,  as  the  States  do  not  make  adequate 
preparation  for  their  care.  New  York  and  Mas- 
sachusetts are  foremost  in  the  provision  for  their 
insane.  In  these  two  States  there  is  one  patient 
with  mental  disease  In  an  institution  for  about 
every  275  of  the  general  population.  We  do  not 
know,  unfortunately,  how  many  of  these  patients 
are  suffering  from  functional  disorders. 

The  number  of  first  admissions  per  year  shows 
somewhat  better  the  incidence  of  insanity  than 
do  figures  showing  the  number  in  institutions  at 
any  one  time.  A  survey  of  mental  diseases  In 
twelve  States  with  a  total  population  of  about 
twenty-five  million  showed  that  there  were  63.8 
first  admissions  to  institutions  caring  for  mental 
disease  to  every  100,000  of  the  general  popu- 
lation.^^ In  other  words,  every  year  i  in  every 
1600  is  admitted  to  an  institution  for  mental  dls- 


10  Pollock  and  Furbush,  "Patients  with  Mental  Diseases, 
Mental  Defect,  Epilepsy,  Alcoholism  and  Drug  Addiction  in 
Institutions  in  the  United  States,  January  i,  1920,"  Mental 
Hygiene,  Vol.  V,  No.  i,  pp.  139-169. 

"Pollock  and  Furbush,  "Mental  Diseases  in  Twelrc  Statet, 
1919,"  Mental  Hygiene,  Vol.  V,  No.  2,  pp.  353-389- 

[329] 


ease.  But  this  rate  Is  only  for  one  year,  whereas 
men  and  women  in^'the  United  States  live,  on  the 
average,  about  forty  years.  The  average  age 
at  death  in  the  United  States  in  19 13  was  39.8 
years.  ^^  Over  a  period  of  40  years  the  number 
of  first  admissions  would  be  about  i  to  every  40 
of  the  general  population  at  any  one  year,  on  the 
basis  of  a  constant  population.  These  figures 
for  first  admissions  include  all  types  of  mental 
disease,  the  organic  and  other  classifications  as 
well  as  the  functional. 

It  would  be  important  if  we  knew  whether  in- 
sanity were  increasing  or  not.  The  number  of 
patients  with  mental  diseases  In  institutions  In 
the  United  States  has  Increased  469  per  cent 
from  1880  to  1920,  while  the  total  population  of 
the  United  States  has  increased  only  iii  per 
cent;  but  these  figures  may  mean  only  that  an 
Increasing  proportion  of  the  Insane  are  being 
cared  for  in  Institutions.^^ 

Against  the  figures  of  the  frequency  of  patients 
In  Institutions  for  the  care  of  mental  disease 
should  be  set  the  fact  that  not  all  cases  are  found 
In  Institutions.  Also  these  figures  include  only 
a  very  small  percentage  of  the  neuroses.     The 

^^  Mortality    StatisticSy     1913,     Department     of     Commerce, 
Bureau  of  Census. 
^*0p.  cit..  Mental  Hygiene,  Vol.  V,  No.  i,  pp.  139-169. 

I330] 


number  of  cases  of  mild  and  acute  neuroses  must 
indeed  be  much  larger.  Neuroses  occasion  just 
as  acute  suffering  if  not  more  than  do  the 
various  physical  illnesses.  Very  probably  the 
thing  we  call  happiness  is  related  to  the  state  of 
the  nerves  more  than  to  economic  conditions  or 
to  material  welfare.  However  closely  paral- 
leled the  theory  of  the  neuroses  may  be  with  the 
theory  of  original  human  nature  and  the  artifici- 
ality of  civilization,  and  however  true  an  index 
nervous  and  mental  disorders  may  be  as  a  meas- 
ure of  lack  of  adjustment  between  culture  and  the 
original  psychological  nature  of  man,  it  is  cer- 
tainly true  that  neuroses  and  psychoses  are  se- 
rious social  problems  in  modern  society. 


EVIDENCE   OF    LACK   OF   ADJUSTMENT: 
SOCIAL   PROBLEMS 

So  far  the  evidence  we  have  considered,  of 
lack  of  adjustment  between  human  nature  and 
culture,  has  been  the  effects  of  a  psychological 
nature  on  the  individual,  as  neuroses  and  psy- 
choses. But  evidence  may  also  be  sought  on  the 
side  of  culture  as  well  as  on  the  side  of  the  indi- 
[331] 


Vidual.  Such  evidence  is  found  in  social  problems 
rather  than  individual  problems,  although  such  a 
line  of  demarcation  is  not  clear-cut. 

The  current  literature  dealing  with  social  prob- 
lems is  full  of  material  concerning  the  behavior 
of  human  nature;  and  as  the  reader  is  familiar 
with  modern  social  issues  it  will  not  be  necessary 
to  set  forth  many  illustrations.  Only  a  few  such 
problems  will  be  discussed  and  then  only  as  types 
of  analysis.  Such  a  presentation  can  be  made 
much  more  briefly  than  in  the  case  of  the  neuroses. 

Crime.  A  conspicuous  instance  of  such  a  social 
problem  showing  evidence  of  lack  of  adjustment 
between  human  nature  and  culture  is  crime. 
Some  crime  is  due  to  feeble-mindedness  and  to  in- 
sanity, but  a  good  deal  of  crime  is  due  to  social 
and  economic  conditions.  For  instance,  social 
conditions  may  become  so  rigorous  in  their  imposi- 
tions or  effects  upon  human  nature  that  behavior 
we  call  crime  will  be  resorted  to.  Under  condi- 
tions of  food  shortage,  looting  may  result.  Slaves 
frequently  steal.  In  periods  of  economic  depres- 
sion there  is  more  temptation  to  violate  laws  re- 
garding property.  The  amount  of  crime,  partic- 
ularly against  property,  fluctuates  with  social  and 
economic  conditions,  and  such  a  fluctuation  is 
thought  to  occur  in  lesser  degree  in  crimes  against 
the  person,  such  as  murder,  assault,  and  sexual 
crimes. 

[332] 


In  other  words,  the  motives  of  the  crime 
might  not  have  caused  crime  if  operating  at  an- 
other time  or  in  another  culture.  Considered 
apart  from  the  social  consequences,  such  motives 
might  have  been  quite  normal  biological  desires. 
The  cultural  situation  may  be  so  framed  that  it 
becomes  very  difficult  for  the  human  desires  to 
find  satisfaction.  A  very  good  illustration  is  the 
increase  in  juvenile  crimes  that  bring  children 
before  the  juvenile  courts  in  our  cities.  In  the 
rural  districts,  the  same  motives  found  in  the  city 
juvenile  delinquent  might  in  many  cases  function 
without  causing  crime.  The  interests  of  the 
group  must  be  protected,  of  course,  against  crime, 
and  crime  may  be  unjustifiable  on  moral  grounds, 
but  nevertheless  the  culture  determines  rules,  the 
breaking  of  which  is  called  crime.  Crime  is 
clearly  evidence  of  lack  of  adjustment  between 
human  nature  and  culture. 

Sex  problems.  Another  illustration  of  such 
lack  of  satisfactory  adjustment  is  sex  problems. 
Adultery,  prostitution  and  all  sexual  intercourse 
out  of  wedlock  are  seen  as  social  problems,  as  is 
also  divorce  with  the  break  which  it  causes  in  so 
important  a  social  organization  as  the  family. 
In  these  cases  culture  imposes  a  code  in  accord- 
ance with  which  human  beings  with  strong  desires 
often  find  it  difficult  to  act.  Even  when  there  is 
conformity  to  the  marriage  code  and  when  dj- 
[333] 


vorces  are  not  granted,  there  may  still  be  much 
unhapplness,  a  sign  of  unsatisfactory  adjustment. 
The  conflict  of  sex  codes  and  human  nature  Is  a 
widespread  and  frequent  cause  of  unhapplness. 
Sex,  strong  and  variable,  meets  with  difliculty  In 
making  adjustment  to  any  rigid  sex  code,  however 
moral  It  may  be. 

Selfishness.  Perhaps  the  psychological  factor 
underlying  the  largest  number  of  social  problems 
is  selfishness.  The  fact  that  a  great  majority 
of  Individuals  in  most  of  the  situations  of  life  feel 
their  own  interests  more  strongly  than  the  in- 
terests of  others  and  act  accordingly  Is  funda- 
mental In  nearly  all  social  problems.  A  large 
number  of  modern  social  problems  flow  from  the 
unequal  distribution  of  property;  one  reason 
why  wealth  Is  so  unequally  accumulated  is  the  pur- 
suit of  one's  selfish  interests  with  not  enough  con- 
siderations for  the  Interests  of  others,  and  an- 
other reason  is  the  scarcity  of  social  limitations 
upon  such  selfish  actions.  More  or  less  unre- 
stricted freedom  to  accumulate  wealth  may  be 
legitimate,  and  culture  may  have  grown  more 
thereby;  nevertheless  a  whole  host  of  social  prob- 
lems follow  because  of  this  unequal  distribution  of 
Income.  Inequality  in  the  distribution  of  wealth 
will  be  found  a  very  significant  factor  in  poverty, 
unemployment,  disease,  taxation,  labor,  govern- 
inent,  war,  and  many  other  problems.  If  wc 
[334] 


were  less  selfish  or  more  considerate,  in  some 
effective  social  manner,  of  the  interests  of  others, 
many  of  our  present-day  social  problems  would 
be  minor  ones.  A  highly  developed  accumula- 
tion of  material  culture  such  as  we  have  in  modern 
society  provides  a  wonderful  opportunity  for  an 
apparently  ruthless  exploitation  of  selfish  in- 
terests. In  other  words,  the  fundamental  self- 
interest  of  our  natures  when  functioning  in  a 
great  wealth  of  material  culture  undergoing 
rapid  change  creates  social  problems  in  abundance 
which  are  evidence  of  a  bad  adjustment. 

Many  other  social  problems  that  show  human 
nature  and  culture  in  a  not  altogether  satisfac- 
tory adjustment  might  be  cited.  In  fact,  human 
nature  is  really  a  factor  in  all  social  problems,  in 
the  sense  that  if  our  human  nature  were  different 
the  social  problems  would  either  not  exist  or  else 
would  be  different,  because  all  social  phenomena 
involve  the  two  factors,  human  nature  and  culture. 
We  are  not  in  this  paragraph  concerned  with 
whether  these  problems  are  due  to  the  biological 
factor  or  to  culture,  but  are  interested  in  showing 
that  social  problems  are  indices  of  maladjustment. 
Social  problems  as  well  as  neuroses,  then,  furnish 
evidence  of  lack  of  adaptation  between  human 
nature  and  culture. 

[335] 


CHANGING  HUMAN  NATURE  VERSUS  CONTROLLING 
SOCIAL  EVOLUTION 

So  far  we  have  shown  that  the  adjustment  be- 
tween culture  and  human  nature  is  not  as  satisfac- 
tory as  is  desired;  and  we  have  seen  something  of 
the  theories  as  to  why  there  is  this  lack  of  adjust- 
ment. To  readers  living  in  an  age  of  so  much 
social  effort  for  improvement,  the  question  natur- 
ally arises  as  to  what  can  be  done  to  bring  about 
a  better  adjustment.  This  question,  though 
stated  in  very  large  terms,  seems  appropriate,  par- 
ticularly since  an  effort  to  apply  scientific  methods 
to  social  questions  is  being  made.  Though  we 
may  not  be  able  to  answer  definitely  and  scien- 
tifically the  question  of  how  best  to  adjust  human 
nature  and  culture,  yet  some  consideration  of  this 
question  may  be  of  value.  To  many,  so  general 
and  simple  a  statement  as  the  problem  of  adjust- 
ment between  human  nature  and  culture  may  be 
objectionable,  since  it  may  appear  best  to  consider 
a  series  of  special  situations  in  detail.  The  value 
of  such  special  studies  of  adjustment  is  realized 
and  many  excellent  studies  have  been  made  and 
arc  being  made.     It  is  realized  that  not  only  is  a 

[336] 


good  deal  lost  In  attempting  to  make  a  general 
formulation,  but  generalizations  are  difficult  to 
substantiate.  Nevertheless  there  is  a  certain 
value  In  trying  to  look  at  the  question  In  Its  broad- 
est aspects. 

Changing  human  nature.  A  harmonious  re- 
lationship between  culture  and  human  nature 
may  conceivably  be  attained  by  making  the  adap- 
tations largely  on  the  part  of  human  nature  or 
largely  on  the  part  of  culture,  or  some  adjust- 
ments on  the  part  of  both  human  nature  and  cul- 
ture. We  shall  consider  first  the  problem  of 
changing  human  nature  to  fit  the  culture,  the  way 
the  problem  has  been  viewed,  to  a  large  extent,  In 
the  past,  particularly  from  the  point  of  view  of 
religion  and  of  morals.  Such  a  method  of  adjust- 
ment seemed  reasonable  in  the  past  when  cultural 
growth  was  slow;  not  many  changes  occurred 
within  a  period  of  time  so  short  as  a  few  genera- 
tions. To  man  with  limitations  to  his  knowledge 
t)f  the  past,  culture  appeared  somewhat  stationary. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  adaptability  of  human  na- 
ture through  habit  and  will  power  appeared  as  a 
fact.  The  bad  adaptations  were  labelled  as  evil 
and  the  approved  adaptations  were  called  good. 
And  the  problem  of  adaptation  was  to  seek  the 
good  and  eschew  the  evil.  Such  a  method  of  con- 
trolling or  modifying  human  nature  within  a  life- 
time has  been  of  great  practical  value. 
[337] 


Changing  the  hereditary  basis  of  human  na- 
ture. With  the  rise  of  the  science  of  biology  a 
good  deal  of  emphasis  was  placed  upon  the  pro- 
cess of  biological  adaptation.  The  changing  of 
species  was  seen  in  terms  of  adaptation  to  environ- 
ment. Those  organisms  not  adapted,  unfit  to 
survive  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  died.  The 
changing  that  was  done  in  order  to  establish  adap- 
tation was  on  the  side  of  the  organism  rather 
than  environment.  That  is,  nature  did  not  bend 
the  environment  to  fit  the  organism.  Casual 
readers  of  biology,  therefore,  have  naturally 
thought  of  the  problem  of  adapting  man  to  en- 
vironment a  good  deal  In  terms  of  changing  man. 
The  programme  of  eugenics  is  a  programme 
which  attempts  to  achieve  desirable  changes  In 
biological  man.  But  with  the  passing  of  the 
theory  of  the  Inheritance  of  acquired  characteris- 
tics and  the  appreciation  of  the  Infrequency  of  mu- 
tations, the  process  of  biological  change  for  pur- 
poses of  adaptation  to  culture  is  seen  to  be  very 
slow.  This  point  is  of  considerable  importance 
because  It  emphasizes  a  stable  biological  nature. 
Of  course  selection  may  be  made  within  the  limits 
of  variation,  and  some  better  adaptation  may 
thereby  be  achieved.  In  so  far  as  those  at  one  end 
of  the  curve  are  better  adapted  than  those  at  the 
other  end.     Such  a  selective  process  Is  difficult  to 

[338] 


realize  practically.  Careful  readers  of  biology, 
therefore,  realize  that  any  Idea  of  changing  the 
biological  nature  of  man  Is  a  very  ambitious  one, 
and  are  Impressed  with  the  slowness  of  biological 
change.  We  do  not  know  what  the  researches  of 
biology  may  discover,  but  at  present  the  knowl- 
edge necessary  for  the  control  desired  In  eugenics 
is  meagre.  Practically,  therefore,  a  rapid,  con- 
trolled change  in  the  Inherited  biological  nature 
of  man  seems  almost  impossible  for  the  pres- 
ent. 

Changing  human  nature  for  a  lifetime.  This 
conclusion  does  not  mean  that  the  inherited  na- 
ture of  man  may  not  be  highly  adaptable  within  a 
lifetime.  In  fact,  a  great  variety  of  adaptations 
have  been  made  this  way  in  the  past,  and  such  has 
been  the  approved  programme  of  statecraft,  reli- 
gion and  morals,  and  justified  to  a  great  extent 
by  experience.  But  with  the  rise  of  abnormal 
psychology  some  skepticism  arises  in  regard  to  a 
whole-hearted  approval  of  this  method  of  adjust- 
ment. The  point  of  the  difficulty  lies  In  the  fact 
that  a  good  deal  of  the  bending  of  human  nature 
to  fit  the  cultural  environment  means  a  repression 
of  quite  normal  biological  processes  and  denial  in 
many  cases  of  the  normal  expression  of  some  in- 
stinctive tendencies.  This  repression,  in  some 
cases,  as  was  observed  in  the  etiology  of  neuroses, 
[339] 


causes  strain,  unhappiness,  mental  conflict  and  neu- 
roses. 

It  is  difficult  to  generalize  as  to  the  extent 
of  such  harmful  repression  as  a  method  of  adap- 
tation, and  such  an  estimate  involves,  as  was 
pointed  out,  more  knowledge  as  to  the  extent  and 
causes  of  neuroses  than  we  now  have.  But  for 
those  whose  programme  calls  for  a  bending  of 
human  nature  to  fit  the  culture,  it  should  be  recog- 
nized that  the  lesson  of  recent  researches  in  ab- 
normal psychology  indicates  that  there  are  limits 
to  which  human  nature  may  be  bent  in  the  process 
of  adjustment  to  social  conditions.  But  the  goal 
of  those  seeking  adjustments  between  culture  and 
human  nature  is  not  only  to  avoid  the  danger  lim- 
its, but  to  seek  the  best  possible  adjustments.  For 
such  a  goal,  it  is  not  possible  to  indicate  how 
much  or  how  little  repression  is  desired  or  what 
the  nature  of  such  repression  should  be.  These 
points  should  be  taken  up  in  detail.  Of  course, 
the  practical  and  psychological  value  of  self-con- 
trol is  appreciated.  There  must  be  a  very  large 
amount  of  such  repression  each  day.  The  point 
is  that  in  such  repression  one  should  endeavor  to 
avoid  the  kind  that  leads  to  serious  mental  con- 
flict. 

Changing  culture.  When  it  is  realized  that 
there  is  slight  prospect  of  changing  the  hereditary 
traits  of  biological  man  to  fit  culture,  and  when 
[340] 


it  is  seen  that  it  is  not  the  happiest  solution  to 
bend  human  nature  far  within  a  lifetime,  in  making 
adjustments  to  culture,  we  naturally  turn  to  the 
attractive  idea  of  modifying  culture  to  fit  human 
nature.  This  theme  has  been  very  interestingly 
presented  by  Graham  Wallas  in  his  The  Great  So- 
ciety, He  there  discusses  the  unsatisfactoriness 
of  the  "balked"  instinct  and  suggests  a  way  out 
through  changes  in  the  social  environment.  Such 
a  possibility  will  occur  to  one  when  the  vast 
amount  of  cultural  change  that  is  taking  place  to- 
day is  observed  in  comparison  with  the  great  sta- 
bility of  biological  man.  It  is  the  stream  of  cul- 
ture that  is  undergoing  rapid  change  and  not  the 
biological  stock.  Therefore  why  attempt  to 
change  the  biological  stock  to  fit  culture?  Why 
not  direct  the  changes  that  are  occurring  in  culture 
to  fit  man,  and  so  reach  a  better  adjustment? 
The  fact  that  such  a  plan  will  be  welcomed  emo- 
tionally by  most  of  us  who  have  felt  the  annoy- 
ance of  unsatisfied  desires,  should  put  us  on  guard 
against  uncritically  putting  our  faith  in  such  a 
programme. 

While  it  is  true  that  the  changes  occurring  to- 
day are  preponderantly  In  the  culture  rather  than 
in  biological  man,  it  does  not  follow  that  these 
cultural  changes  are  controlled  and  purposively  di- 
rected by  man.  Despite  the  fact  that  man  ap- 
pears as  an  active  agent  in  these  changes,  cul- 

[341] 


tural  factors  such  as  social  forces  and  economic 
processes  play  quite  a  determining  part  in  these 
changes.  It  is  not  true  that  man  creates  culture 
freely  as  he  wills.  The  extent  to  which  man  is 
a  freely  determining  agent  in  directing  social  evo- 
lution is  one  of  the  fundamental  questions  in  so- 
ciology. This  question  is  very  similar  to  the  old 
philosophical  and  psychological  question  of  free- 
dom of  the  will.  It  is  also  at  the  root  of  the 
question  of  the  influence  of  the  great  man  in  his- 
tory. An  understanding  of  this  problem  of  free- 
dom and  power  of  the  will  and  of  social  deter- 
minism in  cultural  change  is  of  far-reaching  sig- 
nificance, extending  beyond  the  purpose  for  which 
we  are  now  considering  it.  But  we  must  not 
omit  some  important  observations  which  will 
throw  a  good  deal  of  light  on  it. 

Social  forces.  The  material  presented  in  the 
previous  sections  shows  that  culture  grows  be- 
cause of  purely  cultural  factors,  despite  the  fact 
that  this  growth  occurs  through  the  medium  of 
human  beings.  Thus  the  nature  of  the  inventions 
that  will  be  made  depends  in  large  part  upon  the 
existing  plane  of  culture,  and  there  is  a  relation- 
ship between  the  number  of  inventions  and  the 
amount  of  the  existing  material  culture  out  of 
which  to  make  the  inventions.  In  other  words, 
the  nature  of  the  growth  of  culture  depends  upon 
past  development  and  accumulations.  Cultural 
[342] 


growth  and  change  In  a  particular  locality  result 
from  adopting  elements  from  other  cultures  as 
a  result  of  contacts.  If  a  culture  is  isolated 
changes  take  place  very  slowly  indeed.  But  if 
lines  of  communication  are  opened  between  a 
hitherto  isolated  culture  and  various  other  differ- 
ent cultures,  changes  will  occur  because  of  cultural 
diffusion.  In  other  words,  by  taking  thought  or 
through  the  power  of  the  will,  man  in  isolated  cul- 
tures does  not  produce  the  changes  that  come 
through  cultural  processes  like  diffusion.  The 
growth  of  culture  within  a  particular  locality  is 
to  a  much  less  degree  due  to  inventions  within 
that  locality  than  to  diffusions  from  other  cul- 
tures. 

The  deterministic  nature  of  cultural  change. 
Also,  there  is  a  good  deal  of  evidence  to  indicate 
that  the  accumulation  or  growth  of  culture 
reaches  a  stage  where  certain  inventions  if  not 
inevitable  are  certainly  to  a  high  degree  proba- 
ble, given  a  certain  level  of  mental  ability.  The 
fact  that  an  invention  is  independently  made  in 
several  localities  suggests  such  a  cultural  prepara- 
tion. This  probability  of  an  invention  due  to  cul- 
tural preparations  is  more  noticeable  perhaps  in 
later  cultures  than  in  earlier  cultures.  In  earlier 
cultures  the  accidental  element  may  have  been 
more  frequent.  Observation  of  such  processes 
diminishes  somewhat  one's  faith  in  man's  ability 
[343] 


to  create  or  change  culture  howsoever  he  wills. 

The  unpredictable  social  effects  of  inventions. 
Furthermore,  it  should  be  remembered,  that  al- 
though man  may  invent  because  of  purpose  or  de- 
sires or  will,  the  cultural  effects  of  such  changes 
thus  started  are  far  more  than  can  be  seen  at 
the  time  of  the  invention.  The  consequences  of 
some  inventions  cannot  be  foreseen,  much  less 
controlled.  In  fact  a  good  many  inventions  in 
the  material  culture,  instead  of  being  purposively 
directed  for  control  of  culture,  rather  introduce 
a  good  many  new  problems  of  control.  This  is 
especially  true  of  certain  very  important  changes 
such  as  the  domestication  of  cattle,  the  use  of  the 
plow,  or  the  use  of  steam.  In  fact,  recently  so 
many  and  such  significant  changes  have  been  oc- 
curring In  the  material  culture,  that  man  appears 
hard  put  to  It  to  keep  up  with  the  changes, 
rather  than  appearing  in  the  supreme  role  of 
planning,  controlling  and  directing  them. 

The  great  man  and  social  change.  It  is  un- 
derstandable how  the  social  or  cultural  forces  as 
causes  of  changes  are  obscured  and  how  they  are 
seen  In  terms  of  man's  ability,  will,  and  purpose. 
In  the  first  place,  man  always  appears  as  an  active 
agent  In  any  social  change,  in  the  sense  that  none 
of  these  changes  could  take  place  without  man. 
The  invention,  however  inevitable.  Is  made  by  man 
and  social  movements  proceed  through  the  instru- 
[344] 


mentality  of  leaders.  Human  nature  with  its  in- 
terest in  personalities,  its  hero-worshipping  ten- 
dencies, its  appreciation  of  leadership,  is  more 
interested  in  giving  recognition  of  achievement 
to  a  human  being  than  to  some  abstract  concep- 
tion of  some  social  force.  Besides,  these  social 
forces  are  not  easily  seen  nor  their  nature  readily 
known.  James  J.  Hill  is  given  due  credit  for 
having  built  the  Great  Northern  and  the  North- 
ern Pacific  railroads.  But  if  James  J.  Hill  had 
never  lived  the  railroad  lines  would  have  been 
built  across  this  great  northwestern  area  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean.  The  fact  that  Hill  built  the  rail- 
roads meant  a  great  deal  to  a  particular  financial 
group;  and  the  particular  great  man  is  often  of 
utmost  significance  to  a  particular  social,  econo- 
mic or  political  group  in  the  competition  for  con- 
trol and  rewards.  Perhaps  the  great  man  is  a 
more  decisive  factor  in  political  groups,  in  setting 
national  boundary  lines,  in  war,  or  in  other  forms 
of  culture  such  as  art  or  religion,  than  in  material 
culture.  To  the  extent  that  social  forces  are 
causes  of  development  rather  than  leaders  and 
great  men,  to  that  extent  will  it  be  difficult  to 
modify  the  culture  of  the  future  for  the  purpose 
of  making  it  better  adapted  to  human  nature. 

Regarding  the  relative  influence  of  the  great 
man  and  of  social  forces,  which  it  is  difficult  to 
measure  and  in  the  absence  of  data  is  so  much  a 
[345]  ^ 


matter  of  interpretation,  there  is  always  a  strong 
subjective  element  In  one's  attitude.  Thus  men  of 
great  self-assertlveness,  of  potency,  of  great  hope 
and  faith,  active  In  effort  and  eager  for  achieve- 
ment, probably  have  a  strong  subjective  bias  In 
giving  recognition  to  men's  power  over  culture. 
Such  subjective  elements  are  sure  to  distort  the 
truth  until  the  facts  to  prove  the  case  one  way  or 
another  are  known.  There  has  been  enough  dis- 
cussion to  show  that  the  difficulties  of  controlling 
the  cultural  stream  or  directing  its  course  accord- 
ing to  our  will  are  very  easy  to  underestimate. 
In  fact.  If  the  analysis  be  true,  it  appears  like  a 
grandiose  dream  to  think  of  controlling  according 
to  the  will  of  man  the  course  of  social  evolution. 
Our  conclusions  indicate  Indeed  that  to  change 
man  to  fit  culture  or  to  change  culture  to  fit  man  is 
each  so  difficult  a  task  as  to  be  almost  Impossible. 


B! 

SUGGESTIONS  FOR  BETTER  ADJUSTMENTS 

While  It  does  seem  true  at  the  present  stage  of  de- 
velopment of  man  and  of  culture  that  it  is  futile 
to  think  of  man's  ability  freely  to  control  cultural 
changes  as  he  wills,  still  It  is  thinkable  that  a 
more  harmonious  adaptation  of  culture  to  man 

[346] 


may  be  made  without  any  such  deity-llke  power 
over  culture  as  a  whole.  In  other  words,  to  make 
a  more  desirable  adjustment,  It  Is  not  necessary  to 
"have  all  power  or  even  to  make  wholesale  changes 
In  culture.  Indeed  It  Is  conceivable  that  by  mak- 
ing certain  changes  In  culture,  relatively  minor 
compared  to  the  plan  of  directing  culture  as  a 
whole,  a  more  harmonious  adjustment  may  be 
attained.  For  Instance,  the  acuteness  of  the  lack 
of  adjustment  between  culture  and  human  nature 
Is  manifested  In  certain  spots  or  areas  like  neu- 
roses and  social  problems.  To  bring  about  bet- 
ter adjustment  the  attention  should  be  focused 
chiefly  on  the  particular  fields  where  the  malad- 
justment Is  most  serious.  The  achievement  of 
better  adaptation  even  In  such  problems  may  be 
very  difficult  to  make.  Yet  such  a  programme 
would  appear  to  be  much  more  practicable  than 
the  larger  plan  of  directing  the  course  of  civiliza- 
tion. In  the  growth  of  culture  there  are  probably 
limits  to  the  lack  of  harmony  with  human  nature, 
since  in  adopting  new  cultural  forms  human  de- 
sires play  some  part.  The  bringing  about  of  a 
more  harmonious  relationship,  then,  concerns  cer- 
tain special  fields  rather  than  culture  or  human 
nature  as  a  whole. 

This    Part    is   not   concerned   primarily   with 
amelioration.     There  are  readers  who  are  fired 
with  so  great  a  zeal  for  making  the  world  more 
[347] 


livable  that  plans  of  change  for  the  better  arc  to 
them  the  only  things  worth  while.  Such  an  atti- 
tude cannot  be  praised  too  highly.  These  Indi- 
viduals furnish  the  drive  that  results  in  making 
the  world  a  better  place  to  live  in.  Such  readers 
will  feel  the  inadequacy  of  the  space  given  to  con- 
structive plans  and  the  fragmentary  nature  of 
what  are  merely  suggestions  for  better  adjust- 
ment. In  answer  It  may  be  said  that  there  is  a 
value  to  preliminary  analysis,  which  characterizes 
the  present  and  the  preceding  chapters.  Plans 
may  be  worked  out  more  fully  after  certain  funda- 
mentals are  clear.  Furthermore,  there  are  a 
great  number  of  individuals  doing  most  excellent 
work  on  important  practical  programmes.  It  is 
because  there  is  so  much  constructive  work  done 
on  practical  programmes  that  the  following  sug- 
gestions are  made  less  extensive  and  with  less  re- 
gard for  emphasis  and  relative  Importance. 

Nervous  disorders.  In  so  far  as  psychoses  and 
neuroses  are  evidences  of  lack  of  adaptation,  at- 
tention should  be  concentrated  on  preventing  these 
functional  nervous  disorders.  A  very  Important 
group  of  psychopathologlsts  claim  that  neuroses 
have  a  sexual  origin  and  that  disturbances  of  a 
somewhat  sexual  nature  are  found  in  psychoses. 
If  the  sexual  theories  of  many  mental  and  nervous 
disorders  should  prove  true,  then  the  problem  of 
better   adaptation  would  concern  primarily  the 

C348] 


adjustment  In  regard  to  this  complex  sex  instinct. 
It  is  not  certain  now  just  how  this  could  be  done. 
It  might  concern  a  more  intelligent  expression  of 
parental  affection.  It  might  involve  a  wiser  sex- 
ual education,  particularly  in  very  early  life.  Or 
it  might  Involve  certain  changes  in  the  general  so- 
cial attitude  towards  sex.  Such  social  pro- 
grammes would  be  more  or  less  difficult  to  attain. 
In  some  cases  serious  mental  conflicts  are,  it 
seems,  impossible  to  prevent.  Some  form  of 
therapeutic  or  prophylactic  treatment  might  be 
devised  so  as  to  be  widely  accessible. 

Sublimation.  Some  attention  has  been  paid  to 
a  process  known  as  sublimation  as  a  happy  solu- 
tion of  the  sexual  situation.  There  is  a  good 
deal  of  lack  of  agreement  as  to  what  the  process 
is  and  some  psychologists  deny  that  there  is  such 
a  phenomenon.  Since  there  Is  so  little  agreement 
as  to  what  sublimation  is,  we  might  be  pardoned 
for  passing  it  by.  But  if  there  is  such  a  process 
its  importance  is  quite  great  and  some  comment  is 
desirable.  According  to  most  writers  on  sublima- 
tion the  energy  of  the  libido  can  be  drawn  into 
channels  other  than  customary  sexual  channels. 
Thus  the  libido  may  be  turned  to  social,  religious, 
artistic  or  scientific  aims.  One  would  therefore 
expect  better  adjustments  to  be  made  by  a  general 
development  of  social,  religious,  artistic  or  scien- 
tific aspects  of  culture.  There  is  some  evidence 
[349] 


to  indicate  that  if  this  sublimation  of  the  sex  in- 
stinct occurs  it  takes  place  chiefly  in  very  early 
life.  Much  sublimation  in  childhood,  while  it 
might  make  the  individual  more  religious  or  more 
artistic,  does  not  appear  to  be  a  guarantee  against 
mental  conflict.  And,  indeed,  there  are  limits  to 
the  extent  of  sublimation.  From  certain  ethical 
and  social  standards  a  high  degree  of  sublima- 
tion appears  to  be  desirable;  and  perhaps  it  may 
be  desirable  biologically  and  psychologically.  We 
know  very  little  about  how  sublimation  may  pur- 
posively  and  practically  be  brought  about. 

Strain.  It  is  probable  that  neuroses  and  func- 
tional psychoses  may  be  precipitated  in  adult  life 
as  a  result  of  general  strain,  despite  the  fact  that 
some  individuals  appear  to  stand  strain  remark- 
ably well.  But  it  is  borne  with  only  fair  success 
by  others.  In  any  case,  the  severity  with  which 
mental  strains  affect  individuals  indicates  a  lack 
of  adjustment.  We  may  therefore  consider  what 
can  be  done  to  lessen  the  tension  of  life  in  modern 
civilization.  The  overuse  of  some  instincts  and 
the  under-use  of  others  may  theoretically  produce 
a  very  uncomfortable  state  which  leads  to  great 
restlessness  and  nervousness.  Whether  such  a 
state  be  a  strain  or  whether  it  helps  to  precipi- 
tate a  neurosis,  it  is  frequently  not  a  very  satisfac- 
tory psychological  state  of  being  for  an  individual, 
particularly  when  persisting  over  a  long  time.  It 
[350] 


seems  to  be  true  that  the  division  of  labor  and  the 
social  differentiation  accompanying  modern  civi- 
lization do  lead  to  a  life  where  some  types  of  re- 
sponse to  stimuli  occur  very  frequently  and  monot- 
onously. The  specialization  of  modern  life 
means  for  some  an  extensive  use  of  only  a  part  of 
the  varied  and  wonderful  equipment  of  man. 
Just  how  serious  this  unequal  functioning  is  we 
do  not  know.  The  more  normal  adaptation 
would  appear  ideally  to  be  one  where  all  parts 
of  man's  equipment  would  function  perhaps  not 
exactly  as  It  did  In  the  days  of  the  cave  people, 
but  nevertheless  to  a  degree  which  would  corre- 
spond to  some  normal  biological  standard.  It 
may  not  be  possible  to  define  such  a  standard, 
and  the  human  system  may  show  a  high  degree  of 
variability  in  this  respect,  but  some  such  goal  Is 
desirable. 

Obstacles  to  the  use  of  our  psychological 
equipment.  Assuming  on  the  part  of  some 
groups  an  unsatisfactory  emotional  and  instinc- 
tive life,  how  can  more  normal  functioning  be 
attained?  Prominent  obstacles  are  long  hours  of 
labor,  specialization  of  labor  and  social  codes. 
There  are  also  other  obstacles.  Our  codes  of 
conduct  frequently  show  a  certain  rigidity  appar- 
ently not  suited  to  the  variation  due  to  change 
nor  to  the  variability  due  to  heterogeneity. 
There  seems  to  be  something  akin  to  survivals  in 

[351] 


our  codes.  Perhaps  well  suited  to  earlier  condi- 
tions, they  have  not  changed  to  meet  the  changed 
material  conditions.  Also,  no  doubt,  the  great 
development  of  science  reacts  on  our  morals. 
Codes  of  conduct  are  undergoing,  nevertheless, 
much  change.  However,  there  will  always  be  so- 
cial pressure  to  conform  in  conduct.  There  will 
always  be  a  code  of  morals,  resulting  in  repres- 
sion of  desires,  even  though  they  may  be  changed 
greatly  in  the  interest  of  better  adjustments. 

With  regard  to  specialization,  the  trend  ap- 
pears to  be  towards  more  rather  than  less  of  it. 
Specialization,  particularly  among  the  manual 
workers  in  modern  industry,  means  less  variety  in 
occupation  and  an  activity  during  working  hours 
somewhat  machine-like.  Specialization  plus  the 
long  working  day,  particularly  at  uninteresting 
tasks,  does  not  give  a  picture  of  well  balanced  ac- 
tivity. The  shortcomings  of  specialization  in  la- 
bor may  be  counterbalanced  by  fewer  hours  of 
labor.  The  movement  is  still  in  the  direction  of 
fewer  working  hours  per  day.  But  to  maintain 
production,  probably  for  some  time  to  come,  a 
fairly  large  number  of  hours  of  labor  per  day  will 
have  to  be  worked.  Under  either  socialism  or 
capitalism,  we  shall  have  specialization.  And  we 
shall  always  have  moral  codes.  So  no  doubt 
there  will  be  tendencies  to  an  unbalanced  use  of 
man's  original  equipment.     There  will  always  be 


repression  of  desires.  What  shall  be  done  in  the 
face  of  specialization,  social  pressure,  morality, 
ambition,  repression,  necessary  hours  of  labor,  and 
the  inherent  inevitability  of  conflicting  interests 
and  motives? 

Substitution.  The  idea  of  substitutive  activi- 
ties arises  as  a  solution.  It  is  suggested  from  the 
partial  use  of  man's  physical  equipment.  In- 
dividuals following  sedentary  occupations  do 
not  in  the  course  of  their  work  use  their  muscles 
as  fully  as  did  the  primitive  hunter.  To  meet 
such  a  situation  we  have  invented  the  gymnasium 
and  devised  various  athletic  activities.  What 
seems  to  be  needed  is  some  invention  that  will  do 
for  the  mechanisms  of  instinct  what  the  gymnas- 
ium does  for  the  muscles.  That  is,  certain  in- 
stinctive tendencies,  certain  desires,  certain  mecha- 
nisms of  psychological  reactions  that  do  not  find 
expression  in  the  daily  routine  of  life,  need  the 
use  of  substitutive  devices  that  would  provide  the 
desired  activity  and  yet  be  in  accord  with  moral 
and  social  conduct.  The  urgency  of  such  substi- 
tutions depends  upon  the  harmfulness  and  extent 
of  repression  and  upon  the  nature  of  instinct,  mat- 
ters previously  discussed.  But  that  such  substi- 
tutions are  desirable  is  unquestionable. 

Recreation.  While  there  is  no  such  single  in* 
stitution  as  a  gymnasium  for  the  functioning  of 
the  instincts,  nevertheless  it  is  thought  that  such 
[353] 


services  are  performed  by  certain  activities  which 
may  generally  be  grouped  under  the  term,  recrea- 
tion. We  shall  be  interested  in  inquiring  concern- 
ing recreation  as  an  institution  for  the  functioning 
of  emotional  and  instinctive  activities,  particularly 
those  not  active  during  the  daily  routine.  Such 
a  possibility  exists  because  of  the  fact  that  the 
same  emotion  or  instinctive  tendency  may  be  in- 
cited by  many  different  stimuli  and  there  are  many 
different  motor  outlets  possible  for  the  same  in- 
stinctive tendency.  Thus,  self-assertion  or  acquis- 
itiveness or  anger  may  be  aroused  by  many  dif- 
ferent stimuli  and  their  manifestations  may  be 
various.  In  recreation  a  special  set  of  stimuli  are 
formed  and  special  motor  outlets  are  created. 
Recreation,  as  the  term  is  here  used,  is  seen  as  a 
possible  substitute  for  certain  functlonings  of  hu- 
man nature  which  are  prohibited  through  the 
daily  tasks  of  many  occupations  or  through  the 
prohibitions  of  the  moral  code  or  for  other  rea- 
sons. May  not  some  substitute  outlet  for  many 
of  these  tendencies  be  provided  in  recreation? 
Modern  life  provides  a  great  many  stimuli  to  de- 
sires which  are  not  gratified.  Such  stimuli  are  the 
multitudinous  advertising  displays,  the  behavior 
of  others,  the  various  Incidents  that  appeal  to 
hope  and  ambition,  types  of  recreation,  and  plea- 
sures possibly  beyond  our  economic  means.  Some 
of  these  stimuli  are  popularly  called  temptations. 

[354] 


Modern  life  arouses  many  desires  and  longings 
that  are  not  satisfied.  Is  it  not  possible  that  re- 
creation may  furnish  an  outlet  for  some  of  these 
instinctive  tendencies? 

Psychological  aspects  of  recreation.  Obvi- 
ously emotions  and  specific  instinctive  drives  are 
found  in  recreations.  In  games,  for  instance,  are 
seen  fear,  anxiety,  anger,  the  desire  for  mastery, 
self-assertiveness,  leadership,  sociability.  It  is 
possible  indeed,  if  the  instincts  were  listed  and 
the  many  types  of  recreation  analyzed,  that  all 
the  instincts  would  be  found  operating  in  one  re- 
creation or  another.  It  is  therefore  quite  feas- 
ible to  provide  for  the  functioning  of  instincts. 
Thus  in  the  case  of  a  factory  "hand,"  recreation 
will  enable  certain  instincts  to  function  which  find 
little  opportunity  to  do  so  within  the  factory 
walls.  But  in  the  case  where  instincts  are 
aroused  in  the  course  of  daily  life  but  do  not  com- 
plete their  expression  it  is  not  quite  so  obvious  that 
recreation  will  provide  the  desired  outlets.  It  is 
a  question  of  the  time  element  between  stimulation 
and  expression.  Can  there  be  a  delay  between 
the  beginning  and  ending  of  an  act  of  instinctive 
behavior?  One's  tendency  to  self-assertion  may 
be  aroused  in  a  committee  meeting  and  not  find 
expression  there,  but,  our  point  is,  can  the  self- 
assertion  thus  aroused  find  expression  in  a  later 
meeting  of  the  committee,  or  in  a  game  of  tennis  ? 


That  the  aroused  state  may  hold  for  a  time  Is 
true,  as  previously  instanced,  but  perhaps  the 
more  immediate  the  completion  of  the  response 
the  more  satisfactory  it  is.  The  efficacy  of  de- 
layed substitution  will  vary  with  the  different  de- 
sires and  in  different  situations.  Much  more 
definite  information  can  be  known  by  a  study  of 
particular  situations.  Generally,  however,  the 
use  of  substitution  seems  to  be  rather  widely  ap- 
plicable. 

Much  substitution  may  occur  through  activities 
other  than  what  is  customarily  known  as  recrea- 
tion, as,  for  instance,  in  religion  or  in  the  pursuit 
of  hobbies.  Recreation  is,  though,  a  broad  and 
fertile  field  for  utilizing  such  substitutes. 

The  idea  of  substitution  is  thus  seen  to  be  a 
very  fruitful  one.  It  is  not  to  be  confused  with 
sublimation.  In  sublimation  an  internal  change 
of  a  more  or  less  permanent  character  is  supposed 
to  occur;  whereas  in  the  substitution  we  are  speak- 
ing of,  manipulation  is  largely  of  external  situa- 
tions with  no  fundamental  change  in  the  personal- 
ity. In  substitution,  the  instincts  as  they  exist  in 
an  individual  are  aroused,  or  their  functioning 
completed,  or  both,  by  substituting  stimuli  and 
outlets  in  the  place  of  others,  or  in  providing  them 
where   they  do  not  exist. 

The  primitive  nature  of  recreation.  Concern- 
ing recreation,  Patrick  in  his  Psychology  of  Re- 

[356] 


laxation  has  compared  the  recreation  of  modern 
man  to  the  serious  activities  of  our  primitive  an- 
cestors. This  comparison  is  quite  impressive,  for 
instance,  in  the  case  of  hunting,  fishing,  and  camp- 
ing. In  bull-fighting,  in  boxing  and  in  football 
the  resemblances  are  very  close.  Perhaps  he 
pushes  the  analogy  a  little  far  in  the  case  of  base- 
ball, where  he  says  that  there  are  three  sets  of 
motions  preeminent  in  baseball  that  were  of  sur- 
vival value  in  the  business  of  living  of  the  primi- 
tive hunter,  namely,  hitting,  throwing  and  running. 
This  conception  of  sports  conforms  to  the  theory 
that  we  are  cave  men  trying  to  live  in  an  artificial 
civilization.  Of  course,  in  so  far  as  modern 
sports  are  objectively  the  same  as  the  business 
activities  of  primitive  hunters,  presumably  some- 
what the  same  instincts  would  come  into  play. 
But  also  the  instincts  of  the  primitive  hunter  may 
function  in  activities  where  the  objective  resem- 
blance to  the  business  activities  of  primitive  hunt- 
ers is  very  slight.  In  interpreting  recreation  in 
this  light  one  should  remember  that  cultural  traits, 
as,  for  instance,  the  learned  traits  of 'a  primitive 
hunter,  are  not  inherited.  An  understanding  of 
this  theory  of  sports  is  dependent  upon  an  under- 
standing of  the  theory  that  we  are  cave  people 
living  in  an  artificial  culture. 

Stimulation  and  expression.     The  place   of 
recreation  in  the  problem  of  adjustment  under 
[357] 


consideration  is,  in  a  general  way,  clear.  Some 
more  detailed  observations  should  be  made,  how- 
ever, on  the  nature  of  recreation.  There  are 
really  two  different  kinds  of  recreation  in  regard 
to  the  functioning  of  the  instincts.  One  kind 
stimulates  the  Instincts  but  makes  poor  provision 
for  what  we  have  been  calling  their  outlet. 
Others  do  not  make  such  provision.  It  is  recalled 
that  there  are  several  distinct  parts  to  an  instinc- 
tive act.  There  is  the  perception  or  the  aware- 
ness of  the  stimuli;  the  feeling  or  the  emotion  is 
a  distinct  part;  and  there  is  motor  expression,  or 
outlet.  A  complete  Instinctive  act  has  these  three 
features.  In  certain  types  of  recreation,  there  is 
a  satisfactory  stimulation  of  the  feelings  but  ap- 
parently very  little  provision  for  any  motor  ex- 
pression; at  least,  the  drive  does  not  work  out 
through  much  bodily  activity.  Where  an  individ- 
ual participates  in  a  boxing  match  or  a  football 
game  or  In  various  athletic  contests,  such  Is  not 
the  case,  for  there  is  abundant  provision  for 
motor  outlet.  This  does  not  appear  on  the  sur- 
face to  be  so  true  of  a  recreation  such  as  attend- 
ing the  theatre,  except  as  there  Is  expression  In 
tears,  laughter,  or  applause.  The  theatre  Is  a 
wonderful  Invention  for  arousing  the  emotions. 
As  one  identifies  oneself  with  the  different  char- 
acters of  the  play,  one  feels  love,  hate,  ambition, 
rivalry,  fear,  passion,  etc.     We  do  not  know  very 

[358] 


much  about  the  motor  outlet  in  connection  with 
many  of  these  emotions;  it  is  conceivable  that 
there  may  be  outlets  or  expression  with  little  bod- 
ily activity.  Activity  may  occur  in  various  glands 
during  these  emotions  which  may  be  somewhat 
similar  to  the  frequently  referred-to  motor  out- 
let. Again,  some  muscular  activities,  like  shiver- 
ing though  not  massive  are  distinctly  motor  and 
fulfill  profound  needs.  We  are  not,  however,  in 
a  position  to  speak  positively  concerning  the  re- 
creations involving  little  movement.  There  are, 
of  course,  many  other  types  of  recreation  which 
are  similar  to  the  theatre  in  that  the  motor  out- 
let is  not  impressively  recognized. 

Observers  and  participants.  Recreations  may 
also  be  classified  according  to  whether  we  are 
observers  or  participants.  It  is  easier  to  believe 
that  the  instinctive  behavior  is  more  complete  in 
the  case  of  the  participant  than  of  the  observer. 
The  observer  at  a  game  is  in  the  same  position 
as  an  observer  at  the  theatre.  There  is  evidence 
of  emotion  but  not  very  much  evidence  of  the 
activity  that  is  supposed  to  follow  some  emotions. 
Our  information  is  meagre  concerning  the  motor 
aspect  of  instinctive  behavior;  but  there  is  clearly 
a  difference  between  the  arousing  of  a  desire  and 
its  gratification.  Some  types  of  recreation,  such 
as,  for  instance,  those  that  appeal  to  the  sex  in- 
stinct, apparently  arouse  the  instinct  but  do  not 
[359] 


provide  for  the  completion  of  the  act.  THe  ob- 
server, in  contrast  to  the  participant,  may  have 
his  emotions  aroused,  but  find  insufficient  outlet. 
An  inventory  of  the  recreations  further  reveals 
many  such  as  dancing,  card-playing,  gambling  and 
talking,  concerning  which  it  is  not  very  clear  what 
happens  psychologically  when  one  takes  part  in 
them. 

The  importance  of  recreation.  Human  be- 
havior does  not  consist  wholly  of  simple  unrelated 
tendencies  such  as  the  instincts.  There  exist  cer- 
tain desires  more  general,  complex,  and  flexible 
and  more  bound  up  with  the  conception  of  self  than 
the  stereotyped  tendencies  described  as  instinct  In 
studies  of  animal  behavior.  Instinctive  tenden- 
cies are  built  up  into  what  McDougall  calls  the 
sentiments.  In  man  memory  and  experience  play 
a  great  part  In  determining  the  nature  of  the  ope- 
ration of  our  drives.  The  mind,  the  soul  and  the 
spirit  are  other  terms  used  for  less  specific  ten- 
dencies. The  importance  of  recreation  will  pre- 
sumably be  greater,  the  greater  the  importance 
accorded  to  the  more  specific  tendencies.  Recrea- 
tion will  hardly  cure  a  troubled  soul,  nor  will  it 
cure  a  neurosis.  No  doubt  there  are  many  failures 
In  adjustment  to  culture  that  Involve  a  less  speci- 
fic tendency  than  what  we  think  of  as  simple  In- 
stinct, and  the  value  of  recreation  in  such  situa- 
tions Is  not  so  great.  The  Importance  of  recrea- 
[360] 


tion  in  the  problem  of  adjustment  also  depends 
upon  the  extent  to  which  modern  culture  * 'balks" 
the  instincts.  It  is  very  easy  to  overemphasize 
the  "balking"  of  the  Instincts,  for  the  reason  that 
there  are  so  many  different  cultural  stimuli  and 
cultural  outlets  for  Instinctive  desires. 

We  have  argued  that  recreation  is  a  device  of 
considerable  value  in  making  adaptation  between 
human  nature  and  culture.  It  is  claimed  that  the 
significance  of  recreation  for  social  theory  has  not 
been  sufficiently  appreciated;  nor  has  It  been  ac- 
corded the  place  it  deserves  in  sociological  lit- 
erature. 

We  regret  that  our  investigation  does  not  lead 
to  a  more  definite  formulation.  But  It  should  be 
remembered  that  human  motives  are  a  very 
tangled  web.  Their  mysteries  have  been  probed 
by  poets,  novelists,  psychologists  and  leaders. 
No  one  at  this  time  could  be  so  presumptuous  as 
to  expect  a  reduction  of  the  many  diverse  prob- 
lems of  human  nature  to  a  simple  formula.  Un- 
der any  form  or  organization  of  culture,  there 
will  be  problems  of  human  nature  as  long  as  we 
live  together  in  groups,  which  will  be  always. 
Still  it  is  thought  that  a  consideration  of  the  in- 
stincts, the  libido,  neuroses,  sex  problems,  substi- 
tution and  recreation  do  point  to  very  distinct  pos- 
sibilities of  a  better  adjustment  between  our  mod- 
ern culture  and  human  nature. 

[361] 


Cultural  change  involved  in  social  problems. 
As  to  the  evidence  of  lack  of  proper  adjustment 
between  culture  and  human  nature  as  seen  in  socio- 
logical problems  such  as  crime,  sex  problems  and 
unequal  distribution  of  wealth,  it  would  seem 
that  the  modification  of  the  particular  cultural 
features  concerned  would  in  general  be  more  prac- 
ticable than  further  attempts  to  change  the  origi- 
nal nature  of  man,  and  somewhat  better  results 
would  be  expected  from  such  a  procedure.  It  was 
observed  that  a  great  many  of  these  social  prob- 
lems flow  from  the  dominance  of  what  Is  called 
selfishness  and  the  lack  of  the  power  and  scope  of 
what  Is  known  as  altruism.  This  is  of  course  a 
profound  question  and  deserves  very  full  and  care- 
ful consideration  at  the  hands  of  sociologists. 
But  from  the  biological  consideration  of  human 
nature  we  have  been  discussing,  there  is  no  oc- 
casion to  depart  from  the  position  already  taken 
that  to  change  culture  to  make  the  better  adjust- 
ments is  somewhat  more  practicable  than  to 
change  human  nature.  There  are.  In  connection 
with  the  problem  of  selfishness  In  social  prob- 
blems,  a  great  many  opportunities  for  arranging 
cultural  situations,  not  necessarily  to  diminish  or 
repress  selfishness  and  increase  altruism,  but 
rather  to  keep  selfishness  In  bounds. 

Perhaps  we  should  discuss  plans  of  changing 
the  economic  order,  such  as  are  involved  in  such 

[362] 


extensive  programmes  as  socialism,  and  the  more 
specific  schemes  for  dealing  with  particular  prob- 
lems. Each  such  programme  must  be  studied  on 
its  own  merits.  Much  attention  has  indeed  been 
devoted  to  these  Issues.  There  are  no  doubt 
many  merits  in  socialism,  and  surely  we  can  imag- 
ine a  better  economic  order  which  would  be  ac- 
companied by  less  injustice;  but  even  assuming  a 
fundamental  change  in  the  economic  order  to  have 
occurred,  social  problems  would  not  have  disap- 
peared ;  there  would  still  be  Inequalities  In  the  rate 
of  cultural  change,  and  many  problems  involving 
human  nature  would  remain.  This  Is  not  the 
place  to  pass  rapid  judgment  on  so  fundamental  a 
programme  as  changing  the  economic  order. 

SUMMARY 

In  the  discussion  of  the  adjustment  of  human  nat- 
ure and  modern  culture  we  have  examined  first 
the  theory  that  we  are  cave  people  trying  to  live 
In  an  artificial  culture,  a  theory  that  Is  rather 
readily  suggested  from  the  contents  of  Part  11. 
This  theory  as  popularly  conceived  Is  partly  erron- 
eous and  misleading  for  several  reasons.  Fore- 
most among  these  reasons  Is  the  fact  that  the 
term,  cave  man,  is  a  deceptive  and  an  Inadequate 
description  of  the  original  nature  of  man.  Fur- 
thermore, while  our  modern  culture  is  recent  and 

[363] 


objectively  different  from  any  culture  that  has  pre- 
ceded, it  does  not  necessarily,  for  this  reason, 
cause  maladjustment.  Although  human  nature 
may  be  stable  over  a  great  number  of  generations, 
it  is  quite  adaptable  and  flexible  within  a  lifetime 
and  also  culture,  by  virtue  of  its  rapid  changes  in 
recent  years,  may  display  considerable  adapta- 
bihty. 

However,  there  Is  evidence  of  a  lack  of 
harmonious  adjustment  between  modern  culture 
and  human  nature,  as  seen  particularly  in  the 
extent  of  neuroses  and  functional  psychoses,  and 
in  certain  social  problems.  In  the  more  acute 
cases  of  maladjustment  the  more  probable  solu- 
tion of  the  difficulty  lies  not  in  attempts  to  change 
human  nature  but  rather  in  attempts  to  change 
culture;  for  the  reason  that  in  such  acute  in- 
stances further  efforts  at  changing  human  nature 
result  in  repression  of  instincts  which  is  followed 
by  objectionable  consequences  to  the  Individual 
and  aggravations  of  the  social  problems.  On  the 
other  hand  the  nature  of  cultural  growth  and 
change  shows  that  it  is  futile  to  plan  any  whole- 
sale and  powerful  control  of  the  course  of  social 
evolution.  Directing  the  change  of  culture  is 
much  more  difficult  than  is  customarily  conceived. 
It  is,  however,  not  necessary  to  change  culture  as 
a  whole,  for  relatively  minor  changes  may  result 
in    much    better    adjustments.     These    changes, 

[364] 


though  difficult,  may  be  looked  forward  to 
as  feasible,  if  not  now,  certainly  in  time.  They 
concern  influences  affecting  the  life  of  children  and 
parental  affection,  sex  education,  modification  of 
social  codes,  shorter  hours  of  labor,  recognition 
of  boundaries  to  selfishness,  specific  social  pro- 
grammes, and  finally  it  is  thought  that  possibilities 
of  better  adjustment  lie  in  the  wise  development 
of  substitutive  activities  such  as  recreation. 


[365]' 


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